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DOCUMENTS
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INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

DOCUMENTS 47

OF THE

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION

FOR

INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

1920



AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION
EDITORIAL OFFICE: 407 WEST 117TH STREET, NEW YORK CITY
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1921

It is the aim of the Association for International Conciliation to awaken interest and to seek cooperation in the movement to promote international good will. This movement depends for its ultimate success upon increased international understanding, appreciation, and sympathy. To this end, documents are printed and widely circulated, giving information as to the progress of the movement and as to matters connected therewith, in order that individual citizens, the newspaper press, and organizations of various kinds may have accurate information on these subjects readily available.

The Association endeavors to avoid, as far as possible, contentious questions, and in particular questions relating to the domestic policy of any given nation. Attention is to be fixed rather upon those underlying principles of international law, international conduct, and international organization, which must be agreed upon and enforced by all nations if peaceful civilization is to continue and to be advanced. A list of publications will be found at the end of this volume.

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INTERNATIONAL LABOR CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS



JANUARY, 1920

No. 146

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION
SUB-STATION 84 (407 WEST 117TH STREET)
NEW YORK CITY

I

THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR CONFERENCE

OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

DRAFT CONVENTION LIMITING THE HOURS OF WORK IN INDUSTRIAL UNDERTAKINGS TO EIGHT IN THE DAY AND FORTY- EIGHT IN THE WEEK¹

The General Conference of the International Labor Organization of the League of Nations,

Having been convened at Washington by the Government of the United States of America, on the 29th day of October, 1919, and

Having decided upon the adoption of certain proposals with regard to the "application of principle of the 8-hours day or the 48-hours week," which is the first item in the agenda for the Washington meeting of the Conference, and

Having determined that these proposals shall take the form of a draft international convention,
Adopts the following Draft Convention for ratification by the Members of the International Labor Organization, in accordance with the Labor Part of the Treaty of Versailles of 28 June, 1919, and of the Treaty of St. Germain of 10 September, 1919:

ARTICLE I

For the purpose of this Convention, the term "industrial undertaking" includes particularly:

(a) Mines, quarries, and other works for the extraction of minerals from the earth.

(b) Industries in which articles are manufactured, altered, cleaned, repaired, ornamented, finished, adapted for sale, broken

¹The official report of the Draft Conventions and Recommendations adopted by the International Labor Conference of the League of Nations, Washington, D.C., October 29 to November 29, 1919.

up or demolished, or in which materials are transformed; including shipbuilding and the generation, transformation, and transmission of electricity or motive power of any kind.

(c) Construction, reconstruction, maintenance, repair, alteration, or demolition of any building, railway, tramway, harbor, dock, pier, canal, inland waterway, road, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, sewer, drain, well, telegraphic or telephonic installation, electrical undertaking, gas work, water work or other work of construction, as well as the preparation for or laying the foundations of any such work or structure.

(d) Transport of passengers, or goods, by road, rail, sea or inland waterway, including the handling of goods at docks, quays, wharves or warehouses, but excluding transport by hand.

The provisions relative to transport by sea and on inland waterways shall be determined by a special conference dealing with employment at sea and on inland waterways.

The competent authority in each country shall define the line of division which separates industry from commerce and agriculture.

ARTICLE 2

The working hours of persons employed in any public or private industrial undertaking or in any branch thereof, other than an undertaking in which only members of the same family are employed, shall not exceed eight in the day and forty-eight in the week, with the exceptions hereinafter provided for.

(a) The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to persons holding positions of supervision or management, nor to persons employed in a confidential capacity.

(b) Where by law, custom, or agreement between employers' and workers' organizations, or, where no such organizations exist between employers' and workers' representatives, the hours of work on one or more days of the week are less than eight, the limit of eight hours may be exceeded on the remaining days of the week by the sanction of the competent public authority, or by agreement between such organizations or representatives; provided, however, that in no case under the provisions of this paragraph shall the daily limit of eight hours be exceeded by more than one hour.

(c) Where persons are employed in shifts it shall be permissible to employ persons in excess of eight hours in any one day and

forty-eight hours in any one week, if the average number of hours over a period of three weeks or less does not exceed eight per day and forty-eight per week.

ARTICLE 3

The limit of hours of work prescribed in Article 2 may be exceeded in case of accident, actual or threatened, or in case of urgent work to be done to machinery or plant, or in case of *force majeure*, but only so far as may be necessary to avoid serious interference with the ordinary working of the undertaking.

ARTICLE 4

The limit of hours of work prescribed in Article 2 may also be exceeded in those processes which are required by reason of the nature of the process to be carried on continuously by a succession of shifts, subject to the condition that the working hours shall not exceed fifty-six in the week on the average. Such regulation of the hours of work shall in no case affect any rest days which may be secured by the national law to the workers in such processes in compensation for the weekly rest day.

ARTICLE 5

In exceptional cases where it is recognized that the provisions of Article 2 can not be applied, but only in such cases, agreements between workers' and employers' organizations concerning the daily limit of work over a longer period of time, may be given the force of regulations, if the Government, to which these agreements shall be submitted, so decides. The average number of hours worked per week, over the number of weeks covered by any such agreement, shall not exceed forty-eight.

ARTICLE 6

Regulations made by public authority shall determine for industrial undertakings:

(a) The permanent exceptions that may be allowed in preparatory or complementary work which must necessarily be carried on outside the limits laid down for the general working of an establishment, or for certain classes of workers whose work is essentially intermittent.

(b) The temporary exceptions that may be allowed, so that establishments may deal with exceptional cases of pressure of work.

These regulations shall be made only after consultation with the organizations of employers and workers concerned, if any such organizations exist. These regulations shall fix the maximum of additional hours in each instance, and the rate of pay for overtime shall not be less than one and one-quarter times the regular rate.

ARTICLE 7

Each Government shall communicate to the International Labor Office:

(a) A list of the processes which are classed as being necessarily continuous in character under Article 4;

(b) Full information as to working of the agreements mentioned in Article 5; and

(c) Full information concerning the regulations made under Article 6 and their application.

The International Labor Office shall make an annual report thereon to the General Conference of the International Labor Organization.

ARTICLE 8

In order to facilitate the enforcement of the provisions of this Convention, every employer shall be required:

(a) To notify by means of the posting of notices in conspicuous places in the works or other suitable place, or by such other method as may be approved by the Government, the hours at which work begins and ends, and where work is carried on by shifts the hours at which each shift begins and ends. These hours shall be so fixed that the duration of the work shall not exceed the limits prescribed by this Convention, and when so notified they shall not be changed except with such notice and in such manner as may be approved by the Government.

(b) To notify in the same way such rest intervals accorded during the period of work as are not reckoned as part of the working hours.

(c) To keep a record in the form prescribed by law or regulation in each country of all additional hours worked in pursuance of Articles 3 and 6 of this Convention.

It shall be made an offense against the law to employ any person outside the hours fixed in accordance with paragraph (a), or during the intervals fixed in accordance with paragraph (b).

ARTICLE 9

In the application of this Convention to Japan the following modifications and conditions shall obtain:

(a) The term "industrial undertaking" includes particularly—

The undertakings enumerated in paragraph (a) of Article 1;

The undertakings enumerated in paragraph (b) of Article 1, provided there are at least ten workers employed;

The undertakings enumerated in paragraph (c) of Article 1, in so far as these undertakings shall be defined as "factories" by the competent authority;

The undertakings enumerated in paragraph (d) of Article 1, except transport of passengers or goods by road, handling of goods at docks, quays, wharves, and warehouses, and transport by hand; and

Regardless of the number of persons employed, such of the undertakings enumerated in paragraphs (b) and (c) of Article 1 as may be declared by the competent authority either to be highly dangerous or to involve unhealthy processes.

(b) The actual working hours of persons of fifteen years of age or over in any public or private industrial undertaking, or in any branch thereof, shall not exceed fifty-seven in the week, except that in the raw-silk industry the limit may be sixty hours in the week.

(c) The actual working hours of persons under fifteen years of age in any public or private industrial undertaking, or in any branch thereof, and of all miners of whatever age engaged in underground work in the mines, shall in no case exceed forty-eight in the week.

(d) The limit of hours of work may be modified under the conditions provided for in Articles 2, 3, 4, and 5 of this Convention, but in no case shall the length of such modification bear to the length of the basic week a proportion greater than that which obtains in those Articles.

(e) A weekly rest period of twenty-four consecutive hours shall be allowed to all classes of workers.

(f) The provision in Japanese factory legislation limiting its application to places employing fifteen or more persons shall be amended so that legislation shall apply to places employing ten or more persons.

(g) The provisions of the above paragraphs of this Article shall be brought into operation not later than 1 July, 1922, except that the provisions of Article 4 as modified by paragraph (d) of this Article shall be brought into operation not later than 1 July, 1923.

(h) The age of fifteen prescribed in paragraph (c) of this Article shall be raised, not later than 1 July, 1925, to sixteen.

ARTICLE 10

In British India the principle of a sixty-hour week shall be adopted for all workers in the industries at present covered by the factory acts administered by the Government of India, in mines, and in such branches of railway work as shall be specified for this purpose by the competent authority. Any modification of this limitation made by the competent authority shall be subject to the provisions of Article 6 and 7 of this Convention. In other respects the provisions of this Convention shall not apply to India, but further provisions limiting the hours of work in India shall be considered at a future meeting of the General Conference.

ARTICLE 11

The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to China, Persia, and Siam, but provisions limiting the hours of work in these countries shall be considered at a future meeting of the General Conference.

ARTICLE 12

In the application of this Convention to Greece, the date at which its provisions shall be brought into operation in accordance with Article 19 may be extended to not later than 1 July, 1923, in the case of the following industrial undertakings:

1. Carbon-bisulphide works,
2. Acid works,
3. Tanneries,
4. Paper mills,
5. Printing works,
6. Sawmills,

7. Warehouses for the handling and preparation of tobacco,
8. Surface mining,
9. Foundries,
10. Lime works,
11. Dye works,
12. Glassworks (blowers),
13. Gas works (firemen),
14. Loading and unloading merchandise,

and to not later than 1 July, 1924, in the case of the following industrial undertakings:

1. Mechanical industries: Machine shop for engines, safes, scales, beds, tacks, shells (sporting), iron foundries, bronze foundries, tin shops, plating shops, manufactories of hydraulic apparatus;

2. Constructional industries: Lime-kilns, cement works, plasterers' shops, tile yards, manufactories of bricks and pavements, potteries, marble yards, excavating and building work;

3. Textile industries: Spinning and weaving mills of all kinds, except dye works;

4. Food industries: Flour and grist-mills, bakeries, macaroni factories, manufactories of wines, alcohol, and drinks, oil works, breweries, manufactories of ice and carbonated drinks, manufactories of confectioners' products and chocolate, manufactories of sausages and preserves, slaughterhouses, and butcher shops;

5. Chemical industries: Manufactories of synthetic colors, glassworks (except the blowers), manufactories of essence of turpentine and tartar, manufactories of oxygen and pharmaceutical products, manufactories of flaxseed oil, manufactories of glycerine, manufactories of calcium carbide, gas works (except the firemen);

6. Leather industries: Shoe factories, manufactories of leather goods;

7. Paper and printing industries: Manufactories of envelopes, record books, boxes, bags, bookbinding, lithographing, and zinc-engraving shops;

8. Clothing industries: Clothing shops, underwear and trimmings, workshops for pressing, workshops for bed coverings, artificial flowers, feathers, and trimmings, hat and umbrella factories;

9. Woodworking industries: Joiners' shops, coopers' sheds, wagon factories, manufactories of furniture and chairs, picture-framing establishments, brush and broom factories;

ARTICLE 6

The provision of Article 2 shall not apply to India, but in India children under twelve years of age shall not be employed.

(a) In manufactories working with power and employing more than ten persons;

(b) In mines, quarries, and other works for the extraction of minerals from the earth;

(c) In the transport of passengers or goods, or mails, by rail, or in the handling of goods at docks, quays, and wharves, but excluding transport by hand.

ARTICLE 7

The formal ratifications of this Convention, under the conditions set forth in Part XIII of the Treaty of Versailles of 28 June 1919, and of the Treaty of St. Germain of 10 September, 1919, shall be communicated to the Secretary General of the League of Nations for registration.

ARTICLE 8

Each Member which ratifies this Convention engages to apply it to its colonies, protectorates, and possessions which are not fully self-governing;

(a) Except where owing to the local conditions its provisions are inapplicable; or

(b) Subject to such modifications as may be necessary to adapt its provisions to local conditions.

Each Member shall notify to the International Labor Office the action taken in respect to each of its colonies, protectorates, and possessions which are not fully self-governing.

ARTICLE 9

As soon as the ratifications of two Members of the International Labor Organization have been registered with the Secretariat, the Secretary General of the League of Nations shall so notify all the members of the International Labor Organization.

ARTICLE 10

This Convention shall come into force at the date on which such notification is issued by the Secretary General of the League of Nations, but it shall then be binding only upon those Members

ARTICLE 11

This Convention shall come into force at the date on which such notification is issued by the Secretary General of the League of Nations, but it shall then be binding only upon those Members which have registered their ratifications with the Secretariat. Thereafter this Convention will come into force for any other Member at the date on which its ratification is registered with the Secretariat.

ARTICLE 12

Each Member which ratifies this Convention agrees to bring its provisions into operation not later than 1 July, 1922, and to take such action as may be necessary to make these provisions effective.

ARTICLE 13

A Member which has ratified this Convention may denounce it after the expiration of ten years from the date on which the Convention first comes into force, by an act communicated to the Secretary General of the League of Nations for registration. Such denunciation shall not take effect until one year after the date on which it is registered with the Secretariat.

ARTICLE 14

At least once in ten years, the Governing Body of the International Labor Office shall present to the General Conference a report on the working of this Convention, and shall consider the desirability of placing on the agenda of the Conference the question of its revision or modification.

ARTICLE 15

The French and English texts of this Convention shall both be authentic.

**INTERNATIONAL LABOR CONFERENCE
OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS**

**RECOMMENDATION CONCERNING THE PREVENTION
OF ANTHRAX**

The General Conference of the International Labor Organization of the League of Nations,

Having been convened at Washington by the Government of the United States of America on the 29th day of October, 1919, and

Having decided upon the adoption of certain proposals with regard to "women's employment: unhealthy processes," which is part of the third item in the agenda for the Washington meeting of the Conference; and

Having determined that these proposals shall take the form of a recommendation,

Adopts the following Recommendation, to be submitted to the Members of the International Labor Organization for consideration with a view to effect being given to it by national legislation or otherwise, in accordance with the Labor Part of the Treaty of Versailles of 28 June, 1919, and the Treaty of St. Germain of 10 September, 1919.

The General Conference recommends to the Members of the International Labor Organization that arrangements should be made for the disinfection of wool infected with anthrax spores, either in the country exporting such wool or, if that is not practicable, at the port of entry in the country importing such wool.

INTERNATIONAL LABOR CONFERENCE

OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

RECOMMENDATION CONCERNING THE PROTECTION OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN AGAINST LEAD POISONING

The General Conference of the International Labor Organization of the League of Nations,

Having been convened at Washington by the Government of the United States of America on the 29th day of October, 1919, and

Having decided upon the adoption of certain proposals with regard to "women's and children's employment: unhealthy processes," which is part of the third and fourth items in the agenda for the Washington meeting of the Conference, and

Having determined that these proposals shall take the form of a recommendation,

Adopts the following Recommendation, to be submitted to the Members of the International Labor Organization for consideration with a view to effect being given to it by national legislation or otherwise, in accordance with the Labor Part of the Treaty of Versailles of 28 June, 1919, and of the Treaty of St. Germain of 10 September, 1919.

The General Conference recommends to the Members of the International Labor Organization that in view of the danger involved to the function of maternity and to the physical development of children, women and young persons under the age of eighteen years be excluded from employment in the following processes:

- (a) In furnace work in the reduction of zinc or lead ores.
- (b) In the manipulation, treatment, or reduction of ashes containing lead, and in the desilverizing of lead.
- (c) In melting lead or old zinc on a large scale.
- (d) In the manufacture of solder or alloys containing more than ten per cent. of lead.

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(e) In the manufacture of litharge, massicot, red lead, white lead, orange lead, or sulphate, chromate or silicate (frit) of lead.

(f) In mixing and pasting in the manufacture or repair of electric accumulators.

(g) In the cleaning of workrooms where the above processes are carried on.

It is further recommended that the employment of women and young persons under the age of eighteen years in processes involving the use of lead compounds be permitted only subject to the following conditions:

(a) Locally applied exhaust ventilation, so as to remove dust and fumes at the point of origin.

(b) Cleanliness of tools and workrooms.

(c) Notification to Government authorities of all cases of lead poisoning, and compensation therefor.

(d) Periodic medical examination of the persons employed in such processes.

(e) Provision of sufficient and suitable cloak-room, washing, and mess-room accommodation, and of special protective clothing.

(f) Prohibition of bringing food or drink into workrooms.

It is further recommended that in industries where soluble lead compounds can be replaced by non-toxic substances, the use of soluble lead compounds should be strictly regulated.

For the purpose of this Recommendation, a lead compound should be considered as soluble if it contains more than five per cent. of its weight (estimated as metallic lead) soluble in a quarter of one per cent. solution of hydrochloric acid.

INTERNATIONAL LABOR CONFERENCE

OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

RECOMMENDATION CONCERNING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF GOVERNMENT HEALTH SERVICES

The General Conference of the International Labor Organization of the League of Nations,

Having been convened at Washington by the Government of the United States of America on the 29th day of October, 1919, and

Having decided upon the adoption of certain proposals with regard to "women's employment: unhealthy processes", which is part of the third item in the agenda for the Washington meeting of the Conference, and

Having determined that these proposals shall take the form of a recommendation,

Adopts the following Recommendation, to be submitted to the Members of the International Labor Organization for consideration with a view to effect being given to it by national legislation or otherwise, in accordance with the Labor Part of the Treaty of Versailles of 28 June, 1919, and the Treaty of St. Germain of 10 September, 1919.

The General Conference recommends that each Member of the International Labor Organization which has not already done so should establish as soon as possible, not only a system of efficient factory inspection, but also in addition thereto a Government service especially charged with the duty of safeguarding the health of the workers, which will keep in touch with the International Labor Office.

INTERNATIONAL LABOR CONFERENCE OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

DRAFT CONVENTION CONCERNING EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN DURING THE NIGHT

The General Conference of the International Labor Organization of the League of Nations,

Having been convened at Washington by the Government of the United States of America, on the 29th day of October, 1919, and

Having decided upon the adoption of certain proposals with regard to "women's employment: during the night," which is part of the third item in the agenda for the Washington meeting of the Conference, and

Having determined that these proposals shall take the form of a draft international convention,

Adopts the following Draft Convention for ratification by the Members of the International Labor Organization, in accordance with the Labor Part of the Treaty of Versailles of 28 June, 1919, and of the Treaty of St. Germain of 10 September, 1919:

ARTICLE I

For the purpose of this Convention, the term "industrial undertaking" includes particularly:

(a) Mines, quarries, and other works for the extraction of minerals from the earth.

(b) Industries in which articles are manufactured, altered, cleaned, repaired, ornamented, finished, adapted for sale, broken up or demolished, or in which materials are transformed; including shipbuilding, and the generation, transformation, and transmission of electricity or motive power of any kind.

(c) Construction, reconstruction, maintenance, repair, alteration, or demolition of any building, railway, tramway, harbor, dock, pier, canal, inland waterway, road, tunnel, bridge, viaduct,

undertaking, gas work, water work, or other work of construction as well as the preparation for or laying the foundations of any such work or structure.

(d) Transport of passengers or goods by road or rail, including the handling of goods at docks, quays, wharves, and warehouses, but excluding transport by hand.

The competent authority in each country shall define the line of division which separates industry from commerce and agriculture.

ARTICLE 2

Young persons under eighteen years of age shall not be employed during the night in any public or private industrial undertaking, or in any branch thereof, other than an undertaking in which only members of the same family are employed, except as hereinafter provided for.

Young persons over the age of sixteen may be employed during the night in the following industrial undertakings on work which by reason of the nature of the process, is required to be carried on continuously day and night:

(a) Manufacture of iron and steel; processes in which reverberatory or regenerative furnaces are used, and galvanizing of sheet metal or wire (except the pickling process).

(b) Glass works.

(c) Manufacture of paper.

(d) Manufacture of raw sugar.

(e) Gold mining reduction work.

ARTICLE 3

For the purpose of this Convention, the term "night" signifies a period of at least eleven consecutive hours, including the interval between ten o'clock in the evening and five o'clock in the morning.

In coal and lignite mines work may be carried on in the interval between ten o'clock in the evening and five o'clock in the morning, if an interval of ordinarily fifteen hours, and in no case of less than thirteen hours, separates two periods of work.

Where night work in the baking industry is prohibited for all workers, the interval between nine o'clock in the evening and four o'clock in the morning may be substituted in the baking

industry for the interval between ten o'clock in the evening and five o'clock in the morning.

In those tropical countries in which work is suspended during the middle of the day, the night period may be shorter than eleven hours if compensatory rest is accorded during the day.

ARTICLE 4

The provisions of Articles 2 and 3 shall not apply to the night work of young persons between the ages of sixteen and eighteen years in cases of emergencies which could not have been controlled or foreseen, which are not of a periodical character, and which interfere with the normal working of the industrial undertaking.

ARTICLE 5

In the application of this Convention to Japan, until 1 July, 1925, Article 2 shall apply only to young persons under fifteen years of age and thereafter it shall apply only to young persons under sixteen years of age.

ARTICLE 6

In the application of this Convention to India, the term "industrial undertakings" shall include only "factories" as defined in the Indian Factory Act, and Article 2 shall not apply to male young persons over fourteen years of age.

ARTICLE 7

The prohibition of night work may be suspended by the Government, for young persons between the ages of sixteen and eighteen years, when in case of serious emergency the public interest demands it.

ARTICLE 8

The formal ratifications of this Convention, under the conditions set forth in Part XIII of the Treaty of Versailles of 28 June 1919, and of the Treaty of St. Germain of 10 September, 1919, shall be communicated to the Secretary General of the League of Nations for registration.

ARTICLE 9

Each Member which ratifies this Convention engages to apply it to its colonies, protectorates and possessions which are not fully self-governing:

(a) Except where owing to the local conditions its provisions are inapplicable; or

(b) Subject to such modifications as may be necessary to adapt its provisions to local conditions.

Each Member shall notify to the International Labor Office the action taken in respect of each of its colonies, protectorates and possessions which are not fully self-governing.

ARTICLE 10

As soon as the ratification of two Members of the International Labor Organization have been registered with the Secretariat the Secretary General of the League of Nations shall so notify all the Members of the International Labor Organization.

ARTICLE 11

The Convention shall come into force at the date on which such notification is issued by the Secretary General of the League of Nations, and it shall then be binding only upon those Members which have registered their ratifications with the Secretariat. Thereafter this Convention will come into force for any other Member at the date on which its ratification is registered with the Secretariat.

ARTICLE 12

Each Member which ratifies this Convention agrees to bring its provisions into operation not later than 1 July, 1922, and to take such action as may be necessary to make these provisions effective.

ARTICLE 13

A Member which has ratified this Convention may denounce it after the expiration of ten years from the date on which the Convention first comes into force, by an act communicated to the Secretary General of the League of Nations for registration. Such denunciation shall not take effect until one year after the date on which it is registered with the Secretariat.

ARTICLE 14

At least once in ten years the Governing Body of the International Labor Office shall present to the General Conference a report on the working of this Convention, and shall consider the desirability of placing on the agenda of the Conference the question of its revision or modification.

ARTICLE 15

The French and English texts of this Convention shall both be authentic.

INTERNATIONAL LABOR CONFERENCE OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

RECOMMENDATION CONCERNING THE APPLICATION OF THE BERNE CONVENTION OF 1906, ON THE PRO- HIBITION OF THE USE OF WHITE PHOSPHOROUS IN THE MANUFACTURE OF MATCHES

The General Conference of the International Labor Organization of the League of Nations,

Having been convened at Washington by the Government of the United States of America on the 29th day of October, 1919, and

Having decided upon the adoption of certain proposals with regard to the "extension and application of the International Convention adopted at Berne in 1906 on the prohibition of the use of white phosphorus in the manufacture of matches," which is part of the fifth item of the agenda for the Washington meeting of the Conference, and

Having determined that these proposals shall take the form of a recommendation,

Adopts the following Recommendation, to be submitted to the Members of the International Labor Organization for consideration with a view to effect being given to it by national legislation or otherwise, in accordance with the Labor Part of the Treaty of Versailles of 28 June, 1919, and the Treaty of St. Germain of 10 September, 1919:

The General Conference recommends that each Member of the International Labor Organization which has not already done so, should adhere to the International Convention adopted at Berne in 1906 on the prohibition of the use of white phosphorus in the manufacture of matches. [See page 46.]

II

INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION RESPECTING THE PROHIBITION OF NIGHT WORK FOR WOMEN IN INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYMENT, CONCLUDED AT BERNE IN 1906¹

ARTICLE I

Night work in industrial employment shall be prohibited for all women without distinction of age, with the exceptions hereinafter provided for.

The present Convention applies to all industrial undertakings in which more than ten men or women are employed: it does not in any case apply to undertakings in which only the members of the family are employed.

It is incumbent upon each contracting State to define the term "industrial undertakings." The definition shall in every case include mines and quarries, and also industries in which articles are manufactured and materials transformed: as regards the latter the laws of each individual country shall define the line of division which separates industry from agriculture and commerce.

ARTICLE 2

The night rest provided for in the preceding article shall be a period of at least eleven consecutive hours; within these eleven hours shall be comprised the interval between ten in the evening and five in the morning.

In those States, however, where the night work of adult women employed in industrial occupations is not as yet regulated, the period of uninterrupted rest may provisionally, and for a maximum period of three years, be limited to ten hours.

¹From the *Report on the Employment of Women and Children and the Berne Conventions of 1906*. Prepared by the organising Committee for the International Labor Conference, Washington, 1919.

ARTICLE 3

The prohibition of night work may be suspended:

1. In cases of *force majeure*, when in any undertaking there occurs an interruption of work which it was impossible to foresee, and which is not of a recurring character.
2. In cases where the work has to do with raw materials or materials in course of treatment which are subject to rapid deterioration, when such night work is necessary to preserve the said materials from certain loss.

ARTICLE 4

In those industries which are influenced by the seasons, and in all undertakings in the case of exceptional circumstances demand it, the period of the uninterrupted night rest may be reduced to ten hours on sixty days of the year.

ARTICLE 5

It is incumbent upon each of the contracting States to take the administrative measures necessary to ensure the strict execution of the terms of the present Convention within their respective territories.

Each Government shall communicate to the others through the diplomatic channel the laws and regulations which exist or shall hereafter come into force in their country with regard to the subject matter of the present Convention as well as the periodical reports on the manner in which the said laws and regulations are applied.

ARTICLE 6

The present Convention shall only apply to a colony, possession, or protectorate when a notice to this effect shall have been given on its behalf by the Government of the mother country, to the Swiss Federal Council.

Such government, when notifying the adhesion of a colony, possession, or protectorate, shall have the power to declare that the Convention shall not apply to such categories of native labor as it would be impossible to supervise.

ARTICLE 7

In extra-European States, as well as in colonies, possessions, or protectorates, when the climate or the condition of the native

population shall require it, the period of the uninterrupted night rest may be shorter than the minima laid down in the present Convention provided that compensatory rests are accorded during the day.

ARTICLE 8

The present Convention shall be ratified and the ratifications deposited with the Swiss Federal Council by the 31st December, 1908, at the latest.

A record of this deposit shall be drawn up of which one certified copy shall be transmitted to each of the contracting States through the diplomatic channel.

The present Convention shall come into force two years after the date on which the record of deposit is closed.

The time limit for the coming into operation of the present Convention is extended from two to ten years in the case of

1. Manufactories of raw sugar from beet.
2. Wool combing and weaving.
3. Open mining operations, when climatic conditions stop operations for at least four months every year.

ARTICLE 9

The States non-signatories to the present Convention shall be allowed to declare their adhesion to it by an act addressed to the Swiss Federal Council, who will bring it to the notice of each of the other contracting States.

ARTICLE 10

The time limits laid down in Article 8 for the coming into force of the present Convention shall be calculated in the case of non-signatory States as well as of colonies, possessions or protectorates, from the date of their adhesion.

ARTICLE 11

It shall not be possible for the signatory States, or the States, colonies, possessions, or protectorates who may subsequently adhere, to denounce the present Convention before the expiration of twelve years from the date on which the record of the deposit of ratifications is closed.

Thenceforward the Convention may be denounced from year to year.

The denunciation will only take effect after the lapse of one year from the time when written notice has been given to the Swiss Federal Council by the Government concerned, or, in the case of a colony, possession, or protectorate, by the Government of the mother country. The Federal Council shall communicate the denunciation immediately to the Governments of each of the other contracting States.

The denunciation shall only be operative as regards the State, colony, possession, or protectorate on whose behalf it has been notified.

In witness whereof the plenipotentiaries have signed the present Convention.

Done at Berne this 26th day of September, 1906, in a single copy, which shall be kept in the archives of the Swiss Confederation, and one copy of which, duly certified, shall be delivered to each of the contracting States through the diplomatic channel.

NIGHT WORK OF WOMEN

States which have adhered to the International Convention of 1906.

AUSTRIA	FRANCE
	Algeria
BELGIUM	Tunis
BRITISH EMPIRE	GERMANY
Great Britain	
New Zealand	ITALY
Ceylon	
Fiji Islands	NETHERLANDS
Gibraltar	
Gold Coast	PORTUGAL
Leeward Islands	
Northern Nigeria	SPAIN
Trinidad	
Uganda Protectorate	SWEDEN

SWITZERLAND

CZECHO-SLOVAKIA, by Act of 28 October, 1918, recognized the validity of the Austrian law.

III

INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE SUBJECT OF THE
PROHIBITION OF THE USE OF WHITE (YELLOW)
PHOSPHORUS IN THE MANUFACTURE OF MATCHES,
CONCLUDED AT BERNE IN 1906¹

ARTICLE 1

The High Contracting Parties bind themselves to prohibit in their respective territories the manufacture, importation and sale of matches which contain white (yellow) phosphorus.

ARTICLE 2

It is incumbent upon each of the contracting States to take the administrative measures necessary to ensure the strict execution of the terms of the present Convention within their respective territories.

Each Government shall communicate to the others through the diplomatic channel the laws and regulations which exist or shall hereafter come into force in their country with regard to the subject matter of the present Convention, as well as the reports on the manner in which the said laws and regulations are applied.

ARTICLE 3

The present Convention shall only apply to a colony, possession or protectorate when a notice to this effect shall have been given on its behalf by the Government of the mother country to the Swiss Federal Council.

ARTICLE 4

The present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications deposited with the Swiss Federal Council by the 31st December, 1908, at the latest.

¹From the *Report on the Employment of Women and Children and the Berne Conventions of 1906*. Prepared by the organizing Committee for the International Labor Conference, Washington, 1919.

A record of the deposit shall be drawn up, of which one certified copy shall be transmitted to each of the contracting States through the diplomatic channel.

The present Convention shall come into force three years after the date on which the record of the deposit is closed.

ARTICLE 5

The States non-signatories to the present Convention shall be allowed to declare their adhesion by an act addressed to the Swiss Federal Council, who will bring it to the notice of each of the other contracting States.

The time limit laid down in Article 4 for the coming into force of the present Convention is extended in the case of the non-signatory States, as well as of their colonies, possessions, or protectorates, to five years, counting from the date of the notification of their adhesion.

ARTICLE 6

It shall not be possible for the signatory States, or the States, colonies, possessions or protectorates who may subsequently adhere, to denounce the present Convention before the expiration of five years from the date on which the record of the deposit of ratifications is closed.

Thenceforward the Convention may be denounced from year to year.

The denunciation will only take effect after the lapse of one year from the time when written notice has been given to the Swiss Federal Council by the Government concerned, or, in the case of a colony, possession, or protectorate, by the Government of the mother country; the Federal Council shall communicate the denunciation immediately to the Governments of each of the other contracting States.

The denunciation shall only be operative as regards the State, colony, possession, or protectorate on whose behalf it has been notified.

In witness whereof the plenipotentiaries have signed the present Convention.

Done at Berne this 26th day of September, 1906, in a single copy which shall be kept in the archives of the Swiss Federation, and one copy of which duly certified shall be delivered to each of the contracting Powers through the diplomatic channel.

States which have adhered to the International Convention of 1906.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Great Britain
Canada
India
New Zealand
Union of South Africa
Cyprus
East Africa Protectorate
Gibraltar
Malta
Mauritius
Seychelles
Southern Nigeria
Uganda Protectorate
Northern Nigeria
Leeward Islands
Virgin Islands
St. Christopher and Nevis
Montserrat
Dominica
Antigua
Fiji Islands
Gambia
Gold Coast
Sierre Leone
Bermuda
Southern Rhodesia

***DENMARK**

(Including Faroe Islands and Danish Antilles)

***FRANCE**

Somali Coast
Reunion
Madagascar and Dependencies
French West Africa
French Settlements in Oceania
New Caledonia
Tunis

***GERMANY**

ITALY

***NETHERLANDS**

Dutch Indies

NORWAY

SPAIN

***SWITZERLAND**

CZECHO-SLOVAKIA, by Act of 28 October, 1918, recognized the validity of the Austrian law.

***These States were the original signatories and were bound by Article 4 to ratify the convention by December 31, 1908. The convention came into force three years later.**

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SOME BOLSHEVIST PORTRAITS



FEBRUARY, 1920

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AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION
SUB-STATION 84 (407 WEST 117TH STREET)
NEW YORK CITY

SOME BOLSHEVIST PORTRAITS¹

[Many inquiries have been received regarding the personal history and characteristics of those persons who have become most prominent in the Bolshevik régime in Russia. The following sketches were prepared for the London *Times* by a correspondent of that journal, especially well informed as to Russian affairs. These have been submitted to a leading American authority on Russia and are pronounced by him to be adequate and accurate. —*The Editors.*]

I. LENIN

Of articles on Bolshevism there is now no end, but in the labyrinth of conflicting rumors and reports with which he is confronted the impartial reader frequently finds it hard to pick his way. Difficult as it is for him to conjure up before his eyes even the vaguest picture of Bolshevism as a political philosophy, he is completely nonplussed when he attempts to form an estimate of the character and personality of the man who is its creator and its chief exponent.

The truth of the matter is that Lenin is by no means an easy man to know. For years he has enveloped himself in a veil of mystery—a policy dictated as much by personal inclination as by political motives, and outside his own small circle of disciples and admirers there are not only very few Russians who may be said to know him intimately, but even comparatively few who have ever seen him. If, therefore, he appears to the average Englishman as a red-shirted, high-booted pirate chief, the fault is chiefly of his own making. His all-absorbing passion is the gospel of world revolution.

Born at Simbirsk on April 10, 1870, Vladimir Ilitch Uliannoff, *alias* "Lenin," "Ilitch," "Ilin," "Tylin," is a hereditary noble, and the son of a State Councillor. His mother had a small estate in the Kazan Government, and after her hus-

¹Reprinted from the London *Times*, March 25, 26, 29, and April 7, 1919.

band's death was in receipt of a state pension. Lenin's two sisters and his brother Dmitri were at one time all under police supervision, while his brother Alexander was executed in 1887 for complicity in a terrorist plot against the life of Alexander III. Brought up in the Orthodox faith, Lenin is one of the few genuine Russians to be found among the Bolshevik leaders. After completing his course at the Simbirsk Gymnasium, in 1887 he entered the Kazan University, only to be expelled and banished from Kazan a few months later for participating in an anti-government students' riot. In 1891, however, we find him attending the University of Petrograd, where he studied law and economics. In 1895 he made his first journey abroad to Germany, returning in the same year to Petrograd, where he was again arrested on account of his Socialist activities. On this occasion he was exiled for three years to the village of Sushenskoe, in Eastern Siberia, being forbidden on the expiration of his sentence to reside in any of the big cities, factory centers, or university towns of Russia. After his release in 1900 he again went abroad. From this period begins his real career as a Socialist leader, and the next seventeen years are a long cycle of Socialist Congresses abroad, culminating in the Zimmerwald Conferences of 1915 and his dramatic return to Russia in the notorious "sealed" wagon. During this period he visited many countries, including England, and made the acquaintance of all the revolutionary elements in Europe. His favorite residence, however, was at Poronin, in Galicia, from which point of vantage he was able to maintain a close contact with the revolutionary movement in Russia.

Is Lenin a genius? Many Russians have denied it, and certainly there is nothing in his personal appearance to suggest even faintly a resemblance to the superman. Short of stature, rather plump, with short, thick neck, broad shoulders, round, red face, high, intellectual forehead, bald head, nose slightly turned up, brownish mustache, and short, stubby beard, he looks at the first glance more like a provincial grocer than a leader of men. And yet, on second thoughts, there is something in those steely gray eyes that arrests the attention; something in that quizzing, half-contemptuous, half-smiling look which speaks of boundless self-confidence and conscious superiority. His knowledge of languages is above the average. He is a proficient German scholar, while he writes and speaks English with tolerable accuracy. He is certainly by far the greatest intellectual force which the Russian Revolution has yet brought to light.

It is not, however, to his intellectual powers that he owes his predominating position inside his own party. The almost fanatical respect with which he is regarded by the men who are his colleagues and who are at least as jealous of each other as politicians in other countries, is due to other qualities than mere intellectual capacity. Chief of these are his iron courage, his grim, relentless determination, and his complete lack of all self-interest. In his creed of world revolution he is as unscrupulous and as uncompromising as a Jesuit, and in his code of political ethics the end to be attained is a justification for the employment of any weapon. To him Capital is the Fiend Incarnate, and with such an enemy he neither gives nor asks for mercy.

Yet as an individual he is not without certain virtues. In the many attacks, both justified and unjustified, which have been made against him, no breath of scandal has ever touched his private life. He is married—according to all accounts singularly happily married—and, in a country where corruption has now reached its apogee, he stands out head and shoulders above all his colleagues as the one man who is above suspicion. To Lenin the stories of Bolshevik orgies and carousals have no relation. His own worldly needs are more than frugal, and his personal budget is probably the most modest of all the Bolshevik Commissaries. Dishonest, treacherous, guilty of the worst forms of secret diplomacy as the Bolsheviks have been in all their public dealings, Lenin himself, on the rare occasions on which he has consented to see a foreign journalist or a foreign official, has always been extraordinarily frank. "Personally, I have nothing against you. Politically, however, you are my enemy, and I must use every weapon I think fit for your destruction. Your government does the same against me." The individual is only a pawn in the game, and no individual, however dear, however close he may be to Lenin's heart, will ever be allowed to stand in his way. His cruelty, however, is not a question of personal vengeance. Where Trotsky and other Bolsheviks have pursued their enemies with a bitter, personal hatred, Lenin in certain cases, where the individual has been of little account, has even been guilty of acts of clemency. But where Trotsky might shrink through fear of the consequences from shooting 10,000 men in cold blood, Lenin, although he is not one of the chief advocates of the terror, would assuredly not hesitate if he thought such an action were essential to the advancement of his cause.

No one who has ever been present at a Bolshevik Congress can have any doubts as to the real driving power behind the Bolshevik movement. In the numerous political crises through which the Bolsheviks have passed during their eighteen months' tenure of the Russian political stage, Lenin's has been the master mind which time and again has averted the almost inevitable disaster and restored the fallen fortunes of a party that had temporarily lost both its head and its heart. In debate he is an unrivaled dialectician, facing his opponents with an unruffled temper which is provokingly irritating in its serenity. Politicians of many years' experience might well be puzzled by the madly incongruous, peculiarly Russian questions which are put by ignorant delegates at every Bolshevik Congress. Lenin, however, is never at a loss. He is as sure of himself as a schoolmaster with a class of small boys. A delegate asks an impossible question about the Brest Peace and the doctrine of self-determination. Like a flash comes the reply: "One foolish man can ask more questions in a minute than ten wise men can answer in a day." And, like schoolboys at a conjuring entertainment, the assembly claps its hands and grins with childish delight.

Of course he is a demagogue; has made use of all the demagogue's arts. But behind all the inconsistencies of his policy, the tactics, the maneuvering, there lies a deep-rooted plan which he has been turning over in his mind for years and which he now thinks is ripe for execution. Demagogues have no constructive program. Lenin, at least, knows exactly what he wishes to achieve and how he means to achieve it. Where other politicians try to adapt their program to the needs and desires of society, Lenin is attempting to fit society to the narrow frames of his rigid, Prussianlike program. A fanatic, if you like, but a fanatic who has already made history and who has more genius than most fanatics. Cold, pitiless, devoid of all sentiment, utterly ruthless in his effort to force the narrow tenets of his Marxian dogma upon the whole world, Lenin is not a lovable character. He is, however, the one Bolshevik of whom non-Bolshevik Russians can ever be brought, albeit grudgingly, to speak with respect.

Quite recently the Bolsheviks have set up in the streets of Petrograd a statue to Blanqui on which is inscribed Blanqui's famous motto, "Ni Dieu, ni Maitre." To present-day Russia the words are pitifully inappropriate. Bolshevik Russia has a master, and in his secret heart every Bolshevik knows it.

2. TROTSKY

A more complete contrast than that which exists between Lenin and Trotsky it would be difficult to imagine. While Lenin might easily escape notice in a gathering of Sunday-school teachers, Trotsky, with his long, prominent nose, his fierce, black eyes, his huge forehead surmounted by great masses of black, waving hair, his pointed beard and mustache, and his heavy, cruel, protruding lips, is the very incarnation of the revolutionary of the picture books.

Born in 1877 in the Government of Kherson, the son of a provincial chemist, Leiba Bronstein, or, as he is now known to the world, Lev Davidovitch Trotsky, is a Jew of the Jews. From his earliest years he has been in revolt against society, and as a boy of fifteen we hear of his being expelled from school for desecrating an ikon. When only twenty-two he was arrested at Odessa on account of his connection with the South Russian Workmen's League, and was banished for four years to Eastern Siberia. In the third year of his exile he escaped from the town of Verkholensk, to appear again in the revolution of 1905 as President of the Petrograd Council of Workmen at the early age of twenty-eight. After the collapse of the revolution he was again arrested. On this occasion he was deprived of all his rights as a citizen and was again exiled—this time for life—to Eastern Siberia. Here he lived at Berezhoff, the last resting-place of more than one great Russian statesman who had lost the favor of his Imperial master or mistress. Trotsky, however, must have a genius for escape, for within six months of his arrival he once more evaded his guards and disappeared abroad.

During the succeeding ten years he lived in turn in France, Switzerland, Austria, and Germany, supporting himself mainly by journalism, for which he has a decided bent. In Vienna he edited an Austrian *Pravda*, while in Germany he published his well-known history of the first Russian Revolution. Like Lenin, he has an excellent knowledge of German, speaks fluent French, and understands a little English. His powers of conversation, however, in the last-named language are decidedly limited.

At the beginning of the war he was in Paris, where he edited a Russian Socialist paper called *Nashe Slovo* and the *Golos*. Unlike Lenin, Trotsky has not always been a Bolshevik, and his Paris articles were subjected to severe criticism from the pen of his present chief and colleague. After the great split in the Russian Social Democratic party Trotsky sided with the Mensheviks. A little later, however,

not knowing which party was destined to come to the top, he formed a small party of his own, known as the "Trotskists," whose aim was to steer a middle course between the two currents of Menshevism and Bolshevism. Such opportunism was hardly likely to escape the notice of Lenin, who is, and always has been, just as severe in his condemnation of the Socialist who does not agree with him as of the most rabid capitalist. In these circumstances it is not surprising to learn that Trotsky's original attitude to the war should have been regarded by Lenin as tainted with chauvinism. In July, 1915, we find Lenin writing in Switzerland in his *Social-Democrat* as follows: "Trotsky, as always, is in principle opposed to the Socialist Chauvinists, but in practice he is always in agreement with them." A few months later he writes again: "Judging Trotsky by his writings, we have come to the conclusion that his political interest, his political conduct, consists in avoiding a complete rupture with the Socialist Chauvinists and opportunists. In this respect the lessons of the war have taught Trotsky nothing. He remains a Trotskist. Just as formerly he stood for cooperation with the Socialist 'compromisers', so today he stands for cooperation with the Socialist patriots."

Today, however, Trotsky has committed himself irrevocably to the Bolshevik cause, but it cannot be said that he has the same rigid political principles as Lenin. At times, too, in his impetuosity, he has found it difficult to fall into line with Lenin's policy of *reculer pour mieux sauter*. While Lenin is almost *temperamentlos*, Trotsky is all fire, all passion. He has the temperament of the artist and delights in theatrical heroics. While Lenin sneers at public honor, presumably on the grounds that there is no honor among thieves, and therefore none among capitalists, Trotsky makes great play with the word. He was defending Russia's "honor" at Brest. It pleased him to bandy paradoxes with the German generals, and his sense of flattery was tickled when a well-known American declared in admiration that "if the German General Staff bought Trotsky, they bought a lemon." After Brest, however, the lemon was indeed sour. Trotsky's dignity had suffered an affront, and he returned to Petrograd full of wrath with Germany and breathing threats of revenge. At that moment he would willingly have died fighting if all Russia had been present to see him do it.

When the Bolshevik Government left Petrograd in order to ratify the peace at the Moscow Congress, Trotsky remained behind to sulk in his den at Smolny. A few days later, how-

ever, his equanimity was restored by the offer of the Commissariat for War—an office in which his boundless energy and organizing talents have been of the greatest service to the Bolsheviks. Impetuous and hot-headed, he is apt, like the Queen in *Alice in Wonderland*, to solve every crisis with a wild shriek of "Off with his head!" On more than one occasion it has needed all Lenin's tact and discretion to rescue the Bolshevik bark from the rocks on to which Trotsky's fiery energy had driven it. As Tchitcherin said last July, "It is funny how the military idea has gone to Trotsky's head. A few months ago Lenin had to restrain him from making war on Germany. Now it is Lenin's cool brain that holds him back from declaring war on the Allies."

Among his colleagues Trotsky does not enjoy the same respect or admiration as Lenin, and in this connection too much importance should not be attached to the frequent rumors of quarrels between the two men. They are probably untrue. Bolshevik commissaries will always smile whenever one mentions the possibility of a Lenin-Trotsky split. Trotsky, after all, is only one of themselves. Lenin is of the gods.

This does not mean that Trotsky is to be considered as an insignificant factor in the Bolshevik movement. Originally useful as a journalist and a pamphleteer, he has become today the Bolshevik man of action, the Bolshevik Imperialist. The Red Army, such as it is, is largely his creation, and the methods which he has employed in restoring some semblance of discipline have been very different from the persuasive oratory of a Kerensky.

As an orator Trotsky is a powerful demagogue, hissing out his words with a degree of hate which is not without effect. He is apt, however, to lose his temper in the face of opposition and to take refuge in mere abuse. Rumor has many unkind things to say about his private life and his commercial honesty. They may be untrue, but they give an illustration of the different estimate of the characters of Lenin and Trotsky which exist in the minds of the Russian people. Always neatly dressed and with carefully manicured nails, he is the best dressed of all the Bolshevik Commissaries. Vain and easily susceptible to flattery, he is by no means averse to publicity, and is, or at any rate was, far more accessible to foreign journalists than his more famous colleague. Today he has imitated Kerensky's fashion of appearing at Red Army concerts or parades in a semi-uniform of khaki, and even his own friends have taunted him with Napoleonic designs.

When the world is going well with him, he can be very affable and, indeed, is not without a certain charm of manner. In this way he has been able at times to make a favorable first impression upon foreigners, one American in a fit of exuberation once describing him as "the greatest Jew since Christ." These impressions, however, do not stand the test of time. Behind those fierce black eyes lurks ever the demon of suspicion and mistrust. It is this ever-present fear of treachery which inspires the terrible, pitiless cruelty of which he has been guilty. It was probably after much hesitation and with some misgivings that Trotsky finally threw in his lot with the Bolsheviks. Today, however, he knows that he has crossed a Rubicon to which there is no returning. More conscious of, less indifferent too, than Lenin to the fate that awaits him in the event of failure, he is prepared to sell his life dearly and to shrink before nothing in his attempt to carry Bolshevism by fair means or foul into the four corners of Europe.

3. SOME COMMISSARIES

One of the most curious features of the Bolshevik movement is the high percentage of non-Russian elements among its leaders.

Of the twenty or thirty commissaries or leaders who provide the central machinery of the Bolshevik movement not less than seventy-five per cent. are Jews. Karachan is an Armenian. Peters, the head of the Moscow Extraordinary Commission, and Vatsetis, the Commander-in-Chief, are Letts. Only Lenin, Bucharin, Petrovsky, Tchitcherin, Lunacharsky, and Krilenko are Russians. Of these Lenin is a law unto himself, Bucharin is an independent with independent views, and an independent attitude inside the party, Krilenko is a degenerate, while Tchitcherin and Lunacharsky are to be regarded rather as sentimental and somewhat feeble-minded visionaries than as active revolutionaries.

If Lenin is the brains of the movement, the Jews provide the executive officers. Of the leading commissaries, Trotsky, Zinovieff, Kameneff, Stekloff, Sverdloff, Uritsky, Joffe, Rakovsky, Radek, Menjinsky, Larin, Bronski, Zaalkind, Velodarsky, Petroff, Litvinoff, Smidovitch, and Vorovsky are all of the Jewish race, while among the minor Soviet officials the number is legion. Of all the Bolshevik leaders, Petrovsky, the Commissary for the Interior, and a former member of the Duma, is practically the only one who can in any way be described as a workingman. The rest are all intellectuals of *bourgeois* or petty *bourgeois* origin.

ZINOVIEFF

If the gulf between Lenin and Trotsky is a wide one, there is little to choose, with regard to general ability and influence, between Trotsky and Zinovieff. Trotsky, it is true, is generally regarded both in Russia and outside it as the second man in the Bolshevik party and the probable successor of Lenin. Trotsky, too, it was, who was summoned from the front last August after the attempt on Lenin's life, to take charge of the Bolshevik rudder of state. And yet it may be doubted whether the impetuous Commissary for War has as great an influence with Lenin as the more logical and strictly "Bolshevist" Zinovieff, who during many years of exile has been Lenin's closest friend and inseparable companion.

Ovsei Gershon Apfelbaum, *alias* Zinovieff, Radomyslsky, Shatsky, Grigorieff, was born in the Ukraine in 1883. In his early youth he came under Lenin's influence, and has remained under it ever since. Like nearly all the genuine Bolshevik leaders, he suffered imprisonment during the days of the old régime, and after his release was forced to flee abroad. During the ten years immediately preceding the war he was one of the most active members of the Bolshevik Central Committee, and for some years was secretary of the party. At the beginning of the war he was with Lenin in Galicia, and took a firm stand beside his chief in his wholesale denunciation of militarism and of the war aims of both sets of belligerents. From 1914 until the March Revolution he edited with Lenin the *Social-Democrat*, a paper published in Switzerland and devoted mainly to a sweeping condemnation of those Socialists who supported the war or who made no active resistance to it. With Lenin, too, he represented Russia at the Zimmerwald, Berne, and Quintal conferences.

When in March of last year the Bolshevik Government withdrew to Moscow, Zinovieff remained in Petrograd as President of the Northern Commune.

Of short stature, broad-shouldered, clean-shaven, with firm mouth, cold, calculating eyes, abnormally large head and high forehead Zinovieff certainly gives one the impression of a man of intellect. It is a cruel face, but one feels instinctively that it is the face of a man of reflective, logical cruelty rather than of the passionate nature of a Trotsky. A fine orator, Zinovieff has something of the dialectical brilliance of Lenin. He has, however, few original ideas, and must be regarded chiefly as a phonograph of his master. He is a bitter enemy of the English, and during the past three months has been trying to instil into the minds of the workmen of Petrograd

a passionate hatred for England as "the country which can never be reconciled to Russia." As virtual dictator of Petrograd, he is responsible for the savage cruelties and murders which have been committed in Petrograd in the name of the Revolution. Perhaps the frequent panics which the "advance post" of Bolshevism has experienced during the past year have affected his nerves. At any rate, the terror has been very much worse in Petrograd than in Moscow.

SVERDLOFF

Of the same bitter, implacable type is Sverdloff, the President of the All-Russian Executive Committee, whose death was recently reported in the Bolshevik wireless. Born in 1885 at Nijni-Novgorod, and like Trotsky the son of a chemist and a Jew, Sverdloff, after the usual gymnasium education, began his own career in a chemist's shop. When only seventeen, however, he was sentenced to two weeks' imprisonment for taking part in a demonstration at a student's funeral, and for the next ten years his life was one long round of imprisonment and collisions with the police.

With coal-black hair, fierce eyebrows, piercing eyes, and black mustache and pointed beard, Sverdloff is a striking figure, somewhat after the manner of a Spanish Inquisitor. Not lacking in courage, he makes an efficient chairman at the various meetings of the Central Executive Committee or the All-Russian Congress of Soviets. While Lenin is President of the Council of People's Commissaries, or Prime Minister, Sverdloff's position corresponds more or less to that of president of the republic. He it was who received Count Mirbach when the German representative came to present his credentials to the Moscow Government. He was greeted by Sverdloff "as the representative of the nation with whom we signed the Treaty of Brest."

KRILENKO

It would be unfair both to Sverdloff and to Zinovieff to include Krilenko in the same classification. And yet Krilenko's portrait is given next in order, not so much because of its resemblance to the preceding types, but because it affords a striking example of the depths to which the mind, soured against society, can sink in its contorted perversion.

Krilenko, the ex-Commander-in-Chief, the author of the notorious fraternizing order which finally destroyed the Russian Army, the inspirer of the murder of Dukhonin, has be-

come today Krilenko the Blood-sucker, Krilenko the Bolshevik Public Prosecutor. Of all Bolshevik types this is assuredly the most degenerate and the most perverted. Indeed, it may reasonably be doubted whether Krilenko is in reality quite sane. Even in crime it would be a compliment to compare him to Marat, and yet in his thirst for blood and in his hysterical shrieking for the death sentence he is as insatiable as a drug fiend in his craving for cocaine or morphia. And yet this is a man who has received a university education and who has practiced as a lawyer. Still a comparatively young man, his heavily lined face bears all the marks of early degeneration. Famous since his student days as a demagogic orator, Krilenko today employs all his talents in exciting and inflaming the blood lust of the mob. The rumors which appeared in the English press regarding his capture and death at the hands of the Cossacks appear now to be untrue. The latest news from Russia states that he is still alive and still exercising his nefarious powers as Public Prosecutor.

BUCHARIN AND KAMENEFF

One of the most interesting Bolshevik types, in that he is not a mere mouthpiece of Lenin, is Bucharin. The son of a court official and a man of good education, Bucharin has maintained an independent position inside the Bolshevik party without ever taking any responsible office. He was the chief Bolshevik opponent of the Brest Treaty, and has written several good pamphlets on the Bolshevik movement. One of these is his notorious *Program of the Communists*, a book which reveals with almost brutal nakedness the real aims and aspirations of the Bolsheviks. Still under forty, of small stature but of great personal courage, he is theoretically more extreme and more doctrinaire in his ideas than Lenin. He is, moreover, the one Bolshevik who is not afraid to criticise Lenin or to cross swords with him in a dialectical duel.

As far as pure intellect is concerned, Kameneff must rank after Lenin as one of the chief intellectual forces of the movement. Only thirty-six years old, with his black mustache and beard Kameneff looks very much older than his age. Like the majority of his colleagues, he is a Jew, his real name being Rosenfeldt. He was born of rich parents, and under the old régime was a "hereditary honorary burgher." A graduate of Moscow University, he acquired his Socialistic tendencies during his student days, and like many Russian students came into collision with the police before his twen-

tieth year. He was a member of the first Brest delegation, and has written a book on this much-discussed treaty. After the Brest peace he was appointed Bolshevik Ambassador to Vienna, but was unable to proceed to his post owing to his arrest by the Finns, who kept him in prison until last July. Today he fills an important *rôle* as President of the Moscow Soviet. He is a man of theories rather than a man of blood, and is more moderate in his views than the majority of his colleagues.

LUNACHARSKY THE VISIONARY

A type very different from any of the preceding is represented by Lunacharsky. This man is a Russian of good family and the son of a State Councillor. Tall, with slightly drooping shoulders, silky beard and mustache, and *pince-nez*, he is a man of mild appearance, mild manners, and soft speech. He radiates mildness and softness, and he dabbles in Bolshevism as he dabbles in art. He is essentially the amiable visionary, the Bolshevik crank, the Bolshevik educationist. While no one could possibly be afraid of Lunacharsky as a revolutionary force, there is no doubt that this revolutionary idealist is of considerable service to the Bolsheviks as a propaganda agent. He is at the head of the Bolshevik Department of Education, and in this position he has been responsible for a number of decrees, many of them admirable in theory, for the free education of the whole people. In reality these reforms exist only on paper, all education having broken down under the oppression of a régime which in spite of all Bolshevik inducements has alienated the sympathies of that hitherto most revolutionary body, the Union of Russian Teachers.

Lunacharsky, however, has been instrumental in bringing back Gorki, if not as a Bolshevik sheep, at least into the Bolshevik fold. Gorki now directs a Bureau of Literature in Petrograd, where talented but starving members of the aristocracy and the intelligentsia are engaged in translating William Morris and Ruskin for the edification of the proletariat.

Lunacharsky, too, has been useful to the Bolsheviks in another respect. When it was found that the Bolshevik persecution of the Church was creating a bad impression among the workmen and the peasants, Lunacharsky, as an original adherent to the Orthodox faith, was called upon to pour oil upon the troubled waters and to start a "Bolshevising" movement inside the Church itself. In the autumn of last year he engaged, therefore, in a number of public "disputes" with the more liberal priests of the Orthodox Church, at

which each side was allowed to state its own case. It was on one of these occasions that Lunacharsky made his famous speech in which he compared Lenin's persecution of the capitalists with Christ's expulsion of the money-lenders from the Temple, finishing with the startling peroration that "if Christ had been alive today he would have been a Bolshevik."

MINOR LEADERS

Of the other Commissaries, Stekloff Nakhauskis, a man of no substance but a clever writer, is editor of the official *Izvestia*. Uritsky, the former head of the Petrograd Extraordinary Commission, and Volodarsky, the former Petrograd censor, were both assassinated in the summer and autumn of last year, in each case by a Socialist Jew.

Both Jews themselves, they were men of considerable ability, and their death has been a serious loss to a party which has not succeeded in attracting many able men. This is especially the case with regard to Uritsky who, like Trotsky and Tchitcherin, was originally a Menshevik. Strangely enough, Uritsky was at one time private secretary to Plechanoff, the father of the Social-Democratic movement in Russia, who died last year, stricken down with grief and sorrow at the ruin brought upon his country by a party which he had in some way helped to create.

To the Editor of the Times

Sir: The author of the article "Bolshevik Portraits," in your issue of March 29, greatly insists on the fact that "of twenty or thirty Commissaries or leaders who provide the central machinery of the Bolshevik movement not less than seventy-five per cent. are Jews." In order to prove the accuracy of this assertion, the author provides a list of twenty-seven names, of which eighteen belong to Jews, and only nine to non-Jews. Thus, to all appearances, his figures are justified. As the author shows an effort to be impartial, he may excuse my desire to correct his statistics and to prove that his list of names is neither accurate nor complete.

Among the eighteen Jews your correspondent cites the names of Rakovsky, Menjinsky, Smidowitch, and Vorovsky. As a matter of fact, not one of these is a Jew. Rakovsky is Bulgarian from Rumania; Menjinsky and Vorovsky are Poles; Smidowitch (the brother of the well-known Russian writer Veresayeff) is a Russian. On the other hand, the leading non-Jewish Commissaries left out by your correspondent are very numerous. It seems rather strange that such a close student of the Bolshevik movement as your correspondent appears to be should omit the names of Professor Pokrovsky, Fritche, Antonoff, Stutchka,

Krestinsky, Dzerjinsky, Raskolnikoff, Dybenko, Mme. Kolentai, Kozlovsky, and the two successors of Uriitsky in the Extraordinary Commission—Mme. Yakovleva and Mme. Stassova. It is possible that the English reader is not familiar with some of these names, but the inhabitants of Moscow and Petrograd are, unfortunately, too well acquainted with them. I think that your correspondent will be bound to admit that the additional names are of not less importance in the Bolshevik movement than those of Bronsky, Zalkind, Volodarsky, and even Litvinoff or Joffe. If the author by his statistics desires to suggest that the Bolshevik movement is merely an "alien" movement, I am afraid that he will find himself in disagreement with the unportrayed reality.

I am, Sir, yours faithfully,

S. POLIAKOFF-LITOVITZEFF

London Representative of *Russkoe Slovo*, Moscow

173, Fleet-street, April 1

4. THE RUSSIAN FOREIGN OFFICE

In the preceding articles no mention has been made of the singular combination which directs the fortunes and misfortunes of the Bolshevik Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

In reality the Bolshevik Foreign Office is a triumvirate consisting of Georghi Vasilievitch Tchitcherin, a pure Russian of good family, Lev Michailovitch Karachan, an Armenian, and Karl Radek, an Austrian Jew of doubtful antecedents. It is a strangely ill-consorted trio, the members of which are continually playing out of tune, and who, indeed, are only kept together by the brilliant conducting of the great Bolshevik *chef d'orchestre*.

TCHITCHERIN

Tchitcherin, the nominal Foreign Minister, is one of those mystically sentimental revolutionaries of whose sincerity there can be no doubt. Indeed, the high position which he holds in the Bolshevik party is due far more to his personal integrity and to the genuineness of his beliefs than to any administrative talents or political ability. Holding the "cheen," or rank, of a nobleman, Tchitcherin inherited from his relations a considerable estate, which, as a Socialist, he voluntarily resigned. In the earlier part of his life he was employed for a few months by the Foreign Office of the old régime. Very soon, however, he abandoned this uncongenial occupation for the Socialist cause, to which he has since devoted his whole life.

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Like most of his colleagues, Tchitcherin has been an exile in many lands, and is a linguist of very considerable ability, speaking and writing French, German, and English with great facility and correctness. In 1907 we hear of him as a member of the Central Committee of the Berlin Social Democratic Bureau, where he played an important rôle as a Socialistic proselytizer among the numerous and needy Russian emigrants in Berlin. He did not succeed in escaping the watchful attentions of the Prussian police, and in 1908 he was arrested at Charlottenburg, fined for bearing a false name, and banished from Germany. During the first years of the war he lived in London, where he established close relations with the British Socialist party, being finally interned by the authorities. The manner of his release and of his return to Russia in December, 1917, is well known. After the Brest-Litovsk treaty he succeeded Trotsky as Commissary for Foreign Affairs.

About forty years of age, small of stature, with drooping shoulders, long nose, small red eyes, sandy-colored beard and mustache, and sandy-colored hair, Tchitcherin is a man of insignificant appearance and possesses none of that personal magnetism which distinguishes Lenin and Trotsky. Always polite and almost apologetic for his own existence, he cut a poor figure in face of the imperious demands of the German diplomats during their short tenure of the Maison Berg at Moscow in the summer of last year. As an orator he is as lame and as halting as the stolidest Anglo-Saxon. In his office, however, at the House of Soviets, in other words, the requisitioned Hôtel Métropole, he is an indefatigable worker, and is to be found at his desk early and late poring over documents or telegrams.

Inside the party Tchitcherin is almost a nonentity and has no outstanding claims to distinction beyond a fanatical belief in the doctrine of equality and an almost slavish admiration for Lenin, without whose advice and counsel he decides nothing. He was appointed Commissary for Foreign Affairs at a time when Lenin's policy of "beating to windward" demanded a certain submissiveness and avoidance of friction in the Bolshevik relations with the Central Powers. As the victim selected for this sacrifice the timorous Tchitcherin was obviously more suitable than any of his more impetuous and less cultured colleagues. There he has remained to this day, assured of a place in history as the man who has written more diplomatic notes in a shorter period of time than any other Foreign Minister in the world.

KARACHAN

L. M. Karachan is perhaps a somewhat stronger personality than Tchitcherin, but in saying that one has said all. He, too, was presumably appointed as Tchitcherin's assistant more for the charm of his manners than on account of any outstanding ability.

Only thirty-two years old, Karachan, with his tall figure, his finely chiseled features, and his well-combed black beard and mustache, is a man of striking personal appearance, and is easily the best looking of the Bolshevist Commissaries. Always well dressed, as an actor or artist of note he would not be out of place on the boulevards of Paris. An Armenian, he is an anti-Turk and has no love for the Central Powers. During the war he was one of those Bolshevists who most favored an economic alliance with the Allies.

In the Bolshevist Foreign Office he is popularly supposed to be at the head of the wide system of secret service which the Bolshevists have always employed with considerable success. Under his tutelage a considerable army of foreign Bolshevists is employed in translating Bolshevist pamphlets into every language in the world. Here, too, is edited the *Call*, a newspaper published in English and intended for distribution among the British troops in North Russia. Temperamentally Karachan belongs essentially to that class of Bolshevist which believes that the pen is mightier than the sword. It need scarcely be stated that in their methods the advocates of open diplomacy differ little from the Bernstorffs and the Mirbachs, whom they have so consistently pilloried.

RADEK

If Tchitcherin and Karachan are his nominal superiors, the real *virtuoso* of this Bolshevist trio is Karl Radek, *alias* Sobelsohn, the brilliant leader-writer of the official *Izvestia*.

Radek's past is shrouded in mystery. There are strange rumors respecting his expulsion from various extreme Socialist parties in Poland and in Germany for reasons which these advocates of the destruction of all personal property have been unable to condone. These stories may be libels, but there is doubtless much of the unscrupulous adventurer in Radek's character. In happier circumstances he might possibly have been induced to employ his Machiavellian talents in a different cause, but today, as a rebel against society, he

has sought that refuge and hospitality which the Bolsheviks willingly accord, without regard to the past, to all men of ability who join their ranks.

Of Radek's intellectual brilliance there can be no doubt. Still in the early thirties, he has read voraciously, and as a student of economics and of foreign politics he has amassed a store of knowledge which can only be described as prodigious. In personal appearance he presents an almost grotesque figure. A little man, with a huge head, protruding ears, clean-shaven face, with spectacles and a large mouth with yellow, tobacco-stained teeth, from which a huge pipe or cigar is never absent, Radek is generally dressed in a quaint, drab-colored Norfolk suit with knickers and leggings. As he jaunts from the Dom Sovietov to his office, an English cap on his head, his pipe puffing fiercely, a revolver strapped to his side, and a bundle of books under his arm, he looks like a cross between a bandit and a professor. Indeed, unkind people might well say that this is the truest description of his character.

If Tchitcherin and Karachan maintain to some extent the artificial courtesies which are common to diplomacy, Radek is frankly pugnacious. At Brest he took an impish delight in puffing the smoke of his cheroot into General Hofman's face, until the Germans objected to the presence of an Austrian deserter in the Russian delegation. A brilliant journalist, with a pen that knows how to sting, he is the author of the series of well-informed, if maliciously turned, articles on foreign affairs which have appeared in the *Izvestia* under the name of Viator. Himself a past master in every form of intrigue, he seeks with frenzied joy some new shaft for his pen, which will strike gall into the heart of his opponent without involving a rupture of diplomatic relations. Ambassadors are his game, and Foreign Ministers his butts. During the summer of last year he sorely tried the patience of the German Embassy, which objected more than once to the impudent attacks of the assistant Minister who received the Kaiser's representatives, and the journalist who under a thinly-disguised pseudonym assailed them in the morning newspaper.

Radek, too, it was who in July, 1918, was sent on that famous trip to the Allied embassies at Vologda. On this mission he was entrusted with the delicate task of persuading the Allied ambassadors to come to Moscow, nominally in order to bring them to a place of safety, but probably, if the

truth were known, in order to hold them as hostages in the event of Allied intervention. On this occasion he created a sensation by appearing before the aged American Ambassador with his revolver strapped to his side. Delicacy, however, is scarcely Radek's *forte*. His attempt to cajole, threaten, and finally intimidate the Allied envoys resulted in failure, but his journey provided him with fresh satire for his pen, and in a malicious and highly colored account of his "voyage into Arcadia," he poked fun to his heart's content at the somewhat undignified situation of the Allied embassies in a little country town far removed from the heart of things political.

In politics Radek is hot-headed and impulsive, and it is probably not wrong to presume that he frequently chafes at the restraint which is sometimes placed on his activities by his more cautious colleagues. As a propaganda agent, however, he is probably unrivaled. Few men are more skilled in the art of *suppressio veri* and *suggestio falsi*, and the very accusations which he hurls at the head of all *bourgeois* governments might be used, at least equally well, against his own conduct.

A delegate of the Zimmerwald Conference, Radek, nevertheless, was one of those Bolsheviks who voted for war at the time of the ratification of the Brest Treaty. Although he is an advocate of extreme measures and supports that section of his party which has been guilty of the worst excesses, Radek was not in favor of the wholesale hole-in-the-corner executions which have been carried out by the extraordinary Commissions. His attitude in this matter was assuredly not inspired by any humanitarian instincts, but was influenced purely by reasons of policy and of class interest. Instead of these mysterious executions in the dark, he proposed a form of terror which should appeal more strongly to the proletariat and which should have for its object the starving and cowing of the *bourgeoisie* into submission. He propounded his views in a series of articles and speeches in which he declared that "in the winter no *bourgeois* should have an overcoat until every member of the proletariat had been provided for," and that "everything should be taken away from the *bourgeoisie* in order that the Red Army might be well fed, well clothed, and well shod." In this point of view he was supported by Lenin.

Starting his career in Russia with considerable disadvantages as an Austrian subject whose knowledge of Russian was far from perfect, Radek has gradually increased his prestige among his colleagues until today he stands as one of the

most powerful influences inside the Bolshevik party. His present activities should be closely watched, for if, as seems true, he has been released from prison in Berlin, he will undoubtedly play an important part in the further development of the Spartacist movement in Germany. He is one of the few Bolsheviks who ever provide Lenin with an original idea.

The following three have been added by an American student of Russia.

WILLIAM SHATOV

The terror of Petrograd and one of the most bloodthirsty officials of the Extraordinary Commission for the Petrograd District, William Shatov, is one of the group of Russian immigrants in America who returned to Russia after the revolution of March, 1917, and have played so important a role in the Bolshevik régime. He was a typesetter in New York; he is one of the props of the Lenin-Trotsky régime in Russia.

Shatov came to America soon after the Revolution of 1905 as a very young man. He was a fugitive from the Russian Imperial police, but the reason for his hasty flight from Russia was not political. During the Revolution he was a student at the Kiev University. His offense consisted in committing rape, for which he was ordered arrested, but he succeeded in leaving the country and coming to America. His real name is not Shatov, which name he assumed upon coming to this country in order to escape possible recognition and extradition as a criminal offender.

Shatov's career in America was at first confined mostly to New York. Here he worked as a common laborer, never, however, staying very long at one place. In 1910 he came to work at the printing office of a small Russian paper, the *Russky Golos*. In the course of the next few months he learned how to operate a linotype machine and became a typesetter. He remained in this trade for several years, being later employed in the printing shop of the *Russkoye Slovo*. From this latter place he was finally discharged for constant drunkenness and particularly because, working on a night shift, he used to hold regular orgies in the shop.

During the time of his work as a typesetter, Shatov became very much interested in the theories of Anarchism and in the I. W. W. movement. After he lost his position, he quickly drifted into an active participation in both of

these movements and became very closely associated with Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman. He also did a great deal of organization work for the I. W. W. all over the country, being arrested on several occasions in Detroit and elsewhere.

When the Revolution broke out, he joined forces with Trotsky, who at that time was editor of the *Novy Mir* in New York, in agitating among the Russians here against the Provisional Government. He followed Trotsky to Russia, his passage, just as in the case of Trotsky, being paid by the Russian consulate in New York, which had instructions from Milyukoff to advance passage money to all revolutionary refugees in America. Shatov, always posing as a political refugee, also obtained his passage money in the same way.

In Russia, immediately upon his arrival, he became affiliated with Lenin and his crowd, took part in all the Bolshevik rebellions and attempts at the seizure of the government, and after the Bolshevik revolution, became one of the important men of the régime. He has held the posts of Commissary for the Petrograd railways; special Commissary for Ukraina after its occupation by the Bolsheviks in the spring of 1919; the Chief of the Petrograd Militia and Chief of Police; the Vice-Chairman of the Petrograd *Chrezvychaika*, i.e., the Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution. It was in the latter position that Shatov had distinguished himself for his cruelty, while as Chief of Police he set a new high record of grafting and official corruption.

He is still a comparatively young man. While a man of quick wit and very considerable ability both as an organizer and a writer, Shatov has in his face every indication of criminal degeneracy. A hopeless drunkard, a sexual pervert, this man is eminently fitted for the task of torture and oppression in which he revels now. His case is the best illustration of the undisputed fact that the whole Bolshevik régime is led mostly by criminals or criminal degenerates.

GEORGE KRASIN

George Krasin (also spelt Krassin), the Commissar of Trade and Industry, is undoubtedly the ablest man in the Bolshevik Government from the standpoint of practical business. He was born in the Province of Tobolsk and attended school at Tiumen. Later he entered the St. Petersburg Technological Institute and received an excellent

education as an engineer. During the period of his university education, he was known as a Socialist and had affiliations with the Revolutionary party, but for the most part avoided serious trouble with the authorities, although his brother fell into their hands and suffered several terms of imprisonment.

He later went to Germany, presumably taking refuge there because of his political views, and quickly showed ability as an engineer in the field of industry.

After the Revolution of 1905 he returned to Russia and became the representative of German interests there, especially those of Siemens & Halske, the great German electrical company. His ability was recognized in Russian financial and industrial circles, and during the war he managed a great munition factory and made a combination of two great Russian companies under the leadership of the Russo-Asiatic Bank.

While it is undoubtedly true that he was always in theory a Socialist, he was considered by his associates as a brilliant industrial organizer and enjoyed their friendship and esteem. It is not quite clear how he arrived at his present position or exactly what is his relation to the convicted Bolshevik theorists. He is known as extremely pro-German and it is possible that he owes his present position to German influence. Last summer he spent some time in Berlin and it is believed that he has made extensive arrangements for the participation of Germans in Russian industry and trade. In spite of his radical affiliations, it is hardly possible that he is a believer in the Bolshevik economic program. It is more likely that he is applying his knowledge and abilities to modifications of that program in the direction of organization of production with the aid of German specialists.

MAXIM LITVINOV

Maxim Litvinov, who is now prominent as Assistant Commissar of Foreign Affairs and as the chief Bolshevik representative abroad, has been negotiating at Dorpat and at Copenhagen, is a Jew, born in Bielostok in 1876. His real name is Meyer Wallach. In 1901 he got into difficulties with the authorities in connection with the revolutionary printing office in Kiev and the circulation of pamphlets of the Social Democratic Party. For this he was imprisoned at Kiev and sentenced to exile to Eastern Siberia, but in the following year escaped from prison and got out of the country. In 1906

he was commissioned by the party to purchase arms abroad. A little later he returned and lived in Petrograd on a German passport, under the name of Gustave Graf. In the summer of 1906, he took part in a train robbery near Tiflis, in which a lot of money was stolen from a Government express. During the war, he spent some time as a German spy in England. He is clever in address and shows considerable dialectical ability in setting forth Bolshevik theory and in explaining Bolshevik international policy.

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CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE BOLSHEVIST MOVEMENT IN RUSSIA

PART I

Character of Bolshevist Rule
Economic Results of Bolshevist Control



MARCH, 1920

No: 148

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION
SUB-STATION 84 (407 WEST 117TH STREET)
NEW YORK CITY

CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE BOLSHEVIST MOVEMENT IN RUSSIA

PART I

[EDITOR'S NOTE: The first two sections of this document, with the appendices pertaining thereto, appear in this issue of *International Conciliation*. The third section, including appendices, will be published as Part II in the April issue.]

October 27, 1919

HON. HENRY CABOT LODGE,

*Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate*

SIR: I have the honor to send you herewith, for the information of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, a memorandum on certain aspects of the Bolshevik movement in Russia.

The memorandum has been prepared from original sources by the Division of Russian Affairs of the Department of State. As you will see, the statements are based almost entirely on translations from Bolshevik newspapers. These include the official organs of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of Soviets, of local Soviet committees, and of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). The Bolsheviks' own statements are supplemented by the reports of American representatives.

The appendix contains the full text of representative Bolshevik documents. The text of other documents, such as the constitution of the so-called Soviet Republic, will be found in the published hearings on Bolshevik propaganda before the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, and for that reason are not reproduced here.

Since the overthrow of the autocracy in March, 1917, the Department of State has studied developments in Russia

with the sympathy which America has traditionally shown toward all movements for political and social betterment. The study which has been made of the Bolshevik movement, some of the results of which are furnished herewith, shows conclusively that the purpose of the Bolsheviks is to subvert the existing principles of government and society the world over, including those countries in which democratic institutions are already established. They have built up a political machine which, by the concentration of power in the hands of a few and the ruthlessness of its methods, suggests the Asiatic despotism of the early czars. The results of their exercise of power, as shown by the documents presented in the accompanying memorandum, have been demoralization, civil war, and economic collapse. I commend to your careful consideration the detailed information which the memorandum contains.

I am addressing a similar letter to the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

ROBERT LANSING

INTRODUCTION

The Russian Division of the State Department has prepared from original sources this brief summary of what appear to be some of the fundamental Bolshevik principles, methods, and aims. As will be seen, the statements are based almost entirely on translations from Bolshevik newspapers in the files of the department. These newspapers are the official organs of the All-Russian Central Committee of Soviets, of local Soviet committees, or of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks).

The Bolsheviks' own statements are supplemented by the reports of American representatives in or near Russia.

The theoretical "dictatorship of the proletariat," acknowledged to be the rule of a minority, with a definite policy of

preliminary destruction, is found in fact to have degenerated into a close monopoly of power by a very small group, who use the most opportunistic and tyrannical methods, including "mass terror."

While existing on the accumulated wealth of the country, the Bolshevik régime has brought about a complete economic collapse, with consequent famine and epidemic. The claim of the Bolsheviks that economic isolation is wholly responsible for the economic chaos in Soviet Russia, can not be sustained. The Bolshevik program has not worked and Bolshevism has to its credit no constructive accomplishment.

One of the main aims of the Bolshevik leaders from the very beginning has been to make their movement a world-wide social revolution. They insistently declare that success in Russia depends on the development of corresponding social revolutions in all other countries. Bolshevik policies and tactics are subordinated to the idea of the international proletarian revolution. Apparent compromises with "bourgeois" governments or countries have proved temporary and tactical.

I

CHARACTER OF BOLSHEVIST RULE

I

"DICTATORSHIP OF PROLETARIAT"

The theoretical purposes of the Bolsheviks are clearly set forth in the following statement of aims which was embodied in the call for the First Congress of the new Revolutionary International (later called the Third or Communist International), as having been worked out in accordance with the programs of the Spartacus Association of Germany and the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). As wirelessly by

the Bolsheviks from Petrograd January 23, 1919, this statement contained the following:

The present is the period of destruction and crushing of the capitalist system of the whole world.

The aim of the proletariat must now be immediately to conquer power. To conquer power means to destroy the governmental apparatus of the bourgeoisie and to organize a new proletarian governmental apparatus. This new apparatus must express the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The dictatorship of the proletariat must be the occasion for the immediate expropriation of capital and the elimination of the private right of owning the means of production through making them common property.

In order to protect the socialist revolution against external and internal enemies and to assist the fighting proletarians of other countries, it becomes necessary to disarm entirely the bourgeoisie and its agents and to arm the proletariat.

(See Appendix I for the full text of the proclamation.)

The ablest analysis of the theory of the proletarian dictatorship is given by Lenin himself, in his report to the Eighth Congress of the Russian Communist Party, in March, 1919. (See Appendix II for the full text of this report, made in the form of a series of "theses.") Lenin's "theses" were adopted as the platform of the Third International, established in Moscow in March, 1919. From a reading of these theses it is clear that the period of construction claimed by the Bolshevik sympathizers had not arrived.

The following extract from a speech by Lenin at the session of the Petrograd Soviet of March 12, 1919 ("Severnaya Kommuna," March 14, 1919), indicates the same:

We can understand the activities of the Council of People's Commissaries for the last year only if we assess the rôle of the Soviets on the scale of the world revolution. Often the daily routine of administration and details that could not be avoided in the work of construction are pushing us to one side and forcing us to forget the great task of world revolution. But only when we assess the rôle of the Soviets on the world scale will we be able properly to handle the details of our internal life and regu-

late them properly. The task of construction depends entirely on how soon revolution will triumph in the more important countries of Europe. Only after such a victory shall we be able seriously to undertake the work of construction. The expert accountants from Berne speak of us as the champions of the tactics of violence, but in referring to this they do not see what the bourgeoisie is doing in their own countries, namely, that it is governing exclusively by violence.

In theory, the "dictatorship of the proletariat" is the class-rule of a minority, the city workman. The "poorest peasantry," that is, the proletarian element among the peasants, are accepted as collaborators; but the peasantry as a whole is to be led by the urban proletariat. (Summary of article by Carl Radek in the *Communist*, an official organ of the Russian Communist Party, of April 20, 1918.) The Soviet Government styles itself the "Workmen's and Peasants' Government," but even theoretically it has been primarily the government of the urban proletariat. To bring the peasants into line the workmen thrown out of employment, who had returned to their former villages, were organized as "Committees of the Poor," to control the villages in the interests of the urban proletariat. (This maneuver is described in detail by Larin, president of the Supreme Soviet of National Economy, in the *Izvestia* of September 10, 1918.)

Only recently (since May, 1919) have the Bolsheviks taken a different attitude toward the peasantry. As the result of the increase of discontent and even uprisings in the peasant villages, the Bolsheviks have made a new "class division" of the peasantry. They have "discovered" the class of "middle peasants," as opposed to the "poorest peasants," and the "rich peasants," and at the eleventh hour are endeavoring to conciliate this largest section of the peasantry.

In an address before an extraordinary session of the Moscow Soviet on April 3, 1919, Lenin said:

We must seek new sources of strength among the working classes; we must attract the village medium classes. These medium classes can develop their strength knowing that working

with them are more experienced persons who have had a year's experience. Yes, the advance guard of the working class is worn out. It may be that the medium classes will not do so well, but we shall not lose much by this.

Mensheviks and social revolutionists fall into two classes. There's a group of specialists and officials who are working for us. These are not counter-revolutionists and as long as they work we do not care whether they believe in the constituent assembly or even in God if they want to. The other class which only enters our ranks in order to stir up strikes must be crushed. (Izvestia, April 5, 1919.)

(See also Appendix III, Lenin's Report to the Eighth Congress of the Communist Party, March, 1919; and Appendix IV, speech of Kalinin, the president of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of Soviets.) Then, too, they needed the peasants in the Red Army, as shown by the following announcement:

From the central committee of the Russian Communist Party:

The central committee of the Russian Communist Party announces the following:

"To all provincial committees of the Communist Party, to Provincial Military Commissaries.

"The All-Russian Central Executive Committee of Soviets, at the session of April 23, unanimously adopted the decree to bring the middle and poor peasants into the struggle against the counter-revolution. According to this decree, every canton must send 10 to 20 strong, capable soldiers, who can act as nuclei for Red Army units in those places to which they will be sent." (Petrograd Pravda, May 1, 1919.)

2

ELECTIONS TO SOVIETS

How elections in Soviet Russia actually take place can not be fully established. Detailed accounts of elections, particularly the elections to the local Soviets which are supposed to be the basis of the Soviet system of representation, have not been found in the Bolshevik newspapers. Theoretically, the

constitution of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic specifically provides for unequal representation of workmen and peasants, the inequality being in favor of the workmen. (Art. 53.) The committees of poor peasants mentioned above, composed mainly of workmen thrown out of employment by the collapse of industry, replaced peasant "Village Soviets" in October, 1918, when the latter were found to be acting "contrary to the constitution." (*Izvestia*, October 10, 1918.) The accounts of the Petrograd Soviet elections of July, 1919 (*Petrograd Pravda*, July 5, 1919), give the returns of the election in such broad statements that no analysis of the system of elections is possible, except the generalization that the elections are by factories, regiments, Soviet institutions (employees), and trade unions. It would seem that the soldiers of the Red Army are given disproportionate representation as compared with the workmen of Petrograd.

A side light on the system of election and representation is given in the following news item from the *Izvestia* of the Petrograd Soviet, July 3, 1919:

Teachers and other cultural-educational workers this year for the first time will be able, in an organized manner through their union, to take an active part in the work of the Petrograd Soviet of Deputies. This is the first and most difficult examination for the working intelligentsia of the above-named categories. Comrades and citizens, scholars, teachers, and other cultural workers, stand this test in a worthy manner! . . .

Many observers from Russia have furnished accounts of the arbitrary manner in which the Bolshevik leaders have controlled elections, of which the following is a typical example. This account, from a landlord for whose bias due allowance must be made, was secured by an American representative in June, 1919 (see Appendix XIII):

Considering this discontent and hatred, it would seem that elections to different councils (Soviets) would produce candidates of other parties, nevertheless all councils consist of communists. The explanation is very plain. That freedom of election of which

the Bolsheviks write and talk so much consists in the free election of certain persons, a list of which had already been prepared. For instance, if in one district six delegates have to be elected, seven to eight names are mentioned, of which six can be chosen. Very characteristic in this respect were the elections February last in the district of . . . Moscow Province, where I had one of my estates. Nearly all voters, about 200, of which 12 were communists, came to the district town. Seven delegates had to be elected and only seven names were on the prepared list, naturally all communists. The local Soviet invited the 12 communistic voters to a house, treated them with food, tea, and sugar, and gave each 10 rubles per day; the others received nothing, not even housing. But they, knowing what they had to expect from former experiences, had provided for such an emergency and decided to remain to the end. The day of election was fixed and put off from day to day. After four postponements the Soviet saw no way out. The result was that the seven delegates elected by all against 12 votes belonged to the Octobrists and Constitutional-Democrats. But these seven and a number of the wealthier voters were immediately arrested as agitators against the Soviet Republic. New elections were announced three days later, but this time the place was surrounded by machine guns. The next day official papers announced the unanimous election of communists in the district of Vereia. After a short time peasant revolts started. To put down these, Chinese and Letts were sent and about 300 peasants were killed. Then began arrests, but it is not known how many were executed.

3

EXTRAORDINARY COMMISSIONS

The "Extraordinary Commissions to Combat Counter-Revolution, Speculation, and Sabotage," were introduced in the first months of the Bolshevik régime. The local Extraordinary Commissions were organized by local committees of the Communist Party, and only later was their assumption of governmental functions sanctioned. (Weekly of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission, October 27, 1918.) The Extraordinary Commissions have at moments

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claimed an authority superior to that of the Soviets (Weekly of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commissions, October 27, 1918), and have always been the main instruments of oppression. The All-Russian Extraordinary Commission defines its position in the closing paragraph of a recent proclamation (Izvestia, April 2, 1919):

The All-Russian Extraordinary Commission, established by the will of the Soviet authority to protect the revolution, warns all enemies of the workman class that in order to save hundreds of thousands of innocent victims from the explosions and excesses, in order to save the conquests of the October revolution, it will suppress with a pitiless hand all attempts at uprising and will choke all appeals for the overthrow of the Soviet authority.

[Signed] ALL-RUSSIAN EXTRAORDINARY COMMISSION

From the many proclamations issuing from the Extraordinary Commissions the following have been selected as typical:

COUNTER-REVOLUTIONISTS TO BE SHOT

[From the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission to Combat Counter-Revolution]

The All-Russian Extraordinary Commission to Combat Counter-Revolution, Sabotage, and Speculation, of the Council of People's Commissaries, brings to the notice of all citizens that up to the present time it has been lenient in the struggle against the enemies of the people.

But at the present moment, when the counter-revolution is becoming more impudent every day, inspired by the treacherous attacks of German counter-revolutionists; when the bourgeoisie of the whole world is trying to suppress the advance guard of the revolutionary International, the Russian proletariat, the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission, acting in conformity with the ordinances of the Council of People's Commissaries, sees no other way to combat counter-revolutionists, speculators, marauders, hooligans, obstructionists, and other parasites, except by pitiless destruction at the place of the crime.

Therefore the commission announces that all enemy agents, and counter-revolutionary agitators, speculators, organizers of uprisings or participants in preparations for uprising to overthrow the Soviet authority, all fugitives to the Don to join the

counter-revolutionary armies of Kaledin and Kornilov and the Polish counter-revolutionary legions, sellers and purchasers of arms to be sent to the Finnish White Guard, the troops of Kaledin, Kornilov and Dovbor-Musnitsky, or to arm the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie of Petrograd, will be mercilessly shot by detachments of the commission at the place of the crime.

ALL-RUSSIAN EXTRAORDINARY COMMISSION

PETROGRAD, February 22, 1918

(Krasnaya Gazeta, publication of Petrograd Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, February 23, 1918)

[From the President of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission]

In view of the discovery of a conspiracy which aimed to organize an armed demonstration against the Soviet authority by means of explosions, destruction of railways and fires, the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission warns that demonstrations and appeals of any kind will be suppressed without pity. In order to save Petrograd and Moscow from famine, in order to save hundreds and thousands of innocent victims, the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission will be obliged to take the most severe measures of punishment against all who will appeal for White Guard demonstrations or for attempts at armed uprising.

[Signed]

F. DZERZHINSKY

President of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission

IZVESTIA, April 2, 1919

Wide discretionary powers are given to these Extraordinary Commissions. In April, 1919, Lenin, as president of the Soviet of Defense, sends a telephonogram to the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission in which he says:

In view of the information received, the Soviet of Defense orders that the most urgent measures be taken to suppress all attempts to cause explosions, to destroy railways, and all appeals for strikes.

The Soviet of Defense calls on all workers in the Extraordinary Commission to be specially watchful, and to report to the Soviet of Defense all measures adopted.

(For full text of order see Appendix V.)

The Bolshevik newspapers, especially the official *Izvestia*, have special columns devoted to reports on the activities of the Extraordinary Commissions, which show the range of cases that come under their jurisdiction: Acts of terror, anti-Soviet sermons or agitation, disobedience of orders respecting dwellings and speculation. (See Appendices VI and VII.)

The character and methods of the Extraordinary Commissions are well illustrated by such items as the following, from the *Severnaya Kommuna* of October 17, 1918:

The Extraordinary Commission has organized the placing of police agents in every part of Petrograd. The commission has issued a proclamation to the workmen exhorting them to inform the police of all they know. The bandits, both in word and action, must be forced to recognize that the revolutionary proletariat is watching them strictly.

The following is a communication from the President of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission, reprinted from the *Izvestia*, in the *Russkaya Zhizn* of May 10, 1919:

A whole series of disorders that have taken place recently show that even the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks wish to win the laurels of Krasnov (anti-Bolshevist general).

Their work is devoted entirely to the disorganization of our army (in Briansk, Samara, and Smolensk), and to disruptions of our industries (in Petrograd and Tula), of our transport and food supply services (railway strikes).

The All-Russian Extraordinary Commission herewith declares that it will make no distinction between White Guardists of the Krasnov type and White Guardists of the parties of Mensheviks and Left Socialist-Revolutionaries.

The punishing arm of the Extraordinary Commission will fall with equal severity on the heads of both groups.

The Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks that have been arrested by us will be considered hostages and their fate will depend on the conduct of these two parties.

F. DZERZHINSKY

President of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission

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Newspaper reports that the powers of these Extraordinary Commissions had been recently curtailed were not supported by a report from an American representative of July 2, 1919:

The Extraordinary Commission obtained the right to execute without judgment only in places where martial law was declared. But as the cities are long ago under martial law and in other parts of Soviet Russia martial law can be declared any time, nothing has changed. In fact, prisoners it is desired to shoot without judgment are simply brought to Moscow, as it was done February last with those officers of the organization in Vladimir (For full report of this date, see Appendix XIII.)

Any changes in the personnel of the ruling group in Soviet Russia have to date meant always a more tyrannical régime, as shown by a report from an American representative of September 15, 1919:

Peters has been obliged to resign as commandant of Petrograd and has been replaced by the ex-lawyer Koslovsky, who was known for his relations with German agents during Kerensky's régime. Koslovsky has issued a proclamation saying that all crimes by White Guardists must be considered as committed by the entire bourgeoisie, and therefore all hostages must be killed at the least attempt on the safety of the government, and those guilty must be executed on the spot without trial or judgment.

4

TERROR

The Extraordinary Commissions represent legalized terror, an instrument in the class war which is a fundamental principle of the Bolshevik doctrine. Terror was carried to one of its highest points of development in the fall of 1918. The American Consul-General at Moscow reported as follows on September 3:

The situation of allied citizens here is dangerous but that of the Russians has already become tragic in the extreme. Complete suppression of all but Bolshevik papers since July 1 and imperfect communication abroad have no doubt left the outside

world with hardly more than a suggestion of the true situation in Central Russia.

Since May the so-called extraordinary commission to combat counter-revolution has conducted an openly avowed campaign of terror. Thousands of persons have been summarily shot without even the form of trial. Many of them have no doubt been innocent of even the political views which were supposed to supply the motive of their execution. The assassination of Uritsky and the attempt on Lenin are the results of this high tyranny. Socialists once co-workers with the Bolsheviks have turned against them the methods by which they formerly attacked the tyranny of the czars.

"Mass terror" is the Bolsheviks' reply. The official press publishes today the following from Petrograd: "In connection with the murder of Uritsky five hundred persons have been shot by order of the Petrograd Extraordinary Commission to Combat Counter-Revolution. The names of the persons shot and those of candidates for future shooting, in case of a new attempt on the lives of the Soviet leaders, will be published later." In Moscow "general searches" are being made under general orders to arrest "the better-to-do and all former officers." The ill-administered prisons are filled beyond capacity and every night scores are irresponsibly shot. Sentence is passed on the slightest grounds or the general charge "might be dangerous to the Bolshevik power." The situation cries aloud to all who will act for the sake of humanity.

A copy of this telegram was furnished at the time by the Consul-General to Chicherin, the Bolshevik Commissary for Foreign Affairs, and to Bonch-Bruevich, the Executive Secretary of the Council of People's Commissaries, in the hope that they might be influenced, by consideration of the effect of news of the terror upon public opinion abroad, to endeavor to terminate it. They gave no heed to the protest.

Recourse is also had to mass terror, which is carried on through all agencies of the Government. The following general incitement to terror was telegraphed broadcast in Soviet Russia on September 2, 1918:

Murder of Volodarsky and Uritsky, attempt on Lenin and shooting of masses of our comrades in Finland, Ukania, the Don

and Czecho-Slovakia, continual discovery of conspiracies in our rear, open acknowledgment of Right Social Revolutionary party and other counter-revolutionary rascals of their part in these conspiracies, together with the insignificant extent of serious repressions and mass shooting of White Guards and bourgeoisie on the part of the Soviets, all these things show that notwithstanding frequent pronouncements urging mass terror against the Socialist-Revolutionaries, White Guards and bourgeoisie, no real terror exists.

Such a situation should decidedly be stopped. End should be put to weakness and softness. All Right Socialist-Revolutionaries known to local Soviets should be arrested immediately. Numerous hostages should be taken from the bourgeois and officer classes. At the slightest attempt to resist or the slightest movement among the White Guards, mass shooting should be applied at once. Initiative in this matter rests especially with the local executive committees.

Through the militia and extraordinary commissions, all branches of government must take measures to seek out and arrest persons hiding under false names and shoot without fail anybody connected with the work of the White Guards.

All above measures should be put immediately into execution.

Indecisive action on the part of local Soviets must be immediately reported to People's Commissary for Home Affairs.

The rear of our armies must be finally guaranteed and completely cleared of all kinds of White Guardists, and all despicable conspirators against the authority of the working class and of the poorest peasantry. Not the slightest hesitation or the slightest indecisiveness in applying mass terror.

Acknowledge the receipt of this telegram.

Transmit to district Soviets.

[Signed]

PETROVSKY

Weekly of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission, No. 1, Moscow, September 21, 1918.

Mass terror was again officially instituted in Petrograd in July, 1919; it continues to date according to the latest reports. The following sentences from the proclamation issued by Peters, "To the citizens of Petrograd and environs," are taken from the Izvestia of the Petrograd Soviet for July 4, 1919:

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Mass searches recently conducted with the direct participation of the Petrograd Proletariat and also the voluntary giving up of arms. . . . However, the result of the mass and individual searches that still continue, and the turning in of arms, show that not all of the arms have been given up. . . . Workmen and workwomen of Petrograd: . . . Search the cellars, the attics, sheds, living quarters, and all places. . . . At the same time, in order to meet the weak-spirited and those who do not read orders carefully, I now for the last time fix the time limit for the voluntary giving up of arms. . . . There will be no quarter for those who do not take advantage of this last postponement. Failure to carry out this order will this time be regarded by me as a deliberate, counter-revolutionary ignoring of the ordinances of the Soviet authority, and will call forth a corresponding attitude on my part. (For full text see Appendix VIII.)

Trotsky has tried to justify mass terror (extract from signed article in *Izvestia* of January 10, 1919, under title "Military specialists and the Red Army"):

By its terror against saboteurs the proletariat does not at all say: "I shall wipe out all of you and get along without specialists." Such a program would be a program of hopelessness and ruin. While dispersing, arresting and shooting saboteurs and conspirators, the proletariat says: "I shall break your will, because my will is stronger than yours, and I shall force you to serve me." . . . Terror, as the demonstration of the will and strength of the working class, is historically justified, precisely because the proletariat was able thereby to break the political will of the Intelligentsia, pacify the professional men of various categories and work, and gradually subordinate them to its own aims within the fields of their specialties.

5

CLASS DISCRIMINATION IN FOOD RATIONS

In the fall of 1918, the Bolsheviks began a discrimination in the distribution of food, which operates, on the one hand, to lessen opposition through starvation, and on the other, to bring into the ranks of their active supporters many uncon-

vinced but despairing recruits. By this system, which still subsists (see Appendices IX, X and XI), the population is divided into categories along occupational and class lines, and receives food, so far as food may be available, in accordance with a scale which is adjusted with a view to the maintenance of the Bolsheviks in power and the fulfillment of their program for the extinction of the middle classes. The ration given to members of the Red Army is estimated by the *Izvestia* of February 6, 1919, to be three times the average for the several categories of the civil population. The following is taken from an article by a Bolshevik official, in an *Izvestia* of May 1-14, 1919, describing what happened in the Volga district as the Bolsheviks advanced:

Instructions were received from Moscow to forbid free trade, and to introduce the class system of feeding. After much confusion, this made the population starve in a short time, and rebel against the food dictatorship. . . . "Was it necessary to introduce the class system of feeding into the Volga district so haphazardly?" asks the writer. "Oh no. There was enough bread ready for shipment in that region, and in many places it was rotting, because of the lack of railroad facilities. The class feeding system did not increase the amount of bread . . . it did create, together with the inefficient policy, and the lack of a distribution system, a state of starvation, which provoked dissatisfaction."

6

RED ARMY

The Red Army ceased to be an army of volunteers by May of 1918. At first only the workmen and poorest peasants of certain districts were mobilized (Ordinance of All-Russian Central Executive Committee of May 16, 1918). Later all classes were mobilized (Mobilization Order No. 4, *Izvestia*, September 26, 1918), and by this order the local military commissariats, the heads of families, presidents of Soviets, of committees of poverty, factory committees and house committees, at the place of work or residence of the man called to

the colors, were held responsible for the non-appearance of the conscripted citizen. "Regimental committees, acting as administrative organs, can not exist in the Soviet army," says a pamphlet issued by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee in 1918. The organization of the Red Army will be studied, it is expected, in a subsequent memorandum. Attention is called to the Red Army at this point because it also illustrates the oppressive character of the Bolshevik rule. It is used to handle the growing discontent, to solve the unemployment problem, and to collect food through "requisitioning detachments." The Red Army is the instrument of a minority. Great care is taken in selecting the soldiers for the actual combat corps:

DECREE ON MOBILIZATION OF PEASANTS

The meaning of the decree that is introduced on the initiative of the Council of People's Commissaries is that each Canton must furnish 10 to 20 fighters who are tested cooperators of the Soviet authority and have been recommended by the cantonal executive committees. Experience has shown that it is better to take a small number of class conscious fighters than an enormous mass of unconscious. The decree is adopted unanimously. (Petrograd Pravda, April 27, 1919.)

RESOLUTION OF PETERSBURG SOVIET

For the struggle against Kolchak, the Petersburg Soviet decrees to mobilize 10 per cent of all members of trade unions and 20 per cent of all communists and "candidates." To this end men are to be replaced in all Executive Committees, Commissariats, Unions of the Youth, organs of the Proletcult (Proletarian Culture), etc., by women, and for those mobilized whose years have not been called in, the conditions of subsistence and salary remain the same as previously published. . . ." (Petrograd Pravda, April 27, 1919.)

Writing in the Petrograd Pravda of August 12, 1919, Trotsky used the following expressions:

The mobilization of the 19-year-old and part of the 18-year-old men, the inrush of the peasants who before refused to appear in

answer to the mobilization decree, all of this is creating a powerful, almost inexhaustible, source from which to build up our army. . . . From now on any resistance to local authorities, any attempt to retain and protect any valuable and experienced military worker is deliberate sabotage. . . . No one should dare to forget that all Soviet Russia is an armed camp. . . . All Soviet institutions are obliged, immediately, within the next months, not only to furnish officers' schools with the best quarters, but, in general, they must furnish these schools with such material and special aids as will make it possible for the students to work in the most intensive manner.

7

SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION AND EDUCATION

Bolshevist programs for social reconstruction and education are comprehensive and in some respects good. Many decrees have been issued on this subject, but Lenin explained to the Eighth Congress of the Communist Party:

If we had expected that the whole life of the village could be changed by the writing of thousands of decrees, we certainly would have been complete idiots; but if we had failed to indicate the road in decrees, we would have been traitors to Socialism. These decrees, which in actual practice would not be carried out immediately and fully, have played an enormous rôle for propaganda. (For full text of this speech, see Appendix III.)

An analysis of these measures, with an attempt to determine to what extent they have been actually realized, will, it is hoped, be given in a subsequent memorandum. In the two centers, Petrograd and Moscow, something seems to have been accomplished, but the descriptions of conditions in peasant villages given in the following paragraphs indicate that the "proletarian culture" has not reached very far.

8

PEASANT PROTESTS

The peasants particularly have felt the tyranny of the "dictatorship of the proletariat," as applied by representatives

of the Soviet authority. The Bolshevik leaders themselves realize what has developed in actual practice and try vainly to check the current they started by appeals to their collaborators (see Lenin's Report to Eighth Congress of Communist Party, Appendix III), or by themselves exposing the true facts of the situation, as in the following articles selected from the Moscow Izvestias of May 1-14, 1919:

From the Province of Vitebsk the following letter came to the Izvestia:

"Of late there has been going on in the village a really scandalous orgy. It is necessary to call attention to the destructive work of the scoundrels who worked themselves into responsible positions. Evidently all the good and unselfish beginnings of the workmen's and peasants' authority were either purposely or unintentionally perverted by these adventurers in order to undermine the confidence of the peasants in the existing government in order to provoke dissatisfaction and rebellion. It is no exaggeration to say that no open counter-revolutionary or enemy of the proletariat has done as much harm to the socialist republic as the charlatans of this sort. Take, as an instance, the third district of the government of Vitebsk, the county of Veliashkov. Here the taxes imposed upon the peasants were as follows: P. Stoukov, owning 17 desiatins, was compelled to pay a tax of 5,000 rubles, while U. Voprit, owning 24 desiatins, paid only 500 rubles. S. Grigoriev paid 2,000 on 29 desiatins, while Ivan Tselov paid 8,000 on 23 desiatins." (Quoting some more instances the writer adds that the soil was alike in all cases. He then brings some examples of the wrongs committed by the requisitioning squads.)

Latkin, a Red Army soldier, returned from a journey through several counties of the Province of Moscow, gave to the Izvestia of May 7, 1919, the following description of the frame of mind of the peasant, which he describes as very gloomy:

The peasants are dissatisfied with the war, are against the Red Army, and therefore give protection to deserters and persuade the soldiers not to obey orders. The middle peasant is beginning to cooperate with the village capitalists in their resis-

tance to the Soviet authorities. (The *Izvestia* adds to the story of Latkin its own comment, consisting of a question as to why the peasants are dissatisfied and takes Latkin to task for not suggesting remedies and for having failed to enlighten the peasants.)

From a village in the Province of Tambov one Vopatin writes to the *Izvestia*, as follows:

Help! we are perishing! At the time when we are starving, do you know what is going on in the villages? Take for instance, our village, Olkhi. Speculation is rife there, especially with salt, which sells at 40 rubles a pound. What does the militia do? What do the Soviets do? When it is reported to them, they wave their hands and say, "This is a normal phenomenon." Not only this, but the militiamen, beginning with the chief and including some communists, are all engaged in brewing their own alcohol, which sells for 70 rubles a bottle. Nobody who is in close touch with the militia is afraid to engage in this work. Hunger is ahead of us, but neither the citizens nor the "authorities" recognize it. The people's judge also drinks, and if one wishes to win a case one only needs to treat him to a drink. We live in a terrible filth. There is no soap. People and horses all suffer from skin diseases. Epidemics are inevitable in the summer. If Moscow will pay no attention to us, then we shall perish. We had elections for the village and county Soviets, but the voting occurred in violation of the constitution of the Soviet Government.

As a result of this a number of village capitalists, who, under the guise of communists, entered the party in order to avoid the requisitions and contributions, were elected. The laboring peasantry is thus being turned against the Government, and this at a time when the hosts of Kolchak are advancing from the east.

The following statement is taken from the report on a Bolshevik investigation of peasant uprisings (*Izvestias*, May 1-14, 1919):

The local communists behave with rare exceptions abominably, and it was only with the greatest difficulty that we were able to explain to the peasants that we also were communists.

SUMMARY

An American representative at the Finnish frontier gathering information from refugees from Soviet Russia, reports as follows, under dates of June 25 and July 2, 1919:

The fall of Bolshevism, which seemed inevitable even two months ago, has created the wildest terrorism. People are executed without trial in masses on mere suspicion of sympathy with the Soviet's enemies. . . . Terror and necessity compel work for the Soviet Government but this work is much encumbered by theory, inexperience, and corruption. . . . There will be a slaughtering of Bolsheviks as soon as the deliverers are near the centers and the Red terror ceases to be feared, but terror, hunger, and disease have temporarily created apathy. . . . The strength of the Bolsheviks lies in their organization. Terror, combined with most elaborate espionage at home and propaganda in and behind the ranks of the enemy make them still a formidable force.

Terror is daily increasing and people are being shot not only for agitation against the Soviet Government but for any other accusation. The fact of not being in the Soviet service, of having relatives who are abroad, or the possibility of intending to join a new government is sufficient reason for execution. . . . Espionage and provocation are developed to the highest perfection. Agents of the Extraordinary Commissions are everywhere, in all departments, railroad carriages, streets, and private houses. (For full texts of these reports, see Appendices XII and XIII.)

II

ECONOMIC RESULTS OF BOLSHEVIST CONTROL

I

BLAME ON OTHERS

The economic collapse of Soviet Russia is admitted by the Bolsheviks themselves, as is seen in some of the quotations from their own newspapers given below. The Bolsheviks,

however, blame the incompetence of the old Czarist régime, and of the Lvov and Kerensky governments, and economic isolation or blockade for the desperate situation to which they have brought Russia. Some of these factors have indeed contributed to the breakdown of the economic life of the country. But Bolshevik theories and methods have unquestionably been the main cause of the chaos one finds in Soviet Russia after two years of the Bolshevik régime.

2

ABANDONMENT OF PRINCIPLES

The admitted failure and consequent abandonment of many of their economic tenets may, it is hoped, be analyzed in a subsequent memorandum. "Nationalization" in the sense of "communization" of the land would seem to have been definitely rejected, though only during the last months. The Supreme Soviet of National Economy, the highest Soviet authority for all economic problems, has come under the control of a very small group of men. Workmen's control was abolished after a few months of trial. These facts are frankly admitted by the Bolsheviks themselves.

3

POLICY OF DESTRUCTION

During the first period the avowed aim of the Bolsheviks was first of all to destroy all the institutions of the old order. (See Lenin's Theses of March, 1919, Appendix II.) It was emphasized that this had to be done before constructive work could be undertaken. In October, 1918, the constructive period was supposed to have arrived. But as it was somehow delayed in economic fields, the Bolshevik sympathizers began to emphasize constructive efforts along social and educational lines. As already pointed out, social reconstruction and educational work has been limited to the

constantly decreasing minority of the urban proletariat in the large cities. The majority of those who have observed the Bolsheviks at work, unanimously agree that there has been little evidence of constructive accomplishments, even when the Bolsheviks abandon their principles, falling back into some of the so-called capitalistic methods, and bringing in "bourgeois" experts. Others emphasize that the majority of the Bolshevik administrators have practised and extended the generally recognized, and condemned, abuses of the "capitalist" system, to the distress of such idealists as may be among them. (See reports on All-Russian Extraordinary Commissions, which combat speculation, as well as counter-revolution and sabotage, Appendix VI.)

4

THE BUDGET

It is naturally difficult to document from the Bolshevik newspapers the statement respecting the absence of constructive accomplishments. They publish their budget for the first half year of 1919, showing a deficit of some 30,000,000,000 rubles. A study of the items of this budget shows the large expenditures for their governmental machinery: "All-Russian Central Executive Committee—459,156,743 rubles"; and enormous appropriations for the "Red Army—12,149,770,487 rubles." The Bolshevik publicists, in discussing the budget, try to explain away this enormous deficit. (See article in *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn*, May 21, 1919, Appendix XIV.) One writer, in the *Severnaya Komuna* of March 23, 1919, finds the solution:

The deficit of 28,744,702,112 rubles can be covered only by emission of paper money. This is an inevitable situation until the economic restoration of the country, and until the government has at its disposition, as the result of the nationalization of production and commerce, the greater part of the articles of consumption. The economic restoration depends on the recon-

stitution of Russia and its entering into commercial relations with foreign countries.

The writer, however, calls attention to the depreciation of the ruble, and to the general high cost of living and shortage of products in other countries:

The budget figures are certainly colossal, but it is necessary to consider the depreciation of the ruble; 50,000,000,000 rubles become in reality 5,000,000,000, which is normal in view of contemporary high cost of living and shortage of products in the whole world.

5

ISSUE OF PAPER MONEY

The Bolsheviks have in fact resorted to the expedient of issuing more paper money to meet the crisis they have produced. The *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* (May 21, 1919), which is the most important official publication on economic matters, gives the following table of the amount of paper money in circulation:

	Rubles
Issues before the revolution (March 1917) . . .	9,950,000,000
Issued by the Kerensky government	8,967,000,000
Issued by Bolsheviks to January, 1919	36,353,000,000
	Rubles
In the form of Czar rubles (approximately). .	20,000,000,000
Issued before the revolution (March, 1917). .	9,950,000,000
Czar rubles printed and issued by Bolsheviks .	10,050,000,000
In the form of Duma and Kerensky rubles . .	35,270,500,000
Issued by Kerensky government	8,967,000,000
Duma and Kerensky rubles issued by Bolsheviks	26,303,500,000

These figures are exclusive of the various issues made in order to supply local needs at various times.

In order to meet this situation, the following decree was issued on May 15, 1919:

For the purpose of gradual conversion of all the paper currency at present in circulation, which state of affairs is not in accord

with the principles of the new form of government existing in Russia, as well as for the sake of excluding from circulation of the various money substitutes, which have been issued to meet the shortage of paper currency, the Council of People's Commissaries has decreed to issue a new paper currency (1918 model) on the following basis:

1. The new bills will be issued in denominations of 1, 3, 5, 10, 25, 50, 100, 250, 500, and 1,000 rubles.

2. The aforesaid bills will be legal tender on the whole territory of the Russian Socialistic Federated Soviet Republic for any amount and in any institutions.

3. All moneys in circulation at present continue as legal tender on the same basis as the new money. The People's Commissariat for Finance shall determine dates and regulations governing the redemption of all moneys in circulation now for the new bills.

4. The emission of the new bills of 1918 model is to begin on the 1st of June, 1919, in the usual manner by the People's Bank.

5. The People's Bank has the right to issue bills above the limit established by the decree of December 25, 1918, in accordance with the actual needs of state economy in money.

V. ULIANOV (LENIN)

President of the Council of People's Commissaries

N. KRESTINSKY

People's Commissary for Finances

V. BONCH-BRUEVICH

Executive Secretary

L. FOTIEVA

Secretary.

Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn, May 21, 1919.

This decree refers to redemption of former issues, regulations for which will be published later. What the Bolsheviks really have in mind is to force the peasants to sell their products. This was explained very frankly by one of the commissaries:

Currency plans. Zorin tells me that the Soviet Government has or had printed a new issue of currency which it is proposed to exchange for the old currency within the next three months. The details of the plan have not been completed, but he thinks that an

exchange of ruble for ruble will be made up to 3,000; an additional 2,000 will be placed on deposit in the Government bank. That beyond 5,000 only a small percentage will be allowed to anyone, and that a limit of possibly 15,000 will be placed beyond which no rubles will be exchanged. Then the plan is, after a certain period, to declare the old ruble valueless. Zorin feels that as a result of this plan the new ruble will have some value and that the present situation in the country in which the farmer has so much paper that he refuses to sell any longer for money, will be relieved. This exchange would be followed later on by the issue of still other currency, the entire purpose being the more equal distribution of wealth and the gradual approach to elimination of currency. (Memorandum of W. W. Pettit, April 4, 1919, to American Peace Mission. Hearings on Treaty of Peace with Germany before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, p. 1288.)

6

DISORGANIZATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINERY

The complete disorganization of the administrative machinery is frankly admitted by Rykov, the president of the Supreme Soviet of National Economy, in a statement to the Moscow Soviet on March 4, 1919:

We have 100,000,000 puds of coal, 10,000,000 puds of grain, and several million puds of fish at our disposal which we can not move. In the spring a part will spoil. Transport is impossible, as we have no fuel, and the situation regarding the want of it is that 2,000,000 puds of machine oil had to be used as substitute for want of liquid fuel. Railroad communication will have to be reduced, which will again reflect on the supply of food. We have, therefore, to utilize transport by river as soon as navigation is opened. We also will have to fight with the local Soviets, who often hide their stocks, as for instance the Yaroslav Soviet hiding 500,000 puds of petroleum. The textile industry is also in a critical state; up to 10,000,000 puds of cotton is wanted and flax is scarce, as the peasants spin for their own want or use it for heating purposes. A way out of these difficulties would be to take the Caucasus with its supply of petroleum and to increase productiveness of labor. At present we produce only 5 pairs of

boots for 100 people, and however so many Kerensky rubles we would pay to workmen only 1 in 20 can receive a pair. (Severnaya Kommuna, March 7, 1919.)

7

PRODUCTIVITY OF LABOR

The official organ of the trade unions of Petrograd, the Trud, of April 28, 1919, in discussing the closing down of nineteen textile mills, notes the following reasons for the economic chaos:

Of great significance in our textile crisis is also the inefficient using of what could be used, as the productiveness of labor has dropped to nil, while there is not even a hint of labor discipline, and the machines have become useless as the result of careless handling, and their productive capacity lowered.

A similar situation had developed in Moscow:

At a conference of the main administrative boards of textile enterprises the question of closing down textile factories was discussed. As a result of the debates it was resolved to consider inexpedient the closing down of factories, to recognize as necessary only the partial closing down in dependence on local conditions and the situation of the various enterprises of the textile industry.

It was also resolved to take measures to preserve the basic groups of workmen in these enterprises, and to establish them in necessary work during the period of the closing down of factories. It was also resolved to use the period of closure to make repairs and to lay in supplies of raw material and fuel, and also to use these workmen for agricultural work. The question of closing down all textile industries will be decided finally at a joint conference of representatives of the main administrative board and of the trade union of textile workers. (Moscow Izvestia, April 3, 1919.)

8

INDUSTRIAL COLLAPSE

One of the results of the disorganization of the textile industry was the following:

[31]

The official estimate of cloth needs for Moscow for 1919, its population being given as 600,000 adult males, 700,000 adult females, and 300,000 children, is as follows:

	Arsheens
Heavy cloth	2,366,670
Light cloth	12,116,670
Cotton cloth	52,066,670

During September, October, and November altogether 5,000,000 arsheens of cloth have been issued to the population, which is considered one-third of the actual needs. (Izvestia, February 6, 1919.)

Other branches of industry were collapsing in the late autumn of 1918, at the very moment when it was said that the "constructive period" had arrived in Soviet Russia:

The quantity of benzine is so small that "Provodnik," (one of the largest rubber manufacturing enterprises of Russia), has only enough to last for two months; the factories of "Bogatyr" are still more inadequately supplied with rubber. The stocks of rubber are barely sufficient for another two months' production. The number of workmen employed has fallen from 32,000 to 7,500. (From the official Bolshevik newspaper, National Economy and Finances, November 12, 1918.)

The disorganization of sugar manufacture and beet-root production led to an almost total lack of sugar. The occupation of the Ukraine by the Germans was emphasized as the cause of this particular crisis. There was frank admission, however, that disorganization within Soviet Russia also was a contributing factor. The Red Army was to be supplied with sugar, however:

A total lack of sugar is inevitable. Out of the 238 sugar manufacturing factories, only 32 are on the territory actually belonging to the Soviets. The majority of these factories are out of working order. On the other hand, the land planted with beet roots is very inconsiderable. At the most it would only be possible to produce 7,000,000 puds of sugar if the ground planted (actually 10,000 desiatins) were increased to 70,000 desiatins. The population needs at least 35,000,000 puds of sugar. Therefore, it is to be feared that only the Red Army will be able to obtain sugar

next year. (Official newspaper, National Economy and Finances, November 12, 1918.)

Many other Bolshevik statements, such as the following, might be quoted to show the economic chaos that has come to Soviet Russia under the Bolshevik economic program:

Out of 33 cement factories existing in Russia, only 14 are in a position to be used, but on account of the shortage of fuel, none of those factories are working at present. The reserves of cement amount to 1,080,000 tons, whereas formerly, the annual production amounted to 18,000,000 tons. If 50 per cent of the present actual annual production of coal were used for the production of cement only three factories could work, thus producing the annual output of 1,600,000 tons. (National Economy and Finances, November 12, 1919.)

9

BREAKDOWN OF TRANSPORTATION

The breakdown of all means of transportation has been the most serious aspect of the situation. Even river transportation, which is of great importance in Russia, has become disorganized:

Fifty per cent of the Russian internal steam and sailing mercantile fleet was not in a condition to resume navigation at the beginning of the present season, on account of the lack of workers, fuel, and the decrease in laborers' productivity. Altogether 1,407 steamers were registered and 2,146 other boats. (Moscow Izvestias, May 1-14, 1919.)

The railways are going to pieces in the literal sense of the phrase; locomotives have been scrapped at a disastrous rate and few are being produced:

At a meeting held in connection with the strike at the Putilov factory, Zinoviev said that from August, 1918, to February, 1919, the factory had only turned out 5 locomotives. For the year 1918 the factory had cost the State a deficit of 58,000,000 rubles. (Severnaya Kommuna, March 15, 1919.)

An American representative reports from Finland, under date of August 27, 1919:

A report of the Commissariat of Railroads shows that there are only 250 locomotives now in commission in Soviet Russia. Of these 21 are operating on the Nicholas Railroad (Petrograd-Moscow).

The incompetence of the Bolshevik administrative departments has been described in published accounts by Russians who have served under the Soviet Government. German and English newspapers have published the personal experiences in Soviet offices of British employees or German prisoners who had joined and worked with the Bolsheviks. Items in Bolshevik newspapers give less detailed but very definite pictures of muddling and lack of foresight:

From August, 1918, to February 20, 1919, the food supply department had bought up or requisitioned 82,633,582 puds of grain. Of this amount 22,245,172 puds could not be moved owing to the shortage of engines. A considerable portion of the above grain has since rotted. (Pravda, March 15, 1919.)

The latest reports from American representatives stationed on the border of Soviet Russia give the prevailing prices in Petrograd for September 1, 1919:

Butter, 360 rubles a pound; salt, 91 rubles a pound; black bread, 130 rubles a pound; dog meat, 90 rubles a pound; and wood, 2,000 rubles a sazhen (approximately a half cord).

10

FOOD SUPPLY

A catastrophic situation with respect to the food supply is the natural result of what has been described above. This is reflected in the decree of the Council of People's Commissaries of February 28, 1919:

At the present moment horses are being killed for meat in large quantities and in a disorganized manner. Not only are horses that can not be used in the army or for work being killed, but also horses which might be used successfully by the peasants.¹

This state of affairs threatens catastrophe, interfering with the proper supply of the army, and also of the peasants, who in spring may not have sufficient horses to cultivate the fields.

In order to protect the horses within the limits of Petrograd:
 (1) It is absolutely forbidden to kill horses capable of work; (2) may be killed for meat horses with diseases, defects and wounds which make them incapable of work, and also such as have been discarded by the army, which can not be used for any kind of work; (3) the determination of incapacity of horses for work is entrusted to veterinary departments of Soviet institutions on whose orders horses may be killed . . . ; (4) horses deliberately crippled or made incapable of work in order to secure permission to kill will be confiscated and turned over to the local supply organs, and all persons guilty of such acts as well as persons found killing horses without the permission indicated in point (3) will be brought to trial before the Revolutionary Tribunal.

V. ULIANOV (LENIN)

President of Council of People's Commissaries

V. BONCH-BRUEVICH

Executive Secretary

L. FOTIEVA

Secretary

IZVESTIA, February 28, 1919

II

DISTRESS IN AGRICULTURAL DISTRICTS

Economic distress is not confined to the cities. An American representative reports from Finland under date of July 2, 1919:

The agricultural situation is desperate. All farm equipment stolen from the landlords' estates at beginning of the revolution is now spoilt, and there is no one to repair it, and it would not be of much use anyway as there are no seeds, and persons possessing do not intend sowing them, but try to sell on the sly, as the Bolsheviks took the last autumn crop from the peasants at a low figure. Peasants just cultivate sufficient for their own needs and a quantity, which is allowed, is kept. Former private estates are managed by a commission of all kinds of rabble or by a Soviet steward. In most cases all that was left of the estate has disappeared; enormous accounts are presented and money received, and except immense losses the estate produces nothing. Live

stock formerly stolen and sold by the Bolsheviks now is requisitioned from the richer peasants. (For full text see Appendix XIII.)

12

SUMMARY

A well-known Russian Socialist and Revolutionist, Gregory Alexinsky, came out from Soviet Russia in the late spring of this year. He was interviewed for the Copenhagen Socialdemokraten and the interview was forwarded to Washington. This able summary of economic conditions in Soviet Russia has already been released to the press by the Department of State:

The condition of affairs in Bolshevik Russia is very distressing. The majority of the industrial enterprises are not operating. In the Moscow district 63 textile factories stopped working last fall, and the same picture appears with respect to the textile industry in the vicinity of Ivanovo-Vozesensk near Petrograd, etc. The chemical industry, the paper industry, and many others are likewise in a miserable condition.

The Bolshevik Government has done everything to keep the work going in the plants that produce ammunition, but nevertheless many of them are shut down. Owing to the lack of rolling stock transportation is not good. Locomotives and cars needing repairs are so numerous that the workshops are unable to cope with the repairs.

In order to increase production in Russia the Bolsheviks already have reintroduced the forms which existed prior to the socialization, particularly payment for the 'piecework, the premium system, etc. In short, parity of wages does not exist.

This lamentable picture of our industry's decay has, he continues, led to terrible complications for the workmen on account of the great shortage of provisions and an enormous increase in prices. Bread, "black bread," rye bread because there is no wheat left, costs 35 to 40 rubles per pound in Petrograd; sugar, 180 to 200 rubles per pound; butter, 140 to 180 rubles; tea, 200 rubles; men's footwear, 1,200 to 1,500 rubles per pair, etc. Horse meat costs 30 rubles per pound. In Moscow prices are about on the same scale. On the big market in Moscow (Sucharevskaya)

dog meat is being sold openly, and the official financial gazette publishes statistics showing fluctuations in the price of such meat (5 to 7 rubles per pound). Even a box of matches costs between 3½ and 4 rubles.

On account of shortage of provisions, fuel, soap, and other commodities that are absolutely indispensable for the public health and welfare contagious diseases are spreading everywhere. In Moscow the official statistical bureau calculates 10,000 cases of contagious diseases per week; of that number 8,000 cases are typhoid fever. In Petrograd 30 per cent. of the patients in the communal hospitals die of ordinary consumption which is the result of famine.

In Petrograd there are only 700,000 inhabitants left out of 2½ millions.

(For full text of interview see Appendix XV.)

APPENDICES

I

PROCLAMATION CALLING THE FIRST CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

[Rosta, Official Telegraph Agency of the Bolsheviks, February 24, 1919.]

COMRADES: The undersigned parties and organizations consider it indispensable to call the first congress of the new Revolutionary International. During the war and the revolution it has become clear not only that the old socialistic and social-democratic parties have gone bankrupt, and the Second International with them, and that the elements included among the old Social-Democracy (the so-called "Center") were incapable of active revolutionary activity, but also that already now the framework is ready for the real revolutionary international. The gigantic pace of the world revolution which gives rise to new problems, the danger that this revolution may be killed by the alliance of the capitalistic states, which organize a "League of Nations" against the revolution, the attempt of the "traitor-socialists" to gather, and after having "amnestied" each other, to assist their governments and the bourgeoisie again to betray the working class, and finally in view of revolutionary experience and for the

purpose of internationalizing the whole course of the revolution, we were induced to take the initiative in placing on the order of the day the question of calling the revolutionary proletarian parties to an international congress.

AIM AND TACTIC

According to our opinion, the new International must be based on the recognition of the following principles, which we present as the platform and which have been worked out in accordance with the programs of the "Spartacus Association" in Germany and the Communist (Bolshevik) Party in Russia:

1. The present is the period of destruction and crushing of the capitalistic system of the whole world, and it will be a catastrophe for the whole European culture, should capitalism with all its insoluble contradictions not be done away with.

2. The aim of the proletariat must now be immediately to conquer power. To conquer power means to destroy the governmental apparatus of the bourgeoisie and to organize a new proletarian governmental apparatus.

3. The new apparatus of the Government must express the dictatorship of the working class (and in certain places even the dictatorship of the half-proletariat in the villages, that is the peasant proletariat), that is, to persist in the systematic suppression of the exploiting classes and be the means of expropriating them. No false bourgeois democracy—this treacherous form of the power of a financial oligarchy—with its mere external equality—but a proletarian democracy able to realize the freedom of the working masses; no parliamentarism, but the self-government of the masses through their elected organs; no capitalistic bureaucracy, but governing organs which have been appointed by the masses themselves, through the real participation of these masses in the governing of the country and the socialistic work of reorganization—such ought to be the type of the proletarian state. The Soviet power or a corresponding organization of government is its concrete expression.

4. The dictatorship of the proletariat must be the occasion for the immediate expropriation of capital and the elimination of the private right of owning the means of production, through making them common public property. The socialization (meaning doing away with private property and making it the

property of the proletarian state, which is managed by the workers on a socialistic basis) of the large-scale industries and the central bodies organized by the same, including the banks, the confiscation of the capitalistic agricultural production, the monopolization of large-scale commerce; the socialization of the large buildings in the towns and in the country; the establishment of a workmen's government and the concentration of the economic functions in the hands of the organs of the proletarian dictatorship—are the most essential aims of the day.

5. In order to protect the socialist revolution against external and internal enemies, and to assist the fighting proletariats of other countries, it becomes necessary to entirely disarm the bourgeoisie and its agents and to arm the proletariat.

6. The world situation demands immediate and as perfect as possible relations between the different groups of the revolutionary proletariat and a complete alliance of all the countries, in which the revolution has already succeeded.

7. The most important method is the mass action of the proletariat, including armed struggle against the Government power of capitalists.

ATTITUDE TOWARD SOCIALIST PARTIES

8. The old International has been divided in three main groups: the frank Socialist-Chauvinists, who, during the whole imperialistic war, 1914-1918, supported the bourgeoisie and undertook the rôle of executioners of the laborers' revolution; the "Center," the theoretical leader of which is Kautsky, and which within itself contains mostly wavering elements, who are unable to follow any decided lines, but sometimes are clearly traitorous to the International; and finally the Left Revolutionary Wing.

9. Toward the Socialist-Chauvinists, who everywhere and especially on the most critical occasions appear with arms in their hands against the proletarian revolution, we can only advocate a struggle without quarter, and toward the "Center" such a tactic as would separate the most revolutionary elements from the rest by criticizing and exposing the leaders. It is absolutely necessary to see to it that the labor organizations at a certain stage of development are kept from being controlled by the "Center."

10. It is necessary to organize the revolutionary elements among the workers who have not as yet joined the socialistic parties, but completely stand on the side of the proletarian dictatorship in the form which it has assumed in the Soviet system. Such are first of all the syndicalist elements of the workers.

11. Finally it is necessary to include all proletarian groups or organizations which, if they have not openly joined the Left Revolutionary movement show, however, tendencies in that direction.

12. We propose that in the Congress should participate representatives of the following parties, groups and movements (which have the right to full membership in the Third International):

(1) Spartacus Association of Germany; (2) The Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Russia; (3) Communist Party in German Austria; (4) The Communist Party of Hungary; (5) The Communist Party of Poland; (6) The Communist Party of Finland; (7) The Communist Party of Esthonia; (8) The Communist Party of Lettland; (9) The Communist Party of Lithuania; (10) The Communist Party of White Russia; (11) The Communist Party of the Ukraine; (12) The revolutionary elements within the Czech Social-Democracy; (13) The Social-Democratic Party of Bulgaria; (14) The Social-Democratic Party of Roumania; (15) The Left Wing of the Socialist Party of Serbia; (16) The Social-Democratic Left Party of Sweden; (17) The Social-Democratic Party of Norway; (18) The Socialist Workers' Party of Denmark; (19) The Communist Party of the Netherlands; (20) The revolutionary elements within the Workers' Party of Belgium; (21 and 22) Groups and organizations within the socialist and syndicalist movements of France, mainly solidary with Lorient; (23) Left Social-Democrats of Switzerland; (24) Socialist Party of Italy; (25) The left elements within the Socialist Party of Spain; (26) The left elements of the Socialist Party of Portugal; (27) The Socialist Party of Great Britain (especially adherents of MacLean's groups); (28) The Socialist Labor Party (S. L. P.) of England; (29) I. W. W. (Industrial Workers of the World) of England; (30) I. W. of Great Britain; (31) The revolutionary elements of "shop steward" movement of England; (32) The revolutionary elements of the labor organizations of Ireland; (33) Socialist Labor Party of America (S. L. P.); (34) The left

elements of the Socialist Party of America (S. P.) (especially that group which is represented by Debs and the socialist propaganda association); (35) I. W. W. of America; (36) I. W. W. of Australia; (37) Workers International Industrial Union (W. I. I. U.) of America; (38) Socialistic groups in Tokio and Yokohama (represented by Katayama); (39) Socialistic International Youth.

**THE QUESTION OF ORGANIZATION AND THE
NAME OF THE PARTY**

13. The Third International's basis has been worked out so that in different parts of Europe groups and organizations of similarly thinking people have been formed which join the same program and practically follow the same tactics. This first of all applies to the Spartacans in Germany and the Communist parties in many other countries.

14. The Congress must lay the foundation of a common fighting organ, which will be a uniting link, and methodically lead the movement of the center for the Communist International, which subordinates the interests of the movement in every separate country to the common interests of the revolution on an international scale. The concrete forms for the organizations, the representation, etc., are to be worked out at the Congress.

15. The Congress shall be called "The First Communist International Congress" of which the different parties will form the sections. Marx and Engels even considered the name "Social-Democrats" theoretically wrong. The humiliating bankruptcy of the old "International" demands a new name. In addition, the nucleus of the great movement is already formed by many parties which have already taken the name of Communist.

In view of the above we propose that all affiliated parties and organizations take up, on the order of the day, the subject of calling an International Communist Congress.

With fraternal greetings,

**THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNIST PARTY
(LENIN, TROTSKY)**

**THE FOREIGN BUREAU OF POLAND'S COMMUNIST WORKERS'
PARTY (KARSKI)**

**THE FOREIGN BUREAU OF HUNGARY'S COMMUNIST PARTY
(RUDNJANSKI)**

THE FOREIGN BUREAU OF THE GERMAN-AUSTRIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (OUDO)
 THE RUSSIAN BUREAU FOR THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE LETTISH COMMUNIST PARTY (ROSIN)
 THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE FINNISH COMMUNIST PARTY (SIROLA)
 THE ACTING COMMITTEE FOR THE FEDERATION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY BALKAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS (RAKOWSKY)
 THE SOCIALIST LABOR PARTY OF AMERICA (REINSTEIN)

II

THESES OF REPORT OF COMRADE LENIN ON BOURGEOIS AND PROLETARIAN DEMOCRACIES

[Petrograd Pravda, March 8, 1919.]

1. The growth of the revolutionary movement of the proletariat in all countries has called forth convulsive efforts of the bourgeoisie and its agents in workmen's organizations, to find ideal political arguments in defense of the rule of the exploiters. Among these arguments stands out particularly condemnation of dictatorship and defense of democracy. The falseness and hypocrisy of such an argument, which has been repeated in thousands of forms in the capitalist press and at the conference of the yellow International in February, 1919, Berne, are evident to all who have not wished to betray the fundamental principle of socialism.

2. First of all, this argument is used with certain interpretations of "democracy in general" and "dictatorship in general" without raising the point as to which class one has in mind. Such a statement of the question, leaving out of consideration the question of class as though it were a general national matter, is direct mockery of the fundamental doctrine of socialism, namely, the doctrine of class struggle, which the socialists who have gone over to the side of the bourgeoisie recognize when they talk, but forget when they act. For in no civilized, capitalist country does there exist "democracy in general," but there exists only bourgeois democracy, and one is speaking not of "dictatorship in general" but of dictatorship of the oppressed classes, that is, of the proletariat with respect to the oppressors and exploiters,

that is, the bourgeoisie, in order to overcome the resistance which the exploiters make in their struggle to preserve their rule.

3. History teaches that no oppressed class has ever come into power and can not come into power, without passing through a period of dictatorship, that is, the conquest of power and the forcible suppression of the most desperate and mad resistance, which does not hesitate to resort to any crimes, such as always been shown by the exploiters. The bourgeoisie, whose rule is now defended by the socialists who speak against "dictatorship in general" and who espouse the cause of "democracy in general," has won power in the progressive countries at the price of a series of uprisings, civil wars, forcible suppression of kings, feudal lords, and slave owners, and of their attempts at restoration. The socialists of all countries, in their books and pamphlets, in the resolutions of their congresses, in their propaganda speeches, have explained to the people thousands and millions of times the class character of these bourgeois revolutions, and of this bourgeois dictatorship. Therefore the present defense of bourgeois democracy in the form of speeches about "democracy in general," and the present wails and shouts against the dictatorship of the proletariat in the form of wails about "dictatorship in general," are a direct mockery of socialism, and represent in fact going over to the bourgeoisie and denying the right of the proletariat to its own proletarian revolution, and a defense of bourgeois reformism, precisely at the historic moment when bourgeois reformism is collapsing the world over, and when the war has created a revolutionary situation.

4. All socialists who explain the class character of bourgeois civilization, of bourgeois democracy, of bourgeois parliamentarism, express the thought which Marx and Engels expressed with the most scientific exactness when they said that the most democratic bourgeois republic is nothing more than a machine for the suppression of the working class by the bourgeoisie, for the suppression of the mass of the toilers by a handful of capitalists. There is not a single revolutionist, not a single Marxist of all those who are now shouting against dictatorship and for democracy, who would not have sworn before the workmen that he recognizes this fundamental truth of socialism. And now, when the revolutionary proletariat begins to act and move for the destruction of this machinery of oppression, and to win the

proletarian dictatorship, these traitors to socialism report the situation as though the bourgeoisie were giving the laborers pure democracy, as though the bourgeoisie were abandoning resistance and were ready to submit to the majority of the toilers, as though there were no state machinery for the suppression of labor by capital in a democratic republic.

5. The Paris Commune, which all who wish to be considered socialists celebrate in words, for they know that the working masses sympathize with the Paris Commune keenly and sincerely, showed with particular clearness the historically conditional character and the limited worth of bourgeois parliamentarism and bourgeois democracy—institutions in a high degree progressive as compared with the Middle Ages, but inevitably requiring radical changes in the epoch of proletarian revolution. It was Marx who best showed in his analysis the exploiting character of bourgeois democracy and of bourgeois parliamentarism, under which the oppressed classes received the right to decide once every few years which representatives of the propertied classes are to “represent and suppress” the people in parliament. Precisely at the present moment when the Soviet movement, covering the whole world, continues the work of the Commune before the eyes of the whole world, the traitors to socialism forget concrete experiences and the concrete lessons of the Paris Commune, repeating the old bourgeois rubbish about “democracy in general.” The Commune was not a parliamentary institution.

6. Further, the significance of the Commune lies in the fact that it attempted to break up and destroy completely the bourgeois state machinery of officials, of judges, of military officials, of police, setting up instead self-administrative mass organizations of workmen, which did not recognize the division into legislative and executive authorities. All present-day bourgeois democratic republics, including the German, which the traitors to socialism, scoffing at truth, call proletarian, preserve this governmental apparatus. Therefore it is proven once more, and quite clearly, that the shouts in defense of “democracy in general” are in fact defense of the bourgeoisie and its exploiting privileges.

7. “Freedom of meeting” may be taken as an example of the demands for “pure democracy.” Any conscious workman who

has not broken with his own class will understand immediately that it would be stupid to permit freedom of meetings to exploiters at this period, and under the present circumstances, when the exploiters are resisting their overthrow, and are fighting for their privileges. When the bourgeoisie was revolutionary, in England in 1649, and in France in 1793, it did not give "freedom of meetings" to monarchists and nobles who were calling in foreign troops and who were "meeting" to organize attempts at restoration. If the present bourgeoisie, which has been reactionary for a long time now, demands of the proletariat that the latter guarantee in advance freedom of meetings for exploiters no matter what resistance the capitalists may show to the measures of expropriation directed against them, the workmen will only laugh at the hypocrisy of the bourgeoisie.

On the other hand the workmen know very well that "freedom of meetings," even in the most democratic bourgeois republic is an empty phrase, for the rich have all the best public and private buildings at their disposal, and also sufficient leisure time for meetings and for the protection of these meetings by the bourgeois apparatus of authority. The proletarians of the city and of the village, and the poor peasants, that is, the overwhelming majority of the population, have none of these three things. So long as the situation is such, "equality," that is, "pure democracy" is sheer fraud. In order to secure genuine equality, in order to realize in fact democracy for the toilers, one must first take away from the exploiters all public and luxurious private dwellings, one must give leisure time to the toilers, one must protect the freedom of their meetings by armed workmen, and not by noble or capitalist officers with brow-beaten soldiers.

Only after such a change can one speak of freedom of meetings and of equality, without scoffing at workmen, toilers, and the poor. And no one can bring about this change except the advance guard of the toilers, that is, the proletariat, by overthrowing the exploiters, the bourgeoisie.

8. "Freedom of press" is also one of the main arguments of "pure democracy," but again the workmen know that the socialists of all countries have asserted millions of times that this freedom is a fraud so long as the best printing machinery and the largest supplies of paper have been seized by the capitalists, and so long as the power of capital over the press continues, which power

in the whole world is clearly more harsh and more cynical in proportion to the development of democratism and the republican principle, as, for example, in America. In order to secure actual equality and actual democracy for the toilers, for workmen and peasants, one must first take from capitalists the possibility of hiring writers, of buying up publishing houses, of buying up newspapers, and to this end one must overthrow the yoke of capital, overthrow the exploiters, and put down all resistance on their part. The capitalists have always called "freedom" the freedom to make money for the rich, and the freedom to die of hunger for workmen. The capitalists call "freedom" the freedom of the rich, freedom to buy up the press, freedom to use wealth, to manufacture and support so-called public opinion. The defenders of "pure democracy" again in actual fact turn out to be the defenders of the most dirty and corrupt system of the rule of the rich over the means of education of the masses. They deceive the people by attractive, fine-sounding, beautiful but absolutely false phrases, trying to dissuade the masses from the concrete historic task of freeing the press from the capitalists who have gotten control of it. Actual freedom and equality will exist only in the order established by the Communists, in which it will be impossible to become rich at the expense of another, where it will be impossible either directly or indirectly to subject the press to the power of money, where there will be no obstacle to prevent any toiler (or any large group of such) from enjoying and actually realizing the equal right to the use of public printing presses and of the public fund of paper.

9. The history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries showed us, even before the war, what sort of a thing this famous "pure democracy" really is when one has capitalism. The Marxists have always said that where democracy is most developed and "pure," and the class struggle becomes most apparent, sharp and pitiless, there the yoke of capital and the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie also stand out in a most "pure" form.

The Dreyfus affair in republican France, the reprisals of hired battalions, armed by capitalists, against strikers in the free and democratic Republic of America, these and thousands of similar facts show the truth, which the bourgeoisie tries frantically to conceal, namely, that in the most democratic republics terror and the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie rule in actual fact, showing

themselves openly whenever the exploiters begin to feel that the power of capital is shaking.

10. The imperialistic war of 1914-1918 definitely revealed, even to the retrograde workmen, the true character of bourgeois democracy, even in the freest republics. For the enrichment of a German or an English group of millionaires or billionaires, tens of millions were killed, and in the freest republics the military dictatorship of the bourgeoisie was established. This military dictatorship continues even after the defeat of Germany in the countries of the Entente. The war has been the chief agency by which the eyes of the toilers have been opened, for it tore off the false flowers from bourgeois democracy, and showed to the whole people the enormous speculation and profiteering, in time of war and because of the war. The bourgeoisie continued this war in the name of freedom and equality, and in the name of freedom and equality war contractors have become rich to unheard-of proportions. Despite its efforts to do so the yellow Berne International will not conceal from us the exploiting character of bourgeois freedom, of bourgeois equality, of bourgeois democracy, for it has been completely exposed.

11. In the most developed capitalist country of the European continent, in Germany, the first months of complete republican freedom, secured by the overthrow of imperialist Germany, showed to the German workmen and to the whole world the actual class character of a bourgeois democratic republic. The murder of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg are events of world importance, not only because the best people and the leaders of the truly democratic, communist International perished, but because for the leading European—and one can say without exaggeration for the leading world—State the essentially class character of its order was made clear. If people who have been arrested, that is, taken under protection by the State authority, can be killed by officers and capitalists with impunity under a government of patriots-socialists, then a democratic republic, in which such a thing was possible, is a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. People who express their indignation over the murder of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, but do not understand this truth, reveal, then, either their stupidity or their hypocrisy. "Freedom" in one of the freest and most progressive republics of the world, in the German Republic, is freedom to kill the arrested

leaders of the proletariat with impunity. And it could not be otherwise, so long as capitalism maintains itself, for the development of democratism does not moderate but encourages class struggle, which, by reason of all the results and influences of the war and of its consequences, has been brought to the boiling point.

In the whole civilized world Bolsheviks are now being exiled, persecuted, imprisoned, as, for example, in one of the oldest bourgeois republics—Switzerland; pogroms against the Bolsheviks are taking place in America, etc. From the point of view of democracy in general or of pure democracy, it is really laughable to see how the leading civilized democratic countries, armed to the teeth, fear the presence of a few dozen people from backward, hungry, ruined Russia, which the bourgeois papers in tens of millions of copies call barbarian, criminal, etc. It is clear that an order of society which can produce such a great contradiction is in fact a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.

12. In the presence of such a situation a dictatorship of the proletariat is not only absolutely legal, just as are the overthrow of exploiters and the suppression of their resistance, but it is also absolutely necessary for the whole mass of toilers as the only defense against the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, which brought about the war and is preparing new wars.

That which the socialists do not understand, which constitutes their theoretic nearsightedness, their submission to bourgeois prejudices and their political treason with respect to the proletariat, is the following: In a political society wherever there is any serious sharpening of class struggle which is included in its very structure, there can be no middle course between dictatorship of the bourgeoisie or dictatorship of the proletariat. Any fanciful dreaming about some sort of third line is a reactionary lamentation of the petty bourgeois. Evidence of this is the experience of long development of bourgeois democracy and of the workmen's movement in all leading countries and in particular the experience of the last five years. Also the science of political economy speaks of this, as does the entire content of Marxism, which explains the economic inevitableness, under any economic system based on trade, of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, which can be changed only by a class that has developed, increased in numbers and become stronger internally

by organization and also as a result of the development of capitalism, that is the class of the proletarians.

13. Another theoretic and political mistake of socialists consists in their failure to understand that the forms of democracy must necessarily change in the course of centuries, beginning from ancient times, as one ruling class is replaced by another. In the ancient republics of Greece, in the cities of the Middle Ages, in the late capitalist countries, democracy has different forms and is applied in different degrees. It would be the greatest absurdity to think that the most profound revolution in the history of humanity, where for the first time in the world, power has passed from a minority of exploiters to the majority of the exploited, would take place within the old framework of the old bourgeois, parliamentary democracy, and without the most radical ruptures and the creation of new forms of democracy, of new institutions, representing new methods of applying democracy, etc.

14. Dictatorship of the proletariat resembles dictatorship of other classes in that it was called forth by the need to suppress the forcible resistance of a class that was losing its political rulership. But that which definitely distinguishes a dictatorship of the proletariat from a dictatorship of other classes, from a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie in all the civilized capitalist countries, is that the dictatorship of the landlords and of the bourgeoisie was the forcible suppression of the resistance of the overwhelming majority of the population, namely, the toilers. On the other hand, the dictatorship of the proletariat is the forcible suppression of the resistance of the exploiters, that is, of an insignificant minority of the population—of landlords and capitalists.

It therefore follows that a dictatorship of the proletariat must necessarily carry with it not only changes in the form and institutions of democracy, speaking in general terms, but specifically such a change as would secure an extension such as has never been seen in the history of the world of the actual use of democracy by the toiling classes.

And in actual fact the form of dictatorship of the proletariat which has already been worked out in practice, that is, the Soviet authority in Russia, the Räte system in Germany, the shop stewards committees, and other similar Soviet institutions in other countries, all represent and realize for the toiling classes,

that is, for the overwhelming majority of the population, this actual possibility to use democratic rights and freedoms, which possibility never existed, even approximately, in the very best and most democratic bourgeois republics.

The essence of the Soviet authority consists in this, that the permanent and sole basis of all State authority, of the entire apparatus of government, is the mass organization precisely of those classes which were oppressed by capitalism, that is, of the workmen and of the half-proletarians (peasants who did not exploit the labor of another and constantly had to sell at least a portion of their labor strength). Precisely those masses which even in the most democratic bourgeois republics had equal rights before the law but in fact were deprived of participation in the political life of the country, and by thousands of tricks and traps of the use of democratic rights and liberties, are now brought into constant and actual, and, in addition, decisive, participation in the democratic administration of the State.

15. Equality of citizenship, independent of sex, religion, race and nationality, which bourgeois democracy always and everywhere promised but never introduced, and could not introduce because of the rule of capitalism, has been realized immediately and completely by the Soviet authority or the dictatorship of the proletariat, because only the power of workmen who are not interested in the private ownership of the means of production, and in the struggle for the distribution and dividing up of these means, is in a position to give such equality.

16. The old, that is the bourgeois, democracy, and parliamentarism were so organized that the masses of the toilers were for the most part prevented from penetrating the institutions of administration. The Soviet authority, that is the dictatorship of the proletariat, on the other hand, is so organized as to bring the masses of toilers into close contact with the institutions of administration. To this end the legislative and executive authorities have been brought together under the Soviet organization of the State, and territorial election districts have been replaced by economic units, such as factories and mills.

17. The army was a weapon of oppression, not only in monarchies; it remains such in all bourgeois republics, even in the most democratic. Only the Soviet authority, which is the governmental organization precisely of the classes oppressed by

capitalism, is able to destroy the subjection of the army to bourgeois orders, and thus actually unify the proletariat and the army, actually bringing about the arming of the proletariat and the disarming of the bourgeoisie, without which socialism can not be triumphant.

18. The Soviet organization of the State has been so adapted as to give the leading rôle to the proletariat, because the latter is the class that has been most concentrated and enlightened by capitalism. The experience of all revolutions and of all movements of the oppressed classes, and the experience of the world socialist movement, teach us that only the proletariat is able to unite and carry with it the scattered and retrograde classes of the toiling and exploited population.

19. Only a Soviet organization of the State is able actually to disrupt without delay, and destroy definitively, the old apparatus of government, of the bourgeoisie, the bureaucracy and law courts. This apparatus was preserved and had to be preserved under the capitalistic order of society even in the most democratic republics, because in fact it was the main protection against the introduction of democratism for workmen and toilers. The Paris Commune made the first world-historic step along this road; the Soviet authority, the second.

20. The destruction of State authority is the aim which all socialists have set for themselves, Marx included and at the head; without the realization of this aim true democratism, that is, equality and liberty, cannot be realized. This aim can be realized in actual fact only by a Soviet or proletarian democracy, for by bringing into constant and actual participation in the administration of the State the mass organizations of the toilers, it begins immediately to prepare for the complete decay of any State.

21. The complete bankruptcy of the socialists who gathered in Berne and their complete failure to understand the new, that is, the proletarian democracy, are seen especially in the following: On February 10, 1919, Branting opened in Berne an international conference of the yellow International. On February 11, 1919, in Berlin, in the newspaper of the supporters of this conference, *Die Fröhe*, was published an appeal of the party of "The Independents" to the proletariat. In this appeal the bourgeois character of the government of Scheidemann was acknowledged,

and this government was reproached for wishing to abolish the Soviets, which were called the "Träger und Schützer der Revolution," the standard bearers of the revolution; and it was proposed that the Soviets be legalized, given governmental functions and the right to suspend the decisions of the Constituent Assembly through a referendum based on universal suffrage. This proposal represents the complete bankruptcy of the theorists who have defined democracy without understanding its bourgeois character. This ludicrous attempt to unite the system of Soviets, that is, the dictatorship of the proletariat, with the Constituent Assembly, that is, the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, reveals definitively the deformed mentality of the yellow Socialists and Social-Democrats, their political reactionary tendencies similar to those of the petty bourgeoisie, and their cowardly concessions to the irresistible, growing strength of the new proletarian democracy.

22. In condemning Bolshevism, the majority of the yellow International of Berne, which did not have the courage formally to vote a resolution to this effect because of their fear of the workmen masses, acted from a class point of view, for this majority is in complete solidarity with the Russian Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, and with the Scheidemanns in Germany. The Russian Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, complaining that they are persecuted by the Bolsheviks, try to conceal the fact that they are being persecuted because of participation in the civil war on the side of the bourgeoisie against the proletariat. In the same manner the Scheidemanns and their parties have already shown in Germany that they also are participating in the civil war on the side of the bourgeoisie against the workmen. It is therefore quite natural that the majority of those who took part in the Berne yellow International came out in condemnation of the Bolsheviks. But this was not defense of "pure democracy," but self-defense of people who know and feel that in the civil war they stand on the side of the bourgeoisie against the proletariat. Therefore, from the class point of view one must recognize the correctness of the decision of the majority of the yellow International. The proletariat, not fearing the truth, should look the truth straight in the face and draw the logical political conclusions.

III

ATTITUDE OF PROLETARIAT TO MIDDLE PEASANTRY

LENIN'S REPORT TO EIGHTH CONGRESS OF RUSSIAN
COMMUNIST PARTY (EXTRACTS)

[Petrograd Pravda, April 5, 1919]

It is quite clear that the following question is fundamental, very complicated, but no less vital: How to define exactly the attitude of the proletariat to the middle peasantry. Comrades, for Marxists this question does not present difficulties from the theoretical point of view, which the overwhelming majority of workmen have now acquired. I recall for example that in Kautsky's book on the agrarian question written when Kautsky still correctly presented the teachings of Marx and was recognized as an unquestioned authority in this field, in this book on the agrarian question he speaks of the passing from capitalism to socialism:

"The task of the socialist party is the neutralization of the peasantry; that is, to handle the situation so that the peasantry remains neutral in the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, that the peasantry does not give any active assistance to the bourgeoisie against us." During the long period of the bourgeois rule the peasant has always supported the bourgeois authority and was on the side of the bourgeoisie. This is understandable if one takes into account the economic strength of the bourgeoisie and the political methods of its rule. We can not expect the middle peasant to come over to our side immediately. But if we direct our policy correctly, then after a certain period hesitation will cease and the peasant may come over to our side. Engels, who, together with Marx, laid the foundations of scientific Marxism, that is, of the doctrine which our party follows constantly and particularly in time of revolution—Engels already established the fact that the peasantry is differentiated with respect to their land holdings into small, middle, and large; and this differentiation for the overwhelming majority of the European countries exists to-day. Engels said: "Perhaps it will not be necessary to suppress by force even the large peasantry in all places." And no sensible socialist ever thought that we might ever apply violence to the middle peasantry (the smaller peasantry is our friend). This is what Engels said in 1894, a

year before his death, when the agrarian question was the burning question of the day. This point of view shows us that truth which is sometimes forgotten, though with which we have always theoretically been in accord. With respect to landlords and capitalists our task is complete expropriation. But we do not permit any violence with respect to the middle peasant. Even with respect to the rich peasant we do not speak with the same determination as with regard to the bourgeoisie: "Absolute expropriation of the rich peasantry." In our program this difference is emphasized. We say: "The suppression of the resistance of the peasantry, the suppression of its counter-revolutionary tendencies." This is not complete expropriation.

The fundamental difference in our attitude toward the bourgeoisie and toward the middle peasantry is complete expropriation of the bourgeoisie, but union with the middle peasantry that does not exploit others. This fundamental line in theory is recognized by all. In practice this line is not always observed strictly, and local workers have not learned to observe it at all. When the proletariat overthrew the bourgeois authority and established its own, and set about to create a new society, the question of the middle peasantry came into the foreground. Not a single socialist in the world has denied the fact that the establishment of communism will proceed differently in those countries where there is large land tenure. This is the most elementary of truths and from this truth it follows that as we approach the tasks of construction our main attention should be concentrated to a certain extent precisely on the middle peasantry. Much will depend on how we have defined our attitude toward the middle peasantry. Theoretically, this question has been decided, but we know from our own experience the difference between the theoretical decision of a question and the practical carrying out of the decision. We have come to that difference which was so characteristic of the old French Revolution when the French Convention made wide plans but did not have the proper support to carry them out and did not even know on what class it should rely in order to put through this or that measure. We find ourselves in a much more favorable condition. Thanks to a whole century of development we know on what class we rely and we know also that this class has had a quite inadequate amount of practical experience. The fundamental thing for the

working class, and for the socialist party, was clear—to overthrow the authority of the bourgeoisie and turn over authority to the workmen.

But how to accomplish this? All remember with what difficulty, and after how many months we passed from workmen's control to workmen's administration of industry, and that was development within our class, within the proletarian class, with which we had always had relations. But now we must define our attitude toward a new class, toward a class which the city workmen do not know. We must define our attitude toward a class which does not have a definite steadfast position. The proletariat as a mass is for socialism; the bourgeoisie is against socialism; it is easy to define the relations between two such classes. But when we come to such a group as the middle peasantry, then it appears that this is such a kind of class that it hesitates. The middle peasant is part property owner and part toiler. He does not exploit other representatives of the toilers. For decades he has had to struggle hard to maintain his position and he has felt the exploitation of the landlord-capitalists. But at the same time he is a property owner.

Therefore our attitude toward this class presents enormous difficulties. On the basis of our experience of more than a year and of proletariat work in the village for more than a year and in view of the fact that there has already taken place a class differentiation in the village, we must be most careful not to be hasty, not to theorize without understanding, not to consider ready what has not been worked out. In the resolution which the committee proposes to you, prepared by the agrarian section, which one of the next speakers will read to you, you will find many warnings on this point. From the economic point of view it is clear that we must go to the assistance of the middle peasant. On this point theoretically there is no doubt. But with our level of culture, with our lack of cultural and technical forces which we could offer to the village, and with that helplessness with which we often go to the villages, comrades often apply compulsion, which spoils the whole cause. Only yesterday one comrade gave me a small pamphlet entitled "Instructions for party activity in the Province of Nizhnenovgorod," a publication of the Nizhnenovgorod Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks); and in this pamphlet I read, for example, on page

41: "The decree on the extraordinary revolutionary tax should fall with its whole weight on the shoulders of the village rich peasant speculators, and in general on the middle elements of the peasantry." Now here one may see that people have indeed "understood," or is this a misprint? But it is not admissible for such misprints to appear. Or is this the result of hurried, hasty work, which shows how dangerous haste is in a matter like this? Or have we here simply a failure to understand, though this is the very worst supposition which I really do not wish to make with reference to our comrades at Nizhnenovgorod? It is quite possible that this is simply an oversight. Such instances occur in practice, as one of the comrades in the commission has related. The peasants surrounded him and each peasant asked: "Please define, am I a middle peasant or not? I have two horses and one cow. I have two cows and one horse," etc. And so this agitator who was traveling over entire districts had to use a kind of thermometer in order to take each peasant and tell him whether he was a middle peasant or not. But to do this he had to know the whole history and economic life of this particular peasant and his relations to lower and higher groups, and of course we can not know this with exactness.

Here one must have practical experience and knowledge of local conditions, and we have not these things as yet. We are not at all ashamed to admit this; we must admit this openly. We have never been utopists and have never imagined that we could build up the communistic society with the pure hands of pure communists who would be born and educated in a pure communistic society. Such would be children's fables. We must build communism on the ruins of capitalism, and only that class which has been tempered in the struggles against capitalism can do this. You know very well that the proletariat is not without the faults and weaknesses of the capitalistic society. It struggles for socialism, and at the same time against its own defects. The best and most progressive portion of the proletariat which has been carrying on a desperate struggle in the cities for decades was able to imitate in the course of this struggle all the culture of city life, and to a certain extent did acquire it. You know that the village even in the most progressive countries was condemned to ignorance. Of course the cultural level of the village will be raised by us, but that is a matter of years and years. This is

what our comrades everywhere forget, and this is what every word that comes to us from the villages portrays with particular clearness, when the word comes not from local intellectuals and local officials but from people who are watching the work in the village from a practical point of view. All these voices are of special value to us in the agrarian section. These voices will be of particular value at the present moment, I am convinced of this, and for this party congress inasmuch as they are taken not from books, not from decrees, but from life itself.

This is what impels us to work in this spirit, in order to make more clear our relations to the middle peasantry. This is very difficult because in life we do not have this clarity. This question not only is not solved but it can not be solved if one wishes to solve it at a stroke and immediately. There are people who say: "It was not necessary to write such a quantity of decrees," and they criticize the Soviet government because it gave attention to the writing of decrees without knowing how to carry them out in actual life. These people do not see how they are really galloping over to the White Guardists. If we had expected that the whole life of the village could be changed by the writing of thousands of decrees we certainly would have been complete idiots; but if we had failed to indicate the road in decrees we would have been traitors to socialism. These decrees which in actual practice could not be carried out immediately and fully have played an enormous rôle for propaganda. If at first we carried on a propaganda by general truths, now we are carrying on a propaganda by actual work. This also is preaching, but it is preaching by acts, and not in the sense of independent acts of certain upstarts at whom we used to laugh in the period of anarchists and the old socialism. Our decree is an appeal, but not an appeal in the former spirit: "Workmen, rise, overthrow the bourgeoisie." No, it is an appeal to the masses, an appeal for practical action. The decrees are instructions calling for mass action of a practical character. This is what is important. It does not matter that in these decrees there is much that is worth nothing, much that will not be realized. The aim of a decree is to teach practical methods, to those hundreds, thousands and millions of people who listen to the voice of the Soviet authority. This is the test of practical action in the field of socialist construction in the villages. If we shall take this view,

then we shall derive very much from the total sum of our laws, decrees and ordinances. We shall not look upon them as absolute forms which must be carried out at any cost, immediately and at one stroke.

(At another session of the congress Lenin spoke on the same subject. From Petrograd Pravda, April 9, 1919.)

We have solved so far only the first fundamental task of the socialist revolution, the task of victory over the bourgeoisie. We have solved this task in a fundamental manner although now begins a dangerously difficult half year, during which the imperialists of the whole world are making the last efforts to suppress us. We can say now without exaggeration that they themselves have understood that after this next half year their cause will be absolutely suppressed. Either they must now take advantage of our exhaustion and conquer one country, namely Russia, or we will be the victors, and not only with reference to our own country. During this half year, when the food supply and transportation crises have become more acute and the imperialistic powers are trying to attack on several fronts, our position is extremely difficult, but this is the last difficult half year. One must as before concentrate all efforts on the struggle with the foreign enemy who is attacking us.

When we speak of the tasks in connection with work in the villages, in spite of all difficulties, in spite of the fact that our knowledge has been directed to the immediate suppression of exploiters, we must nevertheless remember and not forget, that in the villages with relation to the middle peasantry the task is of a different nature. All conscious workmen, of Petrograd, Ivanovo-Voznesensk and Moscow, who have been in the villages, tell us of instances of many misunderstandings, of misunderstandings that could not be solved it seemed, and of conflicts of the most serious nature, all of which were, however, solved by sensible workmen who did not speak according to the book but in language which the people could understand, and not like an officer allowing himself to issue orders though unacquainted with village life, but like a comrade explaining the situation and appealing to their feelings as toilers. And by such explanation one attained what could not be attained by thousands who conducted themselves like commanders or superiors.

The resolution which we now present for your attention is drawn up in this spirit. I have tried in this report to emphasize

the main principles behind this resolution, and its general political significance. I have tried to show, and I trust I have succeeded, that from the point of view of the interests of the revolution as a whole, we have not made any changes. We have not altered our line of action. The White Guardists and their assistants shout and will continue to shout that we have changed. Let them shout. That does not disturb us. We are developing our aims in an absolutely logical manner. From the task of suppressing the bourgeoisie we must now transfer our attention to the task of building up the life of the middle peasantry. We must live with the middle peasantry in peace. The middle peasantry in a communistic society will be on our side only if we lighten and improve its economic conditions. If we to-morrow could furnish a hundred thousand first-class tractors supplied with gasoline and machinists (you know of course that for the moment this is dreaming) then the middle peasant would say: "I am for the Commune." But in order to do this we must first defeat the international bourgeoisie, we must force them to give us these tractors, or we must increase our own production so that we can ourselves produce them. Only thus is the question stated correctly.

The peasant needs the industries of the cities and can not live without them and the industries are in our hands. If we approach the situation correctly then the peasant will thank us because we will bring him the products from the cities, implements and culture. It will not be exploiters who will bring him these things, not landlords, but his own comrades, workers whom he values very deeply. The middle peasant is very practical and values only actual assistance, quite carelessly thrusting aside all commands and instructions from above.

First help him and then you will secure his confidence. If this matter is handled correctly, if each step taken by our group in the village, in the canton, in the food-supply detachment, or in any organization, is carefully made, is carefully verified from this point of view, then we shall win the confidence of the peasant, and only then shall we be able to move forward. Now we must give him assistance. We must give him advice and this must not be the order of a commanding officer, but the advice of a comrade. The peasant then will be absolutely for us.

And this is what our resolution contains, and this is what it seems to me should be the decision of the congress. If we accept

this resolution and if it defines all the activity of our party organizations, then we shall solve the second great task that is before us. We learned how to overthrow the bourgeoisie and suppress it and we are very proud of what we have done. We have not yet learned how to regulate our relations with the millions of middle peasants and how to win their confidence. We must say this frankly; but we have understood the task and we have undertaken it and we say to ourselves with full hope, complete knowledge and entire decision: We shall solve this task and then socialism will be absolute, invincible.

IV

SPEECH BY KALININ, PRESIDENT OF ALL-RUSSIAN CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, ON THE MIDDLE PEASANTRY

[Severnaya Kommuna, April 10, 1919.]

Moscow, April 9 (Rosta).—At a plenum meeting of the Moscow Soviet of Workmen's and Red Army Deputies, the president of the Central Executive Committee, Comrade Kalinin, spoke:

"My election is the symbol of the union of the proletariat and the peasantry. At the present moment when all counter-revolutionary forces are pressing in on us, such a union is particularly valuable. The peasantry was always our natural ally, but in recent times one has heard notes of doubt among the peasants; parties hostile to us are trying to drive a wedge between us and the peasantry. We must convince the middle peasants that the working class, having in its hands the factories, has not attacked and will not attack the small, individual farms of the peasant. This can be done all the more easily because neither the old nor the new program of communists says that we will forcibly centralize the peasant lands and drive them into communes, etc. Quite to the contrary, we say definitely that we will make every effort to readjust and raise the level of the peasant economic enterprises, helping both technically and in other ways, and I shall adhere to this policy in my new post. Here is the policy we shall follow:

"We shall point out to province, district, and other executive committees that they should make every effort in the course of the collecting of the revolutionary tax, to the end that it should not be a heavy burden on the middle peasant; that they should make self-administration less costly and reduce bureaucratic

routine. We shall make every effort so that the local executive committees shall not put obstacles in the way of exchange of articles of agriculture and of home consumption between cantons and peasants—that is, the purchase of farm and household utensils that are sold at fairs. We shall try to eliminate all friction and misunderstandings between provinces and cantons. We shall appeal to the local executive committees not only not to interfere with, but on the contrary to support, separate peasant economic enterprises which because of their special character have a special value. The mole of history is working well for us; the hour of world revolution is near, though we must not close our eyes to the fact that at the present moment it is all the more difficult for us to struggle with counter-revolution because of the disorganization of our economic life. Frequently they prophesied our failure, but we still hold on and we shall find new sources of strength and support. Further, each one of us must answer the question as to how to adjust production, carry out our enormous tasks, and use our great natural resources. In this field the unions of Petersburg and Moscow are doing very much, because they are the organizing centers from whose examples the provinces will learn. Much has been done in preparing products, but much still has to be done. We in Petersburg fed ourselves for three months, from the end of June to the beginning of September, on products from our Petersburg gardens.”

Comrade Kalinin taking this matter of the gardens as an example, explains how one must approach the problem in a practical manner:

“We must define the relations between the Supreme Council of National Economy and local economic enterprises, and I am sure the Moscow Soviet will do everything in its power for the preparation of food products. The stronger we are the greater are the chances of a Western European revolution.”

V

TELEPHONOGRAM OF PRESIDENT OF THE SOVIET OF DEFENSE, COMRADE LENIN, TO THE ALL-RUSSIAN EXTRAORDINARY COMMISSION

[Izvestia, April 2, 1919.]

According to a communication from the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission, word has been received from Petrograd

that agents of Kolchak, Denikin, and the Allies tried to blow up the water-supply station in Petrograd. In the cellar were found explosives and an infernal machine; when the latter was taken it exploded prematurely, and the commander of the detachment was killed and four members of the Red Army were wounded.

At other points attempts are being made to blow up bridges and stop railway transportation.

Attempts are being made to blow up railway roadbeds in order to leave Moscow and Petrograd without food supply.

Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks take an active part in appeals for strikes for the overthrow of the Soviet authority.

In view of the information received, the Soviet of Defense orders that the most urgent measures be taken to suppress all attempts to cause explosions, to destroy railways, and all appeals for strikes.

The Soviet of Defense calls on all workers in the Extraordinary Commission to be especially watchful, and to report to the Soviet of Defense all measures adopted.

[Signed] V. ULIANOV (LENIN)
President of Soviet of Defense

VI

EXTRAORDINARY COMMISSION—ACTIVITIES

[From column "Latest news" in *Izvestia*, September 5, 1918.]

ARREST OF RIGHT SOCIALIST-REVOLUTIONARIES

At the present moment the ward extraordinary commissioners are making mass arrests of Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, since it has become clear that this party is responsible for the recent acts of terrorism (attempt on life of Comrade Lenin and the murder of Uritsky), which were carried out according to a definitely elaborated program.

ARREST OF A PRIEST

For an anti-Soviet sermon preached from the church pulpit, the priest Molot has been arrested and turned over to the counter-revolutionary section of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission.

STRUGGLE AGAINST COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARIES

We have received the following telegram from the president of the Front Extraordinary Commission, Comrade Latsis: "The Extraordinary Commission of the front had shot in the district of Ardatov, for anti-Soviet agitation, 4 peasants, and sent to a concentration camp 32 officers.

At Arzamas were shot three champions of the Czarist régime and one peasant-exploiter, and 14 officers were sent to the concentration camp for anti-Soviet agitation."

HOUSE COMMITTEE FINED

For failure to execute the orders of the dwelling section of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission, the house committee at 42, Pokrovka, has been fined 20,000 rubles.

This fine is a punishment for failure to remove from the house register the name of the well-known Cadet Astrov, who disappeared three months ago.

All the movable property of Astrov has been confiscated.

THE ARREST OF SPECULATORS

On September 3 members of the Section to Combat Speculation of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission arrested Citizen Pitkevich, who was trying to buy 125 food cards, at 20 rubles each. A search was made in the apartment of Pitkevich, which revealed a store of such cards bearing official stamps.

This section also arrested a certain Bosh, who was speculating in cocaine brought from Pskov.

VII

DESCRIPTION OF EXTRAORDINARY COMMISSION

[Severnaya Kommuna, October 17, 1918.]

Comrade Morosov has pointed out the importance of the Extraordinary Commission, an organ of the class to conduct civil war, established in view of necessity, and before all in order to beat down the strikes of the civil officials. The first manifestation of the committee has been the liquidation of the union of the "salvation of the revolution." Then the commission annihilated the union of the civil officials who subsidized the committees of

the strikes. The newspaper, *Den*, had special funds for this purpose. The commission has also abolished a staff office which was recruiting men for the army of the Don. Then came the turn of the "Union of the Constituent Assembly," which organized universities for soldiers, which were really centers of preparation for civil war. A large quantity of arms was found in these universities. The "Military League" was then formed, where men for Kaledin were recruited and the assassinations of the commissaries of the people were prepared. The commission has overthrown this league and also a monarchist league called "The White Cross."

The commission has also fought against speculation; fines and requisitions have been increased.

At Moscow, the commission has liquidated the "Union of Proprietors," the plot of Burri, an American, who has been getting ready to monopolize the Soviets, and lastly the affair of Lockhart. The commission has registered 2,559 contra-revolutionary affairs and 5,000 arrests have been made.

The comrade Bokki declared that since the departure of the commission from Moscow 5,423 affairs have been registered, 2,817 of which have been terminated. A number of the guilty have already been shot. There is a lack of judges. Each judge has not less than 100 cases. The total number of people arrested is 6,229. The total number of people shot is 800.

From August 15 to October 15, 1918, 1,101 cases have been examined, 564 of which have been classified. The most important are those of the Chamber of Public Vengeance, the "Union for the Liberation of the Country," and the recruiting of the White Guard. The case of the assassination of Uritsky and the English plot have not yet been terminated. Among the pending cases are pointed out the transport of weapons to the German embassy under the mask of diplomatic documents. One of the cases fell, and Mausers fell out of it. Nine cases of the same sort have been confiscated.

The cases of speculation have led to a confiscation of 20,000,000 rubles.

At Kronstadt there have been 1,130 hostages. Only 183 people are left; 500 have been shot. Four hundred and eighty-nine affairs of counter-revolutionists have been examined and 236 concerning speculations.

VIII

PETERS' PROCLAMATION "TO CITIZENS OF PETROGRAD
AND ENVIRONS"

[Izvestia of Petrograd Soviet, July 4, 1919.]

Mass searches recently conducted with the direct participation of the Petrograd proletariat, and also the voluntary giving up of arms in accordance with the order of June 24, 1919, No. 961, have shown that a large quantity of various kinds of arms and military equipment has been illegally kept by the population, mainly by the more prosperous strata of the population.

However, the result of the mass and individual searches that still continue, and the turning in of the arms, show that not all of the arms have been given up.

Workmen and workwomen of Petrograd: You are standing firm in defense of the revolution, and of its red capital. See to it that not a single rifle, not a single cartridge, remain in the hands of the bourgeoisie. Search the cellars, attics, sheds, living quarters, and all places, and do not allow them to bury arms in the ground.

If you discover the concealment of arms, revolvers, cartridges, bombs—anything that would be of use to the enemies in their attack on us, report the fact immediately to the chief of internal defense. Those guilty of concealing arms will suffer the most severe penalty.

See to it that arms and other military supplies do not lie around without proper guard and careful inventory, because of the carelessness of some one.

All persons and institutions in charge of the registering of various stores, must carefully examine the latter, and communicate immediately if they find among them arms or objects of military equipment. They will be turned over to the Revolutionary court if they conceal these, or overlook them.

House committees are responsible as formerly for arms found in their houses, and will be subjected to the most severe punishment for failure to carry out this order. Searches will continue until the rear of our Red Army and the Petrograd proletariat has been absolutely made safe.

We are firmly resolved to carry out to the end the business we have started.

At the same time, in order to meet the weak-spirited and those who do not read orders carefully, I now for the last time fix the time limit for the voluntary giving up of arms. Whoever will voluntarily give up arms between the day of publication of this order and Tuesday the 8th of July, is guaranteed, as on previous occasions, complete security. There will be no quarter for those who do not take advantage of this last postponement.

Failure to carry out this order will this time be regarded by me as a deliberate counter-revolutionary ignoring of the ordinances of the Soviet authority, and will call forth a corresponding attitude on my part.

The workmen of Petrograd, finally, will be able by entering the revolutionary reserve regiments of the defense, to arm themselves for self-defense against the White Guard bands, and for the struggle against the latter in all directions.

PETERS

Chief of the Internal Defense of Petrograd

IX

ARTICLE ON FOOD CARDS BY CLASSES (EXTRACTS)

[Izvestia, September 11, 1918.]

The card system has been in existence almost from the very first days of the war, but a class card system is being introduced for the first time. As an experiment, this distribution by classes of food supplies was tried first in the Petrograd commune. This was only an experiment, a beginning, but now such a class distribution must be introduced as a general system. "What is this class card system?" The title speaks for itself. It is the distribution of all foodstuffs according to classes of which our present society is composed. . . .

According to the project prepared and already adopted and confirmed, the whole population is divided into four groups and the receiving of its class share of the articles of food is expressed for each group by the following percentages:

Group I	200
Group II	150
Group III	100
Group IV	50

Let us take the third group that receives 100 per cent as the basis for reckoning. In this group are included persons occupied in light physical labor and also persons doing mental work whose work takes place in definitely normal conditions with a normal expenditure of physical and muscular energy. . . .

The fourth group is to receive only 50 per cent.

It is no secret to anyone that the persons of the fourth group are for the most part parasitic elements who do not expend any physical energy and do not do any work useful to the community.

The introduction of such a class system of feeding is dictated by sheer necessity resulting from the absence of reserves of supplies and the difficulties in organizing the distribution of supplies. But I believe that such a system of distribution should be the permanent and general principle in our socialistic country, which is gradually gaining strength.

In conclusion I believe that it would be very desirable if comrades among the workmen would comment on this article of mine, and would try to send in their remarks and express their view with regard to this dividing up of the population into groups, and the class food-card system in general, although the question of introducing the latter has already been decided and the first steps will be taken within the next days.

X

FOOD SUPPLY BY CLASSES

[Severnaya Kommuna, October 20, 1918.]

Scholars and professors have been transferred from the second to the first alimentary category, and have the right to keep their laboratories and studies, as well as the living rooms which are allowed them under the decree concerning apartments. The actors of the State theatres are also classed in the first category. During the days of the celebration of the anniversary of the revolution the rations will be considerably increased; first category receives meat and $1\frac{1}{2}$ pounds of bread; even the fourth will receive one-half pound of bread and 3 pounds of potatoes.

XI

BULLETIN FROM THE COMMISSARIAT OF FOOD SUPPLIES

[Petrograd Pravda, April 9, 1919.]

The commissariat of supplies informs the population that in connection with the coming world-proletarian holiday of May 1

there will be issued: One-half pound of wheat bread instead of rye to the first and second categories; one-eighth pound to the third category.

One-half pound of wheat bread will be issued on labor cards, irrespective of the amount of work done, on the April 30 coupon, together with the bread that would be issued for work done April 30.

In addition, on the account of the first half of the month of May, the following products will be issued:

To first and second categories:	To third category:
Sugar, 1 pound.	Sugar, $\frac{1}{2}$ pound.
Fats, $\frac{1}{2}$ pound.	Fish, $\frac{1}{2}$ pound.
Fish, 1 pound.	Herring, 1 pound.
Herring, 2 pounds.	Salt, $\frac{1}{2}$ pound.
Salt 1 pound.	

Children, pupils in schools, hospitals, asylums, and similar institutions will receive also white bread instead of black for May 1, according to the norms established.

XII

REPORT OF AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVE, FROM FINLAND, JUNE 25, 1919

The fall of Bolshevism, which seemed inevitable even two months ago, has created the wildest terrorism. People are executed without trial in masses on mere suspicion of sympathy with the Soviet's enemies. Agitation is growing abroad, created chiefly by Russian Jews and others who are interested in a prolongation of the Bolshevik régime and against the aims of Generals Kolchak, Yudenich, and Denikin, who are denounced as representing the supporters of czarism. The attempt is made also to convince foreigners that improvements are going on in Soviet Russia, with an ardor which would seem to indicate the hopelessness of the situation.

Some American journalists, received and well treated by the Bolsheviks, also have reported favorably. The Russians who are opposed to the Soviet Government naturally believe these to be bribed. I think this unlikely. I have seen a number of them and it is my belief that their conclusions are due rather to pre-

possessed ideas and to ignorance of real conditions and unfamiliarity with the language.

It is my own strong conviction that even the dark elements are by now disillusioned. The bulk of the workmen and the peasants, to whom so much has been promised, are disgusted. The increasing support which the Bolsheviks found in 1917 has gradually disappeared. Reliable opinion counts not more than 160,000 Communists by conviction, and these are mostly young workmen.

Terror and necessity compel work for the Soviet Government, but this work is much encumbered by theory, inexperience, and corruption. The continued existence of Soviet Russia is largely due to enormous stocks accumulated during the war. Even now colossal quantities of cotton goods exist, which they do not know how to distribute. This inability to produce any practical achievements has resulted, politically, in an outspoken change. The idea of a great Russian Republic has faded and the general wish is rather for a strong constitutional monarchy.

The peasants I have recently seen deny emphatically the existence of support (for the Bolsheviks) in the villages, stating that the few Communists to be found in some villages are known to be loafers.

It is my opinion that not 1 per cent of Soviet Russia's population will be against intervention from whichever side it may come; Kolchak or any other power will be welcomed. There will be a slaughtering of Bolsheviks as soon as the deliverers are near the centers and the Red Terror ceases to be feared, but terror, hunger, and disease have temporarily created apathy.

Finland loathes Bolshevism, fears a czar government, but wishes to be on good terms with a new strong Russia. I believe the same applies to the Baltic Provinces.

As to the Tartars of Siberia and Kazan I have not the slightest doubt that these (about 16,000,000 Mohammedans) will as a whole side with Kolchak against the Bolsheviks. This is confirmed by their representative, Mr. S. Maksoudov, now in Paris, who personally gave me his report of March 25, which was cabled in full to Paris.

Many Russian Jews have by their activity with the Bolsheviks strongly compromised that section of the population and "pogroms" of great magnitude, I fear, are to be anticipated.

The strength of the Bolsheviks lies in their organization. Terror, combined with most elaborate espionage at home and propaganda in and behind the ranks of the enemy, makes them still a formidable force.

XIII

REPORT OF AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVE OF STATEMENTS FROM A PERSONAL FRIEND WHO HAD ESCAPED FROM SOVIET RUSSIA, OF JULY 2, 1919

Terror is daily increasing and people are shot not only for agitation against the Soviet Government or for any other accusation; the non-belonging to the Soviet service or relatives being abroad or the possibility of intending to join a new government are sufficient reasons for execution. For instance: Bakharev was shot because he was not serving the Soviet and his wife had gone abroad. He was a young officer who lived in Chernigov with the parents of his wife and his mother went to Moscow. When in August, 1918, all officers had to be registered, he could not appear, living in the Ukraine. His old mother was then arrested in Moscow. Hearing this he managed to go to Moscow and see the commandant. He was immediately arrested and his mother remained one and one-half months longer in prison. The judgment against Bakharev was the following: "Is not in Soviet service, lived in the Ukraine, appeared only after arrest of his mother. To be considered a White Guardist and to be shot." The cook serving at the Extraordinary Commission, where Bakharev and many thousands have been shot, related afterwards that serious differences arose between the so-called "commissaries of death" as to whom Bakharev's clothes should belong. Bakharev was very well dressed, and it is usual that what the delinquent wears belongs to the commissary of death carrying out the sentence. When Bakharev was brought to the room of "souls" where prisoners were taken for final questions and for taking away of any valuables, the commissaries of death, noticing his fine clothes, began to quarrel as to who should execute. After long disputes and quarreling they decided to toss; the winner then hastened to carry out the sentence on this unfortunate Bakharev.

The officer Kamensky was executed on the supposition of the commissary that he was expecting a change of Government to which he might be useful; and people dangerous to the Soviet power must be shot.

Beginning from the middle of April terror increased, people were shot on suspicion of being in sympathy with Kolchak or the Allies. After the decree of Lenin concerning the cleaning out of all counter-revolutionists in the rear, on account of the danger from Kolchak and others, besides executions, many have been taken as hostages. The names of only a small percentage of those shot are published. When I was two and one-half months in prison at the Extraordinary Commission I had occasion to notice that of 36 shot 7 names were published, and another time of 58 persons 11; on other instances (executions are going on nearly every night) either the names are not published at all or only very few, and the names of thieves and other criminals are always mentioned.

Many people were shot by mistake, especially in August and September, 1918. Officer A. Leite, who was in prison from July, 1918, till February, 1919, told me that from the day of the attempt on Lenin's life 80 to 100 persons were shot daily, of which on an average 60 per cent were officers and former policemen, 20 per cent bourgeois, and 20 per cent workmen belonging to the Right Socialist-Revolutionary or to the Menshevik Party. Mistakes were made due to the arrests of persons having the same name, not much attention being given to the first names. Often men were shot at night and called up for judgment or release the following day. For belonging to the Socialist-Revolutionaries the president of the Trade Union of Workmen in Smolensk was arrested and shot. But his trial was the next morning. When called up the chief jailer declared that prisoner was sent to the "staff of souls."

In the house where I lived a man called Lvov died of smallpox. His corpse was sent to the cemetery and remained there with several hundred others, unburied for three weeks, although the widow asked several times to be allowed to inter her husband. It was refused and all were buried in one big grave.

A workman, Polianker, receiving 800 rubles a month, was not able to supply his family with sufficient food. His wife was unable to work and had to look after the children. Friends helped with 200 to 500 rubles a month; still they remained hungry. He

could not stand to see their sufferings and killed them all and himself.

The administrator of my houses received from the Soviet Government 400 rubles a month; I gave him 300 and besides he earned another 700. Still he could not find sufficient food for his only daughter, and committed suicide.

A wealthy house owner, Mrs. I. Shaposnikov, committed suicide, leaving a note saying: "Hunger and cold forced me to do this."

The president of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission, Dzerzhinsky, appeared last New Year's Eve in our prison and commenced asking all the reason of their imprisonment. Most declared that they were absolutely ignorant why they were arrested. I was next to Col. Fraise. When Dzerzhinsky asked him, and the colonel knew only English and French, whilst Dzerzhinsky only Russian and German, I had to translate in French. The colonel's exhausted condition induced me to transmit only part of Dzerzhinsky's talk; I did not wish to increase his sufferings. No wonder he was exhausted. Long imprisonment and bad food were sufficient reasons. Our rations were: Morning, one-eighth to one-fourth pound of bread and one teaspoonful of sugar; at noon, very small amount of bad fish. Nothing more, only after the second half of December we received at 4 o'clock a second portion of fish. That is how prisoners are kept for several months in the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission. In the regular prison food was slightly better. We received 1 pound of bread and twice, at 12 o'clock and 4 o'clock, the same fish and some sort of porridge, consisting chiefly of water. Still all prisoners want to be transferred to the regular prison in order not to hear the nightly shooting at the Extraordinary Commission.

Espionage and provocation are developed to highest perfection. Agents of the Extraordinary Commission are everywhere—in all departments, railroad carriages, streets and private houses. A. Hoelzke, with family and several friends, was arrested and remained one and one-half months in prison for expressing the opinion that the Bolsheviks would scarcely be able to collect the extraordinary taxes, as they were too high. I. Lopatin was arrested because he said in his home that he did not believe the Allies would recognize the Bolsheviks. His servant denounced him and he sat two months.

N. Potelakhov, a well-known cotton dealer from Turkestan, was arrested in April, 1918. President Dzerzhinsky declared he would remain in prison till Orenburg was taken by the Red Army, then he would be sent to Turkestan to buy cotton. When the cotton was received he was to get a commission of 2 per cent and to be free. After an imprisonment of six months, in October he was tried for the first time and asked why he was in prison. When he assured his ignorance, the commissary said he would look into the matter. In December he was tried again and as there was no charge against him the judge explained that prison was now the place for rich people. When he was arrested it was found that he possessed 68,000,000 rubles, which were confiscated, and the informant received the usual 20 per cent reward. In February, he was sent to Turkestan to buy cotton to the amount of 2,000,000,000 rubles.

Even Bolsheviks are alarmed at the misdeeds, and the newspapers publish sometimes protests of dissatisfaction against the numerous executions of innocent persons without judgment or even examination.

Krylenko and Diakonov protested in meetings and newspapers; they agitated against the right of the Extraordinary Commission to execute people without proof of guilt. The official *Izvestia* answered: "If among 100 executed 1 was guilty, this would be satisfactory and would sanction the action of the Commission." Still a compromise was found: The Extraordinary Commission obtained the right to execute without judgment only in places where martial law was declared. But as the cities are long ago under martial law, and in other parts of Soviet Russia martial law can be declared any time, nothing has changed. In fact, prisoners whom it is desired to shoot without judgment are simply brought to Moscow, as it was done February last with those officers of the organization in Vladimir.

No meetings except those arranged by the Bolsheviks are allowed, and those caught at any gathering are shot or interned, according to the character of the meeting, in former monasteries.

February last the Socialist-Revolutionaries were permitted to publish their newspaper, which, however, was suppressed after a few days. From time to time anti-Bolshevist proclamations appear, but in case it is discovered where they have been printed, the owner of the typography, even if he knew nothing of it, is shot. Such was the fate of the owner of the typography Ivancv.

About half of the arrested persons sentenced to death are not examined, and it is for this reason that so many deplorable mistakes occur. During the time of my imprisonment five such cases occurred.

Discontent and hatred against the Bolsheviks are now so strong that a shock or the knowledge of approaching help would suffice to make the people rise and annihilate the Communists. Considering this discontent and hatred, it would seem that elections to different councils should produce candidates of other parties. Nevertheless all councils consist of Communists. The explanation is very plain. That freedom of election of which the Bolsheviks write and talk so much, consists in the free election of certain persons, a list of which had already been prepared. For instance, if in one district six delegates have to be elected, seven to eight names are mentioned, of which six can be chosen. Very characteristic in this respect were the elections February last in the district of . . . , Moscow Province, where I have one of my estates. Nearly all voters, about 200, of which 12 Communists, came to the district town. Seven delegates had to be elected and only seven names were on the prepared list, naturally all Communists. The local Soviet invited the 12 communistic voters to a house, treated them with food, tea, and sugar, and gave each 10 rubles per day: the others received nothing, not even housing. But they, knowing what they had to expect from former experiences, had provided for such an emergency and decided to remain to the end. The day of election was fixed and put off from day to day. After four postponements the Soviet saw no way out. The result was that the seven delegates elected by all against 12 votes, belonged to the Octobrists and Constitutional-Democrats. But these seven and a number of the wealthier voters were immediately arrested as agitators against the Soviet Republic. New elections were announced three days later but this time the place was surrounded by machine guns. The next day official papers announced the unanimous election of Communists in the district of Vereia. After a short time peasant revolts started. To put down these Chinese and Letts were sent and about 300 peasants were killed. Then began arrests, but it is not known how many were executed.

Of course no freedom of professional trade union exists either. If a union elects as member of the committee one not belonging to the Communists, the union and committee are subject to all

sorts of ill-treatments, like requisition of their premises, arrest of members, house searching, etc., as it happened to the printers' union who elected Mensheviks as managers.

This is in general the political situation. Appalling terror, defenseless population, espionage and provocation are the factors thanks to which the Soviet Government still exists.

The economic situation is still worse and according to the People's Commissary Krassin's statement, a catastrophe. Transport scarcely exists. Notwithstanding the fact of abundant quantities of grain brought to eastern and southern governments there is no possibility of moving them, not even enough for the larger towns. The quantity of locomotives sent for repair is twice as large as that coming out ready for use; and adding to this the want of fuel, thanks to which trains often remain at stations several days waiting for delivery of wood, it is comprehensible why Moscow and other cities have no heating material and electric light.

For three months Moscow will have no electric light and no gas; tramways are running on three lines only and till 6 o'clock. The price for one cubic sashen (7 feet) now is 4,800 to 5,000 rubles (normal price 30-50 rubles). About 50 per cent of houses with central system of heating are no longer fit for use; the pipes have been frozen and burst.

Water and canalization pipes also burst and there is nothing to replace them with and no workmen either. The best houses were occupied by Bolsheviks; having no fuel they used the parquetry and when pipes burst and canalization would not work, they used a room as W.C., and when it was no longer possible to live in such a flat they requisitioned another one, remarking cynically: Let the bourgeois clean the place after us; plenty of lodgings remain for us yet.

Furniture from private houses and storehouses is requisitioned and given, free of charge, to Communists and commissaries; the commissaries take and sell the best furniture, carpets, and pictures.

Most factories and mills have stopped working and the machines left to their fate; the rest, due to want of fuel and raw material, will soon follow. Zinoviev remarked of these: "They barely groan and scarcely cover the cost of fuel."

The productiveness of labor has fallen to a minimum, thanks to hunger and unwillingness to work for the Bolsheviks. Twenty-

four rubles per day has been declared as the minimum wage and February last an increase of 30 per cent was accorded, but not paid for want of currency. Payment of wages is delayed four to five weeks and sometimes two months. According to Commissary Gandler, who was in prison with me, most of the printed money is used for propaganda in all countries; in February large amounts were sent to India and Afghanistan. As the exchange has now fallen too much, the Bolsheviks send diamonds and other jewelry stolen from safes and during searches, and from the results of their sale the propaganda is carried on. Still this was not sufficient and from the beginning of March the Bolsheviks have been printing foreign money. I am repeating the words of former Commissary Gandler and believe he said the truth, as he was furious on account of his arrest. He could reveal much as he was a special commissary on the frontier and received particular instructions for passing agitators.

The bourgeoisie are literally starving and are selling their last belongings; belonging to the third category, they received three-fourths of a pound of bread and during the whole winter a few pounds of herring and other fish. Sick persons received increased nourishment, if certified by a Soviet doctor and a local Soviet. My wife obtained this grant after a series of petitions. And besides the ordinary allowances sick persons received in the course of one month 5 pounds of lentils and one-eighth pound of salted butter.

On all market places one can see bourgeoisie selling clothes and other belongings, to be able to buy food.

The agricultural situation is desperate. All agricultural equipment stolen from the estates is spoilt and there is no one to repair it, and it would not be of much use as there are no seeds and persons possessing such do not intend sowing them, but try to sell on the sly, as the Bolsheviks took last autumn's crop from the peasants at a low figure. Peasants just cultivate sufficient for their own needs and a quantity, which allowed, is kept. Former private estates are managed by a commission of all kinds of rabble or by a Soviet steward. In most cases all that was left on the estate disappeared; enormous accounts are presented, money received, and except immense losses, the estate produces nothing. Live stock, formerly stolen and sold by the Bolsheviks, now is requisitioned from the richer peasants.

Prices in Moscow in April were:		Rubles
1 pound black bread		25-40
10 eggs		110-130
1 goose		55-60
1 pound butter		140-190
1 pound pork		125-150
1 pound hay		55-60

A drive by cab from the center of town to the station (about 2 miles) 250 to 300 rubles. Very often fallen horses remain in the streets for several days. Moscow is slowly dying from hunger, cold, and epidemics. Corpses remain unburied for two to three weeks; coffins cannot be had in sufficient numbers. Frequently some unfortunate bourgeois makes a coffin out of a chest of drawers for his dead child. Suicide is now not at all unusual. Last winter corpses of persons, who did not die from any contagious disease, were buried temporarily in the snow. Hungry dogs were feeding on these corpses and one could find in streets near the cemetery, hands or legs torn off these bodies.

"All Moscow" is seen daily on the Sukharev market, buying and selling. Everything can be bought for money: Forged passports cost from 1,000 to 5,000 rubles; for all sorts of false orders and certificates prices vary according to their importance. I have myself paid 10,000 rubles to a war commissary for a forged certificate for the right to travel by railroad.

From all this the economic bankruptcy of life is evident; organized theft and corruption increase the breakdown.

The military situation is also very poor. No one wants to serve; fear of being shot forces recruits to appear, but at the first possible moment most soldiers run away. In every regiment, in every battalion some Communists are placed and it was decided not to form any more special units of Communists. Trotsky came to the conclusion, that by spreading Communists all over the army the process of communism would be more complete; they play also the rôle of spies and provocators. When advancing they are behind the lines and shoot any deserters or those not showing fight, also in case of retreat. Only this threat keeps the soldiers back from more general desertion. It must be regretted that among the Russian officers a certain number serve the Bolsheviks, and not out of fear but sympathy; some are even staff officers, colonels, and generals—of the old army. But the

bulk of officers going to the front only think of how to go over to the other side. The war commissary, from whom I bought the forged certificate, told me that in the real sense of the word there is no army; there is a highly unreliable element ready at any given moment to turn arms against the Bolsheviks. He accompanied a division from Petrograd to the eastern front, and upon arrival only 280 soldiers remained with him. Horses are few and miserable, guns and ammunition are still sufficient from the old stock, but the new output does not replace the consumption.

Regarding the part Japan is playing in our country, I only know what Bolshevik papers say and we know next to nothing of what is going on abroad. They informed us chiefly of their successes and of different revolutionary movements in other countries. It is clear that the Russians have been deceived by beautiful phrases, exhausted under the yoke of Bolshevism and notwithstanding the earnest desire they can not emancipate themselves; the Intelligentsia is frightened and impotent, workmen went to the villages and mixed with the peasants who are also apprehensive, unarmed, and not organized. Those few who were able to escape the claws of the Bolsheviks and are ready to give their lives for the freedom of Russia, are not only doing this for their country but for humanity; the danger of the Bolshevik disease is threatening the whole cultured world, and if immediate and very energetic steps are not taken for the reestablishment of order in Russia, if a State power guilty of the worst deeds is allowed to remain in the hands of bandits, every day will increase the danger for the whole world, and make the difficulty of relief more precarious.

Help for Russia is needed immediately. Setting aside all other considerations, the liquidation of Bolshevism is not only a Russian, it is an international problem, and delay weakens the position of cultured humanity and thereby strengthens Bolshevik forces—the stranglers of all culture. The nations of the world can not silently sit by, witnesses of organized murder, theft, and plunder.

Let representatives of French workmen ask their compatriots Baré, Vaquié, Jeannean Harrié, who have been in prison with me, of the torments they suffered. Let the English working class take information from Col. Fraise and others, returned not long ago, of those horrors the latter have gone through and witnessed. And just let the workmen of all countries more closely and in

detail become acquainted with what is going on in Soviet Russia. Then they will understand that Russia in the hands of the Bolsheviks is nothing but a source of enrichment, and of propaganda in other countries, that the interests of the working classes are worse looked after than even under the Czar, that at the head of the government are not the representatives of workmen and peasants, but a gang of bandits and mostly criminals. This gang persecutes all, bourgeois and workmen—whoever raises his voice to reveal their doings.

Covering themselves with the high-toned name of "workmen's government" they do not hesitate to execute workmen and by shooting them throttle the expression of opinion and righteous demands.

By a decree of the Soviet Government no strikes are allowed, and for this reason anyone guilty is handed over for sabotage to the revolutionary tribunal, but most are punished without judgment.

The workmen of the Alexander Railroad had a meeting February last, demanding more bread; this meeting was dispersed by Chinese and Lettish troops resulting in several dozens dead and wounded. After this suppression all workmen received warning. Alarmed by the agitation amongst other workmen, the Soviet power published in the press that the suppression was an arbitrary act of the commissary who was dismissed. After a short time this same commissary received a new and better position in another town.

Scarcely any representatives of workmen are in the Executive Committee, unless one counts those criminals who years ago were workmen. When workmen began to object strongly, in order to smooth matters, a workman, Kalinin, was elected and this election was then strongly advertised.

The barbarous suppression of the workmen in Briansk and Orel is unparalleled in the history of labor riots; even those of January 9, 1905, and the Lena trouble can not be compared.

The working classes of other countries who sympathize with the Soviet Government in Russia should learn to know more closely the activity of that power. Then they would understand that by supporting the Bolsheviks they are undermining their own existence.

I repeat: Help is needed immediately and in great strength, without limit; Russia, torn to pieces and exhausted, will show that she can thank her rescuers.

XIV

BUDGET OF THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF 1919

[Moscow *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn*, May 21, 1919.]

Attempting a review of the State budget of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic for January to June 1919, it is necessary to say a few words with regard to the preceding two revolutionary budgets: For January to June 1918 and for July to December 1918. Neither of these budgets reflects a full picture of the financial condition of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, because of conditions attending their production. The budget for the first half of the year of 1918, gotten up immediately after the revolution accomplished toward the end of October, 1917, while differing essentially from the budgets of the previous years in its contents as well as in its special items, could not be satisfactory, because it was gotten up in a most acute moment of the revolution. The greatest weakness of that budget was the fact that it took no account of the operations of the chief producing organ—the Supreme Soviet of National Economy, nor of the operations of the People's Food Commissariat. No more did the budget for the second half of 1918 give a proper picture of all the financial-economic operations of the country. It also failed to account completely for all the economic operations of the country, and included principally expenditures of the consuming apparatus. From the operations of the chief productive organ, namely the Supreme Soviet of National Economy and of the organ of distribution—the People's Food Commissariat—the budget of the second half of 1918 contained no revenues. The expenditures were taken account of only in the form of balances between gross receipts and expenditures, while both the Supreme Soviet of National Economy and the People's Food Commissariat disposed of their receipts as their own special resources apart from the general State budget.

The first peculiarity of the budget for January to June 1919 consisted in the application of a new cardinal principle—that all receipts and all disbursements be calculated in the general State

budget. The second modification in the new budget is the omission of the division into ordinary and extraordinary revenues and expenditures.

Receipts:

	Rubles
1. Direct taxes	1,732,001,980
2. Indirect taxes	2,572,184,000
3. Customs	97,939,100
4. State regalia	810,696,500
5. State property	14,789,269,363
6. Reimbursement of expenses of State treasury	63,659,925
7. Miscellaneous	277,877,020
<i>Total</i>	<u>20,343,627,888</u>

Disbursements:

	Rubles
1. All-Russian Central Executive Committee	459,156,742
2. Office of Council of People's Commissaries	842,045
3. Commissariat for Foreign Affairs	11,400,000
4. Commissariat for Affairs of Nationalities	16,714,337
5. Commissariat for Internal Affairs	655,542,712
6. Commissariat for Education	3,887,993,727
7. Commissariat for Labor	280,816,069
8. Commissariat for Public Health	1,227,834,057
9. Commissariat for Social Welfare	1,619,130,093
10. Commissariat for Justice	250,523,251
11. Commissariat for Finances	1,403,604,258
12. Supreme Soviet of National Economy	5,813,951,055
13. Commissariat for Agriculture	532,725,811
14. Commissariat for Food	8,152,880,527
15. Commissariat for Commerce and Industry	202,007,828
16. Commissariat for Means of Communication	5,072,906,230
17. Commissariat for Post and Telegraph	573,103,010
18. Commissariat for Military Affairs	12,149,770,487
19. Commissariat for Naval Affairs	521,068,892
20. Commissariat for State Control	107,599,080
21. Central Statistical Office	69,119,000
22. All-Russian Evacuation Commission	55,800,000

23. All-Russian Extraordinary Commission to Combat Counter-revolution, etc. . .	348,258,215
24. To liquidate annulled loans	100,181,020
25. Interest on debt to People's Bank by treasury	1,625,617,000
26. Expenses of nationalization and office of S. S. N. E.	5,162,625,009
27. Expenses of local Soviets	201,456,567
28. Appropriations for extraordinary expenses	200,000,000
<i>Total</i>	<hr/> 50,702,627,832

*Comparison of receipts and disbursements in rubles (in millions)
for January-June, 1919, January-June, 1918, and
July-December, 1918*

	1919, January- June		1918			
	Rcpts.	Dis- burse- ments	January- June		July- December	
			Rcpts.	Dis- burse- ments	Rcpts.	Dis- burse- ments
A. RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS IN PRODUCING						
Operations of Supreme Soviet of National Economy	5,812	8,685	2,000	12	2,759	
State sugar operation	493	344	582	472	584	363
State alcohol operation	257	242	97	15	52	10
State timber operation	164	89	40	45	164	80
	6,726	9,358	719	2,532	812	3,212
B. RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS IN DISTRIBUTING						
Provisioning of population	6,500	8,153	1,372		3,143	
Reserve state fund of provisions .	2,250					
Purchase of goods abroad for nationalized undertakings		127				
	8,750	8,280	1,372		3,143	
C. RAILWAY AND WATER TRANSPORT						
Railways	923	5,004	731	3,791	490	3,471
Nationalized merchant fleet . . .	302	425	256	460	302	3,902
	1,225	5,429	987	4,251	792	7,373
MISCELLANEOUS RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS OF ADMINISTRATION						
Taxes and customs	2,123		862		10,820	
State regalia	61		210		105	
State capitals and property . . .	1,117		11		143	
Various receipts	347		64		45	
Education, science, and art . . .		2,327		525		2,004
Public building		1,396		416		1,002
Disbursements for defense . . .		12,491		5,371		9,762
Other disbursements		11,422		3,136		6,078
	3,648	27,636	1,147	9,449	11,123	18,846
Total	20,349	50,703	2,853	17,633	12,727	29,103

(The author says that while the enormous deficit of 30,353,000,000 rubles is obtained, relatively, as seen from the comparison, it shows a favorable situation. For the first half of 1918 the deficit amounted to 83.8 per cent of the disbursement, and for the second half of 1918 the deficit amounted to 58.6 per cent.

Since, however, in the receipts for the second half of 1918 the extraordinary levy of 10,000,000,000 which can not be repeated, was included, the real deficit would amount to 90.7 per cent. For the first half of 1919 the deficit amounts to 59.8 per cent. The author considers it a hopeful progress and believes that the items of receipts can be increased in the future to equal disbursements.

Analyzing separately the various group deficits, the author calls attention to the absence of receipts from the agricultural undertakings of the State and to the very conservative estimate of the receipts from the nationalized industries.

The author considers the real irreparable deficit to be that of the transport operations. He lays it at the door of the imperialistic war, which has ruined transport.

The disbursements of Group D for education, public buildings, and defense are considered not total losses, because of the values they create. The real deficit, according to the author, is 7,774,000,000 rubles and 4,204,000,000, for Group C.)

XV

INTERVIEW WITH GREGORY ALEXINSKY

[Copenhagen Socialdemokraten, June 17, 1919.]

Our party colleague, Gregory Alexinsky, former Social-Democratic member of the Duma for Petrograd and of the Central Committee for the Social-Democratic Organization "Edinstvo" (the Marxist group founded by Plekhanov), has been in Copenhagen for the past few days. He has come from Moscow by the route Petrograd-Reval and has visited our editorial office, on which occasion we requested him to give our readers a picture of the situation of present-day Russia. With great willingness our party colleague placed himself at our disposal for an interview, and we let him speak for himself in the following:

"I left Moscow on May 3," he states, "and left Petrograd on May 17. Thus the news of my country I can give you is fairly fresh, particularly if you take into consideration the difficulties existing at the time in communication between Russia and Europe. At the time of my departure from Petrograd the condition of affairs in Bolshevik Russia was very distressing. The majority of the industrial enterprises are not operating. In the

Moscow district 63 textile factories stopped working last fall, and the same picture appears with respect to the textile industry in the vicinity of Ivanovo-Voznesensk, near Petrograd, etc. The chemical industry, the paper industry and many others are likewise in a miserable condition."

But the metal industry? we ask. The munitions factories?

"Yes," Mr. Alexinsky answers, "in this instance the Bolshevik Government has done everything to keep the work going in the plants that produce ammunition, but nevertheless many of them are shut down. Owing to the lack of rolling stock transportation is not good either. The number of 'sick' locomotives and cars is so large that the workshops are unable to cope with the repairs."

How are conditions with respect to the taking over by the Bolsheviks of means of production, and to wages?

"In this respect the Government has entirely deserted the principles it had promised to apply. In order to increase the production it has already reintroduced the forms which existed prior to the socialization, particularly payment on piecework, the premium system, etc. In short, parity of wages does not exist.

"Among the causes which have prevented the socialization being carried through successfully the following must be emphasized: (1) Shortage of fuel and raw material; (2) our proletariat's inadequate preparation in technical, social and psychological respects, because instead of conceiving of socialization as an increase of its productive work the insufficiently developed and short-sighted workman looked upon it exclusively as an increase of wages, an increase which is purely imaginary because the price of provisions is increasing steadily.

"But, in particular, Russia, which was in a precapitalistic stage of development, could not in the nature of affairs realize the socialistic order of its industries because—as Marx and Engels have established in general and their pupil Plekhanov for Russia—the socialistic order can not be invented according to the will of a few leaders, but must be the result of the consummation of the capitalistic development."

We requested our party colleague to explain what effect this dismal situation of Russia's industry, which he documented in the above, has had upon the position of the working population, and, in particular, we asked for some practical examples as illustrations.

"This lamentable picture of our industry's decay has," he continues, "led to terrible complications for the workmen on account of the great shortage of provisions and an enormous increase in prices. Bread, 'black bread'—rye bread because there is no wheat left—costs 35 to 40 rubles per pound in Petrograd; sugar, 180 to 200 rubles per pound; butter 140 to 180 rubles; tea, 200 rubles; men's footwear, 1,200 to 1,500 rubles per pair, etc. Horse meat costs 30 rubles per pound. In Moscow prices are about on the same scale. On the big market in Moscow (Sukharev) dog meat is being sold openly, and the official financial gazette publishes statistics showing fluctuations in the price of such meat (5 to 7 rubles per pound). Even a box of matches costs between $3\frac{1}{2}$ and 4 rubles.

"I could mention many more such figures, but I believe that these are sufficient to prove to you how great the material sufferings are, which Russia's population must bear, even though it was promised a communistic paradise. Oh, it has obtained a very unsatisfactory position.

"On account of the shortage of provisions, fuel, soap, and other commodities that are absolutely indispensable for the public health and welfare, contagious diseases are spreading everywhere. In Moscow the official statistical bureau calculates 10,000 cases of contagious diseases per week. Of that number 8,000 cases are typhoid fever (typhus exanthematicus). In Petrograd 30 per cent of the patients in the communal hospitals die of ordinary consumption which is the result of famine. Coffins for burying the dead are lacking, and in Moscow the same coffin is used for various interments; a corpse is transported to the grave in a coffin, buried without the coffin, which is sent back to the city to be used for the transportation of the next corpse, etc. . . .

"But," said Alexinsky, changing the subject, "I will not bore you and sadden you with all of these disconsolate descriptions. Let me tell you that I have stood in the ranks of Russian Social-Democracy for almost 20 years, and that it is naturally the interests of the workmen that occupy me most. In that respect I must state that these interests have suffered immeasurably through the present crisis. In Petrograd there are only about 700,000 inhabitants left out of two and one-half millions. Two-thirds of the city's labor population, which I represented in the Duma, no longer exists; a part migrated into the country, another part

died of starvation, etc. Some believe that we can only count on two to two and one-half million industrial workmen instead of the ten to twelve millions Russia had prior to the war and the domestic crisis. The remainder has spread like chaff before the wind, among the small bourgeoisie and the agricultural population. To use a comparison, I might say that the industrial proletariat's oases in Russia have been devoured by mighty stretches of sand out in the country's desert, and now it is the country that rules over the towns.

"This economic phenomenon is not favorable for us socialists, because we lose the ground on which we had worked hitherto, we lose the proletarian masses which had been our circle, our field of action. Therefore, we Marxian Social-Democrats, we representatives of scientific socialism, can by no means approve of the Bolshevik Government's economic and political activity, and we recollect Engel's prophetic words when he said that the worst misfortune that can happen to the proletariat is to assume the power prematurely, i.e. at a moment at which the country's general conditions are not sufficiently mature for the realization of genuine socialism. This disaster, our Russian party colleagues exclaim, has now dealt Russia's proletariat an economic and social blow which is appalling."

But the peasants' position, we interject, is that so brilliant?

"By no means," he answers. "From a material point of view they lack supplies and necessities. For instance, they have no petroleum and must illuminate their huts with ordinary bits of wood that are used as small torches and give very little light, but a lot of smoke. As they have no factory-woven stuffs, they must fall back on their grandmother's old methods and weave for themselves what they need in the clothing line.

"But it is of the utmost importance that the peasants have received the land as their property, and the land question is perhaps the only one that has been more or less solved by the revolution, in favor of the wide masses of the population. They all understand that, and even the old estate owners do not take any stock in the possibility of a return to former agrarian conditions. The White leaders also realize it, and Admiral Kolchak has issued a proclamation in which he promises the peasants that the estates they have taken away from the former owners shall remain in their possession until the all-Russian national

assembly makes its decision. The leader of the Whites who occupied the towns of Pskov (Pleskau) and Gdov (along the front between Petrograd and Pskov) issued a similar proclamation to the peasants. Thus one can state that under the exterior forms of "communism" and "socialization" the process of the transfer of land ownership from estate owners to peasants is being consummated in Russia. And that is the real import of the "Social Revolution" in our country.

"Accordingly simultaneously with the destruction of capitalism in its highest grades of development in big industry and big business, it is being reborn from below and penetrating all pores of national economics in Russia. And Lenin himself has had to admit in a speech he recently made, that in place of the old bourgeoisie a new bourgeoisie is arising and becoming more and more numerous.

"That is what I am able to relate to you concerning the general character of conditions in Russia. With respect to the political and military situation, there is naturally a great deal more to tell, but perhaps I can speak of that some other day. . . ."

In that manner our party colleague who was Russian delegate to the congress at Basle, closes his instructive narrative. But before he leaves us he reports the sad news that death has taken away Vera Zasulich, whose name in the ranks of Russian Social-Democracy is familiar to our readers, inasmuch as she founded the first Social-Democratic labor organization in Russia (1883) together with Plekhanov and Leo Deutsch. She died at Petrograd on May 9, after a long siege of sickness, due to inadequate food, as well as psychic collapse owing to her deep sorrow at witnessing the errors and disasters of her country's proletariat. Vera Zasulich lies buried in the Volkovo cemetery, by the side of Plekhanov, whose theoretical and political views she shared up to her last breath.

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CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE BOLSHEVIST MOVEMENT IN RUSSIA

PART II

Bolshevist Program of World Revolution



APRIL, 1920

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III

BOLSHEVIST PROGRAM OF WORLD REVOLUTION

I

BOLSHEVISM INTERNATIONAL, NOT NATIONAL

It is of the essence of the Bolshevik movement that it is international and not national in character. The revolution in Russia is but the first incident in the Bolshevik program. This thought occurs in almost every proclamation or discourse of Lenin and his associates. In his formal program-theses, when the negotiations for peace were in progress (*Izvestia*, March 8, 1918), Lenin says:

There is no doubt that the Socialist Revolution in Europe must come and will come. All our hopes for the definitive triumph of Socialism are based on this conviction and on this scientific prevision. Our propagandist activities in general, and the organization of fraternization in particular, must be strengthened and developed. (For the full text of these theses, see Appendix XVI.)

The Bolshevik propagandist, Bukharin, writes in chapter XIX of his pamphlet "The Program of the Communists," (Moscow, July 19, 1918):

The program of the Communist party is not alone a program of liberating the proletariat of one country; it is the program of liberating the proletariat of the world. (For full text see Appendix XVII.)

That the Bolsheviks are playing an international game and aim directly at the subversion of all Governments is disclosed by the avowed tactics of their foreign policy. In his "Peace Program," published at Petrograd February, 1918, Trotsky says:

If in awaiting the imminent proletarian flood in Europe, Russia should be forced to conclude peace with the present day Governments of the Central Powers, it would be a provisional, temporary, and transitory peace, with the revision of which the European Revolution will have to concern itself in the first instance. Our whole policy is built upon the expectation of this revolution.

A similar attitude with respect to the Allies is disclosed even more strikingly in extracts from a speech made by Zinoviev, president of the Petrograd Soviet, speaking February 2, 1919, on the subject of the Princes Island proposal:

We are willing to sign an unfavorable peace with the Allies. . . . It would only mean that we should put no trust whatever in the bit of paper we should sign. We should use the breathing space so obtained in order to gather our strength in order that the mere continued existence of our Government would keep up the world-wide propaganda which Soviet Russia has been carrying on for more than a year.

In an address before an extraordinary session of the Moscow Soviet, April 3, 1919, Lenin said:

Spring brings us again to difficulties but I believe this will be our last difficult six months. The Entente and the Anglo-French capitalists will not be able to maintain their pressure longer. On the other hand, the conquests of the Red Army in the Ukraine and on the Don have strengthened our internal position. No matter how great our difficulties, we have great hopes for victory not only in Russia but throughout the entire world. . . .

We are sure of our victory over the international Imperialists, and this for two reasons: First, because they have taken to fighting among themselves, and, second, because the Soviet movement is growing rapidly throughout the world. The situation of the Soviet Republic is improving every hour. The Imperialists are digging their own graves and there are plenty of people in their own countries who will bury them and pack the ground solid over their coffins.

The proletarian revolution in Hungary is proof of the spread of the Soviet movement. The Hungarian bourgeoisie has itself admitted that there is only one power in the world which can lead nations when the crisis comes and that is the Soviet power.

Russia has given an example that the workmen of the whole world have understood.

I have hope that we shall live through all our trials and that to the Russian and Hungarian Soviet Republics will be added an international republic of Soviets. (*Izvestia*, April 5, 1919.)

2

TYPICAL PROCLAMATIONS

Rushing from one front to the other the commander-in-chief of the Red Army issues proclamations and articles from his "Train of Comrade Trotsky," which is equipped with a printing press. This propaganda emphasizes the development of the revolutionary movement all over the world. The following sentences are taken from a typical example of Trotsky's writings (signed article by Trotsky, *Petrograd Pravda*, April 23, 1919; for full text see Appendix XVIII).

The decisive weeks in the history of mankind have arrived.

Spring has come, the spring that decides; our strength is increased tenfold by the consciousness of the fact that the wireless stations of Moscow, Kiev, Budapest, and Munich exchange not only brotherly greetings, but also business agreements respecting common defensive struggle.

To carry out our international duty we must first of all break up the bands of Kolchak, in order to support the victorious workmen of Hungary and Bavaria. In order to assist the uprising of workmen in Poland, Germany and all Europe, we must establish definitely and irrefutably the Soviet authority over the whole extent of Russia.

The Moscow wireless station sends out dozens of messages every day, and many of them are appeals for "world revolution." The message of August 31, 1919, from Moscow, "To all radio employees in Siberia, the Don, the Caucasus, and other occupied Russian districts," the concluding paragraphs of which follow, also illustrates Bolshevik methods of broadcast propaganda:

Every effort must be exerted so that all messages from Soviet Russia will come to the ears of all workers; let each radio message

sent by your brothers from Soviet Russia be read by all workmen and peasants; let the workers of the whole world know that behind the Red Army follow happiness, peace and fraternity of all peoples. The hour is already not far distant when our Red regiments will clear the way and unite us in one family, and at the Congress of radio employees of the whole of Russia our colleagues, amid general enthusiasm, will relate how, when employed at White Guard radio stations, they secretly worked as real proletarians, spreading and extending the workers' and peasants' radios beyond the boundaries of Soviet Russia, and boldly declare: "I was one of the participators in the world revolution!" We will say to those who played the part of traitors and turncoats during the decisive struggle between labor and capital: "The workmen will know how to deal with you according to your deserts." All radio workers who wish to escape from the yoke of the counter-revolutionary régime can boldly fly to Soviet Russia, where everybody is guaranteed work, according to his specialty, in complete security.

In Soviet Russia everyone has the right to work. Long live the solidarity of all radio workers! Long live the solidarity of workers throughout the world! Long live the Socialist world revolution!

**THE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION ON THE RADIO SECTION OF THE
ALL-RUSSIAN UNION OF WORKMEN AND EMPLOYEES OF
NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS**

Wireless News.

3

COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

The Communist International, established by the Bolsheviks in Moscow in March, 1919, issues appeals "To the toilers of the whole world." Such a proclamation was sent out by wireless, and reprinted in all the Bolshevik newspapers, in connection with May 1 of this year, from which the following paragraphs are taken:

The communist revolution grows. The Soviet republics in Russia, Hungary and Bavaria report what has been accomplished daily. Germany is shaking with civil war. A revolution is taking place in Turkey. In Austria and Czecho-Slovakia the workmen are gathering under the glorious flag of socialism. In

France enormous demonstrations have started; in Italy the struggle boils and the workmen call for a dictatorship of the proletariat. In England strikes have taken on the character of an epidemic. In America the working class comes out on the streets; in Japan the workmen are agitated; in the neutral countries like Holland and Switzerland hundreds and thousands of workmen recently took part in a political strike. The workmen of all countries have understood that the decisive moment has come. "Soviets"—by this you will conquer.

The workmen know that only a dictatorship of the proletariat can save humanity from that bloody horror into which the bourgeoisie in all countries has plunged it. The workmen know that the proletarian dictatorship will lead to a triumph of socialism. There is no middle course. Either the bloody dictatorship of executioners-generals, who will kill hundreds of thousands of workmen and peasants in the name of the interests of a band of bankers, or the dictatorship of the working class, that is, of the overwhelming majority of toilers, which will disarm the bourgeoisie, create its own Red Army and free the whole world of slavery. Down with the autocracy of czars and kings.

(For full text see Appendix XIX.)

This world-wide and international character of Bolshevism is well stated by the American representative at Archangel in a report of July 30, 1919, forwarding and commenting on Bolshevik newspapers:

This sort of propaganda against the Peace Conference shows the imperialistic character of the present Moscow government which, while constantly pleading for non-interference in its own internal affairs never lets the people inhabiting its territory for a moment forget that the corner stone of its own foreign policy is to stir up strife and revolution in other countries.

4

COMPROMISES TACTICAL

When the Bolsheviks say they want peace and give assurances that they wish simply to be let alone in order to work out their experiment in Russia, such offers to compromise are, it has been shown, purely tactical. After the expulsion of the Bolshevik Ambassador Joffe from Berlin, Chicherin boasted

of the millions of rubles taken to Berlin for propaganda purposes (official note to German foreign office in *Izvestia*, December 26, 1918). Another illustration of the "scrap of paper" attitude of the Bolsheviks toward treaties is contained in a signed article (*Izvestia*, January 1, 1919) on "Revolutionary methods," in which Joffe himself says:

Having accepted this forcibly imposed treaty (Brest-Litovsk), revolutionary Russia of course had to accept its second article which forbade "any agitation against the state and military institutions of Germany." But both the Russian Government as a whole and its accredited representative in Berlin never concealed the fact that they were not observing this article and did not intend to do so.

And this agitation continued even after the Bolsheviks had signed with Germany, August 27, 1918, the so-called supplementary treaties of Brest-Litovsk, which were not signed like the original treaty under seeming duress, but were actively sought for and gladly entered upon by the Bolsheviks.

By the supplementary agreement dealing with finance the Bolsheviks undertook to deliver to Germany "in compensation of losses sustained by Germans through Russian measures" 6,000,000,000 marks, of which one and one-half billions were to be paid partly in gold bullion and partly in paper money; 1,000,000,000 in Russian merchandise; two and one-half billion to be in the form of a loan to be guaranteed by certain state revenues and particularly the rent for "certain economic concessions which will be given to Germans;" the remaining 1,000,000,000 to be paid by the Ukraine or Finland, if the Bolsheviks might so arrange it, or in accordance with a special agreement to be made later. It was also agreed that all property of Germans in Russia, including bank deposits expropriated by the Bolsheviks in pursuance of communist principles, should be returned to the former owners. Despite Bolshevik principles inheritance by Germans in Russia was also provided for.

English translations of the full texts of the supplementary treaties are published as Appendices XX and XXI.

APPENDIX

XVI

THESES OF LENIN, OF 1918

[First read to party workers in January, but not published until March;
Izvestia, March 8, 1918]

1. The situation of the Russian revolution at the present moment is such that almost all workmen and the overwhelming majority of the peasants undoubtedly are on the side of the Soviet authority, and of the social revolution started by it. To that extent the success of the socialistic revolution in Russia is guaranteed.

2. At the same time the civil war, caused by the frantic resistance of the propertied classes which understand very well that they are facing the last and decisive struggle to preserve private property in land, and in the means of production, has not as yet reached its highest point. The victory of the Soviet authority in this war is guaranteed, but inevitably some time yet must pass, inevitably a considerable exertion of strength will be required, a certain period of acute disorganization and chaos, which always attend any war and in particular a civil war, is inevitable, before the resistance of the bourgeoisie will be crushed.

3. Further, this resistance takes less and less active, and non-military forms: Sabotage, bribing beggars, bribing agents of the bourgeoisie who have pushed themselves into the ranks of the socialists in order to ruin the latter's cause, etc. This resistance has proven stubborn, and capable of assuming so many different forms that the struggle against it will inevitably drag along for a certain period, and will probably not be finished in its main aspects before several months. And without a decisive victory over this passive and concealed resistance of the bourgeoisie and its champions, the success of the socialistic revolution is impossible.

4. Finally, the organizing tasks of the socialistic reorganization of Russia are so enormous and difficult, that a rather prolonged period of time is also required to solve them, in view of the large number of petty bourgeoisie fellow-travelers of the socialistic proletariat, and of the latter's low cultural level.

5. All these circumstances taken together are such that from them result the necessity, for the success of socialism in Russia,

[11]

of a certain interval of time, not less than a few months, in the course of which the socialistic government must have its hands absolutely free, in order to triumph over the bourgeoisie, first of all in its own country, and in order to adopt broad and deep organizing activity.

6. The state of affairs respecting the socialist revolution in Russia must be made the foundation for any definition of the international tasks of the new Soviet authority; for the international situation in the fourth year of the war has become such that the probable moment of the outbreak of revolution, and the overthrow of any of the European imperialistic governments (including the German) absolutely can not be calculated. There is no doubt that the socialist revolution in Europe must come and will come. All our hopes for the definitive triumph of socialism are based on this conviction, and on this scientific prevision. Our propagandist activities in general, and the organization of fraternization in particular, should be strengthened and developed. But it would be a mistake to build up the tactic of the socialistic government in Russia on attempts to determine whether or not the European and especially the German socialist revolution will come within the next six months (or a similarly short period). As it is quite impossible to decide this fact, all attempts to do so would really amount simply to a blind gamble.

7. The peace negotiations at Brest-Litovsk have shown quite clearly to date, January 7, 1918, that in the German Government, which leads the other Governments of the quadruple alliance by the bridle, the military party has without question gained the ascendancy, and has in fact already presented an ultimatum to Russia (one can, one must, expect the formal presentation of the ultimatum from day to day). This ultimatum is as follows: Either further war or an annexationist peace, that is, a peace on the condition that we give up all lands occupied by us, while the Germans keep all the lands occupied by them, and impose on us a contribution (externally concealed as payment for the support of prisoners of war) of about three billion rubles, to be paid in instalments over the period of several years.

8. The Socialist Government of Russia faces a question that requires an immediate decision, whether to accept immediately this annexationist peace or to carry on immediately a revolutionary war. No middle course is really possible. Further postponements are quite out of the question, inasmuch as we have

already done everything possible, and impossible, to drag along artificially the negotiations.

9. Examining the arguments in favor of an immediate revolutionary war, we meet first of all the argument that a separate peace would now mean, objectively, an agreement with the German imperialists, an "imperialistic bargain," etc., and that therefore such a peace would be a complete rupture with the fundamental principles of proletarian internationalism.

But this argument is clearly unsound. The workmen who lose a strike, and sign conditions for the resumption of work that are disadvantageous for them and advantageous for the capitalist, do not betray socialism. Only those betray socialism who exchange advantages for a portion of the workmen against advantages for the capitalists, and only such agreements are inadmissible.

It is treason to socialism to call a war against German imperialism a defensive and just war, when in fact one receives support from Anglo-French imperialists, and one hides from the people the secret agreements with the latter. He who without hiding anything from the people, and without concluding any secret treaties with imperialists, agrees to sign terms of peace disadvantageous for a weak nation, but advantageous for the imperialists of one group if at the moment there is no strength to continue the war, does not commit the slightest treason to socialism.

10. The other argument in favor of immediate war is that by concluding peace we in fact become the agents of German imperialism, for we give the latter the release of troops from our front, millions of prisoners, etc. But this argument also is clearly unsound, for a revolutionary war at the present moment would in fact make us the agents of the Anglo-French imperialism, giving to the latter strength that would assist it in its aims. The English made the direct proposal to our commander-in-chief Krylenko, to pay 100 rubles a month for each soldier in the event of the continuation of the war. Even if we do not take a single kopeck from the English and French, nevertheless, we shall in fact be helping them by keeping occupied a portion of the German troops.

On the other hand in both cases we shall not be breaking completely with either of the imperialistic connections; and it is clear that it is not possible to break off such connections completely until imperialism has been overthrown the world over. The

correct conclusion then is the following: Until the victory of a socialistic government in one of these countries, one must decide all questions not from the point of view of preference for this or that imperialism, but exclusively from the point of view of the best conditions for the development and strengthening of the socialist revolution, which has already begun.

In other words the principle lying at the basis of our tactic should not be which of the two imperialists it is more profitable to assist at the present moment, but should be what is the better and more hopeful way to secure for the socialist revolution the possibility of strengthening itself or at least of maintaining itself in one country, until other countries shall join.

11. They say that the German Social-Democrats who opposed the war have now become "defeatists," and ask us not to give way to the German imperialism. But we have recognized defeatism only with respect to one's own imperialistic bourgeoisie, while we have always rejected victory over a foreign imperialism, a victory secured by formal or actual alliance with "friendly" imperialism, as a method in principle inadmissible and in general useless.

This argument consequently is only a variety of the preceding one. If the German Left Social-Democrats should propose to us to put off the separate peace for a certain length of time, guaranteeing a revolutionary outbreak in Germany within that period of time, then the question might present itself differently to us. But the German Lefts not only do not speak of this, but on the contrary they declare in a formal manner: "Hold out as long as you can, but decide the question in accordance with the situation of Russian socialist revolution, for one can promise nothing positive with respect to the German revolution."

12. Some say that we have in fact "promised" a revolutionary war in a series of party declarations and that the conclusion of a separate peace would be going back on our word. This is not true. We spoke of the need, for a socialistic government, of "preparing and conducting" a revolutionary war in a period of imperialism; we said this in order to combat abstract pacifism—the theory of the complete denial of "defense of country"—in a period of imperialism, and finally to combat the purely bodily instincts of a portion of the soldiers, but we did not assume any obligation to begin a revolutionary war without taking in account the extent to which it could be carried on at this or that moment.

And now we should without any question speak of revolutionary war. We shall carry out this promise of ours, just as we have in general carried out all our promises, which could be carried out immediately; we opened up the secret treaties, we proposed to all peoples a just peace, we dragged out the peace negotiation in every possible way, and several times, in order to give other peoples time to join in.

But the question whether it is possible now, immediately, to conduct a revolutionary war, must be decided by reckoning out the exclusively material conditions of carrying it on and also the interests of the socialistic revolution that has already begun.

13. Summarizing then the arguments in favor of an immediate revolutionary war, one must come to the conclusion that such a policy would perhaps correspond to the requirements of mankind in its striving for the beautiful, the effective and clear, but would not at all take into account the objective interrelations of class forces, and the material factors at the present moment of the socialistic revolution that has started.

14. There is no doubt that our army at the present moment, and for the next few weeks (and probably also the next months) is absolutely not in a condition successfully to resist the German attacks, in the first place because of the extreme weariness and exhaustion of the majority of the soldiers in the presence of an unheard-of breakdown of the food supply service and so forth; in the second place, as the result of the complete inadequacy of the supply of horses, so that our artillery is destined to inevitable loss; in the third place, as the result of the utter impossibility of the defending the coast from Riga to Reval, which gives the enemy the surest chance to conquer the remaining positions of Livland, and then of Estland, to surround and cut off a large portion of our troops, and finally to take Petrograd.

15. Further, there is also no doubt that the peasant majority of our army at the present moment would undoubtedly express itself in favor of an annexationist peace, and not in favor of an immediate revolutionary war; for the work of creating a socialistic revolutionary army, putting into it detachments of the Red Guard and such, has only just been begun.

With the complete democratization of the army, it would be a mere adventure to carry on war against the will of the majority of the soldiers, and at least several months are necessary to build up a really solid, and ideally strong, socialistic workman-peasant army.

16. The poorest peasants in Russia are in a state to support a socialistic revolution led by the workman class, but they are not ready immediately, at the present moment, to go in for a serious revolutionary war. It would be a fatal mistake to disregard this objective interrelation of class forces in connection with the given question.

17. The situation with respect to the revolutionary war at the present moment therefore stands as follows:

If the German revolution should break out in the next three or four months, then perhaps the tactic of an immediate revolutionary war would not ruin our socialistic revolution.

But if the German revolution does not start within the next months, then the course of events, the war being continued, will certainly be such that greater defeats will force Russia to conclude an ever more disadvantageous separate peace, and further this peace will be concluded not by a socialistic government, but by some other (for example, by a combination of the bourgeois Rada with reactionary elements, or some such combination); for the peasant army, exhausted beyond endurance by the war, after the very first defeats probably not in the month but in a week will overthrow the socialistic workmen's government.

18. With such a state of affairs it would be an absolutely inadmissible tactic to gamble with the fate of the socialistic revolution that has already begun in Russia, simply on the chance that the German revolution will begin within a very short time, that can be measured in weeks. Such a tactic would be an adventure. We have no right to take such risks.

19. And a German revolution will not at all be made more difficult, with respect to its objective bases, if we shall conclude a separate peace. For the time the outburst of chauvinism will probably weaken it, but Germany will still remain in a very difficult position. The war with England and America will be a long-drawn out affair; aggressive imperialism on both sides has been exposed completely and definitely.

The example of a socialistic Soviet Republic in Russia will stand as a living model for the peoples of all countries and the propagandist and revolutionizing effect of this model will be gigantic. Here—the bourgeois order of society and the exposed predatory war of both groups of brigands, while there—peace and the Socialistic Republic of Soviets.

20. By concluding peace we free ourselves as completely as is possible at the present moment from both warring imperialistic groups; taking advantage of their hostility, and of the war that makes it difficult for them to make a deal against us, we shall use a certain period when our hands are free, to continue and strengthen the socialistic revolution. The reorganization of Russia on the principle of the dictatorship of the proletariat, on the principle of the nationalization of banks and of large industrial enterprises, with the exchange of goods *in natura* between the town and the village cooperative societies of small peasants, is economically fully possible, on the condition that one is secured several months of peaceful activity. And such a reorganization will make socialism unconquerable, both in Russia and in the whole world, creating at the same time a solid basis for a powerful workman-peasant Red Army.

21. In fact, a revolutionary war at the present moment would be a war of a socialistic republic against bourgeois countries, with the clearly-expressed aim, fully approved by the socialistic army, of overthrowing the bourgeoisie in other countries. But we can not yet at the present moment deliberately set ourselves such an aim. We would be fighting, objectively, for the liberation of Poland, Lithuania, and Courland¹. But not a single Marxist who does not break with the principles of Marxism, and of socialism in general, can deny that the interests of socialism stand above the interests of the right of nations to self-determination. Our socialistic republic has done everything that it can, and continues so to do, for the realization of the right of self-determination of Finland, the Ukraine, and so forth. But if the concrete state of affairs has become such that the existence of the socialistic republic is endangered at a given moment by the violation of the right of self-determination of several nations (Poland, Lithuania, Courland, and others), yet, of course, the interests of preserving the socialistic republic stand higher.

Therefore, whoever says "We can not sign a disgraceful, indecent, etc., peace, betray Poland, and so forth," does not see that by signing peace on the condition of the liberation of Poland, one has simply still further strengthened German imperialism against England, Belgium, Serbia, and other countries. Peace on the condition of the liberation of Poland, Lithuania, Courland, would

¹ The last lines were spoken and not read.

be a "patriotic" peace from the point of view of Russia, but it would not cease to be a peace with annexationists, with German imperialists.

XVII

WORLD REVOLUTION

[Bolshevist Program, from Chapter XIX of Pamphlet entitled "Program of Communists," by N. Bukharin; July 24, 1918]

The program of the Communist Party is the program not only of liberating the proletariat of one country; it is the program of liberating the proletariat of the world, for such is the program of the "International Revolution." At the same time it is the program of liberating all smaller, oppressed countries and peoples. Those robbers, the "Great Powers" (England, Germany, Japan, and America) have stolen an immense quantity of lands and peoples. They divided the world between themselves. It is not surprising that in these stolen countries the workmen and toilers are suffering under double pressure, under the pressure of their own bourgeois as well as under the pressure of the conquerors. The Czar's Russia also stole many countries and peoples; that is why our "empire" is so enormous. Therefore among many of our so-called "aliens" and also among some of the non-Russian proletariat there was no faith in the Great Russians. . . . For the definite victory of the workmen's revolution a complete mutual confidence between the different parts of the proletariat is all important. It must be pointed out and proved that the proletariat of the oppressing nation was a faithful ally of the proletariat of other nations. In Russia the dominant nation was the Great Russian, who conquered the Finns, Tartars, Little Russians, Armenians, Georgians, Poles, and many other peoples. It is natural that even among the proletariat of these peoples there exists a wrong conception concerning every Russian. They have been accustomed to see how the Czar forcibly used Russians, and because of that have believed all Russians, even the members of the proletariat, to be of the kind.

Therefore, in order to create a brotherly union between the different divisions of the proletariat, the communist program announces the right of working classes of every nation to complete separation. That is to say, the Russian workman who has the power, says to workmen of other peoples living in Russia:

[18]

"Comrades, if you do not care to become members of our Soviet Republic, if you desire to form your own Soviet Republic, do so. We give you the full right to do so. We do not wish to hold you by force a single minute."

Only by such tactics it is possible to win the confidence of the whole proletariat. We have only to imagine what would happen in case the Great Russian Soviets should keep in subjection the working classes of other nations, and the latter should protect themselves with arms. It is evident that this would mean the entire failure of the proletarian movement, the complete collapse of the revolution. It is impossible to act in this way, for, we repeat, a brotherly union of proletarians is the one guarantee of victory.

We do not speak of the right of self-determination of nations (i. e., of their bourgeoisie and their workmen), but only of the right of the working classes. Therefore, the so-called "will of the nation" is not sacred for us. Should we wish to learn the will of the nation, we would be forced to call a Constituent Assembly of the nation. For us, the will of the proletariat and of the semi-proletarian masses is sacred. . . . During the dictatorship of the proletariat, not the will of the Constituent Assembly, but the will of the Soviets of the working people decides the question. And if at the same time in two different parts of Russia two assemblies should be called, a Constituent Assembly and a Congress of Soviets, and the former should against the will of the latter proclaim a "separation," we will defend the latter with all means, using armed force if necessary.

That is the manner in which the proletarian party decides the question of different peoples of the same country. But then comes up the broader question of its international program. The way is clear here. It is the way of the world-wide support of the international revolution, of revolutionary propaganda, of strikes and rebellions in imperialistic countries, of uprisings in the colonies of these countries.

In the imperialistic countries (and such are all of them, except Russia, where the workmen have smashed the rule of capital) that section of the Social-Democrats which stands for the defense of the country is one of the most serious obstacles. It is even now setting forth the idea of defending the country (robbers' country), telling different lies to the wide working classes. It pursues our friends, the German, Austrian, and English Bol-

sheviks, who are the only ones who contemptuously reject the idea of defending the bourgeois countries. It wails over the decomposition of the (robber) army. The situation of the Soviet Republic is quite an exceptional one. It is the only state organization of the proletariat in the whole world, among the robber organizations of the bourgeoisie. Therefore it alone has the right to be defended. Moreover, it must be regarded as the fighting weapon of the universal proletariat against the universal bourgeoisie. The fighting slogan of this struggle is quite clear now. It is the International Soviet Republic.

The overthrowing of imperialistic governments by armed uprisings and the organization of an International Soviet Republic is the way of the international dictatorship of the working class.

The most forceful way to maintain the international revolution is by the organization of the armed forces of revolution. All workmen of all countries, who are not blinded by traitor Socialists, by their Socialist Revolutionaries and their Mensheviks (and these are found in each country), see in the workmen's revolution in Russia and in the Soviet authority their own cause. Why? Because they see that the Soviet authority is the authority of the workmen themselves. It would be quite different if the bourgeoisie, assisted by the Mensheviks and the Socialist Revolutionaries, should overthrow the Soviets, should call the Constituent Assembly and through it should recreate the bourgeois authority, for example, as it existed before the October revolution. Then the working class would lose its country for it would lose its power. Then inevitably the banks would be returned to bankers, the factories to manufacturers, the land to the landowners. The land of "profits" would then revive. And the workmen would have no interest to protect such a country. On the other hand, the workmen of Western Europe would be unable to find in bourgeois Russia a lighthouse, which lights them in their hard struggle. The development of the international revolution would be checked.

On the other hand, the strengthening of the Soviet authority, the organization of armed forces of the workmen and poorest peasants, the organization of resistance to international robbers who are going against Soviet Russia as enemies, because they are members of different classes, such as landowners and capitalists, like a band of "hangmen of the workmen's revolution," and finally the organization of the Red Army would strengthen the revolu-

tionary movement in European countries. The better we are organized, the stronger the armed detachments of workmen and peasants, the more powerful the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia, the more quickly will the international revolution come.

This revolution will inevitably come, despite the efforts of German, Austrian, French and English Mensheviks. The working masses in Russia have cut all relations with the compromisers. The workmen of all Europe will do, and in fact are already doing, the same. The slogan of overthrowing robber governments and of the dictatorship of workmen is winning more and more sympathy. Sooner or later we will have the International Republic of Soviets.

This International Soviet Republic will liberate from oppression hundreds of millions of inhabitants of colonies. The "civilized" robber powers tortured the population of colonial countries by a régime of terror. European civilization was maintained by exploitation and by stealing small peoples in distant countries. The latter will be liberated only by the dictatorship of the proletariat. Just as the Russian Soviet authority has actually proved that it is not willing to continue the colonial policy (for instance Persia) so the European workmen, after overthrowing the rule of the bankers, will give complete freedom to the exploited and oppressed classes. Therefore, the program of our party, which is the program of international revolution, is at the same time the program of complete liberation of the weak and oppressed. The great class—the working class—sets itself great tasks. It also is solving these tasks in a bloody, torturing and heroic fight.

XVIII

ARTICLE BY TROTSKY

[Petrograd Pravda, April 23, 1919]

The decisive weeks in the history of mankind have arrived. The wave of enthusiasm over the establishment of a Soviet Republic in Hungary had hardly passed when the proletariat of Bavaria got possession of power and extended the hand of brotherly union to the Russian and Hungarian Republics. The workmen of Germany and Austria are hurrying in hundreds of thousands to Budapest where they enter the ranks of the Red Army. The

movement of the German proletariat, temporarily interrupted, again bursts forth with ever-increasing strength. Coal-miners, metal workers, and textile workers, are sending brotherly greetings to the victorious Hungarian Republic and demand of the German Soviets a complete change of front, that is, a break with imperialists—their own; the English, French and American—and the forming of a close union with Russia and Hungary. There is no doubt that this movement will be given a still more powerful swing by the victory of the proletariat in Bavaria, the Soviet government of which has broken all ties with the oppressors of Berlin and Weimar, with Ebert and Scheidemann, the servants of German imperialism, the murderers of Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg.

In Warsaw, which the allied imperialists tried to make the center for the attack on Soviet Russia, the Polish proletariat rises in its full stature and through the Warsaw Soviet of Workmen's Deputies sends greetings to the Hungarian Soviet Republic.

The French minister of foreign affairs, Pichon, the sworn enemy of the Russian revolution, reports in Parliament on the sad state of affairs: "Odessa is being evacuated" (this was before the occupation of Odessa by Soviet troops); "the Bolsheviks are penetrating the Crimean Peninsula, the situation in the north is not favorable." Things are not going well. The Greek soldiers landed on the shores of Crimea, according to the reports of allied diplomats and newspaper men, were mounted on Crimean donkeys; but the donkeys were not able to arrive in time at the Perekop Isthmus. Things are not going well. Evidently even donkeys have begun to shake off the imperialistic harness.

Foreign consuls do not wish to leave the Ukraine and urge their Governments to recognize the Ukrainian Republic. Wilson sent to Budapest not troops of occupation, to overthrow the Soviet Republic, but the honey-tongued General Smuts to negotiate with the Hungarian Council of People's Commissaries.

Wilson has definitely changed front and evidently has forced France to give up all hope of an armed crusade against Soviet Russia. War with Soviet Russia, which was demanded by the senseless French general, Foch, would take 10 years in the opinion of the American statesmen.

Less than six months have passed since the decisive victory of the Allies over the central empires; six months ago it seemed

that the power of the Anglo-French and American imperialism was without limits.

At that time all the Russian counter-revolutionists had no doubt that the days of the Soviet Republic were numbered; but events now move steadfastly along the Soviet road. The working masses of the whole world are joining the flag of the Soviet authority, and the world robbers of imperialism are being betrayed even by the Crimean donkeys. At the present moment one awaits from day to day the victory of the Soviet Republic in Austria and in Germany. It is not impossible that the proletariat of Italy, Poland, or France will violate the logical order and outstrip the working class of other countries. These spring months become the decisive months in the history of Europe. At the same time this spring will decide definitely the fate of the bourgeois and rich peasant, anti-Soviet Russia.

In the east, Kolchak has mobilized all his forces, has thrown in all his reserves, for he knows definitely that if he does not win immediately then he will never win. Spring has come, the spring that decides. Of course the partial victories of Kolchak are insignificant in comparison with the general conquests of Soviet authority in Russia and in the whole world. What does the temporary loss of Ufa mean in the face of the occupation of Odessa, the movement into the Crimea and especially the establishment of the Bavarian Soviet Republic? What does the evacuation of Belebey, caused by military considerations, mean in the face of the powerful growth of the proletarian revolution in Poland and in Italy? Nevertheless, it would be criminal frivolity on our part to disregard the danger represented by the White Guardist bands of Kolchak on the east. Only stubbornness, steadfastness, watchfulness, and courage in the military struggle have guaranteed till now to the Russian Soviet Republic its international success. The victorious struggle of the Red Army on all fronts aroused the spirit of the European working class, and has made possible the establishment and strengthening first of the Hungarian and then of the Bavarian Republic. Our work has not yet been completed. The bands of Denikin have not been definitely defeated. The bands of Kolchak continue to move toward the Volga.

Spring has come; the spring that decides; our strength is increased tenfold by the consciousness of the fact that the wireless stations of Moscow, Kiev, Budapest, and Munich not only ex-

change brotherly greetings but business agreements respecting common defensive struggle. But at home, on our own territory, we must direct the main portion of our increased strength against the most dangerous enemy—against the Kolchak bands. Our comrades of the Volga district are well aware of this. In the province of Samara all Soviet institutions have been put on a war footing, and the best forces have been diverted to support the army, to form reserve regiments to carry on agitation of an educational character in the ranks of the Red Army. Party, Soviet, and trade union organizations in Syzran have unanimously responded to the appeal of the central authority to support the eastern front. A special shock regiment is being organized from the workmen and popular elements, which only recently were groaning under the heel of the White Guardists. The Volga district is becoming the center of attention of all Soviet Russia. To carry out our international duty we must first of all break up the bands of Kolchak in order to support the victorious workmen of Hungary and Bavaria. In order to assist the uprising of workmen in Poland, Germany, and all Europe, we must establish definitely and irrefutably the Soviet authority over the whole extent of Russia.

To the Urals: This is the slogan of the Red Army and of the whole Soviet country.

The Urals will be the last stage in this bitter struggle. Victory in the Urals not only will give grain to the famished country and cotton to the textile industries, but will secure finally the well-earned rest for our heroic Red Army.

L. TROTSKY

XIX

THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ON MAY 1 APPEALS TO THE TOILERS OF THE WHOLE WORLD

[Severnaya Kommuna, April 25, 1919]

Proletarians of all countries unite! Long live May 1! Long live communism!

Comrades!

Exactly 30 years ago, in 1889, at the International Socialist Congress, when the Second International was held, the workmen of all countries decided to celebrate May 1 as the day of the mobilization of proletarian forces, the day of struggle, the day of

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international brotherhood, of the eight-hour working day, of the abolition of standing armies (against war). These were the slogans of the first May 1 holiday 30 years ago.

In 1890 the European bourgeoisie trembled as the 1st of May approached. In Vienna, Paris, and a whole series of other European countries the bourgeoisie organized whole regiments, expecting the immediate uprisings of workmen. Since that time the celebration of May 1 has been a symbol of proletarian solidarity.

But in the official Social-Democracy there developed from that time larger and larger groups that were hostile to the cause of the proletariat. When the imperialistic war started the socialist-traitors, both German and French, proposed to the working class to abandon the celebration of May 1 in 1915, and the May 1 celebration of the proletariat in 1915 was perverted to a May 1 celebration of the bourgeoisie.

Four years have passed since that time, during which the bourgeoisie has pitilessly shattered by fire and sword the flower of the working class and has ruined all countries. Now the war started by the bourgeoisie is coming to a close. Thirty millions killed and crippled, dozens of countries ruined, millions of starving people, millions of new war debts—these are the results of the imperialistic war.

The Second International died. It wrote its own death sentence on August 4, 1914, when the German and French socialist-patriots voted for war credits, that is, to support the imperialistic war.

The workmen of all countries, exhausted by the war and betrayed by their own leaders, are eagerly looking for an international bond to join them together. The robber-imperialists of Paris are trying to create their Black International, the so-called League of Nations. The conscious workmen of the whole world understand clearly that the so-called League of Nations is in fact a league to suppress the proletarian revolution. The socialist-traitors in Berne also tried to create their Yellow International.

It was impossible to bring back to life the corpse of the Second International. The revolutionary workmen of all countries refused to take part in this despicable comedy staged in Berne.

In 1919 was formed the Red International. Our Third International, of Communists, is an international association of the proletarians of all countries who set for themselves the aim of

overthrowing the bourgeois governments and establishing the international republic.

Our Third Communist International has undertaken to organize the international celebration of May 1.

Workmen, workwomen, soldiers, sailors, peasants, all toilers! The Communist International calls on you to take part in the great May 1 proletarian holiday.

If the bourgeois slave-owners will remain in power they will force on us a war, a new servitude, new taxes, amounting to billions, hunger and complete slavery. Over all Europe ruins are smoking and millions of proletarian children are dying of hunger. There is no grain anywhere, for during four years, instead of cultivating the fields people killed each other by order of a group of slave-owners. The cities are being depopulated. In some countries almost the entire mature male population has been killed. Europe has been covered with blood.

The communist revolution grows. The Soviet republics in Russia, Hungary, and Bavaria report what has been accomplished daily. Germany is shaking with civil war. A revolution is taking place in Turkey. In Austria and Czecho-Slovakia the workmen are gathering under the glorious flag of socialism. In France enormous demonstrations have started; in Italy the struggle boils and the workmen call for a dictatorship of the proletariat. In England strikes have taken on the character of an epidemic. In America the working class comes out on the streets; in Japan the workmen are agitated; in the neutral countries like Holland and Switzerland hundreds and thousands of workmen recently took part in a political strike. The workmen of all countries have understood that the decisive moment has come. "Soviets"—by this you will conquer.

The workmen know that only a dictatorship of the proletariat can save humanity from that bloody horror into which the bourgeoisie in all countries has plunged it. The workmen know that the proletarian dictatorship will lead to a triumph of socialism. There is no middle course. Either the bloody dictatorship of executioners-generals, who will kill hundreds of thousands of workmen and peasants in the name of the interests of a band of bankers, or the dictatorship of the working class, that is of the overwhelming majority of toilers which will disarm the bourgeoisie, create its own Red Army and free the whole world of slavery. Down with the autocracy of czars and kings.

This last cry was raised in Russia in 1917 and its echo was heard over the whole of Europe. Crowns fell from the heads of Nicholas Romanov, William Hohenzollern, Karl of Austria and other executioners of larger and smaller calibre.

Down with the autocracy of capital! This cry is now raised when they rise a second time—when they get ready for the last fight.

The eight-hour labor day—that was the slogan of May 1 holiday in the past. Soviet republics have already carried out this demand.

Against bourgeois militarism this old May 1 demand remains in force even today. In the name of this demand we shall create our own Red Army, a class army, the People's Army, the army of labor, the army of the poor, the army of socialism.

The Red Army already exists in Russia, Hungary, Bavaria, and Austria. The Red Army soon will exist over all the world. The Red Army will triumph.

Long live civil war, the only just war, in which the oppressed class fights its oppressors.

Down with the French imperialists.

Down with the bourgeoisie of the Entente.

Down with the robbers who wish to send their troops to Russia in order to reestablish the authority of landlords, enthrone the monarch, and restore the bourgeoisie.

May 1, 1919, should become the day of attack, the day of the proletarian revolution in all Europe.

Let the workmen of all countries refuse to give up the rifles which the bourgeoisie forced them to take in 1914. The arming of workmen and the disarming of the bourgeoisie—these are the slogans of the moment.

The conflicts which have taken place to date in the various countries were simply the preliminary skirmishes between labor and capital. The decisive struggle is approaching.

Amidst storms, blood and tears, hunger and endless suffering a new world is being born, a bright world of communism, of the common brotherhood of the toilers.

In 1919 was born the great Communist International.

In 1920 will be born the great International Soviet Republic.

Long live May 1!

[Signed] EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST
INTERNATIONAL

G. ZINOVIEV
President

XX

**SUPPLEMENTARY RUSSIAN-GERMAN TREATY,
AUGUST 27, 1918**

[Izvestia, September 3, 1918]

Supplementary Treaty to the Treaty of Peace between Russia for the one part, and Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria for the other.

Guided by the wish to solve certain political questions which have arisen in connection with the peace treaty of March 3-7, 1918, between Russia for the one part, and Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey for the other part, in the spirit of friendly understanding and mutual conciliation, and, in so doing, to promote the restoration of good and confidential relations between the two States, for which a way was paved by the conclusion of peace, the Government of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic and the German Imperial Government have agreed to conclude a supplementary treaty to the Peace Treaty with this object, and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

For the Government of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic: Its diplomatic representative accredited to the German Imperial Government, M. Adolf Joffe;

For the Imperial German Government: The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Imperial Privy Councillor, Rear Admiral Paul von Hintze, retired; and the Director in the Foreign Office, the Imperial Privy Councillor, Dr. Johann Kriege.

After exchanging their credentials, and finding them in correct and proper form, the plenipotentiaries agreed to the following provisions:

CHAPTER I**DEMARCATIOMS AND FRONTIER COMMISSIONS****ARTICLE I**

Insofar as this has not yet been done, Russian-German Commissions will immediately be formed to fix demarcation lines for all fronts where German and Russian troops face one another.

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Exact details as to this shall be agreed on by the commanders of the troops on each side.

These demarcation lines shall be so drawn that there are neutral zones between the respective fronts, which zones must not be trodden by any members of the respective armies, with the exception of parlementaries. In so far as there is not regular traffic between the respective fronts, such traffic will be established by the demarcation commissions.

ARTICLE 2

The Russian-German Commission for fixing the frontier line, provided for in article 3, paragraph 1, of the Peace Treaty, shall also fix the eastern frontiers of Esthonia and Livonia, agreed on in article 6, paragraph 2, of that treaty, more exactly.

After the fixing of the eastern frontier of Esthonia and Livonia, provided for in paragraph 1, Germany will evacuate the territory occupied by her east of this frontier without delay.

ARTICLE 3

Germany will evacuate the territory occupied by her east of the Beresina, even before the conclusion of general peace, in proportion as Russia makes the cash payments stipulated in article 2 of the Russian-German Financial Agreement of this date; further provisions as to this, particularly the fixing of the individual sectors to be evacuated, are left to the commission referred to in article 2, paragraph 1, of this Supplementary Treaty.

The contracting parties reserve the right to make further agreements with regard to the effecting of the evacuation of the occupied territory west of the Beresina before the conclusion of general peace, in accordance with the fulfillment by Russia of the remaining financial obligations undertaken by her.

CHAPTER II

SEPARATIST MOVEMENT IN THE RUSSIAN STATE

ARTICLE 4

In so far as is not otherwise prescribed in the Peace Treaty or in this Supplementary Treaty, Germany will in no wise interfere

in the relations between the Russian State and parts of its territory, and will thus in particular neither cause nor support the formation of independent States in those territories.

CHAPTER III

NORTH-RUSSIAN TERRITORY

ARTICLE 5

Russia will at once employ all the means at her disposal to expel the Entente forces from North-Russian territory in observance of her neutrality.

Germany guarantees that during these operations there shall be no Finnish attacks of any kind on Russian territory, particularly on Petrograd.

ARTICLE 6

When the Entente forces shall have evacuated North-Russian territory, the local Russian coast shipping within the 3-mile limit from the north coast, and the fishing sailing boats within a stretch of 30 miles along this coast, shall be relieved of the barred-zone menace. The German naval command shall have an opportunity, in a way to be further agreed upon, of convincing itself that this concession shall not be taken advantage of to forward contraband goods.

CHAPTER IV

ESTHONIA, LIVONIA, COURLAND, AND LITHUANIA

ARTICLE 7

Russia, taking account of the conditions at present existing in Esthonia and Livonia, renounces sovereignty over these regions, as well as all interference in their internal affairs. Their future fate shall be decided in agreement with their inhabitants.

No obligations of any kind toward Russia shall accrue to Esthonia and Livonia through their former union with Russia.

ARTICLE 8

To facilitate Russian trade through Esthonia, Livonia, Courland and Lithuania the following is agreed:

[30]

NO. 1

In Esthonia, Livonia, Courland, and Lithuania the through transport of goods to and from Russia on routes liable to the payment of duty shall be absolutely free, and the goods to be transported shall not be subject to any transit duties or general transport dues.

NO. 2

On the railways connecting Russia with Reval, Riga, and Windau, the freight tariffs on the goods to be forwarded in through trade with Russia are to be kept as low as possible. They may only be raised above the rates in force on August 1, 1914, by taking the average of the amount by which a general rise in the freight tariffs of the lines in question may be necessary to cover the cost of working and upkeep, including the payment of interest, and timely redemption of the capital invested. Neither must they be higher than the freight tariffs for goods of the same kind of inland origin or destination, which are forwarded over the same lines and in the same direction.

NO. 3

Shipping on the West Dvina between Russia and the open sea, as well as between all places on the Livonian-Courland Dvina, and on the Russian Dvina is, subject to prevailing police regulations, to be free for the transport of goods and passengers, without any discrimination in regard to the ships and the subjects of the one or the other party. It is not to be subject to any tax based solely on the fact of the navigation. It is not to be subject to any stations, slips, depot, turnover, or harborage dues.

Exclusive shipping privileges must not be granted either to companies or corporations or to private persons of any kind.

Taxes for the use of works and institutions which are created, or may be created in future, to facilitate traffic, or to improve and maintain the navigation of the river, may only be raised uniformly in accordance with published tariffs and to the extent necessary to cover the cost of restoration and upkeep, inclusive of payment of interest and redemption of the capital invested. The cost of restoring and keeping up works and institutions which are not for the facilitation of traffic and the improvement and maintenance of the navigation of the river, but are intended to further other objects and interests, may be raised only to a proportionate extent by shipping dues.

The provisions of Nos. 1 to 3 preceding apply also to timber rafts.

NO. 4

At Reval, Riga, and Windau, Russia shall have suitably situated free port zones assigned to her, in which the storing and unpacking of goods coming from or intended for Russia, can take place without hindrance, and the work of dispatching goods from or to the Russian Customs zone can be done by Russian officials.

NO. 5

The individual questions connected with the provision of Nos. 1 to 4, particularly the restrictions to which these provisions may be subjected in war time out of consideration for war necessity, or for urgent sanitary reasons, shall be regulated by a special agreement.

ARTICLE 9

The water of Lake Peipus is not to be artificially diverted on either side to such a degree as to lower the water level. No methods of fishing calculated to diminish the stock of fish will be permitted; a further agreement as to this is reserved.

The water power of the Narova is to be made available when possible for the supply of electricity for the Province of Petrograd according to a special agreement to be made regarding this.

ARTICLE 10

With regard to Esthonia, Livonia, Courland, and Lithuania, agreements, among other agreements, are to be concluded with Russia, as to the following points:

1. With regard to the nationality of the former Russian inhabitants of these territories, as to which they must in any case be allowed the right of option and departure;
2. With regard to the return of the property in Russia belonging to citizens of these territories, particularly that belonging to publicly recognized societies, establishments, and charitable institutions, as well as the property in these territories which belongs to Russian citizens;
3. With regard to an arrangement concerning the property of the communal associations cut up by the new frontiers;
4. With regard to an arrangement concerning the archives, the documents of the legal and administrative authorities, the legal

and administrative trusts, and the register of births, marriages, deaths, etc.;

5. With regard to the regulation of the new frontiers;

6. With regard to the effect of the territorial alterations on the State treaties.

CHAPTER V

RUSSIAN BLACK SEA TERRITORY WITH EXCEPTION OF THE CAUCASUS

ARTICLE 11

With reservation of the provisions of article 12, Germany will evacuate the Russian Black Sea territory, outside the Caucasus, occupied by her after the ratification of the Treaty of Peace to be concluded between Russia and the Ukraine.

ARTICLE 12

The parts of the occupied territory which do not belong to the districts referred to in the third Ukrainian Universal of November 7, 1917, shall be evacuated by the German forces at latest on the conclusion of the general peace, in so far as the peace between Russia and the Ukraine shall not have come into being before then.

The evacuation of the railway line Rostov-Voronezh, as well as of the occupied territory east of it, and a suitable frontier district west of it, including the town of Rostov, will follow as soon as this is demanded on the Russian side. Until the evacuation, Germany will permit the forwarding of grain and other goods for the Russian Government, under the supervision of Russian officials, on those portions of the railway situated in the occupied territory; the same applies for the portions of the railway lines Taganrog-Rostov and Taganrog-Kursk, lying in the occupied territory, for the duration of the occupation.

So long as the Donetsk Basin is occupied by German troops in accordance with article 11 and article 12, paragraph 1, Russia shall receive monthly from the quantities of coal extracted there a three-times greater number of tons than it lets Germany have of crude oil or crude oil products from the Baku district in accordance with article 14, paragraph 2, and a four-times greater number of tons for the consignments of benzine contained therein. In so far as the coal supply in the Donetsk Basin is not sufficient for this, or must be used for other purposes, it will be supplemented by German coal.

CHAPTER VI

THE CAUCASUS

ARTICLE 13

Russia agrees to Germany's recognizing Georgia as an independent State.

ARTICLE 14

Germany will give no assistance to any third power in any military operations in the Caucasus outside Georgia or the districts mentioned in article IV, paragraph 3, of the Peace Treaty. She will also take measures to prevent the military forces of any third power in the Caucasus overstepping the following lines: The Kuban, from its mouth to Petropavlovsk; from there onward the boundaries of the district Shemakha to Agrioba; thence a straight line to the point where the boundaries of the districts of Baku, Shemakha, and Kuban meet; thence along the northern boundary of the district of Baku to the sea.

Russia will do her utmost to further the production of crude oil and crude oil products in the Baku district, and will supply to Germany a quarter of the amount produced, or at least a number of tons, to be agreed upon later, per month. In so far as the quantities produced in the Baku district are not sufficient to supply this number of tons, or must be used for other purposes, they will be supplemented by quantities produced elsewhere. The price will be reckoned by the value of the coal Russia is to be allowed to have in accordance with article 12, paragraph 3, and the remainder will be reckoned by the value of the commodities which Germany is to be allowed to have from Russia in accordance with article 3, No. 2 of the Russian-German Financial Agreement of this date.

CHAPTER VII

TREATMENT OF RUSSIAN WARSHIPS AND RUSSIAN STORES CONFISCATED BY GERMAN MILITARY FORCES AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF PEACE

ARTICLE 15

Germany recognizes Russia's ownership of the Russian warships confiscated by German forces after the ratification of the Peace Treaty, subject to Russia coming to terms with the Ukraine

and Finland as to the national property of the former Russian Empire.

The warships confiscated will remain under German supervision until the conclusion of the general peace.

ARTICLE 16

Germany admits Russia's claim to be compensated for the Russian stores which have been confiscated outside the Ukraine and Finland by German forces after the conclusion of peace. This compensation will be reckoned in when Germany's and Russia's financial obligations arising from the Supplementary Treaty to the Peace Treaty are settled.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUDING PROVISIONS

ARTICLE 17

This Supplementary Treaty shall be ratified, and the ratification documents shall be exchanged not later than September 6, 1918, in Berlin.

The Treaty comes into force on the day the ratification documents are exchanged.

In witness whereof the plenipotentiaries have signed and sealed this Supplementary Treaty.

Executed in duplicate in Berlin on this 27th day of August, 1918.

A. JOFFE
VON HINTZE
KRIEGE

XXI

RUSSIAN-GERMAN FINANCIAL AGREEMENT

AUGUST 27, 1918

The Financial Agreement supplementing the Russian-German Supplementary Treaty to the Treaty of Peace between Russia for the one part, and Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey for the other.

On the basis of paragraph 2, article 35, of the Russian-German Supplementary Treaty to the Peace Treaty concluded between Russia for the one part and Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bul-

garia, and Turkey for the other, the plenipotentiary of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, namely, the diplomatic representative of the Soviet Republic accredited to the Imperial German Government, M. Adolf Joffe, and the plenipotentiaries of the German Empire, namely, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Imperial Privy Councillor, Rear-Admiral M. Paul von Hintze, retired, and the Director of the Department for Foreign Affairs, Imperial Privy Councillor, Dr. Johann Kriege, have agreed to regulate the financial obligations between Russia and Germany arising from the Russian-German Supplementary Treaty, the reciprocal return of bank deposits and bank balances due, as well as the adjustment of certain differences in the economic systems of the two countries, and for these purposes to conclude a supplementary agreement to the Russian-German Supplementary Treaty, taking into consideration the Russian regulations in regard to the annulment of Russian State Loans and State Guarantees, and the nationalization of certain property values in Russia.

The plenipotentiaries, after exchanging their credentials, which were found to be in correct and proper form, came to an agreement in regard to the following provisions:

CHAPTER I

THE FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS OF RUSSIA AND GERMANY ARISING FROM THE RUSSIAN-GERMAN SUPPLEMENTARY TREATY TO THE PEACE TREATY

ARTICLE I

The following provisions of the Russian-German Supplementary Treaty to the Peace Treaty concluded between Russia for the one part and Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey for the other, are annulled: Article 2, article 8, in so far as it relates to payments by Russia on State obligations, including the State guaranteed loans; No. 1; paragraph 2, article 9, in so far as it does not relate to exemption from payment of taxes; clause 2, No. 3, article 9; subclause 1, clause 2, paragraph 2, article 12; articles 13 to 15; paragraph 1, article 16; paragraph 2, article 16, in so far as it relates to Russian expropriations effected before July 1, 1918; and No. 3, article 17, and No. 4, paragraph 2, article 17.

ARTICLE 2

Russia shall pay Germany six billion marks as compensation for losses sustained by Germans through Russian measures; at the same time corresponding claims on Russia's part are taken into account, and the value of supplies confiscated in Russia by German military forces after the conclusion of peace is taken into account.

ARTICLE 3

The payment of six billion marks mentioned in article 2, shall be effected in the following manner:

NO. 1

The sum of one and a half billion shall be paid by the transfer of 245,564 kilograms of gold and 545,440,000 Rs., in bank notes consisting of 363,628,000 Rs. in bank notes of 50, 100, or 500 Rs., and 181,812,000 Rs. in bank notes of 250 or 1,000 Rs.

The transfer shall be effected by five installments namely, (1) a payment of 42,860 kilograms of fine gold and 90,900,000 Rs. in bank notes, consisting of 60,600,000 Rs. in bank notes of 50, 100, or 500 Rs., 30,300,000 Rs. in bank notes of 250 or 1,000 Rs.; this payment shall be made on September 10, 1918; (2) four payments which shall be made on September 20, October 31, November 30, and December 31, 1918, each amounting to 50,676 kilograms of fine gold and 113,635,000 Rs. in bank notes consisting of 75,757,000 Rs. in bank notes of 50, 100, or 500 Rs. and 37,878,000 Rs. in bank notes of 250 or 1,000 Rs.

Each payment shall be delivered to the representatives of the German Government at Pskov or at Orsha; on receipt of the money the representatives shall issue a temporary receipt which shall be replaced by a final discharge after the gold and bank notes have been checked and counted.

NO. 2

The sum of one billion marks shall be canceled by the delivery of Russian commodities on the basis of a special agreement, which shall be concluded in this connection. Before November 15 and December 31, commodities are to be delivered to the value of 50 million marks each time; before March 31, June 30, and December 31, 1919, commodities are to be delivered each time to the value of 150 million marks; before March 31, 1920, com-

modities to the value of 300 million marks; in so far as the deliveries cannot be effected within these periods the amount lacking in each individual case shall be immediately made up either by payment in German Imperial bank notes at their face value or in fine gold and bank notes in rubles in the proportion of 3 to 2 and at a rate which must be separately fixed in each case.

NO. 3

The sum of two and a half billion marks shall be paid by December 31, 1918, through the transfer of securities of a loan at 6 per cent from January 1, 1919, with a sinking-fund of $\frac{1}{4}$ per cent, and this loan is issued by the Russian Government in Germany at the nominal amount of the above mentioned sum, and the terms of the loan shall be considered an essential part of this agreement.

Certain State revenues, and in particular the rental dues for certain economic concessions which will be granted to Germans, shall serve as guarantees of the loan mentioned in paragraph 1; guarantees shall be settled severally by the establishment of a special agreement in such a form that the estimated yearly income from them shall exceed the yearly sum required for interest and sinking-fund by at least 20 per cent.

NO. 4

With regard to the balance of one billion marks, in so far as its payment, with the consent of Germany, will not be taken over by the Ukraine or Finland in their agreement with Russia regarding the distribution of property, the parties reserve the right to enter on a special agreement.

ARTICLE 4

Property of Germans situated in Russia, which was expropriated before July 1, 1918, to the use of the State or local self-government bodies, or the owner of which was in any other way deprived of the right to dispose of it, shall be returned on demand to the owner, subject to the return of the compensation received by him from the sum named in article 2, with due regard to possible improvements or damage if the property has not remained in the possession of the State or local self-government bodies, or if expropriation or any other form of confiscation of

similar property has not been effected, or is annulled, in regard to the local inhabitants or citizens of a third Power; demands for the return of property must be made within a year from the period when it can be claimed

ARTICLE 5

The provisions of article 8 of the Supplementary Treaty to the Peace Treaty remain in full force, in so far as they do not relate to payment on the Russian State debt, as do the provisions of paragraph 2, article 16, in so far as they relate to Russian expropriations after July 1, 1918, and the provisions of clause 2, paragraph 1, article 19, and of clause 1, article 22, and those of articles 28 to 32.

With regard to payment and guarantee of the financial obligations arising from these provisions, the parties reserve the right to conclude a further agreement, in so far as this has not already been regulated in Chapter III of the present agreement.

ARTICLE 6

The contracting parties will supply each other with all possible information for the establishment of the civil damages sustained by the citizens of one party on territory over which the authority of the other party extends, and will likewise satisfy demands for the production of proofs relating to such damages.

CHAPTER II

SURRENDER OF BANK DEPOSITS AND BANK CREDITS

ARTICLE 7

Each contracting party shall take care that the property values (bank deposits) of citizens of the other party, which are lodged on its territory with banking or financial institutions, including the moneys and certificates deposited for them with a central institution for the safe-keeping of valuables, or with an officially recognized trustee of valuables or in some other deposit institution which is recognized by the Government, be made over on demand of the authorized persons, with the right to despatch them to their native countries exempt from State taxes and duties.

Each party shall regard the bank deposits of citizens of the other party within its territory, as the deposits of the citizens

of the other party as interpreted by paragraph 1, if these deposits have been made in the name of such citizens. In other cases a special proof is required showing that the deposits are those of citizens of the other party; possible disputes in this connection shall be decided by a commission consisting of a representative from each of the two Governments and a neutral chairman.

Commissions provided for in paragraph 2 shall be set up at Moscow, Petrograd, and Berlin immediately after the coming into force of this agreement; the chairman shall be appointed, with the consent of the Royal Swedish Government by the Swedish consuls in these places.

ARTICLE 8

Each contracting party shall take care that the banking and financial institutions within its territory, immediately after the coming into force of this agreement, without any reference to the extension of time provided for in clause 1, paragraph 1, No. 3, of article 7 of the Supplementary Treaty to the Peace Treaty, shall pay out the sums demanded by the rightful possessors, for which payment is due and which belong to the citizens of the other party. The rightful owner may also despatch the sums obtained by him to the territory of his native State, exempt from State taxes and duties.

In regard to bank credits, mentioned in paragraph 1 of this article, the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3 of article 7 apply.

ARTICLE 9

In order to hasten the delivery of bank deposits and credits as provided by articles 7 and 8, each contracting party shall immediately appoint a State commissary to whom their respective citizens hand in their claims before January 31, 1919. The two commissaries shall communicate these claims to one another not later than September 25, 1918, for the first time, than November 15, 1918, for the second time, and not later than February 15, 1919, for the third time, and see that the bank deposits and credits to be delivered on this basis shall be transferred on October 25, 1918, December 31, 1918, and March 31, 1919, and immediately after the decision of the commission, in so far as these claims have been verified under paragraph 2, article 7, and paragraph 2, article 8, by the Mixed Commission. The transfer shall take

place in Moscow on the side of Russia and in Berlin on the side of Germany.

Each contracting party takes care that the delivery, in so far as the rights of banks or of third persons to these deposits or credits are not in conflict, shall take place against an authenticated release of the person in whose name the deposit or credit stood, or who is recognized as authorized by the Commission referred to in paragraph 2, article 7. Should another person claim the deposit or credit on the ground of inheritance or legal succession to the entire property of a juridical person, the release can be presented by this other person, if he belongs to the same contracting party as the original claimant and if his right is attested by a statement of the State commissary of this party.

In all other cases the right must be specially proved to the banking or financial institution where the deposit or credit rests.

Persons wishing to present their claims without the mediation of the State commissary, may apply direct to the banking or financial institution, in the case of German citizens, only after October 25, 1918, and in the case of Russian citizens only after December 31, 1918.

ARTICLE 10

The provisions of articles 7 and 8 find corresponding application to the bank deposits and credits in Russia of citizens of Courland, Livonia, Esthonia, and Lithuania, in particular to the moneys, certificates and other valuables abstracted in these provinces during the war, as also to the bank deposits and credits in these provinces of Russian citizens, including deposits in the State Bank as successor in title to all nationalized Russian private banks.

CHAPTER III

THE ADJUSTMENT OF CERTAIN DIFFERENCES IN THE ECONOMIC SYSTEMS OF BOTH COUNTRIES

ARTICLE 11

Property of Germans in Russia shall in future be expropriated or its owner otherwise deprived of the right to dispose of it, only if the expropriation or other form of withdrawal is made in favor of the State or of local self-government bodies under legislation which applies to all the inhabitants of the country and to the

citizens of a third country, and to all property of a similar nature, and further if the owner immediately receives compensation in cash.

The amount of the compensation to be paid, in accordance with paragraph 1, shall be determined by two experts, of whom one shall be appointed by the Russian Government, and the other by the rightful claimant; should these persons not come to an agreement, they shall invite a third expert as chairman, who shall be appointed by the Swedish Consul, if no other arrangement has been made.

ARTICLE 12

Property which has been expropriated in accordance with Article 11, or whose owner has been deprived of the right to dispose of it, shall be returned to the owner on his demand, against the return of the money paid him in compensation, and with regard being had to possible improvement or damage, in all cases where the property does not remain in the public possession of the State or of local self-government bodies, or if the expropriation or other form of withdrawal of similar property is annulled as regards the inhabitants of the country, or the citizens of a third country; the demand for return of the property must be made within a year of the time it can be claimed.

ARTICLE 13

The provisions of paragraph 2, article 11, and of article 12, find corresponding application in so far as property of Germans in Russia has been expropriated or its owner deprived of the right to dispose of it, after July 1, 1918, and before the coming into force of this agreement.

Demands for return in cases mentioned in paragraph 1, can be made when an expropriation or any other form of withdrawal of similar property has not been carried out in regard to inhabitants of the country, or citizens of a third country; such demands must be made within one year after the coming into force of this agreement.

ARTICLE 14

German creditors may demand satisfaction in respect to their claims arising before July 1, 1918, and immediately after these have fallen due, from the balances of their debtors in Russian

banks, if their claims are recognized as valid by both the debtor and the bank. In case there is no acknowledgment on the part of the debtor, a court decision having the force of law may be substituted; if the validity of the claim is disputed by the bank, the matter is decided by the commissions in Petrograd and Moscow, referred to in paragraph 3, article 7.

ARTICLE 15

The Russian-German Convention of October 31 (November 12), 1874, regarding inheritances shall remain in force on condition that, in regard to all cases of inheritance which will arise after the new regulations of rights of inheritance in Russia, the provisions for movable property shall apply also to immovable property, and that the inheritance shall be taxed only by the native State of the deceased, and further that the Convention shall not be disclaimed during the whole period when the right of inheritance in Russia is abolished or essentially limited.

Further, the contracting parties reserve the right to supercede certain provisions of the Convention regarding inheritance, which have proved to be inapplicable in practice, by new provisions more suited to present conditions.

CHAPTER IV CONCLUDING PROVISIONS

ARTICLE 16

This Agreement shall be ratified and exchange of ratification documents shall take place in Berlin by September 6, 1918.

This Agreement comes into force on the day of the exchange of ratification documents.

In witness whereof the plenipotentiaries have signed and sealed this Agreement.

Executed in duplicate in Berlin, August 27, 1918.

INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

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GERMAN SECRET WAR DOCUMENTS

Covering the Period June 15 to August 5, 1914,
and Published by the German Government in 1919



MAY, 1920

No. 150

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GERMAN SECRET WAR DOCUMENTS
COVERING THE PERIOD JUNE 15 TO AUGUST 5, 1914
PUBLISHED BY THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT IN 1919

INTRODUCTION

The following are a selection of some of the most important documents which were published by order of the German Government in the fall of 1919 under the supervision of Karl Kautsky. Kautsky has for a long time been one of the foremost thinkers in the German Socialist movement and when, during the war, a section of the Social Democratic Party seceded and formed the Independent Socialist Party, he also was to be found in the newly formed party. Immediately after the revolution had broken out in Germany in November, 1918, the Revolutionary Government ordered him to collect and edit those documents of the Foreign Office which dealt with the outbreak of the European War. The collection was completed by Kautsky in May, 1919. Publication was, however, postponed. In September, 1919, it was placed in the hands of General Count Max Montgelas and Professor Walter Schuecking, who published the documents in four volumes in November of the same year, after the proofsheets had been submitted to Kautsky. It is, of course, impossible to determine whether all of the documents of the Foreign Office dealing with the outbreak of the war have actually been published or whether, for political reasons, some of them have been withheld. In addition, the attention of the reader must be drawn to the fact that the documents collected by Kautsky were taken only from the archives of the Foreign Office and that the documents of the Department of War and of the Navy Department, as well as those of the General Staff and of the Naval Staff, are not contained in this collection and have so far (January, 1920) not been published.

The documents published cover the period from June 15, 1914, to August 5, 1914. Because of lack of time and space many interesting and important documents had to be omitted in the translation, there being over one thousand documents in the collection of the German Government. In the process of selection stress has been laid upon those documents which show the rela-

tions between the German and the Austro-Hungarian Governments in the period just before the war, as well as those which show the German Emperor's attitude towards the events of the time. This was done because, on reading the documents published by the German Government, it seemed that these above all contained certain definite information which so far had not been accessible. An attempt has been made not to reprint any documents which have already been published in the various White, Blue, Orange, etc. Books, except where the personal remarks of the Emperor were of special interest or where it was necessary to do so in order to enable the reader to understand the sequence of events.

The remarks which the Emperor penned in the margins of the reports and telegrams have been printed in italics while the words and phrases which he underlined have been likewise underlined in the translation.

The two telegrams of the Czar to the Emperor were written originally in English and they are here reproduced as they were received by the Emperor.

The documents have been published in the order in which they arrived at or were sent from the Foreign Office. The number over each document refers to the number of the document in the complete collection.

Appendix I contains the report of the Bavarian representative at Berlin, Dr. von Schoen, to Count Hertling, chairman of the ministerial council of Bavaria.

The documents which pertain to the alleged War Council on July 5 or 6, 1914, are contained in Appendix III. In judging the value of the documents found in Appendices II and III, it will be noticed that all of these were written several years after the events had taken place and in some cases by men who had not been involved in them.

No attempt has been made in the translation to correct mistakes in style or grammar which were found in the original documents.

PAUL KOSOK

3

THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR TO THE AMBASSADOR
AT LONDON

Very confidential!

Written personally!

Berlin, June 16, 1914

Your Excellency will not have failed to notice that the article in the "Birschewija Wjedomosti," which we know was written by the Minister of War, General Suchomlinoff, has produced quite a sensation in Germany. Never, in fact, has an officially inspired article so frankly revealed the war-like tendencies of the Russian military party. It is probably written too clumsily to be able to strengthen French chauvinism in the long run. However, the effect upon German public opinion is serious and undeniable.

Although, up to the present, only the most extreme groups among the pan-Germans and the militarists have been accusing Russia of planning and getting ready for an aggressive war, soon to be launched against us, now even more prudent politicians are beginning to incline to this view. The immediate result is the cry for another immediate and considerable increase in the Army. As a consequence, such being the state of affairs here, the jealousy of the Navy will be aroused, which never wants to be neglected when anything is done for the Army. Since, to speak quite confidentially, H. M. the Emperor has already grown quite accustomed to this line of thought, I fear that a preparedness "craze" will be initiated in this country this summer and fall.

Although, considering the uncertainty of the Russian relations, the true aims of the Russian policy cannot be recognized in advance with any degree of accuracy, and although, with our political dispositions, we must take into account that, of all great European Powers, Russia will be most inclined to take the chance of a war-like adventure, still I do not believe that Russia is planning a war against us in the near future. But, protected by her large armaments, she wishes—and no one can blame her for it—to take a firmer stand at the outbreak of the next Balkan crisis than she did during the last Balkan complications. Whether a European conflagration will then break out will depend entirely upon the attitude of Germany and England. If both of us then will come out united as guarantors of the European peace, and pursue this policy from the beginning according to a common plan, war can be prevented, an action which neither our obligations to the Triple Alliance nor to the Entente make impossible.

Otherwise, even a very unimportant clash between the interests of Russia and Austria-Hungary may start a war. A far-seeing policy must take this possibility into account in time.

Now it is evident that an increased activity on the part of German chauvinists and preparedness fanatics would be just as much a hindrance to such cooperation between Germany and England as the attitude of the English cabinet, which is undefined, but at the same time secretly favors French and Russian chauvinism. Germany can never give up increasing her army in proportion to her growth in population. There is no thought of increasing the scope of the Naval Act. However, the increase in the number of our cruisers in foreign waters, the arming and manning of battleships, etc., which is entirely within the provision of the Naval Act, will necessitate increased expenditures. But it makes a great difference whether such measures appear as the necessary result of a gradual quiet development or whether they are undertaken in a state of panic and under the pressure of an excited public opinion, possessed with the fear of war. . . .

v. Bethmann Hollweg

4

THE AMBASSADOR AT VIENNA TO THE
IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR

Secret!

Vienna, June 17, 1914

After the departure of H. M. the Emperor, Count Berchtold was summoned to Konopischt by His Imperial and Royal Highness, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand. The Minister told me to-day that His Imperial and Royal Highness had expressed his utmost satisfaction with the visit of H. M. the Emperor. He had discussed all possible questions in detail with His Majesty, and was able to report a perfect agreement of opinion.

The Archduke has also informed Count Berchtold of what he had said to Our Most Gracious Emperor in regard to the policy of Count Tisza, especially in relation to the non-Hungarian nationalities. Towards the Roumanians Count Tisza has used fine words, as His Imperial and Royal Majesty had expressed it, but his deeds do not correspond to these words. The Hungarian Prime Minister has made one notable mistake in not giving the Transylvanian Roumanians a few more election districts. Count Berchtold stated to me that he had already tried, often and

vigorously, to influence Count Tisza in favor of greater concessions to the Roumanians. But his efforts have been in vain. Count Tisza claims that he has already made as many concessions to the Roumanians as possible. I, for my part, shall take every occasion, in accordance with orders from high quarters to point out to the Hungarian Prime Minister the necessity of winning the support of the Roumanians, just as I have already done to Count Berchtold.

v. Tschirschky

*he must not by means of his
internal policy, which in
the Roumanian question has
an influence on the external
policy of the Triple Alliance,
compromise the latter.*

7

THE AMBASSADOR AT VIENNA TO THE IMPÉRIAL CHANCELLOR

Vienna, June 30, 1914

Count Berchtold said to me today that everything points to the fact that the threads of the conspiracy to which the Archduke has fallen victim meet at Belgrade. The affair had been so well planned that very youthful people had been deliberately selected for the perpetration of the crime, upon whom only milder penalties could be pronounced. The Minister expressed himself very bitterly with regard to the Serbian instigations.

we hope not

Here I hear repeatedly, even among serious people, the wish that some day there should be a thorough settling of accounts with the Serbs. First, a series of demands ought to be put to the Serbs, and in case they do not accept these, energetic action must be taken. I use

now or never

who has authorized him to do this? That is very stupid! Is none of his business, since it is solely Austria's affair what she intends to do in consequence. Then it will be said if things go wrong, Germany was not willing!! Tschirschky will kindly stop this nonsense! The Serbs must be cleaned up and that quickly.

goes without saying and are platitudes.

every such occasion quietly but very firmly and seriously to warn against rash steps. Above all, one must first be clear as to what one wants, for up to the present I have heard only very vague expressions of feeling. Then the possibilities of any action should be carefully weighed, and it should be kept in mind that Austria-Hungary is not alone in this world, and that it is her duty, in addition to consideration for her allies, to take into account the general European situation and especially to keep in mind the attitude of Italy and Roumania on all questions pertaining to Serbia.

von Tschirschky

II

THE AMBASSADOR AT VIENNA TO THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR

Secret!

Vienna, July 2, 1914

In connection with my other report I have the honor to report the following concerning my audience today with H. M. the Emperor Francis Joseph. . .

Finally, His Majesty once more discussed our Serbian neighbor. The intrigues of Belgrade were unbearable. Nothing could be done with these people in a friendly way. His Majesty mentioned in this connection the position which Herr von Hartwig is occupying at Belgrade and the apprehension which he felt in regard to the so-called trial mobilizations of Russia in the fall, which would thus come at a time when the recruits were being mustered out and the army not completely prepared. He hopes that my Emperor and the Imperial Government recognize the dangers which face the monarchy from the Serbian quarter. The future, as he had said before, must be considered, and the political power of those allies who are united in the Triple Alliance must be preserved. I made use of this remark of the Emperor in order to point out also to His Majesty—as I had already recently done very emphatically to Count Berchtold—that His Majesty could safely count upon finding Germany squarely behind the monarchy

as soon as it is a question of the defence of her vital interests. The decision as to when and where such vital interests exist will have to be left solely to Austria. No responsible policy can be constructed out of feelings and wishes, no matter how comprehensible they may be. Before each decisive step it would be necessary to consider carefully how far one intends and is compelled to go and by what means the aim in view can be attained. In the first place, with every important step the political situation would have to be considered and the probable attitude of the other powers and states taken into account and the ground carefully prepared. I could only repeat that my Emperor will back up every firm decision of Austria-Hungary. His Majesty assented heartily to these words of mine and remarked that I was surely right. . . .

von Tschirschky

13

THE EMPEROR OF AUSTRIA TO THE KAISER

Autograph-letter

(Not dated—Arrived at Foreign Office,
July 5, 1914)

I sincerely regretted that you were compelled to give up your intentions to come to Vienna to the funeral. I would very much have liked to express to you personally my hearty gratitude for your sympathy in my deep affliction.

By your warm and cordial sympathy you have proved again to me that I possess in you a faithful, dependable friend and that in every grave situation I can count upon you.

I would also very much have liked to discuss the political situation with you; since this has now been impossible, I take the liberty of sending you the enclosed memorandum which has been prepared by my Minister of Foreign Affairs. It had been drawn up before the terrible catastrophe at Sarajevo, and it now appears of particular significance after that tragic event.

The murder committed against my poor nephew is the direct result of the agitation carried on by Russian and Serbian pan-Slavists, whose sole aim is the weakening of the Triple Alliance and the destruction of my Empire.

According to all investigations held so far, it was not at Sarajevo a question of a crime by an individual but of a well-organized plot, the threads of which reach Belgrade, and, even if it probably will be impossible to prove the complicity of the Serbian Government, there can, however, be no doubt but that its policy, which

[11]

aims at the union of all southern Slavs under the Serbian flag, encourages such crimes, and that the continuation of these conditions constitutes a permanent danger to my dynasty and my possessions. The aim of my Government in the future must lie in the isolation and diminution of Serbia. The first step in this direction is to be found in the strengthening of the position of the present Bulgarian Government, so that Bulgaria, whose real interests coincide with ours, will be protected against a return to Russophilism.

If it is recognized at Bukarest that the Triple Alliance is determined not to renounce an alliance with Bulgaria, but would be willing to make Bulgaria ally herself with Roumania and guarantee her territorial integrity, then, perhaps, Roumania will turn back from the dangerous course into which she has been driven through her friendship with Serbia and her rapprochement with Russia.

If this succeeds, a further attempt might be made to reconcile Greece with Bulgaria and Turkey; there would then be formed, under the patronage of the Triple Alliance, a new Balkan union whose aim would consist in putting an end to the pan-Slavic flood and insuring peace to our countries.

This, however, will be possible only if Serbia, which at present forms the nucleus of the pan-Slavic policy, is eliminated as a political factor in the Balkans.

You, too, after the recent terrible happenings in Bosnia, will be convinced that a reconciliation of the differences which separate us from Serbia is no longer to be thought of, and that the conservative peace policy of all European monarchs will be threatened so long as this nest of criminal agitation at Belgrade is permitted to remain unpunished.

(Here follows the Balkan Memorandum of the Austro-Hungarian Government, a document of over 4,000 words.)

19

THE AMBASSADOR AT VIENNA TO
THE FOREIGN OFFICE

Telegram 84

Secret!

Vienna, July 8, 1914

Immediately after the close of yesterday's official session of the Cabinet a discussion took place as to the position to be taken

[12]

towards Serbia, when those Ministers who had not been present at the preliminary discussion, to which I had been invited, were informed in a general way of the answer that had arrived from H. M. Our Most Gracious Emperor.

There were two distinct currents of opinion regarding measures to be taken against Serbia: the one, voiced by Count Berchtold and the Foreign Office, wants to base its action directly on the state of affairs created by the entire Serbian policy and the intrigues against the monarchy culminating in the recent murder; while the other, represented by Count Tisza, considers it necessary first of all to make concrete demands. I have the impression that Count Berchtold considers Count Tisza a retarding element. The latter intends further to state his point of view in a memorandum, which Count Berchtold will only receive tonight before his departure for Ischl. Count Berchtold declared he would advise his Emperor, in case the latter should accept the opinion that for the present demands are to be made upon Serbia, to arrange the demands so that their acceptance seems impossible.

Count Berchtold further remarked, *quite in confidence*, that according to Baron Conrad von Hoetzendorf, sixteen days would have to be allowed for mobilization. The Chief of the General Staff, as Count Berchtold tells me, has again pointed out the decisive importance of the attitude of Roumania in regard to the plan and the course of the military operations.

The Minister further remarked that after mature deliberation, he had arrived at the opinion that it would be wiser not to conclude the proposed alliance with Bulgaria for the present, especially because Roumania would otherwise be alarmed. On the contrary, he is going to have the urgent advice to keep quiet transmitted to Sofia.

Tschirschky

23

MEMORANDUM OF THE SECRETARY
FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Berlin, July 9, 1914

The Austrian Ambassador thanked me today by order of his Government for the obliging answer which H. M. the Emperor and King and the Imperial Chancellor have given to the autograph-letter of H. M. Emperor Francis Joseph and the exposé

[13]

delivered by Count Hoyos. The government here will be immediately notified of all decisions that are to be made—the time depending upon the result of the investigation at Sarajevo.

Jagow

29

THE AMBASSADOR AT VIENNA TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE

Telegram 85

Very secret!

Vienna, July 10, 1914

Regarding his report yesterday to H. M. Emperor Francis Joseph, at Ischl, Count Berchtold informs me of the following:

H. M. the Emperor discussed the state of affairs with great calmness. At first he expressed his sincere gratitude for the stand taken by Our Most Gracious Emperor and the Imperial Government, and declared that he is completely of our opinion that a decision must be arrived at now which will put an end to the unbearable relations with Serbia. Of the consequences of such a decision, Count Berchtold added, His Majesty is completely aware.

Since H. M.'s promemoria is about fourteen days old this is taking very long! That has really been drawn up as the basis of the decision!

and very much so! and very precise ones!

The Minister, thereupon, notified the Emperor of the two possibilities regarding immediate procedure against Serbia. His Majesty thought this difference could perhaps be bridged over. On the whole His Majesty rather tended towards the point of view that concrete demands would have to be put to Serbia. He, the Minister, also declared that he was aware of the advantage of such a procedure. The odium of a surprise attack upon Serbia, which would fall upon the monarchy, would thereby be avoided and Serbia be put in the wrong.

[14]

*for that they have had time
enough*

all

Hartwig is dead!

*evacuate the Sandschack!
then there will be a row
immediately! Austria
must immediately and un-
conditionally get it back
again in order to prevent
the union of Serbia and
Montenegro, and to bar
the Serbians from the sea-
board!*

*Toward murderers, after
what has happened!*

Idiocy!

This procedure would also greatly facilitate at least a neutral position for Roumania as well as for England. The formulating of appropriate demands against Serbia is now the chief concern and Count Berchtold said that he would like to know what Berlin thinks about this. He thought that among other things it could be demanded that a commission of the Austro-Hungarian Government be instituted at Belgrade, in order to watch from there the pan-Serbian intrigues, and perhaps also to demand the dissolution of societies and the dismissal of several compromised officers. The time-limit for replying would have to be made as short as possible, say forty-eight hours. Even this short time-limit would suffice for Belgrade to ask for advice from Petersburg. Should the Serbians accept all the stipulated demands, this would be a solution which would be "very disagreeable" to him, and he is still considering what demands could be put which would make an acceptance absolutely impossible for Serbia.

The minister finally complained again about the attitude of Count Tisza, which makes an energetic procedure against Serbia difficult. Count Tisza insists that one must proceed "in a gentlemanly manner," but this is hardly appropriate when such important interests of the state are concerned and especially toward such an opponent as Serbia.

The suggestion of the Imperial Government even now to influence public opinion in England against Serbia by

means of the press—about which Count Szögyény has telegraphed—will be gladly followed by the Minister. Only in his opinion it would still have to be done carefully in order not to alarm Serbia prematurely.

childish!

The Minister of War is taking a leave of absence to-morrow; Baron Conrad von Hoetzendorf will also leave Vienna for the time being. This is done, as Count Berchtold told me, purposely to prevent any alarm.

Tschirschky

*just as at the time of the Silesian Wars!
"I am against councils of war and discussions, especially since the more timid party always has the upper hand."*

Frederick the Great

31

SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE AMBASSADOR AT VIENNA

Telegram 117

Berlin, July 11, 1914

We cannot take any position on the formulation of the demands upon Serbia since this is Austria's affair. For us it only seems desirable that Vienna should collect enough material to prove that a pan-Serbian agitation exists in Serbia which endangers the monarchy, so that the public opinion of Europe may be convinced as far as possible of Austria's just stand. This material had best be published—not separately but together—shortly before presenting the demands, *i. e.*, the ultimatum to Serbia.

Jagow

34

THE AMBASSADOR AT ATHENS TO THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR

Strictly confidential!

Athens, July 6, 1914

My Italian colleague informs me very confidentially that the Italian Ambassador at Petersburg has sent a very alarming report to Rome about the warlike preparations of Russia. The

[16]

report is said to be very detailed. Huge financial demands of the Russian Government are also mentioned, which are said to have been granted for war preparations in a secret session of the Duma or in a committee session.

Quadt

37

THE SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
TO THE AMBASSADOR AT VIENNA

Secret!

Berlin, July 12, 1914

For the strictly confidential use of Count Berchtold.

According to secret despatches Russia and Serbia possess the confidential information that Austria-Hungary is secretly increasing her garrisons along the Serbian and Russian border.

Jagow

40

THE AMBASSADOR AT VIENNA TO
THE FOREIGN OFFICE

Telegram 87

Vienna, July 13, 1914

Count Berchtold entirely shares the view of your Excellency that the results of the investigation at Sarajevo will have to be presented not in detail, but as a summary of the tendency of Serbian policy, together with its results.

The Minister is now personally convinced of the need of the most rapid action. He hopes to come to an agreement to-morrow with Tisza concerning the wording of the note to be sent to Serbia; would then submit it on Wednesday, July 15, to the Emperor at Ischl, whereupon the presentation could then immediately be made at Belgrade, even before the departure of Poincaré.

Tschirschky

50

THE AMBASSADOR AT VIENNA TO
THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR

Very secret!

Vienna, July 14, 1914

After Count Tisza had left me, Count Berchtold sent for me, to inform me on his part of the result of the day's discussion. To his great delight a unanimous agreement had been reached

[17]

concerning the tenor of the note to be handed to Serbia. Count Tisza accepted his, the minister's, conception very cheerfully and even at several points insisted upon greater severity. However, for technical reasons, it has turned out to be impossible to present the note at Belgrade as early as the 16th or 18th. The French text is again to be examined definitely next Sunday morning at nine o'clock at a discussion of the Ministers. He will then submit the note to the Emperor at Ischl, presumably Tuesday. He guarantees that His Majesty will give his consent to it.

In today's discussion there was unanimity of opinion that it would be more advisable at least to await the departure of Poincaré from Petersburg before action is to be *too bad!* taken against Belgrade. For, if possible, it is to be prevented, that, at Petersburg, in a champagne-mood and under the influence of MM. Poincaré, Iswolsky, and the Grand Dukes, a fraternization should take place which then would influence and possibly decide the attitude of the two countries. It would also be of advantage for the toasts to be over before the note is presented. The presentation could therefore follow on July 25th.

Count Berchtold asked me, explicitly and repeatedly, as Count Tisza had already done, to make it clear to my Government that the presence of Poincaré at Petersburg was the sole cause for the delay in the presentation of the note at Belgrade, and that Berlin could feel perfectly assured that there is no question here of hesitation or indecision. The Minister, in conclusion, said that he would, after completing the text on Sunday, send it immediately to the Imperial Government for very confidential information, even before the submission of the note to his own Emperor.

Tschirschky

57

THE FOREIGN OFFICE TO THE CHANCELLOR

Telegram 13

Berlin, July 16, 1914

Vienna has been notified, by means of order to Tschirschky, of the necessity of an understanding with Italy about Serbia.

Ballin has been urged by a private letter to work against the Anglo-Russian Naval Convention by means of his English connections.

Stumm

[18]

THE SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE
AMBASSADOR AT VIENNA

Secret!

Berlin, July 17, 1914

As is known to your Excellency from reading the memorandum of Count Hoyos in regard to his conversation with the Under-Secretary of State, Count Hoyos has stated that Austria must completely partition Serbia.

Count Berchtold and Count Tisza remarked in this connection that this statement merely reflected the personal view of Count Hoyos, and thus expressly refrained from identifying themselves with it; but apparently they did not express themselves further as to their own territorial plans.

For the diplomatic treatment of the conflict with Serbia, it would be not unimportant to know, from the beginning, what are the ideas of the Austrian statesmen about the future status of Serbia, as this question will have an important influence upon the attitude of Italy and upon the public opinion and attitude of England.

That the plans of the statesmen of the Danube Monarchy can be influenced and modified by the course of events is no doubt to be considered self-evident; nevertheless, it must be assumed that the Vienna Cabinet has already drawn up a general outline of the aims which are to be achieved, from a territorial point of view also. Your Excellency will try, in a conversation with Count Berchtold, to get an explanation on this point, at the same time, however, avoiding the impression that we want to retard the Austrian action from the start, or prescribe to it certain limits or aims. It is only of importance to us to be somewhat informed as to where the road will perhaps lead.

v. Jagow

THE EMBASSY AT VIENNA TO THE
IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR

Secret!

Vienna, July 17, 1914

As Count Berchtold tells me, the note which contains the demands that are to be made upon Serbia is to be presented at

Belgrade on Thursday afternoon, the 23d of this month. With a view to expediting this affair as much as possible, the date has been set ahead a few days and the day of M. Poincaré's departure from Petersburg determined for the same. It is assumed that the President will already have embarked when the Belgrade démarche becomes known at Petersburg.

The wording of the note, so the minister tells me, has not yet been definitely determined and conferences are still going on with Count Tisza; on Wednesday, the 22d of this month, it will be presented to H. M. the Emperor Francis Joseph, for final endorsement.

Count Berchtold indirectly expressed the hope that Serbia would not accept the Austrian demands, since a mere diplomatic victory here would again bring on a depressed feeling which is absolutely to no purpose.

W. Pr. Stolberg

67

THE SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES OF THE IMPERIAL SUITE

Telegram 82

Private, secret!

Berlin, July 18, 1914

Please send accurate statement of itinerary of H. M. S. Hohenzollern after the 23d. On that day the Austrian démarche will, as you know, take place—48 hour ultimatum apparently intended—and it depends upon the development of events whether and when the presence of His Majesty will be necessary. Please take Admiral von Mueller into confidence eventually, but do not disquiet His Majesty prematurely. Since we wish to localize a possible conflict between Austria and Serbia, we must not alarm the world by a premature return of His Majesty; on the other hand, His All Highest should be accessible in case unforeseen events should necessitate important decisions (mobilization) on our part. Possibly a cruise in the Baltic might be thought of for the last days of the trip.

Jagow

68

THE SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE AMBASSADOR AT VIENNA

Berlin, July 18, 1914

.....
Finally I would leave it to the consideration of Count Berchtold whether an engagement of Italy in Valona would not facilitate

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materially the Austrian action against Serbia. Vienna—as I have already stated in another connection—must not harbor any illusions about the fact that an Austrian attack upon Serbia will not only find an unfavorable reception in Italy, but will probably also cause direct opposition there. I therefore consider an understanding of the Vienna cabinet with that of Rome of extreme urgency, and think that this could be greatly facilitated if Italy, with Austrian consent, were engaged in Albania.

.....
v. Jagow

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THE SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE
CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES OF THE IMPERIAL SUITE

Telegram 84

Berlin, July 18, 1914

According to information from the Embassy at Vienna, the Austro-Hungarian démarche will be made on the 23d of this month.

Jagow

70

THE SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE
AMBASSADOR AT VIENNA

Telegram 122

Berlin, July 18, 1914

North-German Gazette will publish to-morrow remarks about the Austro-Serbian conflict, which, out of consideration for European diplomacy, will be purposely couched in mild tones. This distinctly semi-official paper must not create premature alarm. Please see to it that this is not mistakenly regarded as a German retirement in view of the determination of Vienna.

Jagow

72

THE SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE
AMBASSADOR AT LONDON

(Private Letter)

Berlin, July 18, 1914

Dear Lichnowsky:

Your opinion of our policy, which your Serbian report contains, is always valuable to me, and I believe that the Imperial Chancel-

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lor thinks similarly about the matter. I cannot deny either that many of your remarks are justified. But we have an alliance with Austria (this can't be helped): *hic Rhodus, hic salta*. Whether this alliance with the continuously disintegrating structure of states on the Danube is to our advantage is also open to discussion, but I say with the poet—I believe it was Busch—: “If this company no longer suits you, look for other provided you have got it.” And a completely successful relationship with England we have unfortunately not succeeded in creating so far, in fact could not after what has happened in the past—if we can ever succeed at all.

Austria which, because of her lack of aggressive strength, has continuously lost more and more of her prestige, can hardly be counted any longer as a fullfledged Great Power. The crisis in the Balkans has weakened her position still more. Because of this decline of Austria's political power our group of allies has also been decidedly weakened.

Austria no longer intends to tolerate the Serbian underground propaganda, nor the continually provocative attitude of the little neighbor at Belgrade.—Notice the language of the Serbian press—and that of Mr. Paschitsch. She recognizes that she has missed many chances and that she can still act, but not so in a few years. Austria wants to settle her affairs with Serbia now and has informed us of this. During the whole Balkan crisis we successfully mediated in the interest of peace without having forced Austria at critical moments into passivity. The fact that, nevertheless, we are in Austria often unjustly accused of being lukewarm, is a matter of indifference to me. We have not now driven Austria to her decision. But we cannot and must not stop her. If we did this, then Austria could justly accuse us, as could we ourselves, of having denied her the last chance for political rehabilitation. Then the process of her disintegration and of her internal decay would only be accelerated. Her position in the Balkans would be lost forever. You will probably agree with me that an absolute stabilizing of the Russian hegemony in the Balkans is, indirectly, also inadmissible to us. The maintenance of Austria, and of a very strong Austria, is for internal and external reasons a necessity for us. That she cannot forever be maintained I willingly admit. But, in the meantime, combinations may perhaps be found.

We must try to localize the conflict between Austria and Serbia. Whether this succeeds will depend, first of all, upon

Russia and, in the second place, upon the moderating influence of the members of the Entente. The more determined Austria shows herself, the more energetically we support her, the more likely it is that Russia will keep quiet. Some blustering at Petersburg will not be wanting, no doubt, but Russia is not really prepared now. Neither France nor England will want a war now. In a few years Russia will be prepared, according to all competent opinion. Then she will destroy us by means of her large number of soldiers; then she will have built her Baltic fleet and her strategic railroads. Our group in the meantime will be becoming continually weaker. This is known in Russia and quiet is absolutely desired there for several years. I gladly believe your cousin Benckendorff that Russia does not want any war with us now. Sazonoff also assures us of the same thing, but the Government of Russia, which today is still peace-loving and halfway friendly towards Germany, is continually becoming weaker, while the attitude of the Slavs is continually becoming more anti-German. How Russia really treats us, we were shown last fall. During the Balkan crisis she could not thank us enough for our pacifying influence. The acute crisis had hardly passed when the unfriendliness about Liman etc. began. If localization cannot be achieved and if Russia attacks Austria, then the *casus foederis* exists, and we cannot sacrifice Austria. We would then be in a position of isolation which could scarcely be called proud. I want no preventive war, but if the struggle presents itself we cannot retreat.

.....

With best regards,

Sincerely yours,
Jagow

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THE EMBASSY AT VIENNA TO THE SECRETARY
FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

(Private letter)

Vienna, July 18, 1914

Highly Esteemed Mr. Secretary of State,

Yesterday I went to Berchtold, who told me that the aforesaid note is to be presented at Belgrade the 23d of this month. As I reported yesterday, Berchtold hopes that the Austrian demands, about which he did not express himself in detail, will not be

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accepted by Serbia, although he is not quite sure of it, and I have gained the impression from his, as also from Hoyos' remarks, that it is possible for Serbia to accept the demands. In reply to my question what will happen if nothing should come of this affair again, Berchtold said that a far-reaching control would have to be exercised in the practical execution of each separate demand. If a final settlement of the relations towards Serbia is desired, which Count Tisza stated recently in a speech was inevitable, then of course, it would be inexplicable why demands should not have been framed of such character as to make a rupture inevitable. If this action comes to naught again, and there remains nothing but a so-called diplomatic victory, then the impression prevailing here, that the Monarchy is no longer capable of any demonstration of power, will be considerably strengthened. The results which this would have both internally and externally are self-evident.

.....
 I have just been with Berchtold again, who told me that tomorrow the note will be finally settled with Tisza and that it will be still further modified according to the events of the day. (Interview of Paschitsch, article of the "Samouprawa," etc.). Hoyos just told me that the demands are of such a nature that, for a state which has any self-respect and dignity left, it would be impossible to accept them. . .

In sincere esteem,
 Your Excellency's
 Obedient
 W. Stolberg

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THE AMBASSADOR AT VIENNA TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE

Telegram 92
 Secret!

Vienna, July 21, 1914

The note which is to be sent to Serbia together with a short summary of the result of the investigation at Sarajevo will be sent tonight to Berlin. The note will be delivered Thursday afternoon at Belgrade and will be published Friday in the morning papers of this city.

Friday morning the Austro-Hungarian representatives to the signatory Powers will hand to the respective governments a note

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containing the text of the note sent to Serbia together with a commentary. This note with commentary addressed to the Powers will be published Friday afternoon or Saturday morning.

Tschirschky

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THE AMBASSADOR AT VIENNA TO
THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR

Secret!

Vienna, July 21, 1914

I have the honor of placing before your Excellency in the appendix a copy of the note destined by the Royal and Imperial Government for the signatory Powers. The note contains the actual wording of the Austro-Hungarian note which is to be presented Thursday afternoon at Belgrade, together with a commentary. At the same time the Imperial and Royal Government holds at the disposal of the aforesaid governments a short summary of the result of the investigation at Sarajevo.

In transmitting the aforesaid documents Count Forgách expressly asked that these be considered as meant for the strictly confidential personal information of your Excellency, since the Imperial endorsement has not yet been given, although there exists no doubt about securing it.

von Tschirschky

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SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO
THE AMBASSADOR AT VIENNA

Telegram 130

For immediate use

Berlin, July 22, 1914

Have asked Count Pourtalès for program of visit of Poincaré. He replies that President leaves Kronstadt Thursday evening 11 o'clock. This would be according to Central European time 9:30 o'clock. If démarche were to be made at Belgrade tomorrow afternoon 5 o'clock it would thus become known during presence of Poincaré at Petersburg.

Jagow

[25]

THE SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE EMPEROR

Telegram 132

Berlin, July 23, 1914

*to decide that is none of his
business; that is the busi-
ness of H. M. the Emperor
Francis Joseph!*

is their business!

*what is frivolous? how can
Grey use such a word
about the venerable old gen-
tleman!*

does not exist!

what would impel me to do

Your Majesty's Ambassador at London telegraphs: "Sir Edward Grey, as I confidentially hear, intends to explain to Count Mensdorff to-morrow that the British Government will make its influence felt so that the Austro-Hungarian demands, in case they are moderate and can be harmonized with the independence of the Serbian State, will be accepted by the Serbian Government. In a similar sense he also believes that Sazonoff will make use of his influence at Belgrade. However, a prerequisite for this is that no unproven accusations, à la Friedjung, are to be brought forward by Vienna and that the Austrian Government is in a position to prove unequivocally the connection of the murder at Sarajevo with the political circles of Belgrade. Everything depends upon the way in which Vienna draws up the note and upon the result of the investigations up to date. Upon the basis of frivolous claims it is however impossible to use influence at Belgrade. I am making an effort in the meantime to urge that unconditional acceptance of the Austrian demands should be advocated in regard to the justifiable demand of Austria for satisfaction and for a final cessation of the continuous disturbances, even if these demands do not completely take into account the national dignity of Serbia. I herein encounter the expectation that our influence in Vienna has succeeded in suppressing impossible de-

that! is none of my business! what is meant by impossible? Those fellows have carried on agitation with murder and must be humbled.

That is a monstrous British impertinence. It is not my business à la Grey to give H. M. the Emperor orders about the maintenance of his honor.

mands. It is definitely counted upon that we will not identify ourselves with demands that plainly have the purpose of bringing about war and that we are supporting no policy which is using the murder of Sarajevo merely as a pretext for fulfilling Austrian ambitions in the Balkans and destroying the Peace of Bukarest. Besides, Sir Edward Grey has today notified me again that he is endeavoring to use his influence at Petersburg in favor of the Austrian point of view. It has, however, made a bad impression here that Count Berchtold has so far very obviously avoided talking with Sir Maurice de Bunsen about the Serbian question."

Your Majesty's Ambassador at London is to receive instructions, for the guidance of his conversation, to the effect that we did not know the Austro-Hungarian demands, but considered them to be an internal question of Austria-Hungary upon which we could exert no influence.

True! But Grey shall be told this very seriously and plainly! so that he sees that I do not stand for any nonsense. Grey commits the mistake of putting Ser-

Most humbly,
Jagow

bia on a level with Austria and other great powers! That is unheard of! Serbia is a pack of robbers and has to be held accountable for its crimes! I shall not interfere in anything which the Emperor alone is authorized to decide! I have expected this despatch and it does not surprise me! True British mentality and a condescending imperious manner which I wish to have rejected!

William I. R.

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THE AMBASSADOR AT LONDON TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE

Telegram 146

London, July 23, 1914

My Italian colleague told me in the course of a rather lengthy confidential conversation that it would be extremely difficult for

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any Italian government to plead before the country for participation in a war which has the purpose of conquering or Austrianizing Serbia. Italy has important trade relations with Serbia and has no interest whatsoever in seeing them destroyed by Austria. The war would, therefore, be contrary to Italian interests and could only be carried on if Austria should propose adequate compensations.

I would ask that these statements be considered as strictly confidential.

Lichnowsky

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THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR TO THE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES OF THE IMPERIAL SUITE

Telegram 89

Berlin, July 23, 1914

Austro-Hungarian note is to be presented this afternoon or evening and published at Vienna tomorrow morning. Ultimatum would therefore expire the evening of the 25th. Our attitude for the present will be that it is an affair which concerns only Austria and Serbia. Only the intervention of another power would drive us into the conflict. That this should happen at once, namely that England should immediately decide to interfere, is not to be assumed. The trip of President Poincaré, who leaves Kronstadt to-night, visits Stockholm the 25th, Copenhagen the 27th, Kristiania the 29th and arrives at Dunkerque the 31st, would in itself delay all decisions.

The English fleet, according to information from the Admiralty Staff, is to disperse the 27th and proceed to its home ports. Any premature recall of our fleet might cause general uneasiness and be regarded with suspicion, particularly in England.

After notification of Admiral von Mueller, please make report to His Majesty accordingly. Am adding to this that the Admiralty Staff makes the following report:

"If the possibility of an immediate declaration of war by England is to be considered, then from a military point of view an attack upon our fleet by the English fleet is to be counted upon with certainty. Our fleet, with its great numerical inferiority, must not in any event be exposed to this possibility. As soon as the possibility of the outbreak of a war with England within any six days has to be reckoned with, the fleet must be recalled."

Bethmann Hollweg

THE AMBASSADOR AT VIENNA TO THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR

Secret!

Vienna, July 22, 1914

Have today discussed in detail with Count Forgách the necessity of influencing the foreign press. As far as Italy is concerned, Herr von Mérey is authorized to make use of any sum of money that he deems necessary. The ambassador persists in his opinion that it would be extremely dangerous now suddenly to flood the Italian press with large amounts of money. That would, as he believes, create great distrust there and perhaps have the contrary effect. But it has again been suggested to him to make attempts to influence the press there, and at least, after the step has been taken at Belgrade, to use every and all means so that the leading papers will not make impossible the neutral position of the Italian Government desired by us.

Count Czernin at Bukarest has likewise unlimited funds at his disposal. He is to try especially to buy the "Adeverul."

Count Szápáry has also the same authorization. But he has little connection with the press there and Austria would be especially thankful if Count Pourtalès could help him in the securing of agents.

In England nothing can be done with money. There it would be necessary to attempt to bring influence to bear by matter-of-fact discussions. Count Mensdorff already has got in touch with Mr. Steed of the "Times," who, unfortunately, after moments of better insight, seems to have fallen back into his Austrophobia. But in the near future articles are to appear in the English papers by Professor Lammasch, Professor Redlich and Count v. Luetzow.

To influence the French press with money is here considered hopeless.

I have strongly advised Count Forgách to influence the press here so as to spare the national feeling of the Serbs in this country after the démarche. He will do everything possible in this direction and is sure of the energetic cooperation of Count Tisza in this matter.

von Tschirschky

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THE AMBASSADOR AT VIENNA TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE

Telegram 97

Vienna, July 23, 1914

Vienna is firmly decided not to be led astray by any attempts at intimidation.

Tschirschky

THE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES AT BELGRADE TO THE
FOREIGN OFFICE

Telegram 30

Belgrade, July 24, 1914

The Austrian chargé d'affaires yesterday evening at 6 o'clock presented the note about the murder at Sarajevo to the Minister of Finance, Patschu, representing the Prime Minister Paschitsch who was absent on an election trip. It has a 48 hour time limit. The Minister of Finance accepted the note without reading it and promised to call together the ministerial council. Today's morning press characterizes the note as being very sharp and advises the Government to reject it. Griesinger

THE SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE
AMBASSADOR AT VIENNA

Telegram 136

Berlin, July 24, 1914

.....
Mr. Bollati informed me that the Austrian ambassador has notified Rome that Austria-Hungary does not intend to make any territorial conquest, but cannot bind herself in this matter.

Only for your Excellency's personal information: Mr. Bollati told me very confidentially that Italy, in the case of Austrian territorial increase, would demand the Trentino as compensation; and if Austria should take a part of Albania, would demand Valona also. Italy does not wish the latter.

.....
Jagow

THE AMBASSADOR AT VIENNA TO
THE FOREIGN OFFICE

Telegram 101

Vienna, July 24, 1914

Entirely superfluous! Will In order to prove his good will towards Russia, Count Berchtold invited the Russian chargé d'affaires to come and see him, in order to explain to him in detail the position of Austria-Hungary toward Russia and must be avoid- Serbia. After recapitulating the histori-

ed. Austria has her good reasons; has proceeded accordingly; now this cannot be put to a kind of a discussion afterwards.

Jackass! the Sandschack she must take back, otherwise the Serbs will get to the Adriatic.

that comes of its own accord and must come. Austria must become preponderant in the Balkans over the other small states at the expense of Russia; otherwise there will be no peace.

Very weak!

cal development of the past years, he emphasized that the Monarchy had no thought of appearing as a conqueror of Serbia. Austria will not demand any Serbian territory. Similarly, every humiliation of Serbia has been carefully avoided in the note addressed to Serbia. Austria firmly insists that the step is solely a defensive measure against Serbian intrigues, but she must necessarily demand guarantees for a further friendly relation of Serbia towards the Monarchy. There is, furthermore, no thought of wanting to produce a rearrangement of the relationship of the Powers in the Balkans and in Europe. On the contrary he considers the inviolable stability of Russia as a necessary factor in European politics. He should suppose that it would be to the general European interest to put an end to the Serbian intrigues that are continually disturbing the peace of Europe, and especially that the European monarchical states should firmly unite in the rejection of the Serbian policy carried on by means of revolvers and bombs.

.....
Tschirschky

159

THE AMBASSADOR AT BELGRADE TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE

Telegram 31

Belgrade, July 24, 1914

Bravo! The Viennese were no longer thought capable of this!

The energetic tone and the precise demands of the Austrian note have been a complete surprise to the Serbian Government. Since this morning the Ministerial Council have been in session under the presidency of the Crown

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It seems H. M. has taken French leave Prince Regent, but cannot come to any agreement. It is stated that it is impossible to fulfill the demands stipulated within forty-eight hours, especially points 2, 4, 5, 6 (section 2), in which a direct interference with the sovereignty of Serbia is seen. In case the order of the day should be issued, a military uprising is feared.

The proud Slavs!

As I hear, the removal of the Government to Nish is being considered.

Griesinger

How hollow the whole so-called Serbian Great Power appears. That is the way all Slav states are! Only tread firmly on the feet of the rabble!

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THE SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE AMBASSADOR AT LONDON

Telegram 174

Berlin, July 25, 1914

Have informed Vienna of proposals of Sir E. Grey. Since ultimatum already expires today, and since, according to newspaper reports, Count Berchtold is at Ischl, I believe that an increase of the time limit will no longer be possible. Jagow

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THE AMBASSADOR AT LONDON TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE

Telegram 155

London, July 25, 1914

Private for Secretary of State v. Jagow.

I would again like to point out to you the importance of Grey's proposal for the mediation by the four Powers of the affair between Austria and Russia. I see therein the only possibility of preventing a world war, in which we will stake everything and in which we can win nothing. If we refuse, Grey will do nothing more. As long as we have not yet mobilized, mediation and a

[32]

settlement of the conflict which will be acceptable to Austria, are still possible. Our refusal, however, would create much ill feeling here, and I do not believe that in case France be drawn in, England could remain indifferent. I again very strongly advise that the English proposal be accepted and Vienna and Petersburg informed of this.

Lichnowsky

182

THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR TO THE EMPEROR

Telegram 139

Berlin, July 25, 1914

Unbelievable presumption! Unheard of! The idea never occurred to me!! This was done because of the message of my Ambassador about the mobilization at Belgrade! This may cause mobilization of Russia; will cause mobilization of Austria! In this case I must keep my forces on land and sea together. In the Baltic there is not a single ship! Moreover I generally take military measures not according to one Wolff telegram but according to the general situation and this the Civil Chancellor has not yet grasped!

The Chief of the Admiralty Staff of the Navy informs me that, because of a Wolff telegram, Your Majesty has given the fleet orders for a rapid preparation for return. Admiral von Pohl has perhaps submitted to Your Majesty the message of Your Majesty's naval attaché at London and the confidential agent at Portsmouth, according to which the English Navy is taking no extraordinary measures whatsoever, rather is carrying out a systematic dispersal which had been previously decided upon.

Since so far the messages of Your Majesty's Ambassador at London also show that and has Sir Edward Grey, at least for the present, does not think of a direct participation of England in a possible European war and intends to use his influence for the localization of the Austro-Hungarian-Serbian conflict, I beg to suggest most humbly that Your Majesty do not order a premature return of the fleet.

W.

If Russia mobilizes my fleet must already be in the Baltic, therefore it is returning home!

Bethmann Hollweg

THE AMBASSADOR AT VIENNA TO
THE FOREIGN OFFICE

Telegram 104

Vienna, July 25, 1914

Baron Macchio informs me by telephone: since several points in the Serbian answer are unsatisfactory, Baron Giesl has left. Since three o'clock this afternoon a general mobilization has been taking place in Serbia.

Tschirschky

THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR TO THE EMPEROR

Telegram 146

Berlin, July 26, 1914

Except the report made by General von Chelius there is so far no reliable news about the attitude of Russia. If Russia should decide upon a conflict with Austria, England intends to try mediation and hopes for French support in this matter. As long as Russia commits no hostile act, I believe that our attitude, which aims at localization, must also remain a calm one. *To remain calm is the citizen's first duty! just keep calm, always keep calm!! A calm mobilization is, to be sure, something new.* General v. Moltke has returned from Karlsbad today and agrees with this view. I most humbly beg for information as to where and when Your Majesty will land, so that I may await Your Majesty there in order to make a report.

Your most humble servant,
Bethmann Hollweg

He is to await me at Berlin; I shall come there or to the Wildpark.

THE AMBASSADOR AT LONDON TO THE
FOREIGN OFFICE

Telegram 160

London, July 26, 1914

Today Sunday, nobody at Foreign Office. Cannot therefore carry out order before tomorrow. Am doubtful whether Sir E. Grey is able to influence Russia in the above sense, since, after the

appearance of the Austrian demands, no one here believes in the possibility of localizing the conflict. That out of such a procedure on the part of Austria a world war must develop no one here has doubted. I consider the moment has arrived to start mediation in the sense of Sir E. Grey which, however, presupposes that Austria be willing to forego further laurels. Lichnowsky

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THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR TO THE EMPEROR

Telegram 150

Berlin, July 26, 1914

As Your Majesty is just being notified through the Admiralty Staff, the naval attaché at Lon-

There is a Russian fleet! In the Baltic there are now five Russian torpedo-boat flotillas on a trial cruise which can arrive together or severally within 16 hours in the Belts and block them. Port Arthur ought to be a lesson! My fleet has received sailing orders for Kiel and that is where it is going!

don reports that the English fleet is discharging reservists and is giving the crews leave of absence as previously planned. In harmony with this I appeal most humbly to Your Majesty to order the Fleet to remain in Norway for the present since this would greatly facilitate England's projected mediation at Petersburg, which seems to be wavering.

Your most humble servant,
Bethmann Hollweg

Where is that to be taken from?

Not from the material that has been presented to me.

244

THE AMBASSADOR AT ROME TO THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR

Fuigi, July 23, 1914

. . . The general situation is as follows: active support of Italy in a possible European conflict can hardly be counted upon.

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A directly hostile attitude of Italy against Austria could, as far as one can judge today, be prevented by a sensible attitude on the part of Austria.

Flotow

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THE AMBASSADOR AT VIENNA TO
THE FOREIGN OFFICE

Telegram 113

Vienna, July 27, 1914

It has been decided here to issue the official declaration of war tomorrow, at the latest the day after tomorrow, mainly to prevent any attempt at intervention.

Tschirschky

272

THE EMPEROR'S REMARKS ABOUT THE
SERBIAN REPLY NOTE

A brilliant performance for a time limit of only 48 hours! That is more than one could have expected. A great moral victory for Vienna, but with that every cause for war disappears, and Giesl could well have remained at Belgrade! Upon the strength of this I should never have ordered mobilization.

W.

281

THE AMBASSADOR AT VIENNA TO
THE FOREIGN OFFICE

Telegram 115

Vienna, July 27, 1914

Count Berchtold called upon me late tonight to notify me of the following:

Telegram received here by Count Szápáry upon basis of information from military attaché that reports are increasing to the effect that the military districts of Kief, Warsaw, Odessa, Moscow have received mobilization orders together with the order calling the reservists to the colors. Districts Petersburg, Vilna, probably Kasan, are said to have received orders for preparation for mobilization, however without reservists.

Chief of General Staff is of the opinion that the moment has come, in case Berlin has confirmation of Russian military preparations, to declare at Petersburg (in order to bring about a desired

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clarification of the military situation) that this mobilization is constituting such a menace along the southern and western borders of Russia that corresponding counter-measures will have to be taken.

.....

Tschirschky

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THE EMPEROR TO THE SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Neues Palais, 28 VII. 14. 10 AM

Your Excellency:

After reading through the Serbian reply, which I received this morning, I am of the conviction that on the whole the wishes of the Danube Monarchy have been fulfilled. The few reservations which Serbia makes on several points can, according to my judgment, be cleared away by negotiations. But capitulation of the most humiliating kind is thereby announced to the whole world and through this every cause for war disappears.

Nevertheless, little weight is to be attached to the piece of paper or its contents, as long as it is not carried out. The Serbs are Orientals, therefore liars, treacherous, and masters at producing delays. In order that these beautiful promises may be carried out, a "douce violence" must be applied. This would have to be done by Austria's occupying some territory (Belgrade) as a guarantee for the enforcement and execution of the promises and keeping it until the demands have actually been carried out. This also is necessary for the sake of the appearance of success in the eyes of the outside world, so as to give a formal "satisfaction d'honneur" to the army, which has been mobilized for the third time without having anything to show for it, and to make it possible to give it at least the consciousness of having been on foreign soil. Without this, in the case of discontinuance of the campaign, a very undesirable spirit might be developed against the dynasty. In case Your Excellency shares my view I would recommend the following: Serbia has been forced to back down in a most humiliating manner and we offer our congratulations on this result. Of course, in the light of this result, no cause for war any longer exists. However, a guarantee would be necessary so that the promises might be fulfilled. That could no doubt be achieved by the temporary occupation of a part of Serbia.

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As in 1871, when we left troops stationed in France until the milliards had been paid. Upon this basis I am ready to mediate peace in Austria. Opposing proposals or protests of other states I would unconditionally reject, all the more since everybody more or less openly appeals to me to help maintain peace.

.....
William, I. R.

311

THE AMBASSADOR AT VIENNA TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE

Telegram 118

Vienna, July 28, 1914

Declaration of war has been telegraphed today 11 o'clock to Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Tschirschky

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THE CZAR TO THE EMPEROR

Telegram (without number) Peterhof Palais, July 29, 1914

To H. M. The Emperor

Neues Palais.

Am glad you are back. In this most serious moment I appeal to you to help me. An ignoble war has been declared to a weak country. The indignation in Russia shared fully by me is enormous. I foresee that very soon I shall be overwhelmed by the pressure brought upon me and be forced to take extreme measures which will lead to war. To try and avoid such a calamity as a European war I beg you, in the name of our old ally! friendship, to do what you can to stop your allies from Wherein going too far.
does this
consist?

Nicky

Admission of his own weakness and an attempt to place the responsibility upon me. The telegram contains a veiled threat! and an invitation, stated however like an order, to stop my ally. In case Your Excellency has sent off my telegram yesterday it must have crossed this one. We will see now what result mine will have. The expression "ignoble war" does not show much feeling of monarchical solidarity on the part of the Czar but rather a pan-Slavic sentiment;

i. e., the fear of a capitis diminutio in the Balkans in case of an Austrian success. The complete effect of this could be calmly awaited. There is always time later for discussion and also for mobilization, for which Russia has no reason at all now. Instead of expecting us to stop our ally His Majesty ought to turn to the Emperor Francis Joseph and carry on discussions with him in order to learn the aims of His Majesty. Should we not send copies of the two telegrams to London for the information of H. M. the King? The Socialists are carrying on anti-military demonstrations in the streets, which cannot be permitted, in any case not now; if this should happen again, I shall proclaim a state of siege and have all the leaders locked up, tutti quanti. Instruct Loebell and Jagow along this line. We cannot stand for any socialistic propaganda any longer!

William

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THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR TO THE AMBASSADOR AT VIENNA

Telegram 181

Berlin, July 29, 1914

.....

I am watching the attitude of the Government at Vienna and its inconsistent procedure towards the various governments with growing consternation. At Petersburg it declares itself to be territorially disinterested; we are left entirely in the dark about its program; Rome is put off with meaningless remarks on the question of compensations; at London Count Mensdorff is giving away parts of Serbia to Bulgaria and Albania and puts himself in contradiction to the solemn declarations of Vienna at Petersburg. Out of these contradictions I must gather that the disavowal of Count Hoyos, stated in telegram No. 83, had been decided upon for the gallery and that the Government at Vienna has plans which it considers best to keep secret from us, so as to make sure in all cases of German support while not risking a possible refusal by means of a frank statement.

Aforesaid remarks are for the time being for the personal use of Your Excellency. I merely wish to point out to Count Berchtold that it would be advisable to counteract a suspicion against statements made by him to the Powers about the integrity of Serbia. I beg you also to draw his attention to the fact that the instructions to Baron Mérey can hardly satisfy Italy.

Bethmann Hollweg

[39]

THE AMBASSADOR AT LONDON TO THE
FOREIGN OFFICE

Telegram 178

London, July 29, 1914

*The biggest and most un-
heard of piece of English
Pharisaism that I have
ever seen! With such
scoundrels I shall never
make a naval agreement!
That puts me out of
business.*

Sir E. Grey just sent for me again. The Minister was perfectly calm, but very serious, and received me with the words that the situation was becoming more tense. Sazonoff has declared that after the declaration of war he is no longer in a position to carry on discussions directly with Austria and has asked here that mediation be taken up again. The Russian Government considers the temporary cessation of hostilities as a necessary basis for this mediation.

*good
for days we have tried
to achieve that, but in
vain!*

*If instead of mediation
he were to speak a serious
word to Petersburg
and Paris that England
will not help them,
that would immediately
quiet the situation.*

Sir E. Grey repeated his suggestion, already reported, that we should take part in such a mediation of four Powers to which, he said, we have already agreed in principle. To him personally, a sufficient basis for mediation seemed to be that Austria state her demands, perhaps after the occupation of Belgrade or other places. If Your Excellency should however undertake mediation, as I was able to promise him this morning, it would of course suit him just as well. But mediation seems very urgent to him now if a European conflict is to be prevented.

Sir E. Grey then told me that he wanted to give me some

friendly and private information since he did not wish that our cordial relationship and our intimate exchange of opinions on all political questions should mislead me, and he wishes to save himself in the future from the charge of insincerity. The British Government wishes to maintain our friendship as heretofore and it would be possible for her to stand aside so long as the conflict is limited to Austria and Russia. If however we and France should be drawn in, then the situation would immediately be a different one and the British Government would under the circumstances be compelled to take steps at once. In this case it would be impossible to stand aside for a long time and to wait; "if war breaks out it will be the greatest catastrophe that the world has ever seen." He had not the slightest intention of uttering a threat; he merely wanted to save me from disappointment and himself from the charge of insincerity, a total and therefore used the form of a failure private discussion.

ah! The mean deceiver!! *that re-*
i. e. we are to leave Austria in the lurch. *mains!*
Base and Mephistophelian! but just like the English

have already been taken
i. e. they will pounce upon us

Insincere he has been all these years, nevertheless, including his last speech

we too!

a newly created one! If it wants to, it can turn and direct public opinion since it is implicitly obeyed by the

to the present it has in general been favorable towards Austria, since the justification for a certain satisfaction is recognized; *With the help of the re-jingo press* now however it begins to re-

press.

verse itself completely as a result of the Austrian stubbornness.

.....
Lichnowsky

England unmasks herself the moment she is of the opinion that we are encircled and are done for, so to speak! This pack of shopkeepers has tried to deceive us with dinners and speeches. The crudest deception, the words of the King to Henry for me: "We shall remain neutral and try to keep out of this as long as possible." Grey gives the King the lie and these words to Lichnowsky are the result of a bad conscience, that in fact, he has had the feeling of having deceived us. Besides, there is actually a threat, together with a bluff, to separate us from Austria and prevent our mobilization, and to place upon us the responsibility for the war. He knows perfectly well that if he utters only one serious, sharp word of warning at Paris and Petersburg and enjoins them to be neutral, both will immediately keep quiet. But he takes care not to utter the word but threatens us instead! Contemptible curl! England alone bears the responsibility of war and peace, not we! This should be pronounced in public. W.

375

THE SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES AT BRUSSELS

Berlin, July 29, 1914

The appendix to this order I humbly beg Your Excellency to keep well locked away, and you are only to open it if you are ordered so to do by telegraph.

The receipt of this order and of the appendix you will please acknowledge by telegraph. v. Jagow

(This appendix contained the German ultimatum to Belgium)

390

THE CZAR TO THE EMPEROR

Telegram (without number) Peterhof, Palais, July 30, 1914

To H. M. The Emperor
Neues Palais

Thank you heartily for your quick answer. Am sending Tatishcheff this evening with instructions. The

[42]

- *) military measures which have now come into force
were decided five days ago for reasons of defense, on
 I account of Austria's preparations. I hope from all my
 heart that these measures won't in any way interfere
with your part as mediator, which I greatly value.
We need your strong pressure on Austria to come to an
 nol understanding with us. Nicky

no, there is no question of that!!!

*) Austria has carried on only a partial mobilization in the south
against Serbia. Thereupon the Czar—as it is here openly admitted
 by him—has taken military measures, which have now come into
force, against Austria and ourselves and moreover he had already
done so 5 days ago. He is therefore almost a week ahead of us and
 these measures are supposed to have been taken as a protection
 against Austria, which is not attacking him at all!!! I can no longer
 carry on mediation, since the Czar who asked for it at the same time
 secretly mobilized behind my back. It is just a move to put us off
 and increase the advantage that has already been gained. My office
 ceases! W.

399

THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR TO THE EMPEROR

*According to this the Czar
 has considered his appeal*

Berlin, July 29, 1914

*for my assistance as a Your Majesty's Imperial and Royal
 joke, and deceived us! For Ambassador at Petersburg reports
 one does not ask for help in the most humbly attached telegram
 and mediation if mobili-* that Mr. Sazonoff has informed him of
zation has already been the mobilization of Russia against Aus-
 declared! W. tria. Accordingly the Russian Amba-

*Upon this I must also
 mobilize!*

*Which was already begun
 on July 24th*

Probably the Guards also

?!

sador here has also informed us that
 Russia is mobilizing Kief, Kasan,
Odessa and Moscow, but that this by
 no means signifies war, and that
 diplomatic relations with Austria would
 not be severed. Against Germany no
mobilization whatsoever has been
 ordered.

[43]

I immediately telegraphed to Your Majesty's Ambassador at Petersburg to point out to the Russian Minister the probable results of this mobilization against Austria and to ask him to prevent every war-like conflict with Austria as long as the negotiations with Vienna in which we are mediating, are still under way.

It had, according to the telegram of the Czar, already been ordered 5 days ago, that is on the 24th, immediately after the presentation of the ultimatum to Serbia. Therefore, long before the Czar had telegraphed to me to mediate.

v. Bethmann Hollweg

He expressly stated in his first telegram that he would probably be forced to take measures which would probably lead to a European war. Therefore he accepts the blame. Actually the measures were already being carried out and he has simply lied to me. The sending of Tatischeff and the wish that I should not allow myself to be disturbed in my rôle as mediator by his mobilization measures are childish and meant solely for the purpose of leading us astray! I consider my action as a mediator to be a failure since the Czar, instead of loyally awaiting its results, had already mobilised behind my back and without giving me a hint!

W.

401

(Upon a telegram of July 30th from the German Ambassador at Petersburg to the Foreign Office, in which, among other things, it was reported that Sazonoff had stated that the Russian mobilization could not be stopped, the Emperor penned the following:)

If mobilisation can no longer be stopped—which is not true—why then did the Czar call upon my mediation at all three days afterwards without mentioning the issuing of the mobilization orders?! That shows clearly enough that the mobilization has seemed too sudden even to him and that afterwards, to quiet his conscience, he made this move here, pro forma, although he knew that it was no longer of any use, since he does not feel strong enough to stop the mobilization. Frivolity and weakness are going to throw the world into the most terrible war, which aims eventually to destroy Germany. For that is clear to me beyond all doubt: England, Russia and France have agreed among themselves—on the ground that we are confronted with our casus foederis towards Austria—to carry on a war of annihilation against us, taking the Austro-Serbian conflict as a pretext.

Hence Grey's cynical remark to Lichnowsky, "as long as the war remains confined to Russia and Austria, England will remain quiet and only if we involve ourselves and France in it would he be forced to move actively against us." That is, either we should basely betray our ally and deliver her up to Russia—thereby destroying the Triple Alliance—or, for our loyalty to our ally, be pounced upon and punished by all of the Triple Entente, by which their jealousy will finally receive the satisfaction of totally ruining both of us. This in a nutshell is the true situation which, slowly and surely initiated by Edward VII, promoted by him and, in spite of denials, systematically developed by means of discussions of England with Paris and Petersburg, is being finally completed and put into operation by George V. The stupidity and clumsiness of our ally is thereby turned into a noose for us. Thus the famous "encircling" of Germany has now at last become an accomplished fact, in spite of all the attempts of our politicians and diplomats to prevent it. The net has been suddenly drawn together over our heads and England, smiling scornfully, has scored the most brilliant results from her tenacious, purely anti-German world-policy, against which we have proven ourselves powerless, for while we are struggling isolated in the net, she is making out of our loyalty to Austria a rope for our political and economic destruction. A wonderful accomplishment, which excites admiration even from him who is sent to destruction by it! Edward VII is, after his death, still stronger than I, who am alive! And yet there have been people who have believed that England could be won over or be pacified by means of this or that petty measure!!! Unceasingly, unyieldingly she has pursued her purpose with notes, proposals for naval holidays, scares, Haldane, etc., until she was ready. And we walked into the trap and even introduced the program of one-ship-a-year, in the pathetic hope of thereby pacifying England!!! All warnings, all entreaties on my part have been in vain. Now we are earning the English so-called gratitude for all this! Out of the dilemma into which our loyalty towards the venerable old Emperor has brought us, a situation is created which gives England the desired pretext for annihilating us with the hypocritical appearance of justice, namely to help France on account of the maintenance of the notorious balance of power in Europe, i. e. the playing off of all European states against us for the benefit of England! Now all of these machinations must be unsparingly uncovered and the mask of Christian peaceableness must be openly and firmly torn from her, and the Pharisaical hypocrisy of pacifism must be exposed on the pillories!! And our consuls

in Turkey and India, agents etc., must incite the whole Mohammedan world to a wild revolt against this detestable, lying and unscrupulous nation of shopkeepers, for if we are to bleed to death then England shall at least lose India. W.

441

THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR TO THE AMBASSADOR AT VIENNA

Telegram 200

Urgent!

Berlin, July 30, 1914

If Vienna, as is to be assumed from the telephonic communication of Your Excellency with Herr von Stumm, rejects all mediation, especially the latest proposal of Grey (Telegram No. 192), it is hardly possible to place the blame of a threatening European conflagration any longer on Russia. Upon the appeal of the Czar, His Majesty has undertaken intervention at Vienna, because he could not reject it without creating the unanswerable suspicion that we wanted the war. The success of this intervention is however made difficult because Russia has mobilized against Austria. Of that we have informed England today, adding that we have already, in a friendly way, suggested at Petersburg and at Paris the cessation of the Russian and French war preparations; a new step in this direction could therefore only be taken by means of an ultimatum, which would mean war. We have, therefore, urged Sir Edward Grey to influence Paris and Petersburg emphatically in this sense and are just now receiving his corresponding assurance through Lichnowsky. If England is successful in these endeavors, while Vienna rejects everything, then Vienna proves that it absolutely wants war, into which we have been drawn while Russia remains free of guilt. This places us in an indefensible position towards our own nation. We can therefore only urgently recommend that Austria accept Grey's proposal which preserves her position in every respect.

Your Excellency will immediately express yourself emphatically in this sense to Count Berchtold and possibly also to Count Tisza.

His Majesty has tonight sent the following telegram to the Emperor Francis Joseph (No. 437):

"The personal appeal of the Czar to undertake an attempt at mediation for the prevention of a world conflagration and for the preservation of world peace, I believed it impossible to reject and

[46]

have had proposals submitted to your Government through my Ambassador yesterday and today. Among other things they point out that Austria should state her demands after the occupation of Belgrade or other places. I would be deeply indebted to you if you would notify me of your decision as soon as possible."

v. Bethmann Hollweg

473

THE AMBASSADOR AT PETERSBURG TO THE
FOREIGN OFFICE

Telegram 197

Petersburg, July 31, 1914

General Mobilization of Army and Navy ordered. First day of mobilization, July 31. Pourtalès

479

THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR TO THE
AMBASSADOR AT VIENNA

Telegram 204

Berlin, July 31, 1914

After the Russian General Mobilization we have declared threatening danger of war which will probably be followed within 48 hours by mobilization. This inevitably means war. We expect from Austria immediate active participation in the war against Russia.

Bethmann Hollweg

482

THE EMPEROR OF AUSTRIA TO THE EMPEROR
OF GERMANY

Telegram (without number)

Vienna, Schoenbrunn, July 31, 1914

P. C. To H. M. The German Emperor, King of Prussia,

Berlin

I make haste to thank you most kindly and most cordially for your friendly telegram. Yesterday, immediately after your Ambassador had submitted to my Government the mediation proposals of Sir Edward Grey, I received the official notice from my Ambassador at Petersburg, according to which the Emperor of Russia has ordered the mobilization of all military districts along my border. Count Szögyény informs me that you

[47]

have already told Emperor Nicholas, in a very pointed way, that the Russian preparations are to cease, as the whole responsibility of a world war would otherwise fall upon his shoulders. In recognition of my grave duties for the future of my Empire, I have ordered the complete mobilization of the whole of my armed forces. The action of my army, which is in progress against Serbia, cannot be disturbed by the threatening and provocative attitude of Russia. Another rescue of Serbia by the intervention of Russia would cause the gravest results for my states, and it would therefore be impossible to accede to such an intervention. I am conscious of the importance of my decisions and have made them, trusting in God's righteousness, with the assurance that your military forces will stand by my Empire and the Triple Alliance in unflinching loyalty.

Joseph

540a

MEMORANDUM OF THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR

[Berlin, August 1, 1914]

H. M. has agreed to the tenor of the declarations of war.

v. B. H. 1/8

588

THE AMBASSADOR AT PETERSBURG TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE

Telegram 214

Petersburg, August 1, 1914

Telegram No. 159 arrived here 5:45 P. M. Russian time.

After deciphering it, at 7 o'clock Russian time, I asked Mr. Sazonoff three times in succession whether he could make the declaration demanded in telegram No. 153 regarding the cessation of war measures against ourselves and Austria. After his answering this question three times in the negative I presented the note as requested.

Pourtalès

596

THE AMBASSADOR AT LONDON TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE

Telegram 212

London, August 1, 1914

London Sir E. Grey just read to me the *This nonsense of* following declaration which had *Grey shows that he* been unanimously decided upon by

[48]

absolutely does not know what to do. We will now await England's decision. I just learned that England has already interrupted the cable of Emden. Thus a war measure! While she is still negotiating.

the Cabinet: "The reply of the German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium is a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium does affect feeling in this country. If Germany could see her way to give the same positive reply as that which has been given by France, it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here, while on the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country."

Treacherous scoundrel, therefore!

Upon my question as to whether he could give me a definite statement as to the neutrality of Great Britain on the condition that we respect the neutrality of Belgium, the Minister declared that this would not be possible, but that this question would play an important part with public opinion here. If we should violate Belgian neutrality in a war with France, there would certainly be a reversal of opinion which would make it difficult for the Government here to take an

Lies! Up to the present it has not taken this attitude at all.

attitude of friendly neutrality. For the present there is not the slightest intention to take a hostile attitude towards us. He would like to prevent this if possible. But it would be difficult to draw a line as to how far we could go without intervention on the part of England. He again came back to the question of Belgian neutrality and said that this

He lies! He himself said so four days ago to Lichnowsky!

Without mentioning any compensation on England's part

would without doubt play an important part. He had already wondered whether it would not be possible

This fellow is mad for us and France, in case of a Russian war, to remain armed without attacking each other. I asked him whether he was in a position to state to me that France would agree to such an arrangement. Since we do not wish to destroy France nor annex any of her territory, I was inclined to think that we might agree to such an arrangement which would assure us the neutrality of Great Britain.

The Minister said that he would find out, and was also aware of the difficulties involved on both sides in keeping the army inactive.

My final impression is that England would like to keep out of the war, but that the answer which the Secretary of State gave to Sir E. Goschen about the neutrality of Belgium has made a bad impression.

Lichnowsky

My impression is this, that Mr. Grey is a treacherous cur who is afraid of his own meanness and treacherous policy, but does not wish to come out openly against us but wishes to be forced to it by us.

624

THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR TO THE AMBASSADOR AT PETERSBURG

Telegram 163

Berlin, August 2, 1914

Please demand your passports from the Government there and entrust the care of German interests to the American Embassy.

Bethmann Hollweg

[50]

Telegram 408

Therapia, August 2, 1914

Treaty signed today 4 P. M. Text will follow.

Wangenheim

755

Telegram (without number)

To H. M. The German Emperor

Lies I have just received your telegram. I profoundly regret that your noble attempts, to which we had also added ours, to ward off the grave international consequences caused by the procedure of Austria-Hungary, have been in vain. From the beginning my Government has notified your Government and that of Austria-Hungary that since the "casus foederis," as stated in the treaty of the Triple Alliance, does not exist, it will make use of all diplomatic means to defend our allies' and our own just interests and work for the cause of peace.

I extend to you the sincere expression of my most cordial wishes for your well-being and that of Germany.

Your brother and ally,

// Scoundrell!
Impudence!

Vittorio Emanuele

W.

771

THE AMBASSADOR AT ROME TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE

Telegram 287

Rome, August 3, 1914

Herr von Kleist sends the following telegram for His Majesty:

"To H. M. The Emperor

Berlin, Palace

Today, Monday 9 A.M. I presented Your Majesty's order to the King of Italy in which the immediate mobilization of the army and the fleet, as well as assistance as fixed by the treaty, was demanded.

The King answered that, personally, he is with us heart and soul and several weeks ago did not doubt for a moment that, in a war, Italy would faithfully help her ally with active measures. The unbelievable clumsiness of Austria towards the Italian popular sentiment has in the last weeks influenced public opinion against Austria to such an extent that active cooperation with Austria now would cause serious outbreaks. The Ministry does not wish to risk an insurrection. He, the King, unfortunately has no power, only influence. Should he dismiss the present Ministry, then no other one would take the responsibility. All this mainly because Austria so far has not seen fit to make any definite promises for the future, by which a reversal of the popular sentiment might, perhaps, have been attained; whether this is still possible is very doubtful.

Since the people do not understand the difference, Italy, because of Austrian clumsiness, unfortunately has to refuse Germany, which greatly grieves the King. He will try to influence the Ministry again and inform me of the result. Kleist"

Herr von Kleist asks that a copy be sent to the Chief of the General Staff. Flotow

835

THE AMBASSADOR AT LONDON TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE

Telegram 250

London, August 4, 1914

Have just learned that Belgian Chargé d'Affaires has informed the Foreign Office of the entrance of German troops into Belgium.

Conversation with Sir William Tyrrell confirms my impression that after the arrival of

*At last he will believe it!
poor Lichnowsky.*

the news about serious German-Belgian clashes, the continuance of English neutrality cannot be counted upon and a break of relations would then be imminent.

Lichnowsky

876

THE CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE FIELD ARMY TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE

Berlin, August 5, 1914

The declaration of war by England which, according to reliable reports, had been intended from the beginning of the conflict,

[52]

forces us to exhaust all means that can help to bring about victory. The grave condition in which the Fatherland finds itself makes it our duty to use every means which might enable us to harm the enemy. The unscrupulous policy that our opponents are carrying on against us justifies ruthless action.

The insurrection in Poland has been initiated. It will fall on fruitful soil, for already our troops are greeted almost as friends. In Wlozlawek, for instance, they have been received with salt and bread.

The sentiment of America is friendly towards Germany. American public opinion is indignant over the shameful way in which we have been attacked. It is important to make the most out of this sentiment. The influential personages of the German colony must be urged to keep on influencing the press in our favor. Perhaps the United States can be induced to undertake a naval action against England for which Canada beckons as the prize of victory.

Of the greatest importance, as I have already explained, in my communication of the 2d of this month, No. 1P, is the insurrection of India and Egypt, also of the Caucasus.—By means of the treaty with Turkey, the Foreign Office will be in a position to carry out this idea and arouse the fanaticism of Islam.

v. Moltke

APPENDIX I

THE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES AT BERLIN TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MINISTERIAL COUNCIL

Report 386

Berlin, July 18, 1914

On the basis of conversations which I had with Under-Secretary Zimmermann and, further, with the Balkan and Triple Alliance Referendary at the Foreign Office and with the Austro-Hungarian Counselor to the Ambassador, I have the honor to inform your Excellency of the following in regard to the discussion with Serbia intended by the Austro-Hungarian Government:

The step which the Vienna Cabinet has decided to undertake at Belgrade and which will consist of the presentation of a note, will be made on the 25th of this month. The reason for the postponement of the action until the present moment is that it is desired to await the departure of MM. Poincaré and Viviani from Petersburg so that it will not be so easy for the Powers of the

Dual Alliance to come to an understanding on a possible counter-action. Till then Vienna is assuming the appearance of peacefulness by the absence at the same time of the Ministers of War and the Chief of the General Staff, and pressure has also been brought to bear upon the press and the exchange, not without success. That the Vienna Cabinet is acting very skilfully in this connection is admitted here; it is only regretted that Count Tisza, who is said to have been opposed at first to firmer action, has already lifted the veil somewhat by his statements in the Hungarian Chamber of Deputies.

As Herr Zimmermann told me, so far as has now been determined, the note will contain the following demands:

1. The promulgation of a proclamation by the King of Serbia, in which it shall be stated that the Serbian Government is entirely dissociated with the pan-Serbian movement and disapproves of it.
2. The initiation of an investigation against the accomplices in the murder of Sarajevo and the participation of an Austrian official in this investigation.
3. Proceedings against all who are connected with the pan-Serbian movement.

A time limit of 48 hours is to be given for the acceptance of these demands.

That Serbia cannot accept such demands, which are irreconcilable with her dignity as an independent state, is evident. The result would therefore be war.

Here there is complete agreement that Austria should use the opportune hour, despite the danger of further complications. Whether Vienna will really make an effort itself, still appears to be doubtful to both Herr von Jagow and Herr Zimmermann. The Under-Secretary remarked that Austria, thanks to her indecision and unsteadiness, has now really become the sick man of Europe, as formerly Turkey was, whose dismemberment Russians, Italians, Roumanians, Serbians and Montenegrins are awaiting. A strong and successful action against Serbia would result in Austrians and Hungarians again feeling themselves to be a political power, would revive her prostrate economic life and suppress foreign aspirations for many years. Because of the indignation which now exists throughout the whole Monarchy over the bloody deed, one could probably also be sure of the Slavic troops. As General Conrad von Hoetzendorf is said

to have himself admitted, in a few years, with the further operation of Slavic propaganda, this would no longer be the case.

The opinion here, therefore, is that for Austria this is a fateful hour, and for this reason, upon an inquiry from Vienna, it has been declared here without hesitation that we should agree to every action which will be determined upon there, even at the risk of a war with Russia. The full powers which were given Count Hoyos, the chief of the Cabinet of Count Berchtold, who had come here to present an autograph letter of the Emperor and a detailed promemoria, were so extensive that the Austro-Hungarian Government was empowered to negotiate with Bulgaria as to admission to the Triple Alliance.

It seems that Vienna did not expect from Germany such unreserved intervention on behalf of the Danube Monarchy and Herr Zimmermann has the impression that the eternally fainthearted and undecided officials at Vienna feel almost annoyed because, from the German side, there has been no admonition to be cautious and restrained. How vacillating Vienna is in its decision is proved by the fact that Count Berchtold, three days after he had had an inquiry made here regarding an alliance with Bulgaria, had telegraphed that he still had doubts as to allying himself with Bulgaria.

It would also be more satisfactory to Berlin if the action against Serbia were not deferred so long and the Serbian Government not given time, perhaps under Russo-French pressure, to offer satisfaction on its part.

What position the other powers will take towards an armed conflict between Austria and Serbia will, according to opinion here, depend largely upon whether Austria will be satisfied with a thrashing of Serbia, or will also demand territorial compensation for herself. In the former case it would be possible to localize the war; in the latter, however, larger complications would probably be inevitable.

In the interest of the localization of the war, the Imperial Government will, immediately after the presentation of the Austrian note at Belgrade, start a diplomatic action with the Great Powers. Calling attention to the fact that the Emperor is on his northern trip, and the Chief of the Great General Staff as well as the Prussian Minister of War on leave of absence, it will insist that it has been just as much surprised by the action of Austria as the other Powers. (I take the liberty of inserting here

that even the Italian Government has not been taken into confidence.) It will explain that it is to the common interest of all monarchical states that the "Anarchist Nest at Belgrade" be destroyed, and it will work to the end that the Powers take the position that the discussion between Austria and Serbia is an affair between these two states. A mobilization of German troops will not be undertaken and our military influence will be brought to bear upon Austria not to mobilize her entire army and especially those troops stationed in Galicia, so as not to bring about automatically a counter-mobilization on the part of Russia, which would force us also, and then France, to take similar measures, and thus bring on a European war.

The question whether the localization of the war will succeed, will be decided in the first place by the attitude of Russia.

If Russia absolutely does not want war against Austria and Germany, she can in this case—and that is the most favorable fact in the present situation—very well remain inactive and take the position towards Serbia that she, just as little as the other civilized states, endorses a method of struggle which proceeds by means of bomb-throwing and revolver shots. This especially so long as Austria does not threaten the national independence of Serbia. Herr Zimmermann assumes that England, as well as France, who would hardly wish for a war at present, will influence Russia to adopt a peaceful attitude; furthermore, he takes for granted that "bluffing" is one of the favorite methods of Russian policy, and that the Russian likes to threaten with the sword but, in the decisive moment, does not like to draw it for others.

England will not prevent Austria from holding Serbia to account. However, an annihilation of the country she will hardly permit; on the contrary, loyal to her traditions, she will probably intervene here also for the principle of nationality. A war between the Dual and Triple Alliance would hardly be welcome to England at the present moment, merely in consideration of the situation in Ireland. Should it, nevertheless, come to this, we would, according to opinion here, find the English cousin on the side of our opponents, since England fears that France, in case of a defeat, would sink down to the rank of a second rate power and the "balance of power" thus be destroyed, whose preservation England considers necessary for her own interest.

Italy would receive very little pleasure from a castigation of Serbia by Austria, to whom she would hardly be willing to grant

a strengthened position in the Balkans. As the Chargé d'Affaires von Bergen, the Referendary for Triple Alliance affairs at the Foreign Office, told me, the relation between Vienna and Rome is again anything but friendly. Vienna is very much put out over the Italian chargé d'affaires in Albania, Aliotti, who seems to have carried on considerable intrigue against Austria, and Ambassador von Mérey, therefore, received several days ago an order to demand of Italy that she change her whole policy, since otherwise a continued understanding would not be possible. The order is said to have been worded so strongly that San Giuliano was quite wrought up, and this tension between Austria and Italy greatly aggravates the situation. The partitioning of Serbia or merely the annexation by Austria of Mount Lovcen in Montenegro, which commands the Bay of Cattaro, would not be suffered by Italy without compensation. It does not seem improbable that Italy is calling out her reserves for the purpose of occupying Valona in this case, an act which she tries to justify by her internal political conditions. Herr Zimmermann is of the opinion that Austria should not oppose this, since Valona would become a new tendon of Achilles for Italy, and the distance between Brindisi and Valona is too large for the Italians to succeed in completely blocking the Adriatic.

Perhaps one can also deduce from a statement of the Austro-Hungarian Counselor to the Ambassador, according to whose opinion Valona might well be given to the Italians, that Vienna has already familiarized itself with the possibility of an occupation of southern Albania by the Italians.

As I have very confidentially been informed, the Counselor to the Ambassador at Vienna, Prince Stolberg, who was here several days ago, was ordered to talk over the question of compensation to Italy with Count Berchtold, and to insinuate in an unofficial way that Italy would probably be won over permanently if Austria would agree, in case of large territorial expansions, to a cession of the southern part of the Trentino, i. e., that part of the archbishopric Trent which had never belonged to the old German Empire. That the Vienna Cabinet will approve this idea is, however, hardly expected here and in order not to cause bad feeling by an official suggestion of this kind, the Counselor to the Ambassador and not the Ambassador, who is also at Vienna, has been ordered purposely to turn the conversation to the Trentino.

As to Bulgaria, the Austro-Hungarian Embassy here assumes that King Ferdinand would use the outbreak of a war between Austria and Serbia to strike against Serbia, so as to win back the territory lost by the Peace of Bukarest. Since the danger exists that Roumania, as in the Second Balkan War, would turn against Bulgaria, an exercise of influence on the part of Russia in this direction, who will not undertake anything directly against Bulgaria, will probably also not be wanting at this time. King Carol, whose attitude of late has been very unsatisfactory, has been informed from here, in unequivocal terms, that Germany would take the side of Bulgaria in case Roumania does not abandon Serbia. According to the answer of the King, it is assumed here that Roumania will keep peace in case the prospect of compensation is held out to her. As such, the territory around Vidin, whose population consists mainly of Roumanians, would come under consideration. In this way, Roumania would of itself probably have been won back to the Triple Alliance.

Greece, which would not be averse to seeing a diminution of Serbia, would be compensated in the Epirus and would, in exchange, have to cede Kaballa to Bulgaria.

As far as Montenegro is concerned, it is hoped here that the intelligent King Nikita will find it advantageous to let the Serbs fight alone against Austria. For the cession of the Lovcen, which Austria, in case of such a far-reaching revision of the Balkans, would probably demand for herself, Montenegro could be compensated in northern Albania.

What the fate of the Duchy of Albania will be, can hardly be determined today. For the present, the unhappy condition will continue which has been characterized in Paris by the words: "*Les caisses sont vides, le trône est Wied, tout est vide.*" and has caused the prince to receive the nickname "*Le Prince du Vide.*"

v. Schoen

APPENDIX II

No. I

THE AMBASSADOR AT VIENNA, COUNT B. WEDEL;
TO THE UNDER-SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
BARON V. D. BUSSCHE (PRIVATE LETTER)

Vienna, 9/5/1917

Dear Bussche:

Stumm wrote to me shortly before his leave of absence that Czernin had said that Tschirschky had declared to Count Berch-

told in July, 1914, that, if Austria did not decide upon energetic action against Serbia, we would be forced to consider a different foreign policy. I would like to try to settle this. The documents contain nothing about it. Stolberg considers it impossible that the prudent Tschirschky should have made such a statement. In order to be sure, I asked Berchtold. He answered my question in the negative and told me that Tschirschky had explained to him that Berlin considered energetic action against Serbia to be desirable. Upon my question as to whether Tschirschky had used any pressure to force the Imperial and Royal Government to this, he said: "No, T. did not use any pressure." That would, in fact, have been incomprehensible since Vienna itself was urging such a procedure and wanted to make sure of our support. I will not fail to draw Czernin's attention to his mistake. There are also people here at the Ballplatz who would like to put the blame for the war upon our shoulders, and invent such tales. The note to Serbia only became known at Berlin on the day on which it was presented at Belgrade. Tschirschky, that is to say, had not sent it by telegraph but by mail. Jagow at that time told Szögyény that the fault of the note consisted in making retreat impossible; a note might be as sharp as possible, but must always leave a way out in case the other party is willing to yield.

With kind regards,

Yours,
Wedel

No. 2

EX-SECRETARY OF STATE, ZIMMERMANN, TO THE
UNDER-SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
BARON VON DEM BUSSCHE (PRIVATE LETTER)

(Berlin) Saturday (August 11, 1917)

Dear Bussche:

The statement of the *Evening News* is actually correct in so far as we had, it is true, received the Serbian Ultimatum about twelve hours before delivery. On the other hand, I can positively not recall confiding this to an American diplomat. A denial can therefore be issued, but I venture no opinion as to whether this would be of any use, considering that the fact of our cognizance of this matter cannot, after all, be kept secret forever.

With best regards,

Yours,
Zimmermann

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APPENDIX III

No. 1

MEMORANDUM OF THE UNDER-SECRETARY FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BARON V. D. BUSSCHE

(Berlin, August 30, 1917)

On the day after the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, in July, 1914, had handed to H. M. the Emperor the letter of the Emperor Francis Joseph, delivered by Count Hoyos, and the Imperial Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg and the Under-Secretary of State Zimmermann had been received in Potsdam, a conference of military personages took place with His Majesty at Potsdam. There were present: His Excellency Capelle for Tirpitz, Captain Zenker for the Admiralty Staff, representatives of the War Department and of the General Staff. It was decided, at all events, to take preparatory measures for a war. Corresponding orders were thereupon issued.—Source absolutely trustworthy.

Bussche. 8/30

No. 2

BARON VON DEM BUSSCHE

(Foreign Office Doc. 27230/ October 16, 1919)

I am sorry that I cannot recall the source. Perhaps Mueller. Date of noting this down might perhaps refresh my memory. Also possible that I mistakenly characterized source as being trustworthy.

No. 3

ADMIRAL VON CAPELLE

(Foreign Office Doc. 2139 October 11, 1919.)

Baden-Baden, October 8, 1919

On Monday, July 6, 1914, between seven and eight A. M. I received, as Acting Secretary of State for the Navy—Grand Admiral v. Tirpitz was on leave of absence—telephonic orders to come immediately to Emperor William in the Neues Palais.

I met the Emperor in the garden, ready to leave on his trip for the North. The Emperor walked back and forth with me for a short while and in a few words told me about the proceedings of last Sunday. He added, as far as I can remember, something like the following (private or official memoranda about this,

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drawn up at that time, probably do not exist): He did not believe that there would be important war complications. The Czar, according to his opinion, would not in this case place himself on the side of the murderers of the Prince. Besides, Russia and France were not prepared.—England the Emperor did not mention.—Upon advice of the Chancellor he would start on his northern trip, in order not to produce any disquiet. Nevertheless, he wanted to inform me of the tense situation so that I could be thinking about the future.

A council of military officials did not, according to the above, take place at Potsdam on July 6, since the Emperor, immediately after his conversation with me, started upon his journey to Kiel.

Admiral v. Capelle

No. 4

ADMIRAL VON MUELLER

(Foreign Office Doc. 28205/ October 28, 1919, P. M.)

To the Foreign Office:

I cannot be the person whom Baron v. d. Bussche mentions. My diary contains nothing about such a council, which must have been held in the period from 6/29 to 7/6/14 (presence of H. M. in the Neues Palais before his northern trip). However, on the morning of July 6th, the meeting mentioned by Admiral v. Capelle took place.

v. Mueller

No. 5

INFANTRY-GENERAL VON BERTRAB

(Foreign Office Doc. 2194/ October 22, 1919)

Berlin, October 20, 1919

To the Foreign Office:

I most humbly reply that, on July 6, 1914, H. M. the Emperor informed me personally, without witnesses, of his opinion concerning the situation created by the measures taken by Austria, in order that I, being then the senior officer of the General Staff at Berlin, should inform the Chief of the General Staff, who was staying at Carlsbad. In the background there were H. M. the Empress, an adjutant and a lackey. Immediately before, presumably for the same purpose, His Majesty had spoken with a naval officer, also privately, who withdrew immediately after the conversation. After the Emperor had dismissed me, he stepped

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into his car to begin his northern trip. No instructions were issued either during or after the conversation. His Majesty even emphasized that he did not deem it necessary to give any special instructions, since he did not expect serious complications as the result of the Sarajevo crime.

v. Bertrab, Gen. of the Inf.

No. 6

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL COUNT WALDERSEE

(Foreign Office Doc. 2215/ October 25, 1919)

To the inquiry of the 23rd of this month ^{Doc. 2190}₉₁₂₆ I have the honor to reply as follows:

On the morning of July 8th, 1914, Lieutenant-General von Bertrab, Chief of the Topographical Department, informed me that during my short absence he had been ordered by the Chief of the Military Cabinet to Potsdam to H. M. the Emperor. The latter had informed him, for notification of the Chief of the General Staff—General von Moltke was just then staying at Carlsbad—that the Emperor had promised the Emperor Francis Joseph to back him up with Germany's power should complications arise out of the action planned by Austria against Serbia. No orders or instructions were issued through General von Bertrab, neither did any orders in relation to possible war preparations reach the General Staff.

It may be emphasized here that General von Bertrab had been ordered to Potsdam solely in his rôle as Senior Quartermaster-General, and that he had nothing to do with work in regard to mobilization.

The Emperor, in the meantime, had started on his northern trip. For me, who represented General von Moltke in all matters relating to the war, there were no orders to issue because of the audience of General von Bertrab at Potsdam. The previously planned work of mobilization had been completed on March 31, 1914. The army was, as always, prepared.

As late as the evening of July 8th I took a leave of absence to take a rest in the country, after I had acquainted myself with the situation. There were also no orders for preparations issued by the War Department and, further, the General Staff had taken no measures looking toward war up to the period shortly before the beginning of the war. In fact, the Chief of the Second Division,

who had been working under me in matters regarding mobilization, took a leave of absence soon after I had done so.

I returned to Berlin on July 23rd, only after the strongest political tension had developed. Count Waldersee

No. 7

THE MAIN OFFICE OF THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

(Foreign Office Doc. 27658/ October 21, 1919)

Ministry of National Defense

Main Office

Berlin, October 16, 1919

No. 165. 10/19 Z. R.

Koenigin-Augusta-Str. 38/42.

In regard to the letter of
October 3 and 4, 19.

No. 1. The former Minister of War, now General of the Infantry, v. Falkenhayn was on a leave of absence from July 10 to 24 inclusive. He left Berlin on July 8, 1914, on an official errand, taking his leave of absence in conjunction with this official errand, and after returning from his leave of absence, which was spent with his family on the shore of the North Sea, he again took charge of his official business on July 25, 1914. His leave of absence was granted by word of mouth, a Cabinet order for the same not being issued.

No. 2. On July 5 or 6, 1914, no officers of the Prussian War Department were ordered to an official discussion with the Emperor. Wurtzbacher

No. 8

CAPTAIN IN THE NAVY, ZENKER

(Foreign Office Doc. 29387, November 12, 1919)

Berlin, November 8, 1919

On July 5, 1914, I was ordered to the Wildpark to receive orders from H. M. the Emperor. Since I have no memoranda in my private possession as to the details of the discussion, I can state the following only from memory:

H. M. the Emperor informed me, for report to my superiors, that at noon of July 5th the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador had inquired of him whether Germany, in case of an Austro-Hungarian conflict with Serbia and probable strained relations with Russia which might arise therefrom, would fulfill her duty as an

ally. His Majesty had promised this, but did not believe that Russia would intervene in the interest of Serbia, which had sullied herself with the assassination. France also would hardly permit a war to develop, since she lacked heavy artillery for her field army. If, therefore, a war against Russia and France did not seem probable, nevertheless the possibility would have to be considered.

The High Sea Fleet, however, was to begin its trip to Norway, set for the middle of July, just as he also would start on his trip to Norway according to previous plans.

My question as to whether the Chief of the Admiralty Staff, who was on leave of absence, should be recalled, His Majesty answered in the negative.

On July 6th I informed the Acting Chief of the General Staff, Vice-Admiral Behncke, of these orders. What orders he issued as a result I am not able to state since, as Chief of the Division of Tactics, I had nothing to do with mobilization affairs.

Zenker, Captain in the Navy

To the Foreign Office, here.

INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

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- I. Present Day Conditions in Europe
- II. The United States and the Armenian Mandate
- III. Report of the American Military Mission to Armenia



JUNE, 1920

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I

PRESENT DAY CONDITIONS IN EUROPE

Address by

HENRY P. DAVISON

Chairman, Board of Governors, League of Red Cross Societies

Before the General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church,
Des Moines, Iowa, May 17, 1920

As Chairman of the Convention of Red Cross Societies, composed of representatives of twenty-seven nations, that met recently in Geneva, I am custodian of authoritative reports recording appalling conditions among millions of people living in Eastern Europe.

Whatever our attitude towards the League of Nations or our apprehensions regarding foreign entanglements, I feel it is essential that the people of the United States realize that one of the most terrible tragedies in the history of the human race is being enacted within the broad belt of territory lying between the Baltic and the Black and Adriatic Seas.

This area includes the new Baltic States—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Ukraine, Austria, Hungary, Roumania, Montenegro, Albania and Serbia.

The reports which come to us make it clear that in these war-ravaged lands civilization has broken down. Disease, bereavement and suffering are present in practically every household, while food and clothing are insufficient to make life tolerable.

Men, women and children are dying by thousands and over vast once-civilized areas there are to be found neither medical appliances nor medical skill sufficient to cope with the devastating plagues.

According to reports of the American Red Cross and the Commissioner of the League of Red Cross Societies made in a signed statement to the American Government, wholesale starvation is threatened in Poland this summer unless she can procure

food supplies in large quantities. A telegram to the League of Red Cross Societies, March 20, stated that there are now approximately 250,000 cases of typhus in Poland and in the area occupied by Polish troops.

This is already one of the worst typhus epidemics in the world's history. In Galicia, whole towns are crippled and business suspended. In some districts there is but one doctor to each 150,000 people. During the year 1919 about 2,400,000 refugees and prisoners entered Poland.

In the Ukraine, we were told, typhus and influenza has affected most of the population. In villages of two to three thousand half the people were ill at the same time and there was almost no medical care. In many cases a territory forty miles in diameter had but one physician. Some doctors who had twenty to thirty thousand patients could get no medical supplies whatever and had nothing better to give the sick than oral instructions. Pauperism is intensified every day.

A report from Vienna dated February 12 said: "There are rations for three weeks. People are apathetic, fatalistic, tired. One hundred thousand school children in Vienna are reported as underfed and diseased because of food shortage and lack of fuel. At least twenty-five thousand hospital beds have become useless owing to lack of medical supplies. Death stalks through the streets of Vienna and takes unhindered toll. The general death rate has risen forty-six per cent. since 1913 and the mortality for tuberculosis two hundred and fifty per cent."

Budapest, according to our information, is one vast city of misery and suffering. The number of deaths is double that of births. Of 160,000 children in the schools, 100,000 are dependent on public charity. There are 150,000 workers idle.

In Roumania tuberculosis is spreading in an alarming and unprecedented manner. All energies are devoted to keeping the typhus epidemic at bay, and a military cordon along the Dniester River prevents the entrance of 20,000 Russian refugees on the other side whose infection is feared.

Typhus and smallpox have invaded the four countries composing Czecho-Slovakia, and there is lack of medicines, soap and physicians. The shelves of their pharmacies and their hospitals are bare.

In Serbia typhus has broken out again and there are but two hundred physicians to minister to the needs of that entire

country. In Montenegro, where food is running short, there are but five physicians for an estimated population of 450,000.

In a letter to the Red Cross Convention appealing for aid, Arthur Balfour, Chairman of the Council of the League of Nations, speaks of "the catastrophe as one of unexampled magnitude. The calamity following hard on war seems almost worse than the war itself."

These are but a few of the top notes of the tragedy. There is nothing here about Russia, whose population is rationed, or of Germany, whose problems are acute, or of Armenia where the distress and destruction are beyond description. Hunger and disease and despair are the lot of these fellow humans of ours. Powerless to help themselves, they are slowly perishing before our eyes.

Returning to the United States a few weeks ago with all these horrors ringing in my ears, I found myself once more in a land whose granaries were overflowing, where health and plenty abounded, and where life and activity and eager enterprise were in the full flood. And though I well know of a hundred disturbing problems I heard of no hunger cries. No American children were dying in their mothers' arms for lack of milk or bread.

I asked myself—What if this plague and famine were here in the great territory between the Atlantic Seaboard and the Mississippi Valley which roughly parallels the extent of these ravaged countries, and that sixty-five million of our own people condemned to idleness by lack of raw material and whose fields had been devastated by invasion and rapine, were racked by starvation and pestilence, and if we had lifted up our voices and invoked the attention of our brothers in happier Europe to our own deep miseries and our cries had fallen on deaf ears, would we not in our despair exclaim against their heartlessness!

And even if this calamity had befallen us because of the wrongdoing of our rulers, even if we were beset by partisan wrangles and torn by conflicting policies, would we not feel that the very magnitude of our disasters outweighed our faults and constituted a claim on the Christian humanity they had in common with ourselves?

In my relations with the representatives of these stricken people of Europe I heard no bitter words about America. I attempted through various relations to plumb their feelings. Invariably the replies ran something like this: "Well, we don't

just understand you, and then, again, we know you are very busy."

But I knew, and you must know, what they were thinking and saying to each other, and it is just what we in the United States should be saying if conditions were reversed.

There are only three ways by which these stricken lands can secure supplies from the outside world. One is by payment, one by credit, and the third is by exchange of commodities. If these peoples tried to buy materials and supplies in America at the present market value of their currencies, Austria would have to pay forty times the original cost, Germany thirteen times, Greece just double, Czecho-Slovakia fourteen times, and Poland fifty times. These figures are official and are a true index of the economic plight of these countries.

It is clear, therefore, that they cannot give us gold for the things they must have, nor have they either products or securities to offer in return for credit. If only they could obtain raw material which these idle millions of theirs could convert into manufactured products they would have something to tender the world in return for its raw material, food and medicine. But if they have neither money nor credit how are they to take this first great step towards redemption?

Yes, I admit that those people speak truth who will say in answer to all this: "We are sorry, but we did not cause it. It is not our affair and we have given all we can afford to Europe. Has not our Red Cross already had four hundred millions of our money? It is about time we attended to our own troubles."

But I assert in reply to all such—You can no more renounce the tribulations of these stricken people than you could escape the consequences of the war. One half the world may not eat while the other half starves. How long do you believe the plague of typhus that is taking a hideous death toll in Esthonia and Poland and the Ukraine and eating along the fringes of Germany and Czecho-Slovakia will confine itself to these remote lands? It is a parasitic disease and if not throttled may spill into the western countries of Europe and creep to our own shores.

Only last Saturday our Health Commissioner of New York, Dr. Copeland, sailed for the other side just to measure the danger and take precaution against such an invasion.

This is one menace at our threshold. The other, more threatening, more terrible, is the menace of the world's ill will. We can

afford to die, but to be despised forever as a greedy and pharisaical nation is a fate that we must not incur.

There are those today in the United States who deplore our very entrance into the war and now pray vehemently to be rid of its encumbrances. These argue that our obligations have been met and that our sacrifices were vain. But the people of Europe do not forget that we declared we fought this war to make the world safe for democracy and furthermore that our President by his part in the Peace Conference and by the reiteration of the principles that he presented as America's, encouraged them to believe that as America had turned the tide of war, so would America help with their resources the reconstruction of the world.

The people of Europe are and will always be grateful to us for what we did, and they accepted at full face value our declarations of what we were going to do. Now they think we have turned our backs on them. As I have heard it expressed, "You came over here and wrote down the rules of the game and then chucked us."

Mr. Wilson was not the only American whose voice carried to Europe. On the 18th day of July, 1918, the day when the boys of the First and Second Divisions were turning the tide of war at Soisson, Theodore Roosevelt spoke as follows to a convention of the political party of which he was the recognized leader:

"We must establish the great free commonwealths of the Poles, the Czecho-Slovaks and the Jugo-Slavs, and save the other submerged peoples who are their neighbors. Unless we do all this, unless we stand by all our allies who have stood by us, we shall have failed in making the liberty of well-behaved, civilized peoples secure, and we shall have shown that our announcement about making the world safe for democracy was an empty boast."

Whatever the developments were later, and whatever the merits of the reasons, do not forget that to Europe we were all-important and gave them every reason to believe that we were there and there to stick and that now we seem to have turned our backs.

So far I have spoken chiefly of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. It is important to distinguish between these countries and our principal allies in Western Europe, who, whatever their distress, are doing their best to pull all Europe out of the Slough of Despond.

The French Government has many serious problems to solve, but the French peasant is working and the French artisan, while still sadly in need of raw materials, has not lost his habit of industry and thrift. The most encouraging fact about France today is that her people are alive to the seriousness of France's problem and they are going forward bravely to solve that problem.

Italy, despite her great shortage of raw material, is looking forward and not backward. Italy can be relied upon to do her part!

England is meeting the problems of reconstruction just as those who knew her past should have expected her to meet them. With a head erect, a quiet courage and a sturdy common sense she is doing her own day's work and at the same time rendering all the assistance that her resources permit to the countries on the Continent.

Neither Belgium nor France nor Italy nor England are asking charity of the United States. The people of these countries are as proud as we are. They are as eager to work out their own destiny as we are to work out ours. In the face of an almost overwhelming catastrophe they seek only the opportunity to regain their own economic strength.

I have supreme confidence in the ultimate good judgment of the American people on any problem fairly submitted to them. No man knows better than I the nobility and generosity of their response when they are aroused to some tragic need. I believe that the apathy and indifference which prevail today are due alone to the fact that the American people have not grasped the dreadful facts.

When once the true bearings of the situation have bitten into their consciousness and they realize that this is the only country possessed of many of the supplies of food and medicine, clothing and transport that these suffering nations must have, I believe they will arise and act.

It is not for me perhaps to give in detail a formula for solution of the world's ills, but as I have been asked many times, "What would you do?" I am glad to give my own answer.

At the outset, let me state that constructive action in this matter may be regarded as altruistic by those who are so minded; it may be regarded as ordinary decency by those who so desire, or it may be regarded withal as good common sense business, in the interests of commerce and trade and of the American people. Accordingly, I would ask:

1. That Congress immediately pass a bill appropriating a sum not to exceed \$500,000,000 for the use of Central and Eastern Europe.

2. That Congress call upon the President to appoint a non-political commission of three Americans, distinguished for their character and executive ability and commanding the respect of the American people. Such a commission should include men of the type of General Pershing, Mr. Hoover or ex-Secretary Lane. I would invest that commission with complete power.

3. I would have the commission instructed to proceed at once, accompanied by proper personnel, to survey conditions in Central and Eastern Europe, and then to act for the restoration of those countries, under such conditions and upon such terms as the commission itself may decide to be practicable and effective. Among the conditions should be provided that there should be no local interference with the free and untrammelled exercise by the commission of its own prerogative of allocating materials. Governmental politics should be eliminated; unreasonable and prejudicial barriers between the various countries should be removed; and such substantial guarantees as may be available should be exacted, in order that the conditions imposed should be fulfilled.

4. As to financial terms, I should make them liberal. I would charge no interest for the first three years; for the next three years, six per cent., with provision that such interest might be funded if the economic conditions of the country were not approaching normal, or if its exchange conditions were so adverse as to make payment unduly burdensome, I should make the maturity of the obligation fifteen years from its date, and I should have no doubt as to its final payment.

5. Immediately the plan was adopted, I would have our Government invite other governments in a position to assist, to participate in the undertaking.

6. To set forth completely my opinion, I should add that in the final instructions the American people, through their Government, should say to the commission:

"We want you to go and do this job in such a manner as, after study, you think it should be done. This is no ordinary undertaking. The American people trust you to see that it is done right."

I would also say to the commission:

"Use so much of this money as is needed." Personally, I am confident that with the assistance and cooperation which would

come from other parts of the world, the sum of \$500,000,000 from the United States would be more than enough to start these countries on their way to self-support and the restoration of normal conditions.

The whole plan, of course, involves many practical considerations, the most serious of which is that of obtaining the money, whether by issuing additional Liberty Bonds, an increase in the floating debt, or by taxation. But I think we could properly say to the Treasury Department:

"We know how serious your financial problems are; we know the difficulties which are immediately confronting you; we know the importance of deflation, and we know that the Government must economize and that individuals must economize, but we also know that the American Government advanced ten billion dollars to its allies to attain victory and peace. Certainly it is worth making the additional advance in order to realize the peace for which we have already struggled,—for nothing is more certain than that until normal conditions are restored in Europe, there can be no peace."

Above all things, I would say that whatever action is taken should be taken immediately. The crisis is so acute that the situation does not admit of delay, except with the possibility of consequences one hardly dares contemplate.

The situation that I have spread out here is far beyond the scope of individual charity. Only by the action of governments, our own and the others whose resources enable them to cooperate, can aid be given in sufficient volume. And I am confident that if the United States of America were to announce that it proposed to move to rescue those suffering peoples, there would go about the world a cry of joy. I am also confident that our action would be followed by the governments of Great Britain, of Holland, of the Scandinavian countries, of Spain and Japan, and that France and Belgium and Italy, notwithstanding all of their losses, would help to the best of their ability.

II

THE UNITED STATES AND THE
ARMENIAN MANDATEMESSAGE OF PRESIDENT WILSON TO THE
CONGRESS, MAY 24, 1920¹

Gentlemen of the Congress:

On the 14th of May an official communication was received at the Executive Office from the Secretary of the Senate of the United States, conveying the following preambles and resolutions:

Whereas, the testimony adduced at the hearings conducted by the sub-committee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations has clearly established the truth of the reported massacres and other atrocities from which the Armenian people have suffered; and

Whereas, the people of the United States are deeply depressed by the deplorable conditions of insecurity, starvation, and misery now prevalent in Armenia; and

Whereas, the independence of the Republic of Armenia has been duly recognized by the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference and by the Government of the United States of America; therefore be it

Resolved, that the sincere congratulations of the Senate of the United States are hereby extended to the people of Armenia on the recognition of the independence of the Republic of Armenia, without prejudice respecting the territorial boundaries involved; and be it further

Resolved, that the Senate of the United States hereby expresses the hope that stable government, proper protection of individual liberties and rights, and the full realization of nationalistic aspirations may soon be attained by the Armenian people; and be it further

Resolved, that in order to afford necessary protection for the lives and property of citizens of the United States at the port of Baku and along the line of the railroad leading to Baku, the President is hereby requested, if not incompatible with the

¹ Reprinted from the *Congressional Record*, May 24, 1920.

public interest, to cause a United States warship and a force of marines to be dispatched to such port, with instructions to such marines to disembark and protect American lives and property.

I received and read this document with great interest and with genuine gratification, not only because it embodied my own convictions and feelings with regard to Armenia and its people, but also, and more particularly, because it seemed to me the voice of the American people, expressing their genuine convictions and deep Christian sympathies and intimating the line of duty which seemed to them to lie clearly before us.

I cannot but regard it as providential, and not as a mere casual coincidence, that almost at the same time I received information that the conference of statesmen then sitting at San Remo, for the purpose of working out the details of peace with the Central Powers which it was not feasible to work out in the conference at Paris, had formally resolved to address a definite appeal to this Government to accept a mandate for Armenia. They were at pains to add that they did this, "not for the smallest desire to evade any obligations which they might be expected to undertake, but because the responsibilities which they are already obliged to bear in connection with the disposition of the former Ottoman Empire will strain their capacities to the uttermost, and because they believe that the appearance on the scene of a power emancipated from the prepossessions of the Old World will inspire a wider confidence and afford a firmer guarantee for stability in the future than would the selection of any European power."

Early in the conferences at Paris it was agreed that to those colonies and territories which, as a consequence of the late war, have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them, and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization, and that securities for the performance of this trust should be afforded.

It was recognized that certain communities, formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire, have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized, subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone.

It is in pursuance of this principle, and with a desire of affording Armenia such advice and assistance, that the statesmen conferring at San Remo have formally requested this Government to assume the duties of mandatory in Armenia. I may add, for the information of the Congress, that at the same sitting it was resolved to request the President of the United States to undertake to arbitrate the difficult question of the boundary between Turkey and Armenia and the vilayets of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis, and it was agreed to accept his decision thereupon, as well as any stipulation he may prescribe as to access to the sea for the independent State of Armenia. In pursuance of this action it was resolved to embody in the treaty with Turkey, now under final consideration, a provision that "Turkey and Armenia and the other high contracting parties agree to refer to the arbitration of the President of the United States of America the question of the boundary between Turkey and Armenia in the vilayets of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis, and to accept his decision thereupon, as well as any stipulations he may prescribe as to access to the sea for the independent State of Armenia"; pending that decision, the boundaries of Turkey and Armenia to remain as at present. I have thought it my duty to accept this difficult and delicate task.

In response to the invitation of the Council at San Remo, I urgently advise and request that the Congress grant the Executive power to accept for the United States a mandate over Armenia. I make this suggestion in the earnest belief that it will be the wish of the people of the United States that this should be done. The sympathy with Armenia has proceeded from no single portion of our people, but has come with extraordinary spontaneity and sincerity from the whole of the great body of Christian men and women in this country, by whose free-will offerings Armenia has practically been saved at the most critical juncture of its existence. At their hearts, this great and generous people have made the cause of Armenia their own. It is to this people and to their Government that the hopes and earnest expectations of the struggling people of Armenia turn as they now emerge from a period of indescribable suffering and peril, and I hope that the Congress will think it wise to meet this hope and expectation with the utmost liberality. I know from unmistakable evidence given by responsible representatives of many peoples struggling toward independence and

peaceful life again, that the Government of the United States is looked to with extraordinary trust and confidence, and I believe that it would do nothing less than arrest the hopeful processes of civilization if we were to refuse the request to become the helpful friends and advisers of such of these people as we may be authoritatively and formally requested to guide and assist.

I am conscious that I am urging upon the Congress a very critical choice, but I make the suggestion in the confidence that I am speaking in the spirit and in accordance with the wishes of the greatest of the Christian peoples. The sympathy for Armenia among our people has sprung from untainted consciences, pure Christian faith and an earnest desire to see Christian people everywhere succored in their time of suffering and lifted from their abject subjection and distress and enabled to stand upon their feet and take their place among the free nations of the world. Our recognition of the independence of Armenia will mean genuine liberty and assured happiness for her people, if we fearlessly undertake the duties of guidance and assistance involved in the functions of a mandatory. It is, therefore, with the most earnest hopefulness, and with the feeling that I am giving advice from which the Congress will not willingly turn away, that I urge the acceptance of the invitation now formally and solemnly extended to us by the Council at San Remo, into whose hands has passed the difficult task of composing the many complexities and difficulties of government in the one-time Ottoman Empire, and the maintenance of order and tolerable conditions of life in those portions of that empire which it is no longer possible in the interest of civilization to leave under the Government of the Turkish authorities themselves.

(Signed) WOODROW WILSON

The White House,
24 May, 1920.

On June 1, 1920, the Senate, by a vote of 52 to 23, passed the following resolution:

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring),
That the Congress hereby respectfully declines to grant to the Executive the power to accept a mandate over Armenia as requested in the message of the President dated May 24, 1920. No action on the resolution was taken by the House before the dissolution of the Congress.

III

AMERICAN MILITARY MISSION TO ARMENIA

*On Board U. S. S. Martha Washington,
October 16, 1919*

From: Maj. Gen. James G. Harbord, United States Army.
To: The Secretary of State.
Subject: Report of the American Military Mission to Armenia.

The undersigned submits herewith the report of the American Military Mission to Armenia. The mission, organized under authority of the President, consisted of Maj. Gen. James G. Harbord, United States Army; Brig. Gen. Frank R. McCoy, United States Army; Brig. Gen. George Van Horn Moseley, United States Army; Col. Henry Beeuwkes, Medical Corps, United States Army; Lieut. Col. John Price Jackson, United States Engineers; Lieut. Col. Jasper Y. Brinton, judge advocate, United States Army; Lieut. Col. Edward Bowditch, Jr., Infantry, United States Army; Commander W. W. Bertholf, United States Navy; Maj. Lawrence Martin, General Staff, United States Army; Maj. Harold Clark, Infantry, United States Army; Capt. Stanley K. Hornbeck, Ordnance Department, United States Army (chief of Far Eastern Division, American Commission to Negotiate Peace); Mr. William B. Poland, chief of the American Relief Commission for Belgium and Northern France; Prof. W. W. Cumberland, economic advisor to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace; Mr. Eliot Grinnell Mears, trade commissioner, Department of Commerce, with other officers, clerks, interpreters, etc.

The instructions to the mission were to—

Proceed without delay on a Government vessel to Constantinople, Batum, and such other places in Armenia, Russian Transcaucasia, and Syria, as will enable you to carry out instructions already discussed with you. It is desired that you investigate and report on political, military, geographical, administrative, economic, and other considerations involved in possible American interests and responsibilities in that region.

The mission proceeded by ship to Constantinople. From there it traveled by the Bagdad Railway to Adana, near the northeastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea, the scene of the massacres of 1909, and the principal city of the rich Province of Cilicia, where two days were spent visiting Tarsus and the ports of Ayas and Mersina; thence continued by rail via Aleppo to Mardin; from there by motor car to Diarbekir, Kharput, Malatia, Sivas, Erzinjan, Erzerum, Kars, Erivan, and Tiflis; thence by rail to Baku and Batum. Erivan, Tiflis, and Baku are the capitals, respectively, of the Republics of Armenia, Georgia, and Azarbaijan, and Batum is the seat of the British military government of the Georgian district of that name. Members of the mission also traveled by carriage from Ula-Kishla to Sivas; from Sivas to Samsun; visiting Marsovan, where there is much apprehension among the Armenian population at this time; from Trebizond to Erzerum; by horseback from Khorasan to Bayazid; from Erivan to Nakhichevan, near the Persian border. The Armenian Catholics, His Holiness Kevork V, was visited at Etchmiadzin, the historic seat of the Armenian Church, with its ancient cathedral, dated from 301 A. D. The mission traversed Asia Minor for its entire length and the Transcaucasus from north to south and east to west. All of the vilayets of Turkish Armenia were visited except Van and Bitlis, which were inaccessible in the time available, but which have been well covered by Capt. Niles, an Army officer, who inspected them on horseback in August, and whose report corroborates our observations in the neighboring regions; as well as both Provinces of the Armenian Republic and the Republics of Azarbaijan and Georgia. The Turkish frontier was paralleled from the Black Sea to Persia. On the return voyage from Batum the mission visited Samsun, the port of one of the world's great tobacco regions, and Trebizond, the latter a principal port on the south shore of the Black Sea, terminus of the ancient caravan route to Persia, of historic interest as the point where the Greek 10,000 reached the sea under Xenophon over 2,300 years ago.

The mission spent thirty days in Asia Minor and Transcaucasia, and interviewed at length representatives of every government exercising sovereignty in that region, as well as individual Turks, Armenians, Greeks, Kurds, Tartars, Georgians, Russians, Persians, Jews, Arabs, British, and French, including Americans for

some time domiciled in the country. It also gave consideration to the views of the various educational, religious and charitable organizations supported by America. In addition to this personal contact the mission before leaving Paris was in frequent conference with the various delegations to the peace conference from the regions visited. It has had before it numerous reports of the American Committee for Relief in the Near East, and Food Administration, and that of the mission of Mr. Benjamin B. Moore, sent by the peace conference to Transcaucasia, as well as the very complete library on the region, its geography, history and governments, loaned by the Librarian of Congress, the American Mission to Negotiate Peace, and others. It has listened to the personal experiences of many witnesses to the atrocities of 1915, and benefited by the views of many persons whose knowledge of the various peoples in the regions visited is that obtained by years spent among them.

The interest, the horror and sympathy of the civilized world are so centered on Armenia, and the purpose and work of this mission so focus on the blood-soaked region and its tragic remnant of a Christian population that this report should seem to fall naturally under the following heads: (a) History and present situation of the Armenian people; (b) the political situation and suggestions for readjustment; (c) the conditions and problems involved in a mandatory; (d) the considerations for and against the undertaking of a mandate.

The report is accordingly so presented.

THE HISTORY AND PRESENT SITUATION OF ARMENIAN PEOPLE

The Armenians were known to history under that name in the fifth century B. C., and since that period have lived in the region where their misfortunes find them today. Their country is the great rough tableland, from 3,000 to 8,000 feet above the level of the sea, of which Mount Ararat is the dominant peak. In ancient times it touched the Mediterranean, Caspian and Black Seas. In later days it has dwindled to about 140,000 square miles, an area about as large as Montana, without political identity, but existing in 1914 in two parts, the eastern belonging to Russia, which consisted of Kars and Erivan, and some portions of the present territory of Azarbaijan; the remainder being Turkish Armenia, comprised in the vilayets of Van, Bitlis, Erzerum, Diarbekir, Kharpout and Cilicia, though Armenians were scattered more or

less throughout the whole of Transcaucasia and Asia Minor. Armenia was an organized nation 1,000 years before there was one in Europe, except Greece and Rome. For over twelve of the twenty-five centuries of its history Armenia enjoyed independence within borders that shifted with the events of the times. Its last king, Leon VI, an exile from his own land, spent his last years in the effort to bring about an understanding between France and England, then in the struggle of the Hundred Years War, and actually presided at a peace conference near Boulogne in 1386, which brought about the understanding which led to the end of that war. Armenia was evangelized by Apostles fresh from the memory of our Lord as early as 33 A. D., and as a nation adopted Christianity and founded a national church in 301 A. D., which has outridden the storms of the centuries and is vital today. Armenia was the first nation to officially adopt Christianity, with all that act involved in a pagan world.

The first two centuries following the foundation of the church were a golden age of Armenian literature, witnessing the invention of an Armenian alphabet; the translation of the Bible into the vernacular; the thronging of Armenians to the great centers of learning at Athens, Rome and Alexandria; and the development of a flexible literary language, one of the great assets of national life.

By its geographical location on the great highway of invasion from east to west the ambitions of Persia, the Saracens and the rising tide of Islam, and the Crusades found Armenia the extreme frontier of Christianity in the East. Persians, Parthians, Saracens, Tartars, and Turks have exacted more martyrs from the Armenian church in proportion to its numbers than have been sacrificed by any other race. The last Armenian dynasty was overthrown by the Sultan of Egypt seventy-eight years before the fall of Constantinople to Mahomet II in 1453. From that time until today the story of their martyrdom is unbroken. In the Persian, the Roman, the Byzantine, the Armenian found Aryan kinsmen and tyranny was tempered with partial autonomy. Even the Saracen was a high racial type, and reciprocal adjustments had been possible. The Turk to whom they now fall prey was a raiding nomad from central Asia. His mainsprings of action were plunder, murder and enslavement; his methods the scimitar and the bowstring. The Crusades were long ended. Europe busy with her own renaissance contented herself with standing on the

defensive against the Moslem, and the eastern Christian was forgotten. For more than three centuries the Armenian people figure little in the history of the times, though at an earlier period sixteen Byzantine Emperors were of that race, and ruled the eastern Empire with distinction. Many individuals, and even colonies, however, played a part in distant lands. Europe, India and Persia welcomed them. They were translators, bankers, scholars, artisans, artists, and traders and even under their tyrannical masters filled posts which called for administrative ability, became ambassadors and ministers, and more than once saved a tottering throne. They carried on trades, conducted commerce and designed and constructed palaces. Nevertheless as a race they were forbidden military service, taxed to poverty, their property confiscated at pleasure and their women forced into the harems of the conqueror. Such slavery leaves some inevitable and unlovable traces upon the character, but in the main the Armenian preserved his religion, his language and his racial purity, persecution bringing cohesion.

Time, temperament, and talent eventually brought most of the industry, finance, commerce and much of the intellectual and administrative work of the Ottoman Empire into Armenian hands.

The progress of events in Europe brought about in the early nineteenth century a revival of interest in the forgotten Near East. As early as 1744 the treaty of Kainardje had placed Imperial Russia in the rôle of a protector of the Christians of the Near East, an attitude many times under suspicion by contemporary statesmen, but whatever its motives, the only genuine attempt by any European nation to afford such protection to helpless Armenia. A plebiscite in Russian Armenia, if fairly held, would probably vote a reconstituted Russia into a mandatory for that region.

With Armenian consciousness of their own capacity to trade, to administer and to govern in the name of others, there came in the last quarter of the nineteenth century the opportunity to throw their weight into the scale for the reform of Turkey from within, at a time when the dismemberment of Turkey was balanced in European politics against the possibility of her self-redemption. In 1876 a constitution for Turkey was drawn up by the Armenian Krikor Odian, secretary to Midhat Pasha, the reformer, and was proclaimed and almost immediately revoked by Sultan Abdul Hamid.

The foregoing inadequately sketches the story of the wrongs of Armenia down to our own times. From 1876 it is a story of massacre and of broken and violated guaranties.

The Russo-Turkish War ended in 1877 by the treaty of San Stefano, under which Russia was to occupy certain regions until actual reforms had taken place in Turkey. This treaty, through British jealousy of Russia, was torn up the following year and the futile treaty of Berlin substituted, asking protection but without guaranties. Meantime there had been the convention of Cyprus, by which that island passed to Great Britain, and the protection of Turkey was promised for the Armenians in return for Great Britain's agreement to come to the aid of Turkey against Russia. A collective note of the powers in 1880 was ignored by Turkey. Then followed the agreement of 1895, which was never carried out, and the restoration of the constitution of 1876 in 1908. A further agreement in 1914 was abrogated at the entrance of Turkey in the war—and the last of the series is a secret treaty of 1916 between Great Britain, France, and Russia, the existence and publication of which rest on bolshevik authority, by which Armenia was to be divided between Russia and France. Meanwhile there have been organized official massacres of the Armenians ordered every few years since Abdul Hamid ascended the throne. In 1895, 100,000 perished. At Van in 1908, and at Adana and elsewhere in Cilicia in 1909, over 30,000 were murdered. The last and greatest of these tragedies was in 1915. Conservative estimates place the number of Armenians in Asiatic Turkey in 1914 over 1,500,000, though some make it higher. Massacres and deportations were organized in the spring of 1915 under definite system, the soldiers going from town to town. The official reports of the Turkish Government show 1,100,000 as having been deported. Young men were first summoned to the government building in each village and then marched out and killed. The women, the old men and children were, after a few days, deported to what Talaat Pasha called "agricultural colonies," from the high, cool, breeze-swept plateau of Armenia to the malarial flats of the Euphrates and the burning sands of Syria and Arabia. The dead from this wholesale attempt on the race are variously estimated from 500,000 to more than a million, the usual figure being about 800,000.

Driven on foot under a fierce summer sun, robbed of their clothing and such petty articles as they carried, prodded by

bayonet if they lagged, starvation, typhus and dysentery left thousands dead by the trail side. The ration was a pound of bread every alternate day, which many did not receive, and later a small daily sprinkling of meal on the palm of the out-stretched hand was the only food. Many perished from thirst or were killed as they attempted to slake thirst at the crossing of running streams. Numbers were murdered by savage Kurds, against whom the Turkish soldiery afforded no protection. Little girls of nine or ten were sold to Kurdish brigands for a few piasters, and women were promiscuously violated. At Sivas an instance was related of a teacher in the Sivas Teachers' College, a gentle, refined Armenian girl, speaking English, knowing music, attractive by the standards of any land, who was given in enforced marriage to the beg of a neighboring Kurdish village, a filthy, ragged ruffian three times her age, with whom she still has to live, and by whom she has borne a child. In the orphanage there maintained under American relief auspices there were 150 "brides," being girls, many of them of tender age, who had been living as wives in Moslem homes and had been rescued. Of the female refugees among some 75,000 repatriated from Syria and Mesopotamia we were informed at Aleppo that forty per cent. are infected with venereal disease from the lives to which they have been forced. The women of this race were free from such diseases before the deportation. Mutilation, violation, torture and death have left their haunting memories in a hundred beautiful Armenian valleys, and the traveler in that region is seldom free from the evidence of this most colossal crime of all the ages. Yet immunity from it all might have been purchased for any Armenian girl or comely woman by abjuring her religion and turning Moslem. Surely no faith has ever been put to harder test or has been cherished at greater cost.

Even before the war the Armenians were far from being in the majority in the region claimed as Turkish Armenia, excepting in a few places. Today we doubt if they would be in the majority in a single community even when the last survivors of the massacres and deportations have returned to the soil, though the great losses of Turkish population to some extent offset the difference brought about by slaughter. We estimate that there are probably 270,000 Armenians today in Turkish Armenia. Some 75,000 have been repatriated from the Syrian and Mesopotamian side, others are slowly returning from other regions, and some

from one cause or another remained in the country. There are in the Transcaucasus probably 300,000 refugees from Turkish Armenia and some thousands more in other lands, for they have drifted to all parts of the Near East. The orphanages seen throughout Turkey and Russian Armenia testify to the loss of life among adults. They are Turkish as well as Armenian, and the mission has seen thousands of these pathetic little survivors of the unhappy years of the war. Reports from twenty stations in Turkey show 15,000 orphans receiving American aid, and undoubtedly the number demanding care is double this, for many were seen cared for under the auspices of the Red Crescent, the organization which in Moslem countries corresponds to our Red Cross. Twenty thousand are being cared for at the expense of the various relief agencies in the Transcaucasus. On the route traveled by the mission fully 50,000 orphans are today receiving government or other organized care. We estimate a total of perhaps half a million refugee Armenians as available to eventually begin life anew in a region about the size of New York, Pennsylvania and Ohio, to which would be added those not refugees who might return from other lands. The condition of the refugees seen in the Transcaucasus is pitiable to the last degree. They subsist on the charity of the American relief organizations, with some help, not great, however, from their more prosperous kinsmen domiciled in that region. Generally they wear the rags they have worn for four years. Eighty per cent. of them suffer from malaria, ten per cent. from venereal troubles and practically all from diseases that flourish on the frontiers of starvation. There are also the diseases that accompany filth, loathsome skin troubles and great numbers of sore eyes, the latter especially among the children. The hospitals are crowded with such cases.

The refugees in Russian Armenia have hitherto drifted from place to place, but an effort is now being made by the administration of Col. Haskell to concentrate them in several refugee camps. The winter season will see many deaths, for the winters there are extremely severe, fuel is scarce, and shelter inadequate. Medicines are scarce and very dear. Quinine costs approximately \$30 a pound. On the Turkish side of the border where Armenians have returned they are gradually recovering their property, and in some cases have received rent for it, but generally they find things in ruins, and face winter out of touch with the American

relief, and with only such desultory assistance as the Turkish Government can afford. Things are little if any better with the peasant Turks in the same region. They are practically serfs equally destitute, and equally defenseless against the winter. No doctors or medicines are to be had. Villages are in ruins, some having been destroyed when the Armenians fled or were deported; some during the Russian advance; some on the retreat of the Armenian irregulars and Russians after the fall of the empire. Not over twenty per cent. of the Turkish peasants who went to war have returned. The absence of men between the ages of twenty and thirty-five is very noticeable. Six hundred thousand Turkish soldiers died of typhus alone, it is stated, and insufficient hospital service and absolute poverty of supply greatly swelled the death lists.

In the region which witnessed the ebb and flow of the Russian and Turkish Armies the physical condition of the country is very deplorable. No crops have been raised for several years and the land ordinarily cultivated has gone to weeds. Scarcely a village or city exists which is not largely in ruins. The country is practically treeless.

Where the desperate character of the warfare, with its reprisals of burning and destroying as one side and then the other advanced, has not destroyed the buildings, which are generally of adobe, the wooden beams have been taken for fuel and the houses are ruined. In the territory untouched by war from which Armenians were deported the ruined villages are undoubtedly due to Turkish deviltry, but where Armenians advanced and retired with the Russians their retaliatory cruelties unquestionably rivaled the Turks in their inhumanity. The reconstruction of this country will be little short in difficulty of its original reclamation from virgin wilderness in days when the world was young.

Where the Russian went he built fine macadam highways, and even the main Turkish roads generally built during the war, over which our mission traveled, were passable, and some quite good. All highways are rapidly going to ruin for lack of maintenance. A country once fairly equipped for motor traffic is sliding back to dependence on the camel caravan, the diminutive pack donkey, and the rattly, ramshackly araba wagon. The ox is the principal draft animal. A good highway existed from Erzerum to Trebizond, on the line of the most ancient trade route in the world, that from Persia to the Black Sea, through which, in all ages, the carpets

and jewels of Persia have reached the western world. The distance is about 150 miles. The freight rate is now between \$145 and \$150 per ton.

In the portion of Turkey traversed we heard of brigandage, but experienced no inconvenience. Apparently the Turkish Government, inefficient and wicked as it sometimes is, can control its people, and does govern. In the region once policed by Russia the relaxation from its iron hand has been great, and life and property are unsafe in many regions. Our mission was fired upon by Kurds in Russian Armenia and several motor cars struck by bullets, and over half the party were kept prisoners one night by Moslems who claimed to have been driven from their villages by Armenians.

In Azarbaijan we were also fired upon. Train wrecks for robbery are frequent on the Transcaucasian Railroad, and the Georgian Government took the precaution to run pilot engines ahead of our train for safety. The highways are unsafe even to the suburbs of the large towns. Practically every man in Georgia and Azarbaijan, outside the cities, carries a rifle. If he desires to stop a traveler on the highway, he motions or calls to him, and if unheeded fires at him.

The relief work consists of the allotment made to the Transcaucasus from the unexpended balance of the hundred millions appropriated by Congress for relief in allied countries, and of the funds contributed through the American Committee for Relief in the Near East. All circumstances considered, the relief administration in the Transcaucasus seems to have been conducted with more than average energy. It has rescued the refugees there from starvation and brought the name of America to a height of sympathy and esteem it has never before enjoyed in this region. It extends now throughout the Near East, and is felt by the wild, ragged Kurd, the plausible Georgian, the suspicious Azarbaijan, the able Armenian, and the grave Turk with equal seriousness. With it, or probably because of it, there has come widespread knowledge of the fourteen points submitted by the President, and "self-determination" has been quoted to the mission by wild Arabs from Shamar and Basra, by every government in Transcaucasia, by the mountaineers of Daghestan, the dignified and able chiefs of the Turkish nationalist movement at Sivas and Erzerum, and the nomad Kurds who ten minutes before had fired at our party, thinking us to be Armenians. Undoubtedly

some charges of corruption on the part of native officials connected with the relief could be substantiated. Charges of partiality favoring Christian against Moslem in equal distress are not infrequent. Due to inexperience, to difficulties of communication, and other causes, there has been inefficiency on the part of American officials and employees. Enthusiastic young Americans out of touch with the sources of their funds, confronted with the horrors of famine in a refugee population, drew drafts on the good faith and generosity of their countrymen, procedure not usual in the business world, but drafts that were honored nevertheless. Any criticism of unbusinesslike methods must be accompanied with the statement of work accomplished, which has been very great and very creditable to America and her splendid citizens who have so generously contributed to this cause. Col. Haskell has reorganized the work in the Transcaucasus and is getting better results. In some way funds must be found and this work must be continued and the people be sustained until they can harvest a crop. If seed is available for planting, a crop should be due in August, 1920. Even this prospective amelioration only applies to those repossessed of their lands.

There is much to show that, left to themselves, the Turk and the Armenian when left without official instigation have hitherto been able to live together in peace. Their existence side by side on the same soil for five centuries unmistakably indicates their interdependence and mutual interest. The aged Vali of Erzerum, a man old in years and in official experience, informed us that in his youth, before massacres began under Abdul Hamid, the Turk and the Armenian lived in peace and confidence. The Turk making the pilgrimage to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina left his family and property with his Armenian neighbor; similarly the Armenian on the eve of a journey intrusted his treasures to his Turkish friend. Testimony is universal that the massacres have always been ordered from Constantinople. Some Turkish officials were pointed out to us by American missionaries as having refused to carry out the 1915 order for deportation. That order is universally attributed to the Committee of Union and Progress, of which Enver Bey, Talaat Bey, and Djemal Pasha were the leaders. A court has been sitting in the capital practically since the armistice, and one man, an unimportant subordinate, has been hung. Talaat, Enver and Djemal are at large, and a group of men charged with various crimes against the laws of war

are at Malta in custody of the British, unpunished, except as restrained from personal liberty. Various rumors place Enver Bey as scheming in the Transcaucasus, and a French officer is authority for the statement that he has been in Tiflis within two months conferring with government officials. This man is in Turkish eyes a heroic figure; risen from obscurity by his own efforts, allied by marriage to the Imperial House of Osman, credited with military ability, the possibilities of disturbance are very great should he appear in command of Moslem irregulars on the Azarbaijan-Armenian frontier.

Such are conditions today in the regions where the remnant of the Armenian people exist; roads and lands almost back to the wild; starvation only kept off by American relief; villages and towns in ruins; brigandage rampant in the Transcaucasus; lack of medicines and warm clothing; winter coming on in a treeless land without coal. We saw nothing to prove that the Armenians who have returned to their homes in Turkey are in danger of their lives, but their natural apprehension has been greatly increased by unbalanced advice given by officers on the withdrawal of foreign troops from certain regions. The events of Smyrna have undoubtedly cheapened every Christian life in Turkey, the landing of the Greeks there being looked upon by the Turks as deliberate violation by the Allies of the terms of their armistice and the probable forerunner of further unwarranted aggression. The moral responsibility for present unrest throughout Turkey is very heavy on foreign powers. Meantime, the Armenian, unarmed at the time of the deportations and massacres, a brave soldier by thousands in the armies of Russia, France, and America during the war, is still unarmed in a land where every man but himself carries a rifle.

THE POLITICAL SITUATION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR READJUSTMENT

In seeking a remedy for political conditions which shriek of misery, ruin, starvation, and all the melancholy aftermath, not only of honorable warfare but of bestial brutality, unrestrained by God or man, but which nevertheless prevail under an existing government with which the powers of Europe have long been willing to treat on terms of equality, one's first impulse is to inquire as to the possibility of reform from within. The machinery of government existing, can it be repaired and made a going concern, affording to its people the guarantees of life, liberty and the

pursuit of happiness which the modern world expects of its governments? The case of the Turkish Empire was duly presented to the peace conference in Paris on June 17 last by the Turkish grand vizier, Damad Ferid Pasha, in which he admitted for the Turkish Government of the unhappy region under consideration the commission of "misdeeds which are such as to make the conscience of mankind shudder with horror forever," and that "Asia Minor is today nothing but a vast heap of ruins." In the reply made by the council of ten of the peace conference to the plea of the grand vizier for the life of his empire, the probability of that government being able to accomplish reforms from within which will satisfy modern requirements and perhaps make amends for past crimes is well weighed in the following words:

Yet in all these changes there has been no case found, either in Europe or in Asia or in Africa, in which the establishment of Turkish rule in any country has not been followed by a diminution of prosperity in that country. Neither is there any case to be found in which the withdrawal of Turkish rule has not been followed by material prosperity and a rise in culture. Never among the Christians in Europe, nor among the Moslems in Syria, Arabia, or Africa, has the Turk done other than destroy wherever he has conquered. Never has he shown that he is able to develop in peace what he has gained in war. Not in this direction do his talents lie.

It seems likely, therefore, that, as far as the Armenians are concerned, the Turk has had his day, and that further uncontrolled opportunity will be denied him.

With the break-up of Russia, the Transcaucasus found itself adrift. This Transcaucasian region is ethnographically one of the most complicated in the world. In all ages it has been one of the great highways of mankind. Here stragglers and racial remnants have lodged during all the centuries that the tides of migration have swept the base of the great Caucasus Range until today its small area contains five great racial groups, divided into some forty distinct races. Nine of these have arrived in comparatively recent times, but the remaining thirty-one are more or less indigenous. There are here twenty-five purely Caucasian races. This racial diversity is complicated by the fact that with the exception of the fairly compact group of Georgians, and one of Tartars, these peoples are inextricably commingled throughout the region. Their civilization varies from the mountain savage to individuals of the highest types. Of the forty distinct races, the

most important groups are the Georgians, the Azarbaijanese Tartars, and the Armenians.


A Transcaucasian confederation formed by all the peoples in that region was followed by an alignment in three small Republics—Georgia, Azarbaijan, and Armenia. Georgia is Christian, and its Iberian population are in the majority; Azarbaijan is Tartar and Moslem; Armenia is made up of the former Provinces that composed Russian Armenia, less the part that went to Azarbaijan in the split, and the majority of its people are the blood brothers of the Armenians of Turkey in Asia. These Republics have been recognized by none of the powers except Turkey. The Armenian Republic seeks at the peace conference a union with the Turkish Armenians, and the creation of an Armenian State to include Russian Armenia and the six Turkish Vilayets—Van, Bitlis, Diarbekir, Kharput, Sivas, Erzerum—and Cilicia, to be governed by a mandatory of the great powers during a transition state of a term of years in which Armenians of the dispersion may return to their homes, and a constituent assembly be held to determine the form of the eventual permanent government. Georgia and Azarbaijan ask independence at the peace conference with certain adjustments of disputed boundaries in which all Transcaucasia is interested.

Both Georgia and Azarbaijan, living on the salvage from the wreck of Russia, have persuaded themselves that the civilization and governmental and business machinery they have taken over have been theirs from the beginning. The Georgians, with a church of their own antedating that of Russia, and traditions of a Georgian dynasty of Armenian origin which reigned in Tiflis for a thousand years before Russia took over the country in 1802, are a very proud and plausible race. They have been much influenced by the proximity of bolshevism, fly the red flag of revolution over their own, and have nationalized land, taking it from the original owners without compensation, to sell to peasants. This measure has been unsatisfactory to both peasant and proprietor. The Azarbaijanese are Tartars by blood and Moslem by religion and sympathy. The varied topography of their little country and the diversity of its products make them more independent of outside help than either of the other Transcaucasian Republics. Both Georgian and Azarbaijan Governments live in terror of the forces of Deniken coming south of the Caucasus Mountains. Georgia has her little army on her northern frontier; and Azarbaijan has

a tacit agreement with Gen. Deniken to refrain from hostilities against him in return for immunity from attack by his gunboats on the Caspian Sea.

The Russian Armenians are the blood brothers of those in Turkey, and came under Russian domination in 1878. They absorbed many Russian manners and customs, and the wealth and ability of the race gave them a predominant rôle in the Transcaucasus under Russia. Tiflis, which was the Russian capital, has probably the largest Armenian population of any city in the world except New York and Constantinople. They are friendly to Deniken and a reconstituted Russia, and their refusal to join Georgia and Azarbaijan against Deniken caused the break-up of the Transcaucasian Federation.

The dominant civilization in Transcaucasia is Russian. Everything worth while in the country is due to Russian money and Russian enterprise. Besides this common bond, these countries are interdependent in the matter of transportation. From Tiflis, the capital of Georgia, a railroad runs west to the Black Sea at Batum and east to the Caspian Sea at Baku, the capital of Azarbaijan, and south to Erivan, the capital of the Republic of Armenia. The road is one of system, of the Russian gauge, with the three radii from Tiflis, each ending in a different country, something like the following:



Under Russia the road was, of course, under one management, with shops, rolling stock and policy in common. Georgia now controls the shops, Azarbaijan the oil fuel, and each of the three such rolling stock as it can get. No one of the three trusts the others; no through or continuous traffic is possible without an outside power guaranteeing the return of the rolling stock when it passes from one jurisdiction to another. Georgia does not hesitate to embargo freight against Armenia, and from her position of vantage simply censors the railroad traffic to that unfortunate country. Azarbaijan controls the fuel supply and combines with Georgia against Armenia, which alone of the three has nothing by which to exert leverage. The railroad can neither be consolidated nor properly operated under native control. Roadbed and rolling stock are rapidly deteriorating. An example of the power of Georgia over Armenia is that the latter is not permitted to import either arms or ammunition, though under almost constant menace from its neighbors.

The three governments from an occidental standpoint are now thoroughly inefficient, without credit and undoubtedly corrupt. Alone each faces inextricable financial difficulties. Religious differences, added to racial, threaten to embroil them unless brought under a common control. Two of them have no outlet to the Black Sea except through Georgia over the railroad. They have no present intermonetary, postal or customs union, and, as stated, no definite agreement for common control and use of the railroad, and are in continual squabbles over boundaries. Azarbaijan has no educated class capable of well administering a government; Georgia is threatened by bolshevism; Armenia is in ruins and partial starvation. All our investigation brings conviction that the people in each would welcome a mandatory by a trustworthy outside power. Russian Armenia would today probably vote a mandate to Russia if that power were reconstituted. Georgia recalls its ancient independence and was never thoroughly reconciled to Russian rule. Azarbaijan, Tartar and Moslem feels a double tie to Turkey and distrusts the Christian, but the more intelligent people realize that outside control is inevitable and even necessary to their relations with Christian countries, and that Turkey is beyond consideration. So closely are the countries related geographically, commercially and by the habit of generations that this mission not only believes that a mandatory is necessary for them but that it is imperative from

the standpoints of peace, order, efficiency, and economy that the same power shall exercise a mandate over them all, leaving for the present their interior boundaries unsettled. The ultimate disposition or form of government of these States, other than that they may look forward to autonomy, but not necessarily independence, should, in our opinion, not now be announced. Their capacity for self-government and their ability to sustain amicable and workable relations among themselves remain to be tested under control by such power as may be induced to undertake its supervision, facing a long period of tutelage for possibly unappreciative and ungrateful pupils, much expense, probably diplomatic embarrassment from a reconstitution of Russia, and little reward except the consciousness of having contributed to the peace of the world and the rehabilitation of oppressed humanity.

The covenant of the League of Nations contemplates that "certain communities *formerly* belonging to the Turkish Empire" shall be subject to a mandatory power for an unstated period, thus appearing to recognize in advance the dismemberment to some degree of that Empire. [The italic is ours.] This, in connection with the arraignment of the Turkish Government in the reply of the peace conference, partly quoted on page 15 ante (see p. 29), may not unreasonably be construed to apply to any or all parts of the Turkish Empire as fast as they reach a certain stage of development. As between actual dismemberment and a receivership for his entire country, the Turk would beyond doubt prefer a mandatory for the whole Empire as it may stand after adjudication by the peace conference. Bad as he is, without the pale of consideration from many standpoints, there would seem to be no objection to action taken in his interest and in line with his preference if the interest and inclination of the world lie in the same direction.

A power which should undertake a mandatory for Armenia and Transcaucasia without control of the contiguous territory of Asia Minor—Anatolia—and of Constantinople, with its hinterland of Roumelia, would undertake it under most unfavorable and trying conditions, so difficult as to make the cost almost prohibitive, the maintenance of law and order and the security of life and property uncertain, and ultimate success extremely doubtful. With the Turkish Empire still freely controlling Constantinople, such a power would be practically emasculated as far as real power is concerned. For generations

these peoples have looked to Constantinople as the seat of authority. The most intelligent and ambitious Armenians have sought the capital as a career. The patriarch of the Armenian Church in Constantinople, although subordinate in matters of doctrine to the Catholicos at Etchmiadzin, is in reality the political head of the Armenian people by his location in Constantinople. Every people in the Empire is numerously represented at the capital, the Armenians reaching before the war the number of 150,000, with business connections ramifying to distant corners of the entire country. To no small degree the future business and industrial development of their native land will depend upon these men. Transportation lines and commerce center at Constantinople. Before the war Constantinople was the most important port in continental Europe, reckoned upon the basis of shipping clearances. There are well-informed business men who believe it is destined to become the third most important commercial city in the world. But, through generations of habit, unless put under a mandatory, Constantinople will continue to be a whirlpool of financial and political currents. Concession hunting, financial intrigue, political exploitation, and international rivalries will center there in the future as in the past. Concerted international action for administration of Constantinople is impracticable. All concerts for governmental action are cumbersome; all concerts must have a leader to secure effectiveness, and were it possible to agree upon one power which should really lead, the reality of a mandate would exist with the handicap of a camouflage concert. In any concert for the future government of Constantinople there would still exist the temptation for single powers to play politics and befriend Turkey for value received. There must be actual control, for responsibility without authority is worse than useless in a land of oriental viewpoints.

As Americans, supposed to be disinterested, this mission was the recipient of confidences from the various sources. Turks when not deriding foreign efforts were deploring their effect on their unfortunate Empire. Without dependable centralized control of Constantinople, a power exercising mandate in Armenia would be crippled in administration, restricted in trade development, ridden by concessionaires, dependent on Turkish discredited diplomacy for redress of local and boundary grievances, and in extreme case practically cut off from communication with the western world. It is believed that allied sentiment is so crys-

tallized in the opinion that Constantinople must be placed under a mandatory, that it may safely be assumed for the purposes of this report that this will be done.

Conceded that there shall be a mandate for Armenia and Transcaucasia and one for Constantinople and Anatolia, there are many considerations that indicate the desirability of having such mandates exercised by the same power. If separate powers exercised such mandate the inevitable jealousies, hatreds, exaggerated separatist tendencies, and economic difficulties would compel failure. With all its faults the Turkish Empire is an existing institution and it has some rusty blood-stained political machinery which under control of a strong mandatory can be made to function. The peoples in question live in adjacent territory and whether they wish it or not are neighbors. A single mandatory for the Turkish Empire and the Transcaucasus would be the most economical solution. No intelligent scheme for development of railroads for Transcaucasia and Armenia can be worked out without extension into Anatolia. Natural highways through the high mountains of Armenia are few, and transportation development will, with proper feeders, at best be costly and difficult; without access into Anatolia it will be impossible. For many years the expenses of exploitation will not be met by equivalent receipts. This situation would be alleviated by control of both regions. With Constantinople, Anatolia, and Armenia in different hands, the manufacturers and exporters of Armenia could not hope for an equal share in the commerce and trade of the Near East.

The Armenian Patriarch, the head of the Armenian Protestants, and others at Constantinople, on our return from Armenia, called and volunteered the belief that the Armenian question could not be settled within the boundaries of that country, and that they were prepared to pass under a single mandate which should include the other parts of the Turkish Empire. In a later written statement, however, they modified this, stating that while "Different nations of this Empire may enjoy the help of the same mandatory power" they felt that to bring Armenia under the same system of administration as that of the Turks would defeat the object of the development of Armenian ideals, "because by assuring the individual rights of a people the national rights and ideals of the same people can not necessarily be assured;" that "Giving a good government to the

whole Turkish Empire will not induce the Armenians to gather to their native land. They will still be a scattered people, etc."

A party of distinguished Turks, including a former cabinet minister of high standing and a diplomat who for eight years represented his country at one of the European courts, stated that as between the independence of Turkey as it existed in 1914, and a mandate for the Empire given to the United States they greatly preferred the latter, and believed that they spoke for the educated classes of all Turkey.

It has been very evident to this mission that Turkey would not object to a single disinterested power taking a mandate for her territory as outlined in the armistice with the Allies, and that it could be accomplished with a minimum of foreign soldiery, where an attempt to carve out territory for any particular region would mean a strong foreign force in constant occupation for many years. The aim of the Nationalist, or National Defense Party, as its adherents style it, as stated by Mustapha Kemal Pasha, its head, is the preservation of the territorial integrity of the Empire under a mandatory of a single disinterested power, preferably America.

The mission, while at Sivas, had a conference with the chiefs of this party, which held a congress at Erzerum in July and one at Sivas in September. This movement has been the cause of much apprehension on the part of those interested in the fate of the Armenians, to whose safety it has been supposed to portend danger. The leader, Mustapha Kemal Pasha, is a former general officer in the Turkish Army, who commanded with distinction an army corps at the Dardanelles, and appears to be a young man of force and keen intelligence. He is supposed to have resigned from the army to lead this movement. It sought, as a means to its end, the overthrow of the Ferid Pasha cabinet, which has since fallen, claiming that it was entirely under the influence of one of the great powers which itself desires a mandate for the Empire. While professing entire loyalty to the Sultan the Nationalist leader had gone to the extremity of cutting all official telegraph communications between the capital and the interior, pending the removal of the cabinet. The fall of the Damad Ferid Pasha ministry in October would seem to put the Empire behind the movement, for the Turkish officials in the interior were already identified with it. In a statement given out on October 15, Mustapha Kemal said:

The Nationalist Party recognized the necessity of the aid of an impartial foreign country. It is our aim to secure the development of Turkey as she stood at the armistice. We have no expansionist plans, but it is our conviction that Turkey can be made a rich and prosperous country if she can get a good government. Our government has become weakened through foreign interference and intrigues. After all our experience we are sure that America is the only country able to help us. We guarantee no new Turkish violences against the Armenians will take place.

The events of the Greek occupation of Smyrna and the uneasiness produced by the activities and propaganda of certain European powers have so stirred the Turkish people in the long interval since the armistice that the mission fears that an announcement from Paris at this time of an intention to carve from Turkey a State of Armenia, unless preceded by a strong military occupation of the whole Empire, might be the signal for massacres of Christians in every part of the country. There is no wisdom in now incorporating Turkish territory in a separate Armenia, no matter what the aspirations of the Armenians. Certainly it is unwise to invite trouble which may be avoided by the consolidation of the mandate region under a single power. Under one mandatory they will be neighbors. Under two or more they will be rivals, their small differences subjected to the interminable processes of diplomatic representation, with the maintenance of duplicate and parallel establishments in many lines of governmental activity. Only under a single mandatory can the matter of ultimate boundaries be deferred, which is believed by this mission to be important.

In the proposition to carve an independent Armenia from the Ottoman Empire there is something to be said on the part of the Turk; namely, that his people, even when all the refugees shall have returned to their homes, will be in the majority in the region contemplated for a reconstituted Armenia—and they were in the majority before the deportations took place—even though due, as it may be, to the gerrymandering of provincial boundaries and the partial extermination of a people. Notwithstanding his many estimable qualities, his culture, and his tenacity of race and religion, the Armenian generally does not endear himself to those of other races with whom he comes in contact. The Armenian stands among his neighbors very much as the Jew stands in Russia and Poland, having, as he does,

the strong and preeminent ability of that race. He incurs the penalty which attaches among backward races to the banker, the middleman, and the creditor. Unjust as it may be, the sentiment regarding him is expressed by this saying current in the Near East: "The Armenian is never legally in the wrong; never morally in the right." Even the American missionary, who in so many instances has risked his life for his Armenian charges, does not, as a rule, personally like the Armenian as well as he does the more genial but indolent and pleasure-loving Turk. The Armenian is not guiltless of blood himself; his memory is long, and reprisals are due and will doubtless be made if opportunity offers. Racially allied to the wild Aryan Kurd, he is cordially hated by the latter. Kurds appealed to this mission, with tears in their eyes, to protect them from Armenians who had driven them from their villages, appealing to be allowed to go back to their homes for protection against the rigorous winter now rapidly approaching on the high interior plateau. The Kurds claim that many of their people were massacred under the most cruel circumstances by Armenian irregulars accompanying the Russian Bolsheviks when the Russian Army went to pieces after the collapse of the Empire.

Similar claim is made by the people of Erzerum, who point to burned buildings in which hundreds of Turks perished, and by the authorities of Hassan-Kala, who give the number of villages destroyed by the Armenians in their great plain as forty-three. According to British Consul Stevens, at Batum, these statements were verified by a commission which examined into the allegations and on which Armenians had a representation. In Baku the massacre of 2,000 Azarbaijanese by Armenians in March, 1918, was followed by the killing of 4,000 Armenians by Azarbaijanese in November of the same year. From the standpoint of this mission the capacity of the Armenian to govern himself is something to be tested under supervision. With that still in doubt the possibility of an Armenian minority being given authority over a Moslem majority against whom its hearts are filled with rancor for centuries of tyranny, may well justify apprehension. There are very many who believe that the best elements of the Armenian race have perished. It is believed that with the reestablishment of order in their native country many of those who have emigrated to other countries will return. That, however, can only come with time, and even then it is doubted if many of the

wealthy and influential Armenians long domiciled in happier lands will return to their somewhat primitive ancient home, even though such absentees have raised their voices most loudly for an autonomous Armenia. Certainly with arbitrary boundaries on the Anatolia side determined only by Armenian wishes, expediency, tradition, or even verified historical claims of former occupation, without regard to the present population, the mandatory powers for both Anatolia and Armenia should inaugurate government by placing a cordon of trustworthy foreign soldiers from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. With a single power in control of both peoples and boundaries unannounced except as they have hitherto existed, such difficulties would not arise. Against such combination of authority and postponement of delimitation of boundaries is to be weighed the unchangeable belief of many that the Turk at the end of his tutelage will still be the Turk, bloodthirsty, unregenerate, and revengeful, and that it is unthinkable that Armenia shall ever again form part of a country which may be governed by him; that the sufferings of centuries should now be terminated by definite and permanent separation of Armenia from Turkey, and that this plan seems to contemplate a tutelage of indefinite length. To this the reply is that the Armenian should have no fear to submit his case to the League of Nations—the court of the world—and that he must in the meantime prove his capacity not only to govern himself but others, and that at the behest of the great powers a plebiscite could be had and the mandatory at any time be terminated by detachment of his territory from Anatolia as well as now and with much greater safety to him and convenience to his benefactors.

The conclusion of the American military mission to Armenia is that the remedy for the existing conditions in Armenia and the Transcaucasus is a mandatory control to be exercised by a single great power. The Armenian question can not be settled in Armenia. It can not be finally settled without answering two questions:

What is to be done with Turkey?

What is Russia going to do?

Pending the ultimate settlement of these questions the mission believes that, for reasons set forth, the power which takes a mandate for Armenia should also exercise a mandate for Anatolia, Roumelia, Constantinople, and Transcaucasia; the boundaries of

the Turkish vilayets of Armenia and Anatolia and the interior boundaries of Russian Armenia, Georgia and Azarbaijan to remain substantially as they are for the present. The divisions of such mandate are an administrative detail to be worked out by the mandatory power. Good administration indicates that there should be some intermediate authority between the Provinces and the capital. A natural subdivision of such a mandate as has been indicated would probably be: Roumelia, city of Constantinople (federal district), Anatolia, Armenia, district of Transcaucasia (less Russian Armenia).

The inclusion of the whole Turkish Empire under the government of a single mandatory would be simpler and proportionately more economical than to divide it. A plebiscite fairly taken would in all probability ask for an American mandate throughout the Empire. Syria and Mesopotamia, however, not being considered essential to the settlement of the Armenian question or as being the field for possible American responsibilities and interests in the Near East as contemplated in the instructions to the mission, because actually occupied by France and Great Britain at this time, have been considered by us as excluded from our considerations, as is for a similar reason Arabia. In its belief that the Armenian problem is only to be solved by a mandatory which should include also Constantinople, Anatolia, Turkish Armenia, and the Transcaucasus, the mission has the concurrence of many Americans whose views by reason of long residence in the Near East are entitled to great weight. Such Americans are practically a unit in believing that the problems of Armenia, Anatolia, Constantinople and Transcaucasia must be considered as an inseparable whole.

The mission has a strong conviction that the nation which may be induced by its colleagues to undertake this mandate should be one prepared to steadfastly carry out a continuity of policy for at least a generation, and to send only its most gifted sons to leadership in the work without regard to political affiliations. Only on the certainty of continuity of a nonpartisan policy would the best men forsake their careers in their own country to take up the burdens in these eastern lands. No disinterested nation would undertake such a mandatory except from a strong sense of altruism and international duty to the peace of the world in this breeding place of wars and at the unanimous wish of other parties to the covenant of the League of Nations.

No duty of modern times would be undertaken under so fierce a glare of publicity. Such nation would hold the center of the international stage with the spotlight from every foreign office and from every church steeple in the world focussed upon it. No nation could afford to fail, or to withdraw when once committed to this most serious and difficult problem growing out of the Great War. No nation incapable of united and nonpartisan action for a long period should undertake it.

THE CONDITIONS AND PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN A MANDATE FOR TURKEY AND TRANSCAUCASIA

This report has heretofore endeavored to consider the conditions and questions of which it treats in the abstract sense applicable to any nation which might be induced to assume the task of a practical regeneration of this region. Its interest for our country, however, lies in the possibility that the United States may be called upon by the world to undertake the task, and the necessity, therefore, of knowing what it would mean for America. The problems for the United States would not be identical with those of any other nation which might undertake it. A not too sympathetic Old World, without pretensions to altruism or too much devotion to ideals, will expect of America in the Near East the same lofty standards shown in Cuba and the Philippines—the development of peoples rather than of material resources and commerce. Distance, our time-honored detachment from the affairs of the Old World, our innocence from participation in the intrigues which have hitherto characterized intercourse with the Turk, our freedom from bias through the necessity of considering Moslem public opinion in other parts of the world, and the fact that we have no financial interest in the great foreign debt of the Ottoman Empire, give America a viewpoint and an advantage in approaching the situation that are enjoyed by no other great power.

A great part of the work of the mission has been devoted to a consideration of the situation as it would affect our own country should it be invited to assume a mandate in the Near East. The problem as a whole has been kept in mind while individual members of the mission have made special inquiry into different matters of which knowledge is necessary to reach an intelligent appreciation of the difficulties to be solved in this region. Each of these studies constitutes a unit on the subject with which it

deals, too important to justify the risk of an attempt at epitomizing for this report. They are therefore submitted as appendices, as follows:

A. Political Factors and Problems, by Capt. Stanley K. Hornbeck, Ordnance Department, United States Army.

B. Government in Turkey and Transcaucasia, by Lieut. Col. Jasper Y. Brinton, judge advocate, United States Army.

C. Public and Private Finance of Turkey and Transcaucasia, by Prof. W. W. Cumberland.

D. Commerce and Industry in Turkey and Transcaucasia, by Trade Commissioner Eliot Grinnell Mears.

E. Public Health and Sanitation, by Col. Henry Beeuwkes, Medical Corps, United States Army.

F. Population; Industrial and Other Qualities; Maintenance, by Lieut. Col. John Price Jackson, Engineers, United States Army.

G. Climate, Natural Resources, Animal Industry, and Agriculture, by Lieut. Col. E. Bowditch, Infantry, United States Army.

H. Geography, Mining, and Boundaries, by Maj. Lawrence Martin, General Staff, United States Army.

I. The Press of Turkey and Transcaucasia, by Maj. Harold W. Clark, Infantry, United States Army.

J. The Military Problem of a Mandatory, by Brig. Gen. George Van Horn Moseley, General Staff, United States Army.

K. Transport and Communications in Asia Minor and the Transcaucasus, by William B. Poland, engineer member of the mission.

L. Bibliography.

THE MILITARY PROBLEM

Our country has so recently sent its young manhood to war overseas and the heart of the Nation is so sensitive to any enterprise which calls for its sons to serve as soldiers in distant lands that the greatest interest attaches to the military problem involved in any mandate to which our people may ever give consideration.

The immediate problems which would lie before the Army and Navy of a mandatory power in Turkey and Transcaucasia are:

(a) The suppression of any disorder attendant upon withdrawal of occupying troops and the initiation of the government.

(b) The maintenance of order until a constabulary could be organized for the rural police of the mandatory region.

(c) To help organize and train a native constabulary.

(d) To constitute a reserve for moral effect, for possible actual use in supplementing the local constabulary in case of emergency,

and for the prestige of the mandatory government in a region which has been governed by force since the beginning of history.

The inauguration of a mandatory government would be followed at a very early date by the withdrawal of the foreign troops now occupying the region and by the dissolution as soon as practicable of the permanent military establishments now maintained by Turkey and Transcaucasia. The United States accepting the mandate at the request of the other great powers and of the peoples interested, no resistance to her troops would be anticipated. On the contrary, they would doubtless be welcomed. No problem of external defense of the country occupied would exist.

(a) The present occupying force of the regions now under consideration, Roumelia, Constantinople, Anatolia and Transcaucasia, excluding five Greek divisions occupying Smyrna, is the Army of the Black Sea and the troops in Cilicia, comprising about 50,000 of the British, French, Italian, and Greek Governments. The regular troops of Turkey and Transcaucasia to be disbanded in the same region at the convenience of the mandatory government aggregate about 92,000 men. The gendarmerie of Turkey amounts to about 30,000 men. The loss of man power in Turkey has been appalling, and too many men are still absent from work and carrying rifles.

It is not thought that any serious disorder would attend this substitution of the troops of the mandatory power for the army of occupation and for the native regular forces.

(b) During the formation of an efficient native constabulary, a period of six months to a year, small garrisons would have to be furnished along the railroads and in isolated towns, especially on the old frontiers, where feeling runs high between races. This would give security while the various nationals are being repatriated, reconstructing their homes, and adjusting themselves to new conditions. The suppression of outlaw bands, which already exist in some localities, and the formation of which in eastern countries invariably follows the disbandment of armies after a long war, would call for constant use of a certain number of United States troops pending the completion of the constabulary organization for service. During this period the disarmament of the civilian population would be accomplished.

(c) The first duty of a mandatory would be to guarantee the safety of life and property through the country, and to this end

its earliest efforts should be directed to the establishment of a native rural police or constabulary for the suppression of brigandage, outlawry, and other crimes outside the towns. This force, with a military organization, should be a force of peace officers as that term is used in our own country, empowered to make arrests of criminals of all kinds, serve warrants, execute orders of arrest, etc. While decentralized in its administration, and destined eventually to operate in small bodies, it should be a Federal force, cooperating with but not serving under provincial officials. Its personnel should absorb the best elements of the present gendarmerie, and also provide suitable employment for deserving officers of the disbanded armies. For a considerable period its highest officers would necessarily be Americans, but as fast as the quality of the native officers justifies, the force should become native. The strength of the constabulary should be such as to enable it to take over the whole task of maintaining order outside the towns and release American troops at the earliest practicable date. Coincident with the organization of the constabulary would be the creation of efficient municipal police.

(d) Considering the uncertain character of the neighboring populations, the traditional lawlessness of migratory Kurds and Arabs, and the isolation of certain regions where the temptation to reprisals for past wrongs will be strong for at least a generation, a certain force must be kept in hand to supplement the native constabulary when needed. Such a force will also be necessary for general moral effect. Its mere existence will prevent organized disorder on a scale too large for a peace force to handle. Such a force would be stationed near the capital, trained for quick expeditionary work, and sent where needed.

The character of the troops should be suited to the purpose for which used. For expeditionary purposes, marines or infantry with artillery would be best. For moral effect in the interior and during the period of constabulary organization, cavalry would be preferable. A small efficient air service should be maintained. The aeroplane is not only a means of very rapid communication, but its value for dealing with a distant small problem among half-wild tribes cannot be overestimated. The country much resembles Mexico, and the conditions would be not unlike our border cavalry service. A regiment of railway engineers would be a necessity. During the initial period of the mandatory, troops

would be needed in connection with the general problem of sanitation and cleaning up, and an extra proportion of sanitary troops would be necessary.

Estimates of the necessary number of mandatory troops vary greatly—from 25,000 to 200,000. Conditions change so rapidly that plans made today for the use of troops might be obsolete in six months. Uncertainty as to the time the mandate will be tendered and accepted make estimates merely approximate. Under conditions as they exist today the undersigned believes that a force of two American divisions, with several hundred extra officers, or a total force of 59,000, would be ample. Such force would be specially organized; one aeroplane squadron; a minimum of artillery; not to exceed one regiment of 75's motorized; a minimum of the special services; four times the usual number of sanitary troops; four regiments of cavalry, with minor changes in organization at the discretion of the senior general officer on duty with the mandatory government. This force should be substantially reduced at the end of two years, and by fifty per cent. at the end of the third year. After that some further reduction could be slowly effected, but the irreducible minimum would be reached at about the strength of one division.

The annual cost for the force of the Army above stated would be at the maximum:

For the first year	\$88,500,000
At the end of two years perhaps	59,000,000
At the end of three years	44,250,000

with thereafter a continuing appropriation of that sum less such amount as the local revenues could afford, probably a very substantial fraction of the cost.

To offset our expenditures there would be available at least a part of the naval and military budget hitherto used for the support of the disbanded armies in the region. In Turkey before the war this totaled about \$61,000,000 annually for the Army, including \$5,000,000 for the Navy.

The Naval Establishment should consist of a station ship for the capital, and probably one each for Smyrna, Mersina, Batum, and Baku, to meet local needs in quick transportation of troops. A transport of light draft capable of carrying a complete regiment should be permanently on station at the capital. Four to six destroyers would be needed for communication and moral effect.

Collier, repair and hospital service afloat should be in proportion. Old ships of obsolete type would probably answer for all except the station ship at the capital and the destroyers. Some ships of the Turkish Navy, of which there are over thirty, could doubtless be used with American crews soon to be replaced by natives.

The Naval Establishment might not entail any additional Federal appropriations. Ships and personnel could probably be drawn from existing establishment; the only additional expense would probably be the difference in cost of maintenance in near eastern and home waters.

It is very important that a proper military and naval setting be given the mandatory government at the beginning. In no part of the world is prestige so important, and in no region have people been so continuously governed by force. The mandatory could at the outset afford to take no unnecessary risks among such a population in densest ignorance as to our resources and our national traits.

CONCLUSIONS

This mission has had constantly in mind the moral effect to be exercised by its inquiry in the region visited. Very alarming reports had been received from Transcaucasia for several months before its departure from France, particularly as to organized attacks by the Turkish Army impending along the old international border between Turkey and Russia. The itinerary of the mission through Turkey was planned with those reports before it and with the intention of observing as to their truth and, if possible, to exert a restraining influence. We practically covered the frontier of Turkey from the Black Sea to Persia, and found nothing to justify the reports. The Turkish Army is not massed along the border; their organizations are reduced to skeletons, and the country shows an appalling lack of people, either military or civilian. At every principal town through which we passed the chief of the mission held a conference with the Turkish officials. Inquiry was made as to the Christian community, some were always interviewed; the interest of America in its own missionaries and in the native Christians was invariably emphasized; the Armenian deportations, the massacres and the return of the survivors were discussed on each occasion, as well as other matters intended to convince Turkish officials that their country is on trial before the world. The visit of the mission has had a

considerable moral effect in securing the safety of Christian lives and property pending action by the peace conference.

We would again point out that if America accepts a mandate for the region visited by this mission it will undoubtedly do so from a strong sense of international duty, and at the unanimous desire—so expressed at least—of its colleagues in the League of Nations. Accepting this difficult task without previously securing the assurance of conditions would be fatal to success. The United States should make its own conditions as a preliminary to consideration of the subject—certainly before and not after acceptance, for there are a multitude of interests that will conflict with what any American would consider a proper administration of the country. Every possible precaution against international complications should be taken in advance. In our opinion, there should be specific pledges in terms of formal agreements with France and England and definite approval from Germany and Russia of the dispositions made of Turkey and Transcaucasia, and a pledge to respect them.

Of particular importance are the following:

Absolute control of the foreign relations of the Turkish Empire, no ambassador, envoy, minister or diplomatic agent to be accredited to Turkey, and the latter to send none such abroad.

Concessions involving exclusive privileges to be subject to review if shown to be contrary to the best interests of the State.

Concessions undesirable from the standpoint of the mandatory upon which work has not been started to be canceled. Compensation to be allowed to holders when necessary.

The system by which specified revenues are assigned for particular purposes to be discarded. All revenues to be controlled by the treasury, and all creditors to look only to the treasury as the source of payment.

Foreign control over Turkey's financial machinery to cease, meaning the dissolution of the council of administration of the Ottoman public debt, reserving the right to retain some individual members of the council as advisers because of their familiarity with Ottoman finances.

All foreign obligations of the Empire to be unified and refunded.

Those countries receiving territory of the Turkish Empire, *e. g.*, Syria and Mesopotamia, to assume their reasonable share of the paper currency, of the foreign obligations and of obligation for possible reparation payments.

Abrogation, on due notice, of existing commercial treaties with Turkey.

All foreign governments and troops to vacate territorial limits of mandate at dates to be fixed by the mandatory power.

Consent to many of these measures would not easily be obtained. Many nations now have some sort of financial control within the Ottoman Empire, and they would not see this control taken away without protest.

It needs no argument, however, to show that the United States could not submit to having her financial policies controlled from foreign capitals. The refunding of the debt, possibly with a reduction of the capital amount, would raise a storm of protest, but it should be insisted upon. Otherwise an American administration would be embarrassed and run the risk of being discredited.

The mission has not felt that it is expected to submit a recommendation as to the United States accepting a mandate in the Near East. It, therefore, simply submits the following summary of reasons for and against such action, based on all information obtainable during six weeks' constant contact with the peoples of the region:

Reasons for

1. As one of the chief contributors to the formation of the League of Nations, the United States is morally bound to accept the obligations and responsibilities of a mandatory power.

2. The insurance of world peace at the world's crossways, the focus of war infection since the beginning of history.

Reasons against

1. The United States has prior and nearer foreign obligations, and ample responsibilities with domestic problems growing out of the war.

2. This region has been a battle ground of militarism and imperialism for centuries. There is every likelihood that ambitious nations will still maneuver for its control. It would weaken our position relative to Monroe doctrine and probably eventually involve us with a reconstituted Russia. The taking of a mandate in this region would bring the United States into the politics of the Old World, contrary to our traditional policy of keeping free of affairs in the Eastern Hemisphere.

Reasons for—Continued

3. The Near East presents the greatest humanitarian opportunity of the age—a duty for which the United States is better fitted than any other—as witness Cuba, Porto Rico, Philippines, Hawaii, Panama, and our altruistic policy of developing peoples rather than material resources alone.

4. America is practically the unanimous choice and fervent hope of all the peoples involved.

5. America is already spending millions to save starving peoples in Turkey and Transcaucasia and could do this with much more efficiency if in control. Whoever becomes mandatory for these regions we shall be still expected to finance their relief, and will probably eventually furnish the capital for material development.

6. America is the only hope of the Armenians. They consider but one other nation, Great Britain, which they fear would sacrifice their interests to Moslem public opinion as long as she controls hundreds of millions of that faith. Others fear Britain's imperialistic policy and her habit of staying where she hoists her flag.

For a mandatory America is not only the first choice of all the peoples of the Near East but of each of the great powers, after itself.

American power is adequate;

Reasons against—Continued

3. Humanitarianism should begin at home. There is a sufficient number of difficult situations which call for our action within the well-recognized spheres of American influence.

4. The United States has in no way contributed to and is not responsible for the conditions, political, social, or economic, that prevail in this region. It will be entirely consistent to decline the invitation.

5. American philanthropy and charity are world-wide. Such policy would commit us to a policy of meddling or draw upon our philanthropy to the point of exhaustion.

6. Other powers, particularly Great Britain and Russia, have shown continued interest in the welfare of Armenia. Great Britain is fitted by experience and government, has great resources in money and trained personnel, and though she might not be as sympathetic to Armenian aspirations, her rule would guarantee security and justice.

The United States is not capable of sustaining a continuity of foreign policy. One Congress can not bind another. Even treaties can be nullified by cutting off appropriations. Nonpartisanship

Reasons for—Continued

its record clean; its motives above suspicion.

7. The mandatory would be self-supporting after an initial period of not to exceed five years. The building of railroads would offer opportunities to our capital. There would be great trade advantages not only in the mandatory region but in the proximity to Russia, Roumania, etc.

America would clean this hot-bed of disease and filth as she has in Cuba and Panama.

8. Intervention would be a liberal education for our people in world politics; give outlet to a vast amount of spirit and energy and would furnish a shining example.

9. It would definitely stop further massacres of Armenians and other Christians, give justice to the Turks, Kurds, Greeks, and other peoples.

Reasons against—Continued

is difficult to attain in our Government.

7. Our country would be put to great expense, involving probably an increase of the Army and Navy. Large numbers of Americans would serve in a country of loathsome and dangerous diseases. It is questionable if railroads could for many years pay interest on investments in their very difficult construction. Capital for railways would not go there except on Government guaranty.

The effort and money spent would get us more trade in nearer lands than we could hope for in Russia and Roumania.

Proximity and competition would increase the possibility of our becoming involved in conflict with the policies and ambitions of States which now our friends would be made our rivals.

8. Our spirit and energy can find scope in domestic enterprises, or in lands south and west of ours. Intervention in the Near East would rob us of the strategic advantage enjoyed through the Atlantic, which rolls between us and probable foes. Our reputation for fair dealing might be impaired. Efficient supervision of a mandate at such distance would be difficult or impossible. We do not need or wish further education in world politics.

9. Peace and justice would be equally assured under any other of the great powers.

Reasons for—Continued

10. It would increase the strength and prestige of the United States abroad and inspire interest at home in the regeneration of the Near East.

11. America has strong sentimental interests in the region—our missions and colleges.

12. If the United States does not take responsibility in this region, it is likely that international jealousies will result in a continuance of the unspeakable misrule of the Turk.

13. "And the Lord said unto Cain, 'Where is Abel, thy brother?' And he said, 'I know not; am I my brother's keeper?'"

Better millions for a mandate than billions for future wars.

Reasons against—Continued

10. It would weaken and dissipate our strength, which should be reserved for future responsibilities on the American continents and in the Far East. Our line of communication to Constantinople would be at the mercy of other naval powers, and especially of Great Britain, with Gibraltar and Malta, etc., on the route.

11. These institutions have been respected even by the Turks throughout the war and the massacres; and sympathy and respect would be shown by any other mandatory.

12. The peace conference has definitely informed the Turkish Government that it may expect to go under a mandate. It is not conceivable that the League of Nations would permit further uncontrolled rule by that thoroughly discredited Government.

13. The first duty of America is to its own people and its nearer neighbors.

Our country would be involved in this adventure for at least a generation, and in counting the cost Congress must be prepared to advance some such sums, less such amount as the Turkish and Transcaucasian revenues could afford, for the first five years, as follows:

FIRST YEAR

General govern-	
ment	\$100,000,000
Communications,	
railroads, etc. . .	20,000,000

*Reasons for—Continued**Reasons against—Continued*

Relief, repatria- tion, education, etc.	50,000,000
Army and Navy	88,500,000
Sanitation	17,000,000
	<hr/>
Total	<u>275,500,000</u>

SECOND YEAR

General govern- ment	75,000,000
Communications, railroads, etc.	20,000,000
Relief, education, etc.	13,000,000
Army and Navy	59,000,000
Sanitation, etc.	7,264,000
	<hr/>
Total	<u>174,264,000</u>

THIRD YEAR

General govern- ment	50,000,000
Communications, railroads, etc.	20,000,000
Relief, education, etc.	4,500,000
Army and Navy	44,250,000
Sanitation, etc.	5,000,000
	<hr/>
Total	<u>123,750,000</u>

FOURTH YEAR

General govern- ment	\$25,000,000
Communications, railroads, etc.	20,000,000
Relief, education, etc.	4,500,000
Army and Navy	44,250,000
Sanitation, etc.	3,000,000
	<hr/>
Total	<u>96,750,000</u>

*Reasons for—Continued**Reasons against—Continued*

FIFTH YEAR

General govern- ment	15,000,000
Communications, railroads, etc. .	20,000,000
Relief, education, etc.	4,500,000
Army and Navy .	44,250,000
Sanitation, etc. .	2,000,000

Total 85,750,000

Total first year .	275,500,000
Total second year .	174,264,000
Total third year .	123,750,000
Total fourth year .	96,750,000
Total fifth year .	85,750,000

Grand total . 756,014,000

14. Here is a man's job that the world says can be better done by America than by any other. America can afford the money; she has the men; no duty to her own people would suffer; her traditional policy of isolation did not keep her from successful participation in the Great War. Shall it be said that our country lacks the courage to take up new and difficult duties?

Without visiting the Near East it is not possible for an American to realize even faintly the respect, faith and affection with which our country is regarded throughout that region. Whether it is the world-wide reputation which we enjoy for fair dealing, a tribute perhaps to the crusading spirit which carried us into the Great War, not untinged with hope that the same spirit may urge us into the solution of great problems growing out of that conflict, or whether due to unselfish and impartial missionary and educational influence exerted for a century, it is the one faith which is held alike by Christian and Moslem, by Jew and Gentile, by prince and peasant in the Near East. It is very gratifying to the

pride of Americans far from home. But it brings with it the heavy responsibility of deciding great questions with a seriousness worthy of such faith. Burdens that might be assumed on the appeal of such sentiment would have to be carried for not less than a generation under circumstances so trying that we might easily forfeit the faith of the world. If we refuse to assume it, for no matter what reasons satisfactory to ourselves, we shall be considered by many millions of people as having left unfinished the task for which we entered the war, and as having betrayed their hopes.

Respectfully submitted.

JAMES G. HARBORD

Major General, United States Army, Chief of Mission

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I

Supplementary message of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly concerning the Accession of Switzerland to the League of Nations, February 17, 1920.¹

The Federal Council has already informed the Federal Assembly of the unexpected phase upon which the question of the accession of Switzerland to the League of Nations had entered after the Chambers had passed the Resolution of November 21, 1919. The history of this phase is contained in the official declaration which the President of the Confederation, acting in the name of the Federal Council, read before the National Council and before the Council of the States in their sessions of February 3. We reproduce this declaration here, to which we have nothing to add concerning what took place up to the date mentioned, February 3. We publish, in the form of an annex to this message, the diplomatic documents to which the declaration alludes or to which it is related. The examination of these documents will furnish the Federal Assembly with the most complete and most exact picture possible of all the negotiations which took place, both at Paris, before the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers, and at London before the Council of the League of Nations.

These documents are as follows:

1. The Federal Resolution of November 21, 1919;
2. The Memorandum of the Federal Council, dated December 6, 1919;
3. The Note of the Supreme Council, dated January 2, 1920;

¹In the use of italics the editors have followed the original document.

4. The Memorandum of the Federal Council of January 13, 1920;
5. The Note of the Conference of Ambassadors at Paris, sent in the name of the Supreme Council, dated January 26, 1920;
6. The new Note of the Federal Council addressed to the Powers represented on the Council of the League of Nations, dated January 30, 1920.

The following is the text of the declaration made to the Chambers by the President of the Confederation on February 3, 1920:

"The question which concerns *the accession of Switzerland to the League of Nations* entered upon a new phase at the beginning of this year. The Federal Council, convinced that the policy of a democratic country ought to be inspired by complete frankness, has been anxious to inform public opinion, by means of official communications as exact and as complete as possible, of all the facts which have a bearing on this new phase. It knows that the Swiss people are following these facts with the closest attention and passionate interest. The assembling of Parliament in special session would offer the representatives of the people a natural and legitimate occasion to ask for explanations from the federal government. The government considers it to be its duty to forestall any interpellation and *of its own accord* to furnish to the Chambers the information and the enlightenment which they might be led to demand from it. The Federal Council has also charged its president to explain to you, in an official declaration, *the exact nature of the situation*. This declaration cannot point out to you any new facts; it simply aims to make clear the line of conduct which has been followed so far by the Federal Council, and to define its intentions for the future.

By its resolution of November 21, 1919, the Federal Assembly authorized the Federal Council to declare, at an opportune time, the accession of Switzerland to the Covenant establishing the League of Nations, which was adopted by the Peace

Conference. At the same time it decreed that the resolution should be submitted to the vote of the people and the cantons, but it specified that such a vote could not take place until all the five Great Powers should have ratified the League Covenant.

Article I of the Covenant provides that the original members of the League of Nations shall be, among others, the States named in the annex to the Covenant which shall have acceded to the same without any reservations by means of a declaration deposited with the secretariat within two months from the coming into force of the Covenant and notification whereof shall have been made to the other members of the League.

It was to be expected that it would be difficult and even impossible for Switzerland to organize the popular vote within the time limit fixed by Article I of the Covenant. The difficulty became a physical and political impossibility on the supposition that the condition of the accession of all the Great Powers to the League were not fulfilled before the expiration of the time limit of two months. This supposition has become a reality; while the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan have definitely adhered to the Covenant, the United States has not yet declared itself. *The Covenant went into effect on January 10; notification of this fact was made the same day to all the States invited as original members; it would seem then that the time limit should expire March 10; however, during the first days of February, there is still uncertainty as to the intentions of the United States.*

The Committee of the National Council had had in some way a premonition of these possible or probable complications and had suggested that the Federal Council find out, by means of an inquiry addressed to the competent authorities, whether, in case the declaration of accession to the League of Nations be made within the time limit of two months, Switzerland would preserve the status and the advantages of an original member even in the contingency that circumstances should oblige her to decree the popular vote outside of the time limit.

The Federal Council followed this suggestion and sent to the Powers which would become parties to the League of Nations *a memorandum dated December 6, 1919*. This memorandum stated the question and proposed, in advance, to solve it in a manner conformable to the interests of Switzerland; for the sake of clearness it was accompanied by the text of the Federal Resolution of November 21, as an annex. The *memorandum referred exclusively to the question of the time limit; it did not raise either directly or indirectly the questions pertaining to the perpetual neutrality of the State*; these questions seemed to us to be solved by the genesis, the purport and the literal text of Article 435 of the Treaty of Versailles.

The Government of the French Republic had the kindness to inform the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers of the question which formed the subject of the memorandum. The Supreme Council replied to us in a note dated January 2. The text of the note as well as the text of the memorandum are well known; they have been published by us; it will therefore be sufficient to summarize the contents of the document emanating from the Supreme Council. This document touches *upon two distinct questions: upon the question of the time limit, which the Federal Council had propounded, and upon the question of neutrality, which the Federal Council considered solved and which it had, consequently, not propounded*. The document, furthermore, makes explanations concerning the date and the coming into force of the Covenant.

As regards the time limit, the Supreme Council observes that the declaration of accession should be presented without reservations within the two months following the coming into force of the Covenant, and remarks that a declaration subordinated to the result of a *referendum* could not be considered as an accession without reservations.

As regards perpetual neutrality, the Supreme Council gives no advice and confines itself to reserving examination of the question.

Placed in this situation, the Federal Council could not keep silent. Its urgent duty was to speak and to explain itself. It did

so by means of a *memorandum* dated January 13 and by the sending of a special mission to Paris. The tenor of the memorandum has been made public; the mission was entrusted to M. Gustave Ador, former president of the Confederation, and to Professor Max Huber, Counselor to the Department of Foreign Affairs.

The memorandum treats briefly all the points which were raised directly or indirectly in the note of the Supreme Council.

The point concerning the date of the Covenant could not furnish material for discussion. The Federal Assembly and the Federal Council had chosen the date of April 28, 1919; the Supreme Council specifies that the date of the Covenant is the date of the Treaty of Peace, that is to say, June 28, 1919; the point is settled.

The point concerning the moment of the coming into force of the Covenant could also not give occasion for a real difference of opinion; it is indisputable that, according to the final provision of the Treaty of Peace, the Covenant, which forms the first part of that treaty, comes into force with the treaty itself, that is to say, as soon as three of the Great Powers have ratified it; but it is no less incontestable that the Covenant creates, as one of the principal organs of the League, a Council upon which are represented the five Great Powers and four other Powers, and that, consequently, as long as the Council does not include all the Powers which are called into it, the Covenant will lack, from the point of view of the definitive organization of the League of Nations, an essential organic condition. No one could fail to notice that the absence of the United States constitutes an important fact, in its juridical as well as in its political aspect.

There remain the other two points; *whereas, in the question of the time limit*, it is a matter of views which apparently contradict each other and which it must be attempted to harmonize, in the common interest, *in the question of neutrality it is not a matter of contradictory opinions, but of points to be determined, to be defined and emphasized.* Switzerland is the only state in the world which, in order to obey the spirit and the

exigencies of its democratic institutions, must have recourse to a vote of the people. This confirmation seems to us to have a decisive value. *The popular vote differs profoundly from the parliamentary vote.* It presupposes problems clearly and definitely put, without the possibility of equivocation or misunderstanding. *It should avoid even semi-obscurities; it needs the full light.* Therein consists all its beauty and all its moral value. *Moreover, a popular vote demands a prolonged and intense propaganda,* with time limits which are not too short and with discussions conducted in public assemblies and in the press. These are the reasons which the Federal Council indicated briefly and which we hope will inspire in the competent authorities a solution in harmony with the interests at stake. *Ultra posse nemo tenetur.*

The question of our perpetual neutrality was raised by the Federal Council, with complete frankness, at the earliest disclosure of the projects which resulted in the creation of the League of Nations. *The Swiss point of view was first explained in a memorandum of February 4, 1919.* This memorandum, addressed to the Peace Conference, explained the necessity and the reasons for our century-old neutrality and indicated the part which ought to be reserved for it in the future. *The problem was taken up more in detail in the message of August 4.* The delegates of the Federal Council, who were at Paris in the month of April, 1919, demonstrated to several members of the Peace Conference the possibility of reconciling our perpetual neutrality with our duties of international solidarity. *Article 435 of the Treaty of Peace, negotiated with France in the meantime, solved the question.* This article recognizes our perpetual neutrality and places it in the category of international engagements for the maintenance of peace which Article 21 of the League Covenant expressly considers as not being incompatible with any provision of the Covenant. Of course the question under consideration is our military neutrality. The essential facts of this neutrality are the following: (1) Switzerland does not participate militarily in any war, not even those provided for in Article 16 of the Covenant; (2) Switzerland

is inviolable; she is ready for any sacrifice in order to defend the inviolability of her territory; (3) Switzerland could not allow any passage of troops or any preparation of military enterprises upon her soil.

If there should remain any uncertainty or doubt concerning the extent and the significance of our military neutrality, our people would be justly disturbed, and would refuse by an immense majority, without any distinction of regions or languages, to exchange the traditional neutrality for a new neutrality, inconsistent, uncertain, or ill-defined.

On January 21, at Paris, the delegates of the Federal Council explained the demands of the Federal Council before the Supreme Council, in conformity with written instructions which they had received. The Supreme Council was on the eve of dissolution. It listened to our delegates with the greatest attention and the greatest good will. It devolved upon the Conference of Ambassadors, presided over by M. Alexandre Millerand, the new French Prime Minister, to reply, in the name of the Supreme Council, by means of a note dated January 26. This note was also published. *It does not constitute, far from it, a disappointment for the Federal Council;* it proclaims in a very categorical manner that the representatives of the Powers, among whom figure personally the heads of the British, French and Italian governments, *are unanimous in considering that the signatory Powers of the Treaty of Paris are and remain bound by Article 435 of that Treaty.* The note adds, however, that the observations formulated by the Federal Council in its memorandum and through its delegates could not receive a definitive reply except from the Council of the League of Nations.

This reply was by no means unexpected. *The Federal Council knew that the question of competence was doubtful. It has now been decided in favor of the Council of the League of Nations.* The latter has been convoked at London for a session which will probably last from February 11 to February 13. Through the intermediary of the General Secretariat of the League, we have asked the Council to be good enough to inscribe upon the

order of the day of its session the questions which interest Switzerland. At the same time, in a short note addressed to the Powers represented upon the Council, we have insisted upon the necessity of *recognizing in Switzerland a special juridical status justified by her unique and exceptional situation.*

MM. Ador and Huber will go to London to defend our interests there in fresh negotiations. The ardent hopes of all patriots will go with them. *The mission entrusted to them is of extreme importance; it involves the future destiny, the international situation, and the position of Switzerland in the world.* We have confidence *in the friendship* which has so often been shown us by all the Powers represented upon the Council of the League of Nations; we rely on the *justice of our cause*; we also allow ourselves to think that it is not a matter of indifference to any one, but especially not to those who, like ourselves, attach so great an importance to the creation of a new international order, whether the old Swiss democracy, *whose whole spirit is inclined toward right, justice and peace among men*, sees the door, which gives access to the League of Nations, opened or closed to it.

The Federal Assembly would seem to us well advised if it should abstain from any discussion as long as we have not determined the results of the negotiations about to be opened in the British metropolis. As soon as these negotiations have been completed, we will render an account thereof, either to the Federal Assembly if it is still in session, or to public opinion. *If at that time the United States has not yet passed an act of accession to the League of Nations, we shall not declare the accession of Switzerland without having given the Federal Assembly an opportunity to express itself, in a special session if need be.* We consider ourselves bound in this matter both by the declarations already made by the Federal Council here and in the parliamentary commissions in the month of November, and by the general aspects of the political situation. *The propositions which we shall have to submit to you cannot fail to be influenced by the results of the negotiations in London.* It is our duty, as well as our intention, to continue to treat this question

in the future, as in the past, *quite openly, in the full light of day*. It is by means of the loyal application of this method that we hope to keep your confidence and that of the people."

The Council of the League of Nations met at London on February 11, 12 and 13, presided over by Mr. Arthur Balfour, President of the English Privy Council, representative of the British Empire.

Our delegates, who had left Switzerland with precise instructions on February 7, arrived in London on February 9. They were given a hearing before the Council of the League on February 11, when M. Gustave Ador explained verbally, in detail, the Swiss points of view which had already been indicated and developed in the memorandum of January 13 and in the note of January 30.

The Council of the League gave its reply, in a public session, in the afternoon of Friday, February 13. This reply, communicated immediately by telegraph to the Federal Council, arrived in Berne on the morning of the following day and could thus be brought to the cognizance of the National Council before the latter had interrupted its session. It was not possible to do as much for the Council of States because at the moment when the President of the Confederation was preparing to pass from the National Council to the other Council in order to make the same communication there, the latter had just adjourned the first part of its session.

The text of the declaration of London is as follows:

"The Council of the League of Nations, assembled in session at London, at St. James Palace, February 13, 1920—There were present: the Right Honourable Arthur James Balfour, Lord President of the Council, Representative of the British Empire; M. Léon Bourgeois, President of the French Senate, Representative of France; M. Demitrios Caclamano, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the King of Greece at London, Representative of Greece; M. Gastao da Cunha, Ambassador of the United States of Brazil at Paris, Representative of Brazil; M. Maggiorino Ferraris,

[13]

Senator of the Kingdom of Italy, Representative of Italy; M. Paul Hymans, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Representative of Belgium; M. Matsui, Ambassador of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan at Paris, Representative of Japan; M. José Quiñones de Leon, Ambassador of His Majesty the King of Spain at Paris, Representative of Spain—

As concerns the question of the accession of Switzerland as a member of the League of Nations, has adopted the following resolution:

The Council of the League of Nations, while affirming the principle that the concept of the neutrality of the members of the League of Nations is incompatible with that other principle that all the members of the League shall have to act in common in order to make their engagements respected, recognizes that Switzerland is in a unique situation, caused by a tradition of several centuries which has been explicitly incorporated into international law, and that the members of the League of Nations signatories to the Treaty of Versailles have rightfully recognized by Article 435, that the guarantees stipulated in favor of Switzerland by the Treaty of 1815 and particularly by the Act of November 20, 1815, constitute international engagements for the maintenance of peace. The members of the League of Nations have the right to expect that the Swiss people will not hold back if it is a question of defending the high principles of the League. It is in this sense that the Council of the League has taken cognizance of the declarations made by the Swiss Government in its message to the Federal Assembly of August 4, 1919, and in its memorandum of January 13, 1920, declarations which have been confirmed by the Swiss delegates to the session of the Council, and according to which Switzerland recognizes and proclaims the duties of joint liability which devolve upon her from the fact that she is to be a member of the League of Nations, including the duty of participating in the commercial and financial measures demanded by the League of Nations against a State which violates the Covenant, and is ready for every sacrifice to defend her own territory herself in all circumstances, even

during an action undertaken by the League of Nations, but that she shall not be forced to participate in a military action or to permit the passage of foreign troops or the preparation of military enterprises upon her territory. In accepting these declarations, the Council recognizes that the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland and the guaranty of the inviolability of her territory, such as were derived from international law, particularly by the Treaties and the Act of 1815, are justified by the interests of universal peace and, consequently, are compatible with the Covenant.

As concerns the declaration of accession to be made by the Swiss Government, the Council of the League of Nations, being mindful of the altogether unique constitution of the Swiss Confederation, is of the opinion that the notification based on the decision of the Federal Assembly and effected within the time limit of two months beginning January 10, 1920, the date of the entrance into effect of the Covenant of the League of Nations, may be accepted by the other members of the League as the declaration required by Article I for admission as an original member, on condition that the confirmation of this declaration by the people and the Swiss cantons be effected in the shortest time possible.

Done at London, Saint James Palace, February 13, 1920."

It would be difficult to exaggerate the *historic importance* of the preceding document. It is only fair to place the declaration of the League of Nations on a parallel with the declaration contained in the Act of November 20, 1815, recognizing and guaranteeing the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland and the inviolability of her territory. The most important provision of the latter declaration, due, it is said, to the inspiration of Pictet de Rochemont, is the one which proclaims "that the neutrality and the inviolability of Switzerland and her independence from every foreign influence are to the real interest of the politics of all Europe." This phrase, so pregnant with historical and political significance, has always been considered as the substance and, in some sort, as the charter of our neutrality.

There is for Switzerland, after the passing of more than a century and immediately after a world convulsion during which her neutrality has been put to the most fearful test, a subject for consolation and almost a cause for pride in seeing the Council of the League of Nations, in its declaration of London, consecrate and underline with a new force the truths contained in the Act of November 20, 1815.

The Council of the League of Nations entered completely into the views of the Federal Council. It establishes the principle that the concept of the neutrality of the members of the League is not at all compatible with that other principle that all the members are required to act in common in order to make their engagements respected, but it immediately adds *that Switzerland is in a unique position*, that this unique position rests upon a tradition of several centuries and *that it has been incorporated as an integral part of international law*. The Council of the League also proclaims solemnly that it is just and right that the Powers signatories to the Treaty of Versailles have written into it Article 435. The neutrality of Switzerland, it goes on to say, and the inviolability of her territory, *such as they are derived from international law, are justified by the interests of general peace, and consequently are compatible with the Covenant*.

Our delegates, in accordance with the declarations formulated in our message of August 4, 1919, and in our memorandum of January 13, 1920, recognized that the character of a future member of the League of Nations would impose upon Switzerland certain duties of joint liability, including the duty of participating in commercial and financial measures demanded by the League against a State which has broken the Covenant. These duties of joint liability are incontestable. They naturally do not imply that Switzerland ought to withdraw in case of war from the charitable and philanthropic rôle which has been her honor and her privilege during the world war and which has become an essential element of her tradition; the seat and the cradle of the Red Cross could not in any case renounce its mission. But the duties of cooperation

remain; to refuse to recognize them would mean a revolt against the very idea of international organization and to render it impossible. By such a refusal, Switzerland would diminish her prestige, because she would be renouncing her loftiest reasons for existence and activity in the world.

On the other hand, our delegates pointed out that Switzerland is ready for any sacrifice in order to defend her territory herself under all circumstances, even during an action undertaken by the League, that she is not forced to military action of any kind whatever and that she allows neither the passage of foreign troops, nor the preparation of military enterprises on her territory. These declarations were expressly accepted by the Council of the League; thus they give to our military neutrality a very firm and henceforth incontestable basis.

All this was already virtually contained in Article 435 of the Treaty of Versailles. This article was the very foundation of the negotiations of Paris and London. But it is evident that the declaration of London now invests the recognition of our perpetual neutrality with a striking importance which it did not before possess. Every ambiguity has been cleared away; a misunderstanding has become impossible; our juridical status in the League of Nations is safe from dispute and cannot be invoked as a precedent in favor of other members. The perpetual neutrality of our country and the inviolability of its territory constitute henceforth an integral part of international law, of the *jus gentium*, and are thus an article of the code which some day, we hope and wish, will govern the relations between all the nations of the world. The seat of the League accorded to Switzerland finds in this fact its most legitimate claim and we might almost say the plenitude of its value and its significance.

Switzerland has not counted in vain on the justice of her cause and on the friendship of the Powers represented on the Council of the League, just as she was not deceived as to the devotion and the ability of her representatives at the negotiations.

The question of the time limit within which Switzerland must make her declaration of accession was solved equally to our satisfaction. We shall have to present such a declaration between now and March 10; but the vote of the people and the cantons may be organized outside of the time limit expiring on March 10, on the condition, however, that it be within the shortest possible time. Our very special situation from the constitutional point of view is thus recognized; the Council of the League has understood the exigencies resulting to us from our democratic institutions and has taken them into account. It only demands of us that we convoke the people and the cantons as quickly as possible in order that they may confirm or annul the notification which the Federal Assembly shall have to present, in keeping with the law, in virtue of the Resolution passed by the Federal Assembly, within two months from January 10, the day on which the League Covenant went into effect. An unjustified delay in the summons for the popular ballot would make us lose the benefits, both moral and material, but above all moral, which attach to the status of an original member of the League.

Now—as we predicted in our declaration of February 3 to the Federal Chambers—on the date on which we know the results of the negotiations at London and submit to you the present message, the United States has not yet ratified the Treaty of Peace of Versailles, of which the League Covenant is a part. Uncertainty still reigns concerning its final decision. If we should be forced to wait until the political situation in the United States shall be finally cleared up, we would run the risk of not being able to fulfill the express condition which the declaration of London made to our accession as an original member, that is to say, the convocation of the electorate within the shortest possible time compatible with our democratic institutions and with the necessity for preparatory propaganda inherent in them.

The Federal Resolution of November 21, 1919, does not permit us to submit the question of the accession of Switzerland to the people and the cantons before the five Great

Powers have all adhered to the Covenant. The British Empire, France, Italy and Japan have adhered to it; the United States has not yet expressed itself. The problem which presents itself is this: shall we wait, before convoking the people and the cantons for the vote, until the United States has expressed itself definitely, or shall we wait no longer and modify the Federal Resolution of November 21 on this point?

The Federal Council proposes that you modify the Resolution and allow it to order the vote of the people and the cantons without waiting for the United States to make a final decision.

You will allow us first of all to remark that the draft of a resolution submitted by the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly, in its message of August 4, 1919, did not contain the provision which we shall call, for the sake of brevity, the *American clause*. This clause only came to be grafted on the draft of the resolution later. It served especially to calm the scruples of those who, while being in principle advocates of the League of Nations, considered that it was proper to delay the decision of Parliament until the international situation had become clearer and better defined and, particularly, until the time limit of two months had really commenced. The Federal Assembly was otherwise in full accord with us. It is none the less true that the insertion of the American clause into the Federal Resolution, having come about under the circumstances described, did not permit an exact estimate of all its consequences. From it has resulted a lack of clearness on an important point: Was the presence of the United States in the League of Nations solely a condition for the submission of the Federal Resolution to the vote of the people and the cantons, or was it a condition going beyond this end and affecting also the notification to be made by the Federal Council to the Secretariat of the League within the two months after the coming into force of the Covenant? If one accepts a purely literal interpretation, it would indeed appear that the presence of the United States was, according to the intention of the Federal Assembly, only one of the conditions for the referendum. If, on the contrary, one goes to the bottom of

things and beyond mere appearances, one has no difficulty in seeing that the American clause had a larger scope. The Federal Council also did not hesitate to declare, even independently of the insertion of the American clause into the parliamentary Resolution, that if, at the time of presentation of the notification intended to preserve for Switzerland the status of an original member of the League of Nations, the United States had not yet ratified the Covenant, the Federal Council would consult the Federal Assembly again.

We are very far from pretending that the absence, even though temporary, of the United States is a fact of little importance. If we thought so, we would be contradicting ourselves and, in particular, the points of view which we defined in our memorandum of January 13 and in our declaration of February 3. It remains incontestable that the Covenant provides for a League Council upon which the United States would occupy one of the seats reserved for the Great Powers. As long as the United States has not occupied this seat, the activity of one of the most important organs of the League of Nations will suffer from a defect, a deficiency, and so will not be exactly what the founders of the League had conceived, desired and willed.

The wider the League of Nations opens its doors and the more it affirms its universal character the more guaranties and elements of success it will contain. The United States is an immense country, still young, prodigiously rich in raw materials and in money, marvelously active, called upon to play a more and more important part in the history of the world. Her place in the new international organization is, therefore, clearly indicated. We Swiss would be acting with very bad grace if we did not render grateful homage to the American people and their authorities, who during the whole world war did not cease to show us their active and enlightened sympathy and to give us their fraternal assistance in supplying us with raw materials and food stuffs.

But the question which the Federal Assembly must solve now is a different one. Is it in accordance with Swiss interests

that Switzerland should make her entrance into the League of Nations dependent upon the entrance of the United States?

We recognize that, even though leaving out of account what we have just said on the subject of the organization of the League of Nations, the participation of the United States would be an element of beneficial equilibrium in the new Covenant resulting from the world war. One has been tempted at times to consider the League as an alliance of the conquerors against the conquered. The fact that Germany, Austria and the former Russian Empire remain provisionally excluded from the League may have given a semblance of truth to this manner of thinking. The presence of the United States, given the reasons which determined her entrance into the war and the part which she played in it, would certainly be of a nature to alleviate or efface the scruples of those whom this apparently accurate criticism disturbs.

But, after having made this concession to those who would make the entrance of Switzerland into the League dependent upon the entrance of the United States, we are obliged to call the attention of the Federal Assembly and of the people in the most pressing manner to the following considerations.

The attitude of the United States gives rise to three distinct hypotheses: Either the United States will decide not to join the League, or it will join only after a lapse of time still relatively distant, or it will join very soon.

The last hypothesis is the simplest and calls for no discussion. If the United States decided to join the League very soon, it would be clearly unreasonable for Switzerland to delay in making a decision, since waiting would procure for her nothing but disadvantages without any advantages.

There remain the other two hypotheses: The first would be that the United States should definitely renounce participation in the League. This hypothesis is extremely improbable. Our information leads us to believe that the United States—where the question of entrance into the League is complicated by

constitutional arguments concerning the respective powers of the Senate and the President of the Republic and also to a certain extent by party struggles which it is difficult for us to comprehend—will finally respond to the appeal of all her friends and will not condemn the work of which she made herself the champion by means of the eloquent voice of one of her own men, namely President Wilson. It seems morally improbable that the American people, imbued, in spite of all that may have been said, by an impelling and powerful idealism, should hold themselves finally aloof from the grandest attempt yet undertaken by men to banish blind violence from the relations between the states and to make justice and law triumph.

But, after all, we must face even the hypothesis which runs counter to our hopes, and which the facts seem to deny, and in such a case it would be necessary to seek the reasons for it. Now these reasons could only consist in a very strict application of the Monroe Doctrine. The United States, wishing to avoid at any price the interference of Europeans in American affairs, would herself renounce any mingling in the affairs of Europe and other parts of the world, and would refuse, for this reason, to be part of an international organization having a more or less coercive universal character. It is enough to have described this situation in order to point out that Switzerland, a state situated in the very center of Europe and wholly impregnated with the European spirit in the best sense of the word, would be playing a somewhat singular part if she, of necessity, combined her attitude of a European state with the attitude of a state which (this is, of course, only a hypothesis) would decline any cooperation with Europe. In order to invest the attitude of Switzerland with a show of justification, it would then be necessary, at least, that all the great states of the two Americas should have espoused the same cause as the United States. Now this is not and will not be the case!

We have reason to believe that all the European states invited to join the League of Nations as original members will

reply to the invitation before March 10. Several, headed by Spain, have already replied. If Switzerland should refuse the invitation, she would then be the only one among the invited states in Europe to answer in the negative or with reservations. We will not dwell upon the gravity of the injury which we would voluntarily have done to our international position, our prestige and our interests. This injury would be so much the more grievous since our mission in London had just been crowned with complete success. We should give the impression of replying to the kindness of our friends by defiance. We should have definitely inaugurated a sterile policy of aloofness and isolation. It would then be only just to apply to us the terrible saying: *Woe to him who stands alone!*

There remains, finally, the intermediate hypothesis according to which the United States would end by entering into the League, but would postpone her entrance until a time relatively distant. The entrance of the United States would thus be an assured fact, but the time would remain uncertain; *eventus certus an, incertus quando*. According to this hypothesis, the participation of the United States in the League would no longer be a basic question, but a question of time. Switzerland would have the assurance of some day seeing her great American sister take her place on the Council of the League of Nations. But would there be a truly decisive interest for her *in following* rather than preceding the great American Republic? We look for this decisive interest in vain. No matter what are the sympathies and the profound affinities which unite the old Helvetic democracy and the transatlantic democracy, it would not seem to us very dignified for a state like ours to make itself in a way totally dependent upon, and to enter thus completely into the wake of, another state. The historic evolution of Switzerland, her geographic position and her economic conditions command us not to weaken her independence. We are forbidden, in particular, to restrict in any way the development of our political personality.

These are some of the essential reasons which oblige us, no matter from which point of view we examine the attitude of

the United States, to counsel you to abandon the American clause. We should fail, it seems to us, in our essential duty of government and, in particular, in our task as an agency watching over the foreign relations of Switzerland if we failed to address to the Federal Assembly and to the Swiss people as a whole the most urgent and the most sincere appeal in order that they shall not refuse to listen to our voice in this unique hour of our history.

It goes without saying that it is not the purpose of this supplementary message to expound to you anew all the reasons which we have already set forth in our principal message of August 4, 1919, and which we confirm in all its essential points. We attach great importance to the fact that the declaration issued in London on February 13 by the Council of the League of Nations expressly mentions our principal message referred to above and our memorandum of January 13, 1920. These two documents have thereby acquired a value which goes beyond the framework of an interpretation intended for the simple use of our domestic policy.

The fine political education of our people, their sense of moral and economic realities, their far-seeing instinct which has rarely been deceived, will point out to them this time, too, the road which has been marked for them by destiny. Our message, in concluding these lines, can only be a message of unshakeable confidence in our democracy and of faith and hope in the happy destiny of the Swiss Fatherland, over which Divine Providence has never ceased to watch in a manner quite visible.

We have the honor to

propose

that you confirm the Federal Resolution of November 21, 1919, concerning the accession of Switzerland to the Covenant of the League of Nations of April 28 to June 28, 1919, with this single modification, that Article II of the Resolution shall contain no more than the provision relative to the vote of the people and the cantons, without mention of the five Great Powers.

[24]

Accept, Mr. President and Gentlemen, the assurance of our high consideration.

In the name of the Swiss Federal Council:

The President of the Confederation
Motta

The Chancellor of the Confederation
Steiger

ANNEXES

1. *Federal Resolution of November 21, 1919, concerning the accession of Switzerland to the League of Nations*

The Federal Assembly of the Swiss Confederation, after having taken cognizance of a message from the Federal Council dated August 4, 1919, stating that the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland, recognized notably by the Act of November 20, 1815, is considered, by Article 435 of the Treaty of Peace concluded by the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany on June 28, 1919, as an international engagement for the maintenance of peace, and that the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland must, in accordance with Article XXI of the Covenant of the League of Nations, be considered as being not incompatible with any of the provisions of the said Covenant, trusting that the League of Nations will grow in the near future in such a manner as to become universal, decrees:

Article I. Switzerland accedes to the Covenant of the League of Nations adopted on April 28, 1919, by the Peace Conference assembled in Paris.

The provisions of the Federal Constitution concerning the promulgation of Federal laws are applicable to the ratification of the amendments affecting said Covenant and to the approval of conventions of all kinds connected with the League of Nations.

The decisions relative to the denunciation of the Covenant or to the withdrawal from the League of Nations must be submitted to a vote of the people and the cantons.

Article 121 of the Federal Constitution concerning popular initiative also applies to decisions relative to denunciation of the Covenant or withdrawal from the League.

Article II. The present Federal resolution shall be submitted to the vote of the people and the cantons as soon as the five Great Powers shall have adhered to the Covenant.

Article III. The Federal Council is charged with the execution of the present resolution.

2. *Memorandum of the Federal Council of December 6, 1919*

Although the deposit of the ratifications of the Treaty of Peace of June 28, 1919, has not yet been effected and, consequently, the Swiss Federal Council has not yet been officially invited to declare that Switzerland will accede to the League of Nations, in accordance with the terms of Article I of the Covenant of April 28, 1919, the Swiss Federal Council has the honor to inform the Government of ——— that the Swiss Federal Assembly has decided, on November 21, 1919, in favor of the entrance of Switzerland into the League of Nations, the text of which decision is annexed to the present memorandum.

The Federal Council reserves the right to send at the proper time to the General Secretariat of the League a formal declaration on the subject of the accession of Switzerland. In order to satisfy a desire expressed by the Commission of the Swiss National Council, however, it wishes to make known, from this moment, its opinion that the vote of the Swiss people and cantons upon the Federal resolution of November 21, 1919, which is to be taken as soon as circumstances permit, need not necessarily take place within the time limit specified in Article I of the Covenant of the League of Nations. It would be absolutely contrary to the constitutional practices of Switzerland to submit to the people the draft of a resolution, the juridical bases of which have not yet been established, the realization of the League of Nations depending upon the accession of all the states to which the Covenant,

out of regard for their special political importance, grants a permanent representation upon the Council of the League.

The Federal Council does not doubt that a notification of the decision of the Swiss Federal Assembly, made within the two months after the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace, will have the effect of insuring to Switzerland—without conjecture as to the final decision of the people and the cantons—all the rights of a state invited to accede to the League of Nations in the capacity of an original member. Switzerland is the only country where the principle of popular consultation in the question of accession to the League of Nations is a constitutional necessity; but this principle being absolutely in conformity with the spirit of the international régime which the League of Nations wishes to inaugurate, the Federal Council has the firm conviction that no disadvantage can result to Switzerland from the democratic character of its constitutional law.

3. *Note of the Supreme Council, January 2, 1920*

By its memorandum of December 18, 1919, the legation of Switzerland, referring to the Covenant of the League of Nations dated April 28, 1919, made known to the Government of the French Republic that the Swiss Federal Assembly resolved on November 21, 1919, in favor of the entrance of Switzerland into the League of Nations, the text of which resolution was annexed to said memorandum.

The Swiss Government adds that it reserves the right to send at the proper time to the General Secretariat of the League of Nations a formal declaration of accession after the referendum which is provided for by the Swiss Constitution and which, in its opinion, need not necessarily take place within the time limit of two months stipulated in Article I of the Covenant, for the reason that the realization of the League of Nations would depend upon the accession of all the states to which the Covenant grants a permanent representation upon the Council of the League.

Finally, according to the Swiss Government, the notification of the resolution of the Federal Assembly made within the time limit of two months after the entering into effect of the Treaty would result in insuring to Switzerland all the rights of a state invited to accede as an original member and at the same time not prejudice the final decision adopted by the Swiss people in the referendum required by the Swiss Constitution.

The Government of the French Republic has made known to the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers the memorandum of the legation of Switzerland. The Supreme Council considers that this memorandum can in no way be counted as a declaration of accession, as the Swiss Government itself recognizes. It has the honor to add the following observations:

1. According to Article I of the Covenant, the declaration of accession must be made without reservations and within the two months following the entrance into effect of the Covenant. A declaration of accession which would be made dependent upon the result of a referendum would not be considered as an accession without reservations. On the other hand, the measures which Swiss constitutional law demands in such matters concern Switzerland alone. For the other Powers interested, it is the declaration of accession effected in accordance with the terms of the treaty which is solely to be taken into consideration.

2. The Swiss note presents the date of April 28, 1919, as the date on which the Covenant was adopted.

It is important to remark that the only official text is that which was signed by the Powers and to which the date of April 28, 1919 does not apply.

3. The thesis of the Swiss note, according to which the realization of the League of Nations would depend upon the ratification of the five principal Powers, is not compatible with the final clauses of the Treaty, according to which the latter, in all its parts, that is to say including Part I (Covenant of the League of Nations) is applicable *ergo omnes* in all

that concerns the calculation of time limits, and, upon the deposit of the ratification of three of the principal Powers and Germany, will come into effect for all the Powers which shall have ratified it at that time.

4. Finally, the Resolution of the Federal Council, a copy of which the Swiss Government has been pleased to annex to its memorandum, contains in its preamble various observations upon the relation between the accession of the Helvetic Confederation to the League of Nations and the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland, as well as between Articles 21 and 435 of the Treaty.

The Supreme Council must reserve examination of this question.

4. *Memorandum of the Federal Council of January 13, 1920*

Under date of December 6, 1919, the Swiss Federal Council addressed a memorandum to the signatories to the Treaty of Peace and to the states invited to adhere to the League of Nations with which the Confederation has permanent diplomatic relations. The Federal Council therein expressed the opinion that Switzerland could, by means of a notification based on the resolution of the Federal Assembly and effected within the time limit of two months fixed by Article 1 of the League Covenant, reserve the rights of a state invited to join the League as an original member, even if the vote of the Swiss people and cantons, dictated by the principles of the Federal Constitution, could not take place within that time.

The Government of the French Republic having communicated this memorandum to the Supreme Council, the latter took it up and sent to the Federal Council a reply dated January 2, 1920. In view of this reply, the Federal Council considers that it ought to define and develop its point of view. It holds this to be all the more necessary since the statement of the Supreme Council also touches upon a point—the question of neutrality—of which the memorandum made no mention, and which is of decisive importance for Switzerland, as will be shown further on.

As concerns the moment and the form of the declaration of accession, the Supreme Council upholds a strictly literal interpretation which is evidently exact. But the Federal Council had been and continues to be of the opinion that it would be in conformity with the spirit of the League Covenant to take into account also, in the application of this provision, the democratic institutions of Switzerland. Never yet has a people been called upon to pronounce directly upon an international treaty of such scope. The Swiss electors, jealous guardians of the independence of their country, insist on examining with care the proposal which is submitted to them. The work which aims at enlightening the people before the vote, can be done in a useful and efficacious manner only when the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace shall have created a well-defined legal status.

It has by no means escaped the attention of the Swiss Federal Council that the text which figures in Articles I to 26 of the Treaty of Peace of June 28, 1919, is the only authoritative one; neither has it submitted any other text to the Federal Chambers. The apparent divergence of opinion between the Federal Council and the Supreme Council has only a purely theoretical importance. The Federal Council likes to see in the unanimous manifestation of the Paris Conference on April 28 the creative act which gives substance to the desire to found, under the name of the League of Nations, an independent international organization. The Treaties of Peace, into which the League of Nations Covenant was inserted, do not concern Switzerland directly, since she remained neutral during the war. That is the reason which made her preserve in Article 4 of the Covenant the designation of the five Powers represented permanently upon the Council instead of the expression "the five great Allied and Associated Powers" which is perfectly in place in the Treaty of Peace.

The Swiss Federal Council—as well as the Federal Assembly—does not contest that the final provision of the Treaty of Peace of June 28, 1919, concerning the duration of the time

limits, should apply also to the first part of the Treaty (League of Nations). Nevertheless it seems to it that, until the accession of all the five Great Powers, there is lacking to the Covenant, from the point of view of the definitive organization of the League of Nations, an essential provision. It seems that it would be a fact of the greatest importance from the political point of view if one of the principal Powers remained outside, or adhered only with limiting reservations, or delayed its accession beyond all expectation.

The Federal Assembly, in making its decision of November 21, could hope that ratification by all the five Great Powers would take place soon enough to enable the referendum to take place within the time limit of two months, or at least shortly after that. If this expectation should be disappointed, the Federal Chambers would be called upon to examine the question as to whether, in spite of the fact that their anticipations had not been realized, they would adhere to their resolution or modify it. The Federal Council is perfectly well aware of the fact that Switzerland, especially in consideration of the very great honor rendered her by the choice of Geneva as the seat of the League of Nations, cannot postpone indefinitely her decision on the subject of accession to the League under the terms of Article 1 of the Covenant. She will make known her final decision as soon as her special constitutional situation will allow.

Finally, the Supreme Council has reserved the examination of the connection which exists between Articles 435 and 21 of the Treaty of Peace of June 28, 1919, as concerns the permanent neutrality of Switzerland, a connection which is mentioned in the introduction of the Federal Resolution of November 21, 1919.

The Federal Council has complete confidence in the friendly sentiments which the Allied and Associated Powers have repeatedly manifested toward it and in the assurances which it has given to Switzerland. Nevertheless, it considers itself obliged to make the following declaration concerning the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland.

In its memorandum of February 8 and in its message of August 4, 1919, the Federal Council set forth the reasons why Switzerland ought, even under the protection of the League of Nations, to preserve her perpetual neutrality. It maintains this point of view in its entirety.

The delegates of Switzerland who were in Paris during the month of April, 1919, explained to several members of the Conference the views of Switzerland in this matter. They explained particularly that the article which the Commission for the League of Nations proposed to insert into the Covenant and which became in the final text Article 21, could and should be applied quite naturally to the Act of November 20, 1815, concerning the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland. It was precisely on this basis that the negotiations took place on the subject of Article 435 of the Treaty of Peace. This article is of decisive importance. By it all the Powers confirm the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland and recognize that that neutrality is an international engagement for the maintenance of peace, that is to say, an agreement not incompatible with any provision of the League Covenant. The literal identity on this point between the terms of Article 21 and Article 435 of the Treaty of Peace was planned and had a definite purpose. It is only on condition of this double recognition of the perpetual neutrality and recognition of the non-incompatibility of that neutrality with the provisions of the League Covenant, in accordance with Article 21, that the Federal Council consented to renounce, under reservation of the approval of the Chambers, certain historic rights in Savoy. All the discussions of the Federal Assembly on the general question of the accession of Switzerland to the League of Nations as well as on the special question of the agreement concluded between the French Government and the Federal Government as it appears in Article 435, have been penetrated and dominated by these considerations.

In its message of August 4, 1919, and in its declarations to the Chambers, the Federal Council has explained in the clearest possible manner the nature and the effects of the perpetual

neutrality of Switzerland within the League of Nations. It is its most definite duty to enlighten, first of all, the Swiss people concerning the scope of the obligations which will devolve upon it from its entrance into the League of Nations. It insists, moreover, in allowing no doubt to remain, on the part of the other states, concerning the unshakeable will of Switzerland to remain neutral. This question touches the Swiss people in its innermost fibers. Absolute clearness on all these essential points is, moreover, the first condition of a consultation of the people.

The neutrality of Switzerland must continue to be recognized in all wars, even in actions undertaken by the League of Nations on the basis of Article 16. The territory of Switzerland is and remains inviolable; she is ready for any sacrifice in order to defend it. This inviolability is in the supreme interest of the League itself. Switzerland could therefore not participate in any military action of the League of Nations, nor allow any passage of troops or the preparation of any military enterprises whatsoever upon her territory.

As to the question of the duties of joint liability which devolve upon Switzerland from the fact that she becomes a member of the League of Nations, an obligation which Switzerland recognizes and proclaims, the Federal Council has explained this question in detail in its message of August 4, 1919, to the Federal Assembly.

The Supreme Council having touched upon the question of Swiss neutrality, even though it is only in the form of a reservation for further examination, the Federal Council is placed in the necessity of seeking to know whether the Supreme Council or the Council of the League of Nations are in agreement with the Swiss point of view on this question. It would be infinitely grateful if it could obtain the assurance that these Councils and the states which they represent share its point of view. Desirous of obtaining popular ratification as quickly as possible, it can only express the hope that this question may be cleared up without delay. It will permit itself to explain its point of view through a special mission, and

it is ready to collaborate, if the case arises, in the preparation of reciprocal declarations.

The Federal Council takes this occasion to proclaim anew that a League of Nations established on the broadest possible basis, constitutes, in its eyes, a necessity of international politics, and that it entertains the most ardent desire to contribute, so far as in it lies, to the creation of this magnificent and necessary work. If it demands at present that the special situation of Switzerland be taken into consideration as concerns the time limit of the declaration of final accession, and if it insists on the recognition of the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland within the League, it is convinced that it asks nothing which can in any way injure the interests of the League of Nations.

The Federal Council does not believe that it is departing from the truth when it affirms that in no other country have the people and the authorities devoted a more passionate interest and a more conscientious study to this question. Swiss policy is nurtured entirely on the ideas of peace and justice which form the very substance of the new international order. These statements suffice to dispel every shadow of misunderstanding concerning the general import and the scope of the declaration of the Federal Council.

Berne, January 13, 1920.

5. *Note of the Conference of Ambassadors of January 28 to the Swiss Delegation*

Mr. President:

You have been pleased to explain before the Supreme Council, on January 26, the point of view of the Swiss Government concerning the compatibility of the perpetual neutrality of the Confederation with its entrance into the League of Nations.

The Supreme Council, while recognizing, by the unanimous vote of its members present, which included the heads of the British, French and Italian Governments, that the Allied and Associated Powers are and remain bound, as concerns the

perpetual neutrality of Switzerland, by Article 435 of the Treaty of Versailles, considered, in its last session, that it appertained to the Council of the League of Nations to pronounce upon the observations presented by your Government.

Be pleased to accept, Mr. President, the assurances of our very high consideration.

(Signed) MILLERAND

6. *Note of the Federal Council of January 30, 1920*

The Swiss Federal Council, referring to its *note verbale* of January 14, 1920, and to the memorandum of the preceding day annexed thereto, has the honor to bring to the attention of the Government of ——— the reply which the Supreme Council has been pleased to communicate to it under date of the 26th of this month. This reply is worded as follows:

"You have been pleased to explain before the Supreme Council, on January 26, the point of view of the Swiss Government concerning the compatibility of the perpetual neutrality of the Confederation with its entrance into the League of Nations. The Supreme Council, while recognizing, by the unanimous vote of its members present, which included the heads of the British, French and Italian Governments, that the Allied and Associated Powers are and remain bound, as concerns the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland, by Article 435 of the Treaty of Versailles, considered, in its last session, that it appertained to the Council of the League of Nations to pronounce upon the observations presented by your Government."

Whereas the time limit within which the declaration of accession to the League of Nations may validly be made seems to expire on March 10 next, the Federal Council made known to the General Secretariat of the League of Nations that it would appreciate it most highly if the Council of the League would be pleased to inscribe upon the order of the day of its next meeting in London the questions of particular interest to

Switzerland, the examination of which was delegated to the Council of the League by the Supreme Council. The Swiss Federal Council explained its point of view concerning the permanent neutrality of Switzerland within the League in its memorandum of January 13, 1920. This point of view it had already developed in greater detail in its message of August 4, 1919, to the Federal Assembly, a message which it had also sent to all the Powers. The Government of the Swiss Confederation has insisted, from the very beginning of the discussions concerning the League of Nations, on emphasizing—and always with entire frankness—that Switzerland intended to maintain her position as a perpetually neutral state even in the new international organization. The essential aim of the negotiations which resulted in the insertion of Article 435 into the Treaty of Versailles has been to reserve for Switzerland a special position resulting from her perpetual neutrality and compatible with the Covenant of the League of Nations, in accordance with Article 21 of said Covenant. This special status, justified by the unique position of Switzerland, has, according to the conviction of her people, a real value only on condition that it be effective under all circumstances and consequently also during the state of war stipulated by Article 16 of the Covenant. The concept of neutrality excludes all active military participation of the neutral state and any tolerance of military enterprises upon her territory, which is inviolable; it particularly excludes any passage of troops. The Federal Council attaches extreme importance to an authentic statement on this subject.

The Federal Government is particularly happy to recognize the excellent reception accorded at Paris to its delegates, Messrs. Ador and Huber, in the fulfillment of their mission. It is equally grateful to the Supreme Council for the friendly spirit which inspired its reply of January 26.

Finally, it expresses its complete confidence that the Powers represented upon the Council of the League of Nations will be equally willing—just as this has already been explained and demanded by the delegates of the Federal Council, at the time

of their mission in Paris—to enter into its views and to define in an explicit declaration the juridical position of Switzerland within the League.

NOTE. The referendum on the question of the accession of Switzerland to the League of Nations, which was held on May 16, resulted in favor of the proposition. The vote was close, 11½ of the cantonal votes in favor of it, 10½ against. The popular vote in favor of the League was 414,954, and against it, 322,886.

II

THE UNITED STATES AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

RESOLUTION OF RATIFICATION

November, 19, 1919

RESOLVED (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein), That the Senate advise and consent to the ratification of the treaty of peace with Germany concluded at Versailles on the 28th day of June, 1919, subject to the following reservations and understandings, which are hereby made a part and condition of this resolution of ratification, which ratification is not to take effect or bind the United States until the said reservations and understandings adopted by the Senate have been accepted by an exchange of notes as a part and a condition of this resolution of ratification by at least three of the four principal allied and associated powers, to wit, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan:

1. The United States so understands and construes article I that in case of notice of withdrawal from the league of nations, as provided in said article, the United States shall be the sole judge as to whether all its international obligations and all its obligations under the said covenant have been fulfilled, and notice of withdrawal by the United States may be given by a concurrent resolution of the Congress of the United States.

2. The United States assumes no obligation to preserve the territorial integrity or political independence of any other country or to interfere in controversies between nations—whether members of the league or not—under the provisions of article 10, or to employ the military or naval forces of the United States under any article of the treaty for any purpose, unless in any particular case the Congress, which, under the Constitution, has the sole power to declare war or authorize

the employment of the military or naval forces of the United States, shall by act or joint resolution so provide.

3. No mandate shall be accepted by the United States under article 22, part 1, or any other provision of the treaty of peace with Germany, except by action of the Congress of the United States.

4. The United States reserves to itself exclusively the right to decide what questions are within its domestic jurisdiction and declares that all domestic and political questions relating wholly or in part to its internal affairs, including immigration, labor, coastwise traffic, the tariff, commerce, the suppression of traffic in women and children, and in opium and other dangerous drugs, and all other domestic questions, are solely within the jurisdiction of the United States and are not under this treaty to be submitted in any way either to arbitration or to the consideration of the council or of the assembly of the league of nations, or any agency thereof, or to the decision or recommendation of any other power.

5. The United States will not submit to arbitration or to inquiry by the assembly or by the council of the league of nations, provided for in said treaty of peace, any questions which in the judgment of the United States depend upon or relate to its long established policy, commonly known as the Monroe Doctrine; said doctrine is to be interpreted by the United States alone and is hereby declared to be wholly outside the jurisdiction of said league of nations and entirely unaffected by any provision contained in the said treaty of peace with Germany.

6. The United States withholds its assent to articles 156, 157, and 158, and reserves full liberty of action with respect to any controversy which may arise under said articles between the Republic of China and the Empire of Japan.

7. The Congress of the United States will provide by law for the appointment of the representatives of the United States in the assembly and the council of the league of nations, and may in its discretion provide for the participation of the United States in any commission, committee, tribunal, court, council,

or conference, or in the selection of any members thereof and for the appointment of members of said commissions, committees, tribunals, courts, councils, or conferences, or any other representatives under the treaty of peace, or in carrying out its provisions, and until such participation and appointment have been so provided for and the powers and duties of such representatives have been defined by law, no person shall represent the United States under either said league of nations or the treaty of peace with Germany or be authorized to perform any act for or on behalf of the United States thereunder, and no citizen of the United States shall be selected or appointed as a member of said commissions, committees, tribunals, courts, councils, or conferences except with the approval of the Senate of the United States.

8. The United States understands that the reparation commission will regulate or interfere with exports from the United States to Germany, or from Germany to the United States, only when the United States by Act or Joint Resolution of Congress approves such regulation or interference.

9. The United States shall not be obligated to contribute to any expenses of the league of nations, or of the secretariat, or of any commission, or committee, or conference, or other agency, organized under the league of nations or under the treaty or for the purpose of carrying out the treaty provisions, unless and until an appropriation of funds available for such expenses shall have been made by the Congress of the United States.

10. If the United States shall at any time adopt any plan for the limitation of armaments proposed by the council of the league of nations under the provisions of article 8, it reserves the right to increase such armaments without the consent of the council whenever the United States is threatened with invasion or engaged in war.

11. The United States reserves the right to permit, in its discretion, the nationals of a covenant-breaking State, as defined in article 16 of the covenant of the league of nations, residing within the United States or in countries other than

that violating said article 16, to continue their commercial, financial, and personal relations with the nationals of the United States.

12. Nothing in articles 296, 297, or in any of the annexes thereto or in any other article, section, or annex of the treaty of peace with Germany shall, as against citizens of the United States, be taken to mean any confirmation, ratification, or approval of any act otherwise illegal or in contravention of the rights of citizens of the United States.

13. The United States withholds its assent to Part XIII (articles 387 to 427, inclusive) unless Congress by act or joint resolution shall hereafter make provision for representation in the organization established by said Part XIII, and in such event the participation of the United States will be governed and conditioned by the provisions of such act or joint resolution.

14. The United States assumes no obligation to be bound by any election, decision, report, or finding of the council or assembly in which any member of the league and its self-governing dominions, colonies, or parts of empire, in the aggregate have cast more than one vote, and assumes no obligation to be bound by any decision, report, or finding of the council or assembly arising out of any dispute between the United States and any member of the league if such member, or any self-governing dominion, colony, empire, or part of empire united with it politically has voted.

On the resolution of ratification the yeas are 41 and the nays 51. The resolution not having received the constitutional two-thirds, it is rejected.

(Reprinted from the *Congressional Record*, November 19, 1919, pp. 8777-8.)

RESOLUTION OF RATIFICATION

March 19, 1920

RESOLVED (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein), That the Senate advise and consent to the ratification of the treaty of peace with Germany concluded at

[41]

Versailles on the 28th day of June, 1919, subject to the following reservations and understandings, which are hereby made a part and condition of this resolution of ratification, which ratification is not to take effect or bind the United States until the said reservations and understandings adopted by the Senate have been accepted as a part and a condition of this resolution of ratification by the allied and associated powers and a failure on the part of the allied and associated powers to make objection to said reservations and understandings prior to the deposit of ratification by the United States shall be taken as a full and final acceptance of such reservations and understandings by said powers:

1. The United States so understands and construes article 1 that in case of notice of withdrawal from the League of Nations, as provided in said article, the United States shall be the sole judge as to whether all its international obligations and all its obligations under the said covenant have been fulfilled, and notice of withdrawal by the United States may be given by a concurrent resolution of the Congress of the United States.

2. The United States assumes no obligation to preserve the territorial integrity or political independence of any other country by the employment of its military or naval forces, its resources, or any form of economic discrimination, or to interfere in any way in controversies between nations, including all controversies relating to territorial integrity or political independence, whether members of the league or not, under the provisions of article 10, or to employ the military or naval forces of the United States, under any article of the treaty for any purpose, unless in any particular case the Congress, which, under the Constitution, has the sole power to declare war or authorize the employment of the military or naval forces of the United States, shall in the exercise of full liberty of action, by act or joint resolution so provide.

3. No mandate shall be accepted by the United States under article 22, part 1, or any other provision of the treaty of peace with Germany, except by action of the Congress of the United States.

4. The United States reserves to itself exclusively the right to decide what questions are within its domestic jurisdiction and declares that all domestic and political questions relating wholly or in part to its internal affairs, including immigration, labor, coastwise traffic, the tariff, commerce, the suppression of traffic in women and children and in opium and other dangerous drugs, and all other domestic questions, are solely within the jurisdiction of the United States and are not under this treaty to be submitted in any way either to arbitration or to the consideration of the council or of the assembly of the League of Nations, or any agency thereof, or to the decision or recommendation of any other power.

5. The United States will not submit to arbitration or to inquiry by the assembly or by the council of the League of Nations, provided for in said treaty of peace, any questions which in the judgment of the United States depend upon or relate to its long-established policy, commonly known as the Monroe Doctrine; said doctrine is to be interpreted by the United States alone and is hereby declared to be wholly outside the jurisdiction of said League of Nations and entirely unaffected by any provision contained in the said treaty of peace with Germany.

6. The United States withholds its assent to articles 156, 157, and 158, and reserves full liberty of action with respect to any controversy which may arise under said articles.

7. No person is or shall be authorized to represent the United States, nor shall any citizen of the United States be eligible, as a member of any body or agency established or authorized by said treaty of peace with Germany, except pursuant to an act of the Congress of the United States providing for his appointment and defining his powers and duties.

8. The United States understands that the reparation commission will regulate or interfere with exports from the United States to Germany, or from Germany to the United States, only when the United States, by act or joint resolution of Congress approves such regulation or interference.

9. The United States shall not be obligated to contribute to any expenses of the League of Nations, or of the secretariat, or of any commission, or committee, or conference, or other agency, organized under the League of Nations or under the treaty or for the purpose of carrying out the treaty provisions, unless and until an appropriation of funds available for such expenses shall have been made by the Congress of the United States: Provided, That the foregoing limitation shall not apply to the United States proportionate share of the expense of the office force and salary of the secretary general.

10. No plan for the limitation of armaments proposed by the council of the League of Nations under the provisions of article 8 shall be held as binding the United States until the same shall have been accepted by Congress, and the United States reserves the right to increase its armament without the consent of the council whenever the United States is threatened with invasion or engaged in war.

11. The United States reserves the right to permit, in its discretion, the nationals of a covenant-breaking State, as defined in article 16 of the covenant of the League of Nations, residing within the United States or in countries other than such covenant-breaking State, to continue their commercial, financial and personal relations with the nationals of the United States.

12. Nothing in articles 296, 297 or in any of the annexes thereto or in any other article, section, or annex of the treaty of peace with Germany shall, as against citizens of the United States, be taken to mean any confirmation, ratification, or approval of any act otherwise illegal or in contravention of the rights of citizens of the United States.

13. The United States withholds its assent to Part XIII (articles 387 to 427 inclusive) unless Congress by act or joint resolution shall hereafter make provision for representation in the organization established by said Part XIII, and in such event the participation of the United States will be governed and conditioned by the provisions of such act or joint resolution.

14. Until Part I, being the covenant of the League of Nations, shall be so amended as to provide that the United States shall be entitled to cast a number of votes equal to that which any member of the league and its self-governing dominions, colonies, or parts of empire, in the aggregate shall be entitled to cast, the United States assumes no obligation to be bound, except in cases where Congress has previously given its consent, by any election, decision, report, or finding of the council or assembly in which any member of the league and its self-governing dominions, colonies, or parts of empire, in the aggregate have cast more than one vote.

The United States assumes no obligation to be bound by any decision, report, or finding of the council or assembly arising out of any dispute between the United States and any member of the league if such member, or any self-governing dominion, colony, empire, or part of empire united with it politically has voted.

15. In consenting to the ratification of the treaty with Germany the United States adheres to the principle of self-determination and to the resolution of sympathy with the aspirations of the Irish people for a government of their own choice adopted by the Senate June 6, 1919, and declares that when such government is attained by Ireland, a consummation it is hoped is at hand, it should promptly be admitted as a member of the League of Nations.

Upon agreeing to the resolution of ratification the yeas are 49 and the nays are 35. Not having received the affirmative votes of two-thirds of the Senators present and voting, the resolution is not agreed to, and the Senate does not advise and consent to the ratification of the treaty of peace with Germany.

RESOLVED, That the Secretary of the Senate be instructed to return to the President the treaty of peace with Germany, signed at Versailles on the 28th day of June, 1919, and respectfully inform the President that the Senate has failed to ratify said treaty, being unable to obtain the constitutional majority therefor.

(Reprinted from the *Congressional Record*, March 19, 1920, pp. 4915-6.)

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An Exposition and A Review

By GEORGE A. FINCH



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THE TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE: AN EXPOSITION AND A REVIEW¹

By GEORGE A. FINCH

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District of Columbia*

For the second time the United States Senate, on March 19, 1920, refused its advice and consent to the ratification of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, signed at Versailles on June 28, 1919. The first rejection took place exactly four months before, namely, on November 19, 1919. The vote on the treaty in November was 39 for and 55 against, and in March 49 for and 35 against. Both votes were upon resolutions of ratification containing reservations and understandings the acceptance of which by the Allied and Associated Powers was made a condition precedent to the going into effect of the ratification of the United States. A resolution of ratification without reservations or conditions of any kind was presented to the Senate on November 19, 1919, and defeated by a vote of 38 for to 53 against. No resolution of this kind was offered or voted upon in March. The treaty has thus failed to receive in either form the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senators present as required by the Constitution for the making of treaties by the President.

These votes do not in themselves, however, give an accurate index to the real attitude of the Senate toward the treaty if full weight be given to the positions assumed by Senators in

¹ Reprinted from the American Journal of International Law, Vol. XIV, Numbers 1 and 2, January and April, 1920.

debate and by their votes in the preliminary stages of the contest for ratification. To understand the parliamentary dilemma into which the treaty has been forced, it is necessary to refer briefly to certain facts in its short but turbulent career affecting ratification and to summarize the efforts of its advocates to obtain the constitutional advice and consent of the Senate.

THE SITUATION PRIOR TO THE SUBMISSION OF THE TREATY TO THE SENATE

The first part of the treaty text to be made public was the Covenant of the League of Nations approved by the Peace Conference on February 14, 1919, which, under the resolution adopted by the Conference on January 25, 1919, "should be treated as an integral part of the general treaty of peace." Opposition to the Covenant was expressed in the Senate soon after the text became known in the United States and, when the President returned from Paris to Washington in February, 1919, he invited the members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs to the White House for the purpose of discussing the terms of the Covenant. This took place at a dinner on February 26, 1919.

According to one of the Senators present on that occasion, attention was directed to "what were considered to be vital defects and infringements of our Constitution and form of government. Great changes of our traditional policies were pointed out and discussed, and the President was informed that those changes would be absolutely necessary, and that the Covenant in the form in which it then stood was absolutely unsatisfactory to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate."² The objections thus pointed out informally to the President were given more definite form on March 4, 1919, the last day of the Sixty-Fifth Congress, when the following

² Statement of Senator Brandegee, Congressional Record, Nov. 19, 1919, p. 8774.

resolution, the consideration of which was prevented by lack of unanimous consent, was inserted in the record bearing the signatures of thirty-seven Senators:

Whereas under the Constitution it is a function of the Senate to advise and consent to or dissent from the ratification of any treaty of the United States, and no such treaty can become operative without the consent of the Senate expressed by the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the Senators present; and

Whereas, owing to the victory of the arms of the United States and of the nations with whom it is associated, a Peace Conference was convened and is now in session at Paris for the purpose of settling the terms of peace; and

Whereas, a committee of the Conference has proposed a constitution for a League of Nations and the proposal is now before the Peace Conference for its consideration: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate of the United States in the discharge of its constitutional duty of advice in regard to treaties, That it is the sense of the Senate that, while it is their sincere desire that the nations of the world should unite to promote peace and general disarmament, the constitution of the League of Nations in the form now proposed to the Peace Conference should not be accepted by the United States; and be it

Resolved, further, That it is the sense of the Senate that the negotiations on the part of the United States should immediately be directed to the utmost expedition of the urgent business of negotiating peace terms with Germany satisfactory to the United States and the nations with whom the United States is associated in the war against the German Government, and that the proposal for a League of Nations to insure the permanent peace of the world should be then taken up for careful and serious consideration.*

With reference to the objections to the contents of the Covenant raised by members of the Senate Committee the President has since said:

"I brought the first draft of the Covenant of the League of Nations over to this country in March last. I then held a conference of the frankest sort with the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate. They made a number of suggestions as to altera-

* Congressional Record, March 4, 1919, p. 4974.

tions and additions. I then took all of those suggestions back to Paris, and every one of them, without exception, was embodied in the Covenant."⁴

The President's reply to the request of the thirty-seven Senators for the separation of the Covenant from the treaty was given in his speech at the Metropolitan Opera House in New York City on March 4, 1919, in which, after vigorously defending the Covenant, he said:

When that treaty comes back gentlemen on this side will find the Covenant not only in it, but so many threads of the treaty tied to the Covenant that you cannot dissect the Covenant from the treaty without destroying the whole vital structure.

President Wilson evidently did not at that time doubt his ability to secure the approval of the treaty by the United States, including the Covenant of the League of Nations. His course was warmly defended by Senators of his own party. Some peace societies, notably the League to Enforce Peace, undertook a nation-wide propaganda to develop public sentiment for the League, and the President no doubt felt justified in relying upon the traditionally favorable disposition of the American people and government toward the substitution of peaceful methods for war in the settlement of international disputes. He publicly expressed his confidence in the popular support of his program at home in his speech at New York above referred to, made on the eve of his return to Paris. In opening that address he said:

The first thing I am going to tell the people on the other side of the water is that an overwhelming majority of the American people is in favor of the League of Nations. I know that this is true. I have had unmistakable intimations of it from all parts of the country, and the voice rings true in every case.

⁴ Address of the President at Tacoma, Washington, Sept. 13, 1919, Senate Document No. 120, 66th Cong., 1st sess., p. 182.

The original draft of the Covenant and the Covenant as finally adopted are printed in the Supplement to the *AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW* for April, 1919, pp. 113 and 128. The alterations made in the original draft are described by President Wilson in his address at the plenary session of the Peace Conference at Paris, April 28, 1919, reporting the final draft for adoption. His address is printed in the Supplement, *ibid.*, p. 124.

This feeling of confidence in the ultimate success of the President's policy was reflected among his advisers and assistants on the American Peace Commission, to which the writer was attached as an assistant technical adviser. The opinion was freely expressed among them that when President Wilson brought back the treaty and the Covenant he would be so overwhelmingly supported by the American people as to make his demand for ratification irresistible.

THE TREATY IN THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Such was the situation when President Wilson on July 10, 1919, personally submitted the peace treaty with Germany to the Senate with an earnest appeal for its prompt ratification.⁵ Under the rules of the Senate, the treaty was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. The Committee decided to hold public hearings, which began July 31, and ended on September 12. During its consideration of the treaty the Committee met on 37 days, sitting sometimes in the morning and afternoon. In the course of the hearings the Committee had before it Honorable Robert Lansing, Secretary of State and one of the American Peace Commissioners, and several of the technical advisers to the American Peace Commission, including Mr. B. M. Baruch, economic adviser, Mr. Norman H. Davis, financial adviser, and Mr. David Hunter Miller, legal adviser. In addition to these officials who took part in the formulation and drafting of the treaty, the Committee heard a number of private persons interested in particular sections of the treaty, especially those relating to geographical distribution of territories and the self-determination of peoples. The presentation of such subjects was made by American citizens as, under the rules of the Committee, only American citizens could be heard by it.

The proposed transfer of Shantung to Japan was opposed by Mr. Thomas F. Millard, who styled himself the unofficial

⁵ The President's address on submitting the treaty to the Senate is printed in the *AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW* for July, 1919, pp. 554 and 576.

friendly counsellor of China, and Mr. John C. Ferguson, official adviser to the President of China. A statement on this subject was also made by Professor E. T. Williams, technical adviser on Far Eastern affairs to the American Peace Commission.

Objections to the provisions of the treaty in regard to Egypt were presented by Mr. Joseph W. Folk, counsel for the commission appointed by the Legislative Assembly of Egypt to attend the Peace Conference at Paris. The Egyptians desired either a recognition of their independence or that their status be left to the Council of the League of Nations.

The recognition of the independence of Lithuania, Latvia, Esthonia and the Ukraine was requested by representatives of the American Mid-European Association, the League of Esthonians, Letts, Lithuanians and Ukrainians of America, and the Ukrainian Federation of the United States.

Mr. Dudley Field Malone, who stated that he appeared as the chosen representative to speak for the people of India, requested that the Covenant be so amended as to require every signatory to provide all its people with democratic institutions, and he presented a resolution passed by the Indian National Council in December, 1918, claiming the right of self-determination.

A large delegation of Americans of Irish descent appeared in opposition to the approval of the Covenant on the ground that, if adopted, it would make more difficult the realization of the aspirations of Ireland for independence. The delegation was headed by the Honorable Daniel F. Cohalan, Justice of the Supreme Court of New York, and included the Honorable Frank P. Walsh, chairman on the American Commission for Irish Independence, former chairman of the War Labor Board; Honorable Edward F. Dunne, former Governor of Illinois and former Mayor of Chicago; Honorable W. W. McDowell, Lieutenant-Governor of Montana, and the Honorable W. Bourke Cochran, former member of Congress.

The claims of Greece to Thrace were submitted by representatives of the National Congress of the Friends of

Greece, while representatives of the Hungarian-American Federation protested against the dismemberment of Hungary and requested that plebiscites be held in Hungarian territory which it is proposed to transfer to other sovereignties. The claims of Hungary so far as they overlapped those of Czechoslovakia were opposed by representatives of the Slovak League and the Bohemian National Alliance of America.

Representatives of the Albanian National Party requested the right of self-determination for Albania and a government by an international commission appointed by the League of Nations.

The claims of the Jugo-Slavs in the Adriatic and Fiume were explained by a delegation representing the Jugo-Slav Republican Alliance of the United States, while Italy's side was set forth by Honorable F. H. La Guardia, member of Congress, and representatives of the Italian Irredentist Associations of America.

The complete verbatim report of all of these hearings is printed in an official document of 1,297 pages^a and contains, in addition to the oral testimony, numerous written communications sent to the Committee by interested parties, and the texts of some important official documents of the Peace Conference at Paris.

The most important part of the hearings was a conference with the President at the White House, which took place on August 19, 1919. It would be impossible within a short space to give an adequate summary of the conversation between the President and the sixteen Senators who participated. The President's views were presented in writing at the opening of the conference, of which the following extract contains the material part:

Nothing, I am led to believe, stands in the way of the ratification of the treaty except certain doubts with regard to the meaning and implication of certain articles of the Covenant of the League of Nations; and I must frankly say that I am unable to understand why such doubts should be entertained. You will

^a Senate Document, No. 106, 66th Cong., 1st sess.

recall that when I had the pleasure of a conference with your committee and with the Committee of the House of Representatives on Foreign Affairs at the White House in March last the questions now most frequently asked about the League of Nations were all canvassed with a view to their immediate clarification. The Covenant of the League was then in its first draft and subject to revision. It was pointed out that no express recognition was given to the Monroe Doctrine; that it was not expressly provided that the League should have no authority to act or to express a judgment on matters of domestic policy; that the right to withdraw from the League was not expressly recognized; and that the constitutional right of the Congress to determine all questions of peace and war was not sufficiently safeguarded. On my return to Paris all these matters were taken up again by the Commission on the League of Nations and every suggestion of the United States was accepted.

The views of the United States with regard to the questions I have mentioned had, in fact, already been accepted by the Commission and there was supposed to be nothing inconsistent with them in the draft of the Covenant first adopted—the draft which was the subject of our discussion in March—but no objection was made to saying explicitly in the text what all had supposed to be implicit in it. There was absolutely no doubt as to the meaning of any one of the resulting provisions of the Covenant in the minds of those who participated in drafting them, and I respectfully submit that there is nothing vague or doubtful in their wording.

The Monroe Doctrine is expressly mentioned as an understanding which is in no way to be impaired or interfered with by anything contained in the Covenant and the expression “regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine” was used, not because any one of the conferees thought there was any comparable agreement anywhere else in existence or in contemplation, but only because it was thought best to avoid the appearance of dealing in such a document with the policy of a single nation. Absolutely nothing is concealed in the phrase.

With regard to domestic questions Article 16 of the Covenant expressly provides that, if in case of any dispute arising between members of the League the matter involved is claimed by one of the parties “and is found by the Council to arise out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic juris-

diction of that party, the Council shall so report, and shall make no recommendation as to its settlement." The United States was by no means the only Government interested in the explicit adoption of this provision, and there is no doubt in the mind of any authoritative student of international law that such matters as immigration, tariffs, and naturalization are incontestably domestic questions with which no international body could deal without express authority to do so. No enumeration of domestic questions was undertaken, because to undertake it, even by sample, would have involved the danger of seeming to exclude those not mentioned.

The right of any sovereign State to withdraw had been taken for granted, but no objection was made to making it explicit. Indeed, so soon as the views expressed at the White House conference were laid before the Commission it was at once conceded that it was best not to leave the answer to so important a question to inference. No proposal was made to set up any tribunal to pass judgment upon the question whether a withdrawing nation had in fact fulfilled "all its international obligations and all its obligations under the Covenant." It was recognized that that question must be left to be resolved by the conscience of the nation proposing to withdraw; and I must say that it did not seem to me worth while to propose that the article be made more explicit, because I knew that the United States would never itself propose to withdraw from the League if its conscience was not entirely clear as to the fulfilment of all its international obligations. It has never failed to fulfil them and never will.

Article 10 is in no respect of doubtful meaning when read in the light of the Covenant as a whole. The Council of the League can only "advise upon" the means by which the obligations of that great article are to be given effect to. Unless the United States is a party to the policy or action in question, her own affirmative vote in the Council is necessary before any advice can be given, for a unanimous vote of the Council is required. If she is a party, the trouble is hers anyhow. And the unanimous vote of the Council is only advice in any case. Each Government is free to reject it if it pleases. Nothing could have been made more clear to the conference than the right of our Congress under our Constitution to exercise its independent judgment in all matters of peace and war. No attempt was made to question or limit that right. The United States will, indeed, undertake under

Article 10 to "respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League," and that engagement constitutes a very grave and solemn moral obligation. But it is a moral, not a legal, obligation, and leaves our Congress absolutely free to put its own interpretation upon it in all cases that call for action. It is binding in conscience only, not in law.

Article 10 seems to me to constitute the very backbone of the whole Covenant. Without it the League would be hardly more than an influential debating society.

It has several times been suggested, in public debate and in private conference, that interpretations of the sense in which the United States accepts the engagements of the Covenant should be embodied in the instrument of ratification. There can be no reasonable objection to such interpretations accompanying the act of ratification provided they do not form a part of the formal ratification itself. Most of the interpretations which have been suggested to me embody what seems to me the plain meaning of the instrument itself. But if such interpretations should constitute a part of the formal resolution of ratification, long delays would be the inevitable consequence, inasmuch as all the many governments concerned would have to accept, in effect, the language of the Senate as the language of the treaty before ratification would be complete. The assent of the German Assembly at Weimar would have to be obtained, among the rest, and I must frankly say that I could only with the greatest reluctance approach that assembly for permission to read the treaty as we understand it and as those who framed it quite certainly understood it. If the United States were to qualify the document in any way, moreover, I am confident from what I know of the many conferences and debates which accompanied the formulation of the treaty that our example would immediately be followed in many quarters, in some instances with very serious reservations, and that the meaning and operative force of the treaty would presently be clouded from one end of its clauses to the other. ⁷

The only other outstanding feature of the hearings which space will permit us to notice, was the testimony of William C. Bullitt regarding the alleged views of Secretary Lansing on the treaty. Mr. Bullitt was an employe of the State

⁷ Sen. Doc. 106, 66th Cong., 1st sess., p. 500.

Department, attached to the Peace Conference, who resigned in May, 1919, after he had learned the terms of the proposed Treaty of Peace with Germany. At the end of his testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations on September 12, 1919, Mr. Bullitt read from a memorandum of a conversation with the Secretary of State at Paris on May 19, 1919, as follows:

Mr. Lansing then said that he, too, considered many parts of the treaty thoroughly bad, particularly those dealing with Shantung and the League of Nations. He said: "I consider that the League of Nations at present is entirely useless. The great powers have simply gone ahead and arranged the world to suit themselves. England and France particularly have gotten out of the treaty everything that they wanted, and the League of Nations can do nothing to alter any of the unjust clauses of the treaty except by unanimous consent of the members of the League, and the great powers will never give their consent to changes in the interests of weaker peoples."

We then talked about the possibility of ratification by the Senate. Mr. Lansing said: "I believe that if the Senate could only understand what this treaty means, and if the American people could really understand, it would unquestionably be defeated."⁸

PRESIDENT WILSON'S ENDEAVORS TO OBTAIN UNCONDITIONAL RATIFICATION

Debate in the Senate continued while the treaty was under consideration by the Committee on Foreign Relations. It increased in volume and diversity until the Senators became divided into three groups. A small number of Senators absolutely opposed the ratification of the treaty in any form, and because of their insistent opposition they became known as the "irreconcilables." A larger group supported the President's demand that the treaty be ratified as signed, but later indicated their willingness to accept reservations of an "interpretative character." The third group was made up of

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 1276.

Senators who favored the ratification of the treaty on condition that it contain reservations safeguarding what they believed to be the substantial rights and interests of the United States. This group itself did not remain compact, but developed a schism of so-called "mild reservationists" who favored a larger participation of the United States in world affairs and therefore a minimum of reservations, as against the more restricted participation and maximum program of reservations advocated by the main group of reservationists.

As the debate progressed in the Senate and individual Senators expressed their views, it became apparent that the treaty could not obtain the necessary votes for ratification even with "interpretative reservations." President Wilson endeavored to save the situation by personal conferences at the White House with mild reservation Senators; but the serious probability that the Senate would not fully approve his work at Paris forced him to play what he evidently relied upon as his strongest hand, namely, a direct appeal to the people to support the treaty and to bring sufficient pressure to bear upon the opposing Senators to obtain its ratification in form acceptable to him. Accordingly the President undertook to accomplish this purpose in a speech-making tour of the West. He began at Columbus, Ohio, on September 4, 1919, visiting in rapid succession Indianapolis, St. Louis, Kansas City, Des Moines, Omaha, Sioux Falls, St. Paul, Minneapolis, Bismarck and Mandan, N. D., Billings and Helena, Montana; Cœur d'Alene, Idaho; Spokane, Tacoma, Portland, San Francisco, Oakland, San Diego, Los Angeles, Sacramento, Reno, Ogden, Salt Lake City, Cheyenne; Denver and Pueblo, Colorado. In his speeches he expounded what he considered to be the real meaning of the Covenant, dwelt upon features of the treaty whose merits he said had been overlooked by its opponents and lukewarm friends and deplored the attempts to amend or accept it with reservations. At the last-named city the trip was brought to an abrupt end on September 25 by the serious breakdown of the President, which forced him immediately to return to Washington, where

he was confined to the White House for five months and obliged to relinquish his active leadership in behalf of the treaty of peace and the League of Nations. His physical exertions on this strenuous 9,500 mile trip to bring about their ratification, in the course of which he made thirty-seven addresses of an average length of 5,000 words each in twenty-nine cities on eighteen days, exclusive of Sundays, spending his nights and the intervals between speeches in his Pullman car, came near resulting unfortunately in the tragic fulfilment of the declaration made in the course of his address at Spokane, Washington, on September 12, 1919, that "I am ready to fight from now until all the fight has been taken out of me by death to redeem the faith and promises of the United States."⁹

THE TREATY REPORTED TO THE SENATE

In the meantime the Committee on Foreign Relations had concluded its consideration of the treaty, and on September 10, 1919, reported it to the Senate with recommendations of a number of amendments and reservations. The amendments and reservations proposed by the Committee were thus explained in its report:

AMENDMENTS

The first amendment offered by the Committee relates to the League. It is proposed so to amend the text as to secure for the United States a vote in the Assembly of the League equal to that of any other power. Great Britain now has under the name of the British Empire one vote in the Council of the League. She has four additional votes in the Assembly of the League for her self-governing dominions and colonies, which are most properly members of the League and signatories to the treaty. She also has the vote of India, which is neither a self-governing dominion nor a colony, but merely a part of the Empire and which apparently was simply put in as a signatory and member of the League by the Peace Conference because Great Britain desired it. Great Britain also will control the votes of the Kingdom of Hejaz and of Persia. With these last two, of course, we have nothing to do.

⁹ Sen. Doc. 120, 66th Cong., 1st sess., p. 173.

But if Great Britain has six votes in the League Assembly no reason has occurred to the Committee and no argument had been made to show why the United States should not have an equal number. If other countries like the present arrangement, that is not our affair; but the Committee failed to see why the United States should have but one vote in the Assembly of the League when the British Empire has six.

Amendments 39 to 44, inclusive, transfer to China the German lease and rights, if they exist, in the Chinese Province of Shan-tung, which are given by the treaty to Japan. The majority of the Committee were not willing to have their votes recorded at any stage in the proceedings in favor of the consummation of what they consider a great wrong. They cannot assent to taking the property of a faithful ally and handing it over to another ally in fulfilment of a bargain made by other powers in a secret treaty. It is a record which they are not willing to present to their fellow-citizens or leave behind them for the contemplation of their children.

Amendment No. 2 is simply to provide that where a member of the League has self-governing dominions and colonies which are also members of the League, the exclusion of the disputants under the League rules shall cover the aggregate vote of the member of the League and its self-governing dominions and parts of empire combined if any one of them is involved in the controversy.

The remaining amendments, with a single exception, may be treated as one, for the purpose of all alike is to relieve the United States from having representatives on the commissions established by the League which deal with questions in which the United States has and can have no interest and in which the United States has evidently been inserted by design. The exception is amendment No. 45, which provides that the United States shall have a member of the Reparation Commission, but that such commissioner of the United States cannot, except in the case of shipping where the interests of the United States are directly involved, deal with or vote upon any other questions before that Commission except under instructions from the Government of the United States.

RESERVATIONS

The Committee proposes four reservations to be made a part of the resolution of ratification when it is offered. The Committee

reserves, of course, the right to offer other reservations if they shall so determine. The four reservations now presented are as follows:

"1. The United States reserves to itself the unconditional right to withdraw from the League of Nations upon the notice provided in Article 1 of said Treaty of Peace with Germany."

The provision in the League Covenant for withdrawal declares that any member may withdraw provided it has fulfilled all its international obligations and all its obligations under the Covenant. There has been much dispute as to who would decide if the question of the fulfilment of obligations was raised and it is very generally thought that this question would be settled by the Council of the League of Nations. The best that can be said about it is that the question of decision is clouded with doubt. On such a point as this there must be no doubt. The United States, which has never broken an international obligation, cannot permit all its existing treaties to be reviewed and its conduct and honor questioned by other nations. The same may be said in regard to the fulfilment of the obligations to the League. It must be made perfectly clear that the United States alone is to determine as to the fulfilment of its obligations, and its right of withdrawal must therefore be unconditional as provided in the reservation.

"2. The United States declines to assume, under the provisions of Article 10, or under any other article, any obligation to preserve the territorial integrity or political independence of any other country or to interfere in controversies between other nations, members of the League or not, or to employ the military or naval forces of the United States in such controversies, or to adopt economic measures, for the protection of any other country, whether a member of the League or not, against external aggression or for the purpose of coercing any other country, or for the purpose of intervention in the internal conflicts or other controversies which may arise in any other country, and no mandate shall be accepted by the United States under Article 22, Part I, of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, except by action of the Congress of the United States."

This reservation is intended to meet the most vital objection to the League Covenant as it stands. Under no circumstances must there be any legal or moral obligation upon the United States

to enter unto war or to send its Army and Navy abroad or without the unfettered action of Congress to impose economic boycotts on other countries. Under the Constitution of the United States the Congress alone has the power to declare war, and all bills to raise revenue or affecting the revenue in any way must originate in the House of Representatives, be passed by the Senate, and receive the signature of the President. These constitutional rights of Congress must not be impaired by any agreements such as are presented in this treaty, nor can any opportunity of charging the United States with bad faith be permitted. No American soldiers or sailors must be sent to fight in other lands at the bidding of the League of Nations. American lives must not be sacrificed except by the will and command of the American people acting through their constitutional representatives in Congress.

This reservation also covers the subject of mandates. According to the provisions of the Covenant of the League the acceptance of a mandate by any member is voluntary, but as to who shall have authority to refuse or to accept a mandate for any country the Covenant of the League is silent. The decision as to accepting a mandate must rest exclusively within the control of the Congress of the United States as the reservation provides and must not be delegated, even by inference, to any personal agent or to any delegate or commissioner.

"3. The United States reserves to itself exclusively the right to decide what questions are within its domestic jurisdiction, and declares that all domestic and political questions relating to its affairs, including immigration, coastwise traffic, the tariff, commerce, and all other domestic questions, are solely within the jurisdiction of the United States and are not under this treaty submitted in any way either to arbitration or to the consideration of the Council or of the Assembly of the League of Nations, or to the decision or recommendation of any other power."

This reservation speaks for itself. It is not necessary to follow out here all tortuous windings, which to those who have followed them through the labyrinth disclose the fact that the League under certain conditions will have power to pass upon and decide questions of immigration and tariff, as well as the others mentioned in the reservation. It is believed by the Committee that this reservation relieves the United States from any dangers or any obligations in this direction.

The fourth and last reservation is as follows:

"4. The United States declines to submit for arbitration or inquiry by the Assembly or the Council of the League of Nations provided for in said treaty of peace any questions which in the judgment of the United States depend upon or relate to its long-established policy, commonly known as the Monroe Doctrine; said doctrine is to be interpreted by the United States alone, and is hereby declared to be wholly outside the jurisdiction of said League of Nations and entirely unaffected by any provision contained in the said Treaty of Peace with Germany."

The purpose of this reservation is clear. It is intended to preserve the Monroe Doctrine from any interference or interpretation by foreign powers. As the Monroe Doctrine has protected the United States, so, it is believed by the committee, will this reservation protect the Monroe Doctrine from the destruction with which it is threatened by Article 21 in the Covenant of the League and leave it, where it has always been, within the sole and complete control of the United States.

This Covenant of the League of Nations is an alliance and not a League, as is amply shown by the provisions of the Treaty with Germany which vests all essential power in five great nations. Those same nations, the principal Allied and Associated Powers, also dominate the League through the Council.

The Committee believe that the League as it stands will breed wars instead of securing peace. They also believe that the Covenant of the League demands sacrifices of American independence and sovereignty which would in no way promote the world's peace but which are fraught with the gravest dangers to the future safety and well-being of the United States. The amendments and reservations alike are governed by a single purpose and that is to guard American rights and American sovereignty, the invasion of which would stimulate breaches of faith, encourage conflicts, and generate wars. The United States can serve the cause of peace best, as she has served it in the past, and do more to secure liberty and civilization throughout the world by proceeding along the paths she has always followed and by not permitting herself to be fettered by the dictates of other nations or immersed and entangled in all the broils and conflicts of Europe.¹⁰

The foregoing report was signed by the majority of the

¹⁰ Senate Report, No. 176, 66th Cong., 1st sess. Part 1.

members of the Committee. A separate report was made on September 11, by the minority members of the Committee, who opposed both amendments and reservations. The proposed amendments would, if adopted, in their opinion defeat the participation of the United States in the treaty, and the same effect would be produced, it was stated, by the adoption of the reservations, which were in no sense "interpretative reservations" but in fact alterations of the treaty. Concerning the League of Nations the minority report added:

The League of Nations proposes to organize the nations of the world for peace, whereas they have always heretofore been organized for war. It proposes to establish the rule of international justice in place of force. It proposes to make a war of conquest impossible by uniting all nations against the offender.

It is the first international arrangement ever made by which small and weak nations are given the organized strength of the world for protection.

It is a covenant between many nations by which each agrees not to do certain things which in the past have produced wars and to do many things which have been found to preserve the peace.

It is a working plan for the gradual reduction of armament by all members simultaneously in proper proportion and by agreement.

It sets up arbitration as a friendly method of adjusting disputes and inquiry when arbitration is not agreed to. In both cases it provides a cooling-off period of nine months during which the differences may be adjusted.

It preserves the territorial integrity and political independence of each member and leaves to each the exercise of its sovereign rights as a nation.

It will save the world from wars and preparations for wars. It will reduce armies and navies and taxes.

It will help to remove the discontent with government in all countries by making government beneficent and devoting its revenues to constructive rather than to destructive purposes.

It is the only plan proposed to redeem the world from war, pestilence and famine. The only one by which a stricken world can be redeemed from the disasters of the late war and the dangers of impending international chaos.¹¹

¹¹ *Ibid.*, Part 2.

A third report on the treaty, made by Senator McCumber on September 15, represented substantially the views of the "mild reservationists." It opposed the amendments and objected to the phraseology of the reservations which it characterized as unnecessarily severe. It recommended four substitute reservations in lieu of the reservations proposed by the majority, and added two additional reservations to take the place of the amendments proposed by the majority on the subject of Shantung and the voting power of self-governing dominions in the League. Concerning the other amendments Senator McCumber expressed his opinion that the United States should not withdraw from the work of reconstruction in Europe. He thus commented upon the Covenant of the League of Nations:

There has been written into this compact a great underlying principle which is the very soul of the agreement, that the same code of morality which governs people in their relations to each other in every highly organized State of the world shall govern nations in their relations to each other; that no nation shall rob another nation of its territory or its independence; that no nation shall have the right to murder the people of another nation for the selfish purpose of extending its own domains.

No statesman, no philosopher, has ever yet given a single reason why nations, which are but collections of individuals, should not be governed in their international relations by the same code of ethics that governs the peoples of communities or States in their internal relations.

For the first time in the history of the world this great advance step is attempted. The whole issue is whether nations can so eliminate their selfish desires, so restrain their national avarice, as to accord equal justice to all people. As in the community, every individual assumes to assist in the enforcement of law, in the protection of the life, liberty, and property of every other citizen, so in this international code of ethics, each nation assumes to do its part in guarding the international rights of every other nation. As in every State a forum has been provided for the settlement of individual disputes, and no individual is allowed the right to disregard the law of his community, so in this international compact, a forum is provided for the settlement of inter-

national disputes, and each nation is forbidden to determine when it may commit an act of aggression against another nation until it has at least brought its case into this forum for consideration and settlement if possible.¹²

THE TREATY IN THE SENATE

The treaty of peace became the regular business before the Senate on September 15. On the following day its consideration was begun section by section. By September 27, the first 111 articles had been read and the reading was interrupted to take up the amendments proposed by the Committee to eliminate the United States from participation in certain work connected with the execution of the treaty.

The amendments eliminated the American representatives from the commissions to run the frontiers between Belgium and Germany, Poland and Germany, and Poland and Czecho-Slovakia, and from the commissions to administer the Saar Basin, Upper Silesia, East Prussia and Schleswig during the periods of the plebiscites and to carry out their results. They also eliminated the participation of the United States in future negotiations regarding the status of Luxemburg and from the proposed agreements with Poland and Czecho-Slovakia regarding the protection of minorities. The United States was further eliminated from any part in the appointment of the manager of the Central Rhine Commission, and from the acceptance of any right or title in Memel and Danzig or participation in the future settlement of their status.

The above amendments were debated until October 2, when they were put to a vote under a unanimous-consent agreement. All were rejected by votes ranging from 58 yeas to 30 nays to votes without the formality of a roll call.

The reading of the treaty was resumed on October 7 and 8, when the amendments were reached transferring to China instead of Japan the German lease and rights in Shantung. Debate on these amendments continued until October 16, when they were also voted upon under a unanimous-consent

¹² Sen. Rep. 176, 66th Cong., 1st sess., Part 3.

agreement, and rejected by a vote of 35 yeas to 55 nays. The reading of the treaty was immediately resumed and on the following day, October 17, the Committee's amendment was reached restricting the participation of the American member of the Reparation Commission to matters arising under Annex 3 to the reparation clauses, unless otherwise specifically instructed by his government to take part. The amendment was promptly voted upon and rejected by a *viva voce* vote. The reading of the treaty then proceeded until October 20 when it was completed.

On October 22 the Senate took up the first amendment, which had been passed over, intended to secure equality of voting of the United States in the Council and Assembly of the League of Nations. This amendment proposed to insert the following proviso at the end of Article 3 of the Covenant:

Provided, that when any member of the League has or possesses self-governing dominions or colonies or parts of empire, which are also members of the League, the United States shall have votes in the Assembly or Council of the League numerically equal to the aggregate vote of such member of the League and its self-governing dominions and colonies and parts of empire in the Council or Assembly of the League.

The amendment was rejected on October 27 by a vote of 38 yeas to 40 nays. The second Committee amendment on the same subject was then taken up. It proposed to insert the following paragraph in Article 15 of the Covenant:

Whenever the case referred to the Assembly involves a dispute between one member of the League and another member whose self-governing dominions or colonies or parts of empire are also represented in the Assembly, neither the disputant members nor any of their said dominions, colonies, or parts of empire shall have a vote upon any phase of the question.

Senator Shields offered the following substitute for the amendment of the Committee:

Provided further, That when imperial and federal governments and their self-governing dominions, colonies, or states are members of the League, as originally organized or hereafter admitted, the

empire or federal government and the dominions, colonies, or states shall, collectively, have only one membership, one delegate, and one vote in the Council and only three delegates and one vote in the Assembly.

The substitute was defeated on March 29 by a vote of 42 yeas to 49 nays; and the amendment proposed by the Committee was rejected on the same day by a vote of 36 yeas to 47 nays.

This concluded the amendments proposed by the Committee on Foreign Relations, and amendments from individual Senators were then in order. On October 29, Senator Johnson offered the following amendment:

When any member of the League has or possesses self-governing dominions or colonies or parts of empire, which are also members of the League, the United States shall have representatives in the Council or Assembly or any organization of labor or labor conference under the League or treaty numerically equal to the aggregate number of representatives of such member of the League and its self-governing dominions and colonies and parts of empire in the Council or Assembly of the League or organization of labor or labor conference under the League or treaty, and such representatives of the United States shall have the same powers and rights as the representatives of said member and its self-governing dominions or colonies or parts of empire, and upon all matters whatsoever the United States shall have votes in the Council and Assembly and any organization of labor or labor conference under the League or treaty numerically equal to the aggregate vote cast or registered by any such member of the League and its self-governing dominions and colonies and parts of empire.

The proposed amendment went on to explain that its intent was "to give to the United States representation upon Council or Assembly and in any labor organization or labor conference under the League or treaty, a voting power in every respect and upon all questions equal to the aggregate representation and voting power of any member of the League and such member's self-governing dominions and colonies and parts of empire, and this amendment shall be literally applied and

construed to effectuate fully said intent." It concluded by repeating the Committee amendment just rejected.

The Johnson amendment was promptly rejected by a vote of 35 yeas to 42 nays.

On October 30, Senator La Follette moved to strike out Part XIII of the treaty dealing with the International Labor Organization. This motion was defeated on November 5 by a vote of 34 yeas to 47 nays. On November 4, Senator Lodge moved to strike out Articles 156, 157, and 158 of the treaty dealing with the question of Shantung. This proposal was immediately rejected by a vote of 26 yeas to 41 nays. On November 5, Senator Gore proposed to insert at the end of the first paragraph of Article 12 of the Covenant a proviso that members of the League should not resort to war until an advisory vote of the people shall have been taken, which was rejected on November 6 by a vote of 16 yeas to 67 nays.

The argument chiefly used by the opponents of textual amendments was that their adoption would necessitate a resubmission of the treaty to the Peace Conference, including Germany. As shown by the votes upon the amendments, the majority of the Senate was opposed to such a course. The opposition to amendments was so evident that on the same day that they were taken up in the Senate for consideration (October 22), the Committee on Foreign Relations met for the purpose of substituting reservations for them.

On October 24, Senator Lodge, on behalf of the Committee on Foreign Relations, reported a new draft of the reservations already reported, together with certain additional reservations, making fourteen in all, preceded by a preamble. On November 6, after the Senate had rejected all of the proposed amendments, Senator Lodge moved the adoption of the new reservations and preamble. Voting upon them began the following day. The proceedings upon each were as follows:

RESOLVING CLAUSE OR PREAMBLE

Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein), That the Senate advise and consent to the ratifi-

cation of the Treaty of Peace with Germany concluded at Versailles on the 28th day of June, 1919, subject to the following reservations and understandings, which are hereby made a part and condition of this resolution of ratification, which ratification is not to take effect or bind the United States until the said reservations and understandings adopted by the Senate have been accepted by an exchange of notes as a part and a condition of this resolution of ratification by at least three of the four principal Allied and Associated Powers, to wit, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan.

This clause was taken up and adopted on November 7 by a vote of 48 to 40. Previously a motion by Senator McCumber to strike out all after the word "ratification" in the sixth line had been rejected by a vote of 40 to 48. The same motion made by Senator Hitchcock on November 18, when the Senate was acting upon the report of the Committee of the Whole, was rejected by a vote of 36 to 45. A motion on November 7, by Senator Borah to amend so as to require the acceptance of the reservations by all four of the principal Allied and Associated Powers instead of three was defeated by a vote of 25 yeas to 63 nays. An amendment proposed by Senator King to provide for the implied acceptance of any power by participation in proceedings authorized by the treaty was also rejected, the vote being 42 yeas to 46 nays.

RESERVATION NO. I.—*Withdrawal*
from the League

The United States so understands and construes Article I that in case of notice of withdrawal from the League of Nations, as provided in said article, the United States shall be the sole judge as to whether all its international obligations and all its obligations under the said Covenant have been fulfilled, and notice of withdrawal by the United States may be given by a concurrent resolution of the Congress of the United States.

This reservation was adopted on November 8 in the form recommended by the Committee, by a vote of 50 to 35. A motion by Senator Thomas to strike out the last clause providing for notice of withdrawal by a concurrent resolution, offered on November 7 but withdrawn and renewed on November 8 by Senator Walsh of Montana, was lost by 37 yeas to 49 nays. An amendment by Senator Gore that such notice might be given either by the President or by a concurrent resolution was rejected on November 8 by a vote of 18 yeas to 68 nays. On the same day a motion by Senator Nelson to change "concurrent" resolution to "joint" resolution was voted down, 39 yeas to 45 nays. Senator King then moved to amend the words "the United States shall be the sole judge" to read "any nation shall be the sole judge," and it failed to carry by a vote of 32 yeas to 52 nays.

RESERVATION NO. 2.—*Guarantee of
territorial integrity*

The United States assumes no obligation to preserve the territorial integrity or political independence of any other country or to interfere in controversies between nations—whether members of the League or not—under the provisions of Article 10, or to employ the military or naval forces of the United States under any article of the treaty for any purpose, unless in any particular case the Congress, which, under the Constitution, has the sole power to declare war or authorize the employment of the military or naval forces of the United States, shall by act or joint resolution so provide.

This reservation was adopted on November 13 as drafted by the Committee on Foreign Relations, by a vote of 46 to 33. Before its adoption several unsuccessful attempts to modify it were made. On November 10, Senator Thomas offered the following substitute:

That the suggestions of the Council of the League of Nations as to the means of carrying the obligations of Article 10 into effect

are only advisory, and that any undertaking under the provisions of Article 10, the execution of which may require the use of American military or naval forces or economic measures, can under the Constitution be carried out only by the action of the Congress, and that the failure of the Congress to adopt the suggestions of the Council of the League or to provide such military or naval forces or economic measures shall not constitute a violation of the treaty.

After this substitute was rejected by a vote of 36 yeas to 48 nays, a substitute by Senator Borah declaring that "the United States assumes no obligation, legal or moral, under Article 10 and shall not be bound by any of the terms or conditions of said article" was also rejected on the same day, 18 yeas to 68 nays. Senator Walsh of Montana moved to strike out the clause "or authorize the employment of the military or naval forces of the United States," which was rejected, 38 yeas to 45 nays. He then moved the following addition to the reservation: "And the United States hereby releases all members of the League from any obligation to it under Article 10 and declines to participate in any proceeding by the Council authorized thereby." The vote on this addition did not take place until November 13, when it was rejected, 4 yeas to 68 nays. On the same day Senator Thomas moved an amendment which would recognize the obligation of the United States to preserve the territorial integrity or political independence of other countries for a period of five years. This was rejected by a vote of 32 yeas to 46 nays. Thereupon, Senator Walsh of Montana offered a proviso to the reservation under which the United States would assume for a period of five years the obligation to preserve the territorial integrity and political independence of Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State. This proviso was rejected by a vote of 32 yeas to 44 nays. Senator McKellar moved a proviso under which the United States would guarantee for five years the sovereignty of France over Alsace-Lorraine, which was also rejected, 31 yeas to 46 nays. A substitute offered by Senator Hitchcock was next rejected, 32 yeas to 44

nays, interpreting the advice mentioned in Article 10 of the Covenant as to the employment of naval and military forces to be "merely advice which every member nation is free to accept or reject, according to the conscience and judgment of its then existing government," and declaring that "in the United States this advice can only be accepted by action of the Congress at the time in being." Another substitute was then offered by Senator Owen declaring that the United States, in assuming the obligations of Article 10 of the Covenant, "does so with the understanding that the advice or recommendation of the Council or Assembly under Articles 10 and 15 is purely advisory and absolutely subject to such judgment and action as the Congress of the United States may find justified by the facts in any case submitted." It was rejected by a vote of 33 yeas to 44 nays; whereupon Senator Hitchcock proposed to add to the reservation the following paragraph:

But, finally, it shall be the declared policy of our Government, in order to meet fully and fairly our obligations to ourselves and to the world, that the freedom and peace of Europe being again threatened by any power or combination of powers, the United States will regard such a situation with grave concern as a menace to its own peace and freedom, will consult with other powers affected with a view to devising means for the removal of such menace, and will, the necessity arising in the future, carry out the same complete accord and cooperation with our chief co-belligerents for the defense of civilization.

The proposed amendment was rejected, 34 yeas to 45 nays.

RESERVATION No. 3.—*Mandates*

No mandate shall be accepted by the United States under Article 22, Part I, or any other provision of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, except by action of the Congress of the United States.

This reservation was adopted without a roll call on November 15, in Committee of the Whole, in the form recommended

by the Committee on Foreign Relations. When the report of the Committee was before the Senate for concurrence on November 18, Senator Lodge demanded a roll call and the reservation was adopted by a vote of 52 to 31.

RESERVATION NO. 4.—*Domestic questions*

The United States reserves to itself exclusively the right to decide what questions are within its domestic jurisdiction, and declares that all domestic and political questions relating wholly or in part to its internal affairs, including immigration, labor, coastwise traffic, the tariff, commerce, the suppression of traffic in women and children and in opium and other dangerous drugs, and all other domestic questions, are solely within the jurisdiction of the United States and are not under this treaty to be submitted in any way either to arbitration or to the consideration of the Council or of the Assembly of the League of Nations, or any agency thereof, or to the decision or recommendation of any other power.

This reservation was adopted in Committee of the Whole on November 15 by a vote of 59 to 36 after it had been amended on motion of Senator Hale so as to exclude boundary questions from arbitration or the jurisdiction of the League of Nations, but the amendment was eliminated in the Senate on November 18. On November 15, a substitute offered by Senator Hitchcock, simply excluding from the jurisdiction of the League any matter which a member nation "considers to be in international law a domestic question, such as immigration, labor, tariff, or other matter relating to its internal or coastwise affairs," was rejected by a vote of 43 yeas to 52 nays.

RESERVATION NO. 5.—*Monroe Doctrine*

The United States will not submit to arbitration or to inquiry by the Assembly or by the Council of the League of Nations, provided for in said treaty of peace, any questions which in the judgment of the United States depend upon or relate to its long-established policy, commonly

known as the Monroe Doctrine; said doctrine is to be interpreted by the United States alone, and is hereby declared to be wholly outside the jurisdiction of said League of Nations and entirely unaffected by any provision contained in the said Treaty of Peace with Germany.

The reservation as reported by the Committee on Foreign Relations was adopted on November 15 by a vote of 55 to 34, after two substitutes offered by Senators Hitchcock and Pittman had been rejected, 43 yeas to 51 nays, and 42 yeas to 52 nays,¹³ and a motion by Senator Smith to strike out after the words "said doctrine" the clause "is to be interpreted by the United States alone" had been rejected without a roll call.

RESERVATION NO. 6.—*Shantung*

The United States withholds its assent to Articles 156, 157, and 158, and reserves full liberty of action with respect to any controversy which may arise under said articles between the Republic of China and the Empire of Japan.

This reservation was adopted on November 15 by a vote of 53 to 41 in the form recommended by the Committee. Before its adoption Senator McCumber moved a substitute reading: "The United States refrains from entering into any agreement on its part in reference to the matters contained in Articles 156, 157, and 158, and reserves full liberty of action in

¹³ These substitutes read:

SENATOR HITCHCOCK:

That the national policy of the United States known as the Monroe Doctrine, as announced and interpreted by the United States, is not in any way impaired or affected by the Covenant of the League of Nations and is not subject to any decision, report, or inquiry by the Council or Assembly.

SENATOR PITTMAN:

The United States does not bind itself to submit for arbitration or inquiry by the Assembly or the Council any question which, in the judgment of the United States, depends upon or involves its long-established policy commonly known as the Monroe Doctrine, and it is preserved unaffected by any provision in the said treaty contained.

respect to any controversy which may arise in relation thereto." It was rejected by a vote of 42 yeas to 50 nays. Senator Pittman then moved a substitute which provided that in ratifying the treaty the United States understands that the rights and interests renounced by Germany in favor of Japan are to be returned by Japan to China upon the adoption of the treaty in accordance with the notes exchanged between Japan and China on May 25, 1915. This substitute was likewise rejected, the vote being 39 yeas to 50 nays.

RESERVATION NO. 7.—*Appointment of American representatives in the League*

The Congress of the United States will provide by law for the appointment of the representatives of the United States in the Assembly and the Council of the League of Nations, and may in its discretion provide for the participation of the United States in any commission, committee, tribunal, court, council, or conference, or in the selection of any members thereof, and for the appointment of members of said commissions, committees, tribunals, courts, council, or conferences, or any other representatives under the treaty of peace, or in carrying out its provisions, and until such participation and appointment have been so provided for and the powers and duties of such representatives have been defined by law, no person shall represent the United States under either said League of Nations or the Treaty of Peace with Germany or be authorized to perform any act for or on behalf of the United States thereunder, and no citizen of the United States shall be selected or appointed as a member of said commissions, committees, tribunals, courts, councils, or conferences except with the approval of the Senate of the United States.

RESERVATION NO. 8.—*Reparation Commission*

The United States understands that the Reparation Commission will regulate or interfere with exports from

the United States to Germany, or from Germany to the United States, only when the United States by act or joint resolution of Congress approves such regulation or interference.

RESERVATION NO. 9.—*Expenses of the League*

The United States shall not be obligated to contribute to any expenses of the League of Nations, or of the secretariat, or of any commission, or committee, or conference, or other agency, organized under the League of Nations or under the treaty or for the purpose of carrying out the treaty provisions, unless and until an appropriation of funds available for such expenses shall have been made by the Congress of the United States.

RESERVATION NO. 10.—*Armaments*

If the United States shall at any time adopt any plan for the limitation of armaments proposed by the Council of the League of Nations under the provisions of Article 8, it reserves the right to increase such armaments without the consent of the Council whenever the United States is threatened with invasion or engaged in war.

RESERVATION NO. 11.—*Relations with nationals of covenant-breaking State*

The United States reserves the right to permit, in its discretion, the nationals of a covenant-breaking State, as defined in Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, residing within the United States or in countries other than that violating said Article 16, to continue their commercial, financial, and personal relations with the nationals of the United States.

RESERVATION NO. 12.—*Illegal acts in contravention of American rights*

Nothing in Articles 296, 297, or in any of the annexes thereto, or in any other article, section, or annex of the

Treaty of Peace with Germany shall, as against citizens of the United States, be taken to mean any confirmation, ratification, or approval of any act otherwise illegal or in contravention of the rights of citizens of the United States.

All of the above reservations were adopted on November 15, in the form recommended by the Committee on Foreign Relations, by the following votes: No. 7, 53 to 40; No. 8, 54 to 40; Nos. 9 and 10, 56 to 39; No. 11, 53 to 41; No. 12, 52 to 41.

RESERVATION No. 13.—*International Labor Organization*

The United States withholds its assent to Part XIII (Articles 387 to 427, inclusive) unless Congress, by act or joint resolution, shall hereafter make provision for representation in the organization established by said Part XIII, and in such event the participation of the United States will be governed and conditioned by the provisions of such act or joint resolution.

This reservation was offered by Senator McCumber on November 17, and agreed to on November 18 by a vote of 54 to 35, after a substitute by Senator King withholding entirely assent to Part XIII of the treaty, excepting it from the act of ratification and declining to participate in carrying out its provisions, had been voted down 43 yeas to 48 nays.

RESERVATION No. 14.—*Voting power of self-governing dominions*

The United States assumes no obligations to be bound by any election, decision, report, or finding of the Council or Assembly in which any member of the League and its self-governing dominions, colonies, or parts of empire, in the aggregate have cast more than one vote, and assumes no obligation to be bound by any decision, report, or finding of the Council or Assembly arising out of any

dispute between the United States and any member of the league if such member, or any self-governing dominion, colony, empire, or part of empire united with it politically has voted.

This reservation was offered by Senator Lenroot on November 18, and agreed to by a vote of 55 to 38. It was adopted after Senator Johnson had offered in slightly modified form as a reservation his textual amendment on this subject rejected on October 29 and it had again been defeated, 43 yeas to 46 nays; and after the following addition proposed by Senator McCumber had been rejected by a vote of 3 yeas to 86 nays: "Unless upon the submission of the matter to the Council or Assembly for decision, report, or finding, the United States consents that the said dominions, colonies, or parts of empire may each have the right to cast a separate vote upon the said election, decision, report or finding."

REJECTED COMMITTEE RESERVATIONS

On November 17 the Senate, as in Committee of the Whole, rejected by votes of 29 yeas to 64 nays, and 36 yeas to 56 nays, the following reservations recommended by the Committee on Foreign Relations:

The United States declines to accept as trustee, or in her own right, any interest in or any responsibility for the government or disposition of the overseas possessions of Germany, her rights and titles to which Germany renounces to the principal Allied and Associated Powers under Articles 119 to 127, inclusive.

The United States reserves to itself exclusively the right to decide what questions affect its honor or its vital interests and declares that such questions are not under this treaty to be submitted in any way either to arbitration or to the consideration of the Council or of the Assembly of the League of Nations or any agency thereof or to the decision or recommendation of any other Power.

An attempt was made on November 18 to have the Senate restore the latter, but it was again rejected by a vote of 33 yeas to 50 nays.

OTHER RESERVATIONS REJECTED

A number of reservations offered by individual Senators were also rejected, as follows:

On November 17 Senator Owen offered a reservation declaring that "the protectorate in Great Britain over Egypt is understood to be merely a means through which the nominal suzerainty of Turkey over Egypt shall be transferred to the Egyptian people, and shall not be construed as a recognition by the United States of any sovereign rights over the Egyptian people in Great Britain or as depriving the people of Egypt of any of their rights of self-government and independence." This was rejected by a vote of 37 yeas to 45 nays. Senator Owen attempted to have the same reservation adopted when the report of the Committee of the Whole was being considered in the Senate on November 18, but he again failed by a vote of 31 yeas to 46 nays.

After the rejection of his reservation regarding Egypt on November 17, Senator Owen the same day proposed the following reservation, which was rejected by a *viva voce* vote:

Resolved, That the United States in ratifying the Covenant of the League of Nations does not intend to be understood as modifying in any degree the obligations entered into by the United States and the Entente Allies in the agreement of November 5, 1918, upon which as a basis the German Empire laid down its arms. The United States regards that contract to carry out the principles set forth by the President of the United States on January 8, 1917, and in subsequent addresses, as a world agreement, binding on the great nations which entered into it, and that the principles there set forth will be carried out in due time through the mechanism provided in the Covenant, and that Article 23, paragraph (b), pledging the members of the League to undertake to secure just treatment of the native inhabitants under their control, involves a pledge to carry out these principles.

On November 18, Senator Phelan proposed that the United States reserve the right to interpret the Covenant of the League of Nations and the treaty of peace in harmony with the principles laid down by President Wilson's fourteen

points. This was voted down by 12 yeas to 79 nays. The following resolution of ratification was then offered by Senator Knox as a substitute for all of the reservations that had been adopted:

Resolved, That the Senate of the United States unreservedly advises and consents to the ratification of this treaty in so far as it provides for the creation of a status of peace between the United States and Germany.

Resolved further, That the Senate of the United States advises and consents to the ratification of this treaty, reserving to the United States the fullest and most complete liberty of action in respect to any report, decision, recommendation, action, advice, or proposals of the League of Nations or its Executive Council or any labor conference provided for in the treaty, and also the sole right to determine its own relations and duties and course of action toward such League or toward any member thereof, or toward any other nation in respect to any question, matter, or thing that may arise while a member of such League, anything in the covenants or constitution of such League or the Treaty of Versailles to the contrary notwithstanding, and also reserves to itself the unconditional right to withdraw from membership in such League and to withdraw from membership in any body, board, commission, committee, or organization whatever set up in any part of the treaty for the purpose of aiding its execution or otherwise, effecting by such withdrawal as complete a release of any further obligations and duties under such treaty as if the United States had never been a party thereto. It is also

Resolved further, That the validity of this act of ratification depends upon the affirmative act of the principal Allied Powers named in the Treaty of Peace with Germany, approving these reservations and certifying said approval to the United States within 60 days after the deposit of the resolution of ratification by the United States.

It was rejected by a vote of 30 yeas to 61 nays.

Senator Jones of Washington offered a reservation prohibiting the American representative in the Council of the League from giving his consent to any proposal involving the use of the military or naval forces of the United States until

he had secured the authority of Congress, which was rejected by a vote of 34 yeas to 50 nays.

A reservation submitted by Senator Gore, declaring that

Nothing contained in this treaty or Covenant shall be so construed as to require the United States of America to depart from its traditional policy of not intruding upon, interfering with, or entangling itself in the political questions or policy or internal administration of any foreign State; nor shall anything contained in the said treaty or Covenant be construed to imply a relinquishment by the United States of America of its traditional attitude toward purely American questions,

was then rejected by a vote of 28 yeas to 50 nays.

Senator France moved a proviso to Reservation No. 2 that the United States should have the privilege of nominating any non-member nation for membership in the League and of offering any amendment to the Covenant at any time, and in case of unfavorable action by the League upon either proposal the United States reserved the right to withdraw immediately without condition or notice. The rejection of this proviso was accomplished without a roll call; and Senator France then offered a second reservation providing that, in accordance with the principles declared in Article 22, "the principal Allied and Associated Powers shall renounce in favor of the United States all their rights and titles to the colonies and territories in Africa formerly held by Germany . . . and the United States shall act as mandatory of such territories to the end that the inhabitants of these colonies and territories may be civilized, educated, and fitted for self-determination," which was rejected by a vote of 3 yeas to 71 nays.

Senator Owen submitted the following modification of the reservation proposed by him on November 17: "The United States holds that the principles covered by the letter of Secretary of State of November 5, 1918, as the conditions upon which the armistice was based, are binding and the Covenant of the League must be interpreted in accordance with those principles." This was rejected by a *viva voce* vote.

Senator Jones of Washington then proposed the addition of a paragraph giving notice on behalf of the United States that it will withdraw from the League at the end of two years unless Shantung shall have been restored to China in full sovereignty, the relations of Ireland to the British Empire shall have been adjusted satisfactorily to the people of Ireland, the independence of Egypt recognized, and conscription abolished by each member of the League. This proposal was also rejected by a *viva voce* vote.

Six reservations introduced by Senator La Follette upon the following subjects were severally rejected by the votes indicated:

Insuring to all peoples the right of self-government—
rejected 24 yeas to 49 nays.

Abolishing conscription—rejected 21 yeas to 54 nays.

Giving the people of all nations a referendum vote on war—
rejected 13 yeas to 58 nays.

Limitation of armaments—rejected 10 yeas to 60 nays.

Prevention of forcible annexations—rejected 19 yeas to 51
nays.

Prohibiting the use of mandates over weaker states for
exploitation of the inhabitants and resources of the
country—rejected 23 yeas to 51 nays.

A reservation to Article II of the Covenant proposed by Senator Walsh of Massachusetts to safeguard the rights of free speech, the liberty of the press, and the advocacy of the principles of national independence and self-determination, failed of adoption by a vote of 36 yeas to 42 nays.

REJECTION OF THE RESOLUTION OF RATIFICATION

After all of the reservations had been acted upon on November 18, those adopted in the Committee of the Whole were reported to the Senate and concurred in as adopted, except No. 4, which was amended as previously indicated.¹⁴ The second rejection of Senator Reed's reservation regarding

¹⁴ *Supra*, p. 30.

vital interests and Senator Owen's reservation regarding Egypt, also previously mentioned,¹⁵ ended the Senate's consideration of the reservations.

The resolution of ratification, including the reservations adopted, was presented by Senator Lodge immediately upon the convening of the Senate on November 19, when ninety-three of the ninety-six Senators answered the roll call. After a number of Senators had explained why they intended to vote for or against the resolution of ratification, the vote was taken and resulted in 39 for and 55 against, so that the resolution of ratification was rejected, two-thirds of the Senators present not having voted in favor of it. A formal motion to reconsider the vote was adopted; whereupon the Senate, by a vote of 41 to 50, rejected a motion by Senator Hitchcock that the treaty be referred to the Committee of the Whole with instructions to report it back to the Senate with the following reservations:

That any member nation proposing to withdraw from the League on two years' notice is the sole judge as to whether its obligations referred to in Article 1 of the League of Nations have been performed as required in said article.

That no member nation is required to submit to the League, its Council, or its Assembly, for decision, report, or recommendation, any matter which it considers to be in international law a domestic question such as immigration, labor, tariff, or other matter relating to its internal or coastwise affairs.

That the national policy of the United States known as the Monroe Doctrine, as announced and interpreted by the United States, is not in any way impaired or affected by the Covenant of the League of Nations and is not subject to any decision, report, or inquiry by the Council or Assembly.

That the advice mentioned in Article 10 of the Covenant of the League which the Council may give to the member nations as to the employment of their naval and military forces is merely advice which each member nation is free to accept or reject according to the conscience and judgment of its then existing Government, and in the United States this advice can only be

¹⁵ *Supra*, p. 36.

accepted by action of the Congress at the time in being, Congress alone under the Constitution of the United States having the power to declare war.

That in case of a dispute between members of the League, if one of them have self-governing colonies, dominions, or parts which have representation in the Assembly, each and all are to be considered parties to the dispute, and the same shall be the rule if one of the parties to the dispute is a self-governing colony, dominion, or part, in which case all other self-governing colonies, dominions, or parts, as well as the nation as a whole, shall be considered parties to the dispute, and each and all shall be disqualified from having their votes counted in case of any inquiry of such dispute made by the Assembly.

Senator Lodge's resolution of ratification was then reconsidered and again rejected by 41 yeas to 51 nays.

A resolution of unconditional ratification offered by Senator Underwood was also rejected, the vote being 38 yeas and 53 nays.

Whereupon the Senate adjourned.

THE TREATY AGAIN BEFORE THE SENATE

Congress convened in regular session on December 2, 1919, but no formal action was taken upon the peace treaty until February 9, on which date the Senate recommitted the treaty to the Committee on Foreign Relations with instructions to report it back immediately, together with the resolution of ratification rejected in November, including the reservations previously adopted. These instructions were complied with on the following day. On February 11 Senator Lodge presented certain proposed amendments to the reservations which he stated had been discussed by an informal bipartisan committee during the last two weeks of January.¹⁶ The action subsequently taken upon each reservation was as follows:

RESERVATION NO. 1.—*Withdrawal from the League*

On February 16, Senator Lodge proposed to change the notice of withdrawal from a concurrent resolution of Congress

¹⁶ See Senate Document No. 193, 66th Cong., 2d sess.

to notice by "the President or by Congress alone whenever a majority of both Houses may deem it necessary." This amendment was rejected on February 21 by a vote of 32 yeas to 33 nays. A substitute amendment offered by Senator Hitchcock providing that notice of withdrawal may be given by a joint resolution instead of a concurrent resolution of Congress was also rejected, 26 yeas to 38 nays. The difference between a concurrent resolution and a joint resolution was stated in debate to be that the former does not require the signature of the President, while the latter does. The purpose of both the amendment by Senator Lodge and the substitute of Senator Hitchcock was to meet the objection to the constitutionality of the reservation adopted on November 19 in that it purported to deprive the President of participation in foreign affairs vested in him by the Constitution. The argument was ineffective, for the reservation was readopted in its original form on February 21 by a vote of 45 to 20.

RESERVATION NO. 2.—*Guarantee of territorial integrity*

Instead of being considered in its regular order, this reservation was postponed until March 12. It related to Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations which was the crux of the contest over the ratification of the treaty. On that date Senator Lodge proposed the following substitute for the reservation adopted on November 19:

The United States assumes no obligation to preserve the territorial integrity or political independence of any other country by the employment of its military or naval forces, its resources, or any form of economic discrimination, or to interfere in any way in controversies between nations, whether members of the League or not, under the provisions of Article 10, or to employ the military or naval forces of the United States under any article of the treaty for any purpose unless in any particular case the Congress, which, under the Constitution, has the sole power to declare war or authorize the employment of the

military or naval forces of the United States, shall, in the exercise of full liberty of action, by act or joint resolution so provide.

For the foregoing, Senator Frelinghuysen proposed to substitute the following: "The United States assumes no obligation to preserve the territorial integrity or political independence of any other country, or to interfere in controversies between nations or to employ its military or naval forces or its resources for any purpose under any article of the treaty."

The debate upon this reservation continued until March 15, when the Frelinghuysen substitute was defeated by a vote of 17 yeas to 59 nays. Two substitutes were then offered by Senator Kirby in succession, as follows:

The United States assumes no obligation to employ its military or naval forces or the economic boycott to preserve the territorial integrity or political independence of any other country under the provisions of Article 10, or to employ the military or naval forces of the United States under any other article of the treaty for any purpose, unless in any particular case the Congress, which, under the Constitution, has the sole power to declare war, shall, by act or joint resolution, so provide. Nothing herein shall be deemed to impair the obligation in Article 16 concerning the economic boycott.

The United States declines to assume any binding or legal obligation to preserve the territorial integrity or political independence of any other country under the provisions of Article 10 or to employ the military or naval forces of the United States under any article of the treaty for any purpose; but the Congress, which under the Constitution has the sole power in the premises, will consider and decide what moral obligation, if any, under the circumstances of any particular case, when it arises, should move the United States in the interest of world peace and justice to take action therein and will provide accordingly.

The first was rejected 31 yeas to 45 nays, and the second 30 yeas to 46 nays. The following substitute offered by Senator King was then rejected without a roll call:

The United States understands that by Article 10 the United States undertakes separately to respect the territorial integrity and existing political independence of each other member of the League; but that Article 10 does not impose upon the United States the separate, sole, and singular duty to preserve the territorial integrity and existing political independence of every member of the League as against the external aggression of the other powers; but only that in case of such aggression or threat of the same, the Council will advise upon the means for preserving the territorial integrity and existing political independence of the member against which such aggression is exerted, and will recommend to members of the League the measures which it may deem proper and necessary to protect the covenants of the League, and that the United States may consider such recommendations and take such action as Congress may in its discretion deem appropriate in such case.

Senator Simmons then offered the following substitute, but it was rejected, 27 yeas to 51 nays:

The United States agrees to use its friendly offices, when requested so to do under the provisions of Article 10, in assisting to procure a just and peaceful settlement of territorial or political controversies between nations, or to protect any member of the League from external aggressions; but it does not assume any obligation to use its military or naval forces, or its financial or economic resources for the purpose of intervention in the controversies or conflicts between nations, or to protect the territorial integrity or political independence of any nation under the provisions of Article 10, unless in any particular case the Congress, in the exercise of full liberty of action and in the light of full information as to the national justice and human rights involved, shall by act or joint resolution so provide. Nothing herein shall be deemed to impair the obligations of the United States under Article 16.

Senator Simmons offered his substitute again in the Senate on March 18, and it was laid on the table by a vote of 45 to 34.

Senator Walsh of Montana proposed that the following paragraph be added to the substitute offered by Senator Lodge, but the proposal was rejected by a vote of 34 yeas to 44 nays:

Any act or threat of external aggression involving the territorial integrity or political independence of any nation, whether a member of the League or not, which, in the judgment of the United States menaces or threatens the peace of the world, will be a matter of grave concern to the United States, and assurance is hereby given that the United States will seek to cooperate, entirely within the powers conferred by the Constitution, with the other members of the League to the end that such menace or threat to the peace of the world be removed.

The substitute for this reservation offered by Senator Hitchcock on November 13¹⁷ and rejected was now again offered by Senator King and again rejected, 31 yeas to 47 nays.

Another substitute offered by Senator France affirming the doctrine of self-determination, expressing hope for the liberation of Ireland, India, and Egypt, and declaring that the United States will not interfere to preserve the territorial integrity of any imperial country in a contest with a subject nation or colony for independence, was rejected without a roll call.

During the debate on March 13, Senator Lodge, without objection, modified his substitute by inserting after the word "nations" in line 5, the words "including all controversies relating to territorial integrity or political independence." When the Senate had this reservation up for final action on March 18, an attempt by Senator Simmons to add after the insertion by Senator Lodge the words "by the employment of its military or naval forces, its resources, or any form of economic boycott" and to omit the words "in any way" in line 4, was laid on the table by a vote of 44 to 35. The same action was taken by a vote of 45 to 34 on an amendment offered by Senator Smith to omit the clause "or to interfere in any way in controversies between nations, including all controversies relating to territorial integrity or political independence, whether members of the League or not."

Mr. Lodge's amendment in the nature of a substitute was,

¹⁷ See p. 28, *supra*.

on March 15, agreed to by a vote of 56 to 24, and Reservation No. 2 readopted as modified by a vote of 56 yeas to 26 nays.

RESERVATION No. 3.—*Mandates*

This reservation was readopted in its original form on February 26 without debate by a vote of 68 yeas to 4 nays.

RESERVATION No. 4.—*Domestic questions*

On February 26, Senator Lodge moved to insert the word "internal" before the word "commerce" in the fifth line, and to omit the words "and of other domestic questions" after the word "drugs" in the sixth line. He stated that these changes had been suggested in the bipartisan conference, but after they were criticized by several Senators, he withdrew them. On March 2, Senator Fletcher again moved the omission of the word "commerce," but his motion was defeated by a vote of 34 yeas to 44 nays. The same amendment was renewed in the Senate on March 18 by Senator Smith and laid on the table by a vote of 40 to 33. The following substitutes offered respectively by Senators Hitchcock and King on March 2 were promptly rejected, the first by a vote of 36 yeas to 44 nays and the second without a roll call:

That the United States is not required, and hereby declines, to submit to the League, its Council or Assembly, for decision, report, or recommendation, any matter which it considers to be a domestic question, such as immigration, labor, tariff, or other matter relating to its internal or coastwise affairs.

The United States understands that the jurisdiction and authority of the Council or the Assembly of the League do not include any power over the proper domestic, internal, or national policy of any member of the League, and that said articles do not confer upon the League any powers with respect to immigration, imposts, property, inheritance, naturalization, citizenship, labor, coastwise traffic, or any other matter of proper domestic policy. This enumeration of matters of policy shall not in any wise be taken to exclude from the authority of the United States any other subject of domestic policy properly within the national political powers and sovereignty of the United States, as rec-

ognized by the law and custom of nations. The United States will not submit to arbitration or to consideration of the Council any question which in its judgment is a question within its domestic jurisdiction and sovereignty.

The reservation was then adopted in its original form by a vote of 56 yeas to 25 nays.

RESERVATION No. 5.—*Monroe Doctrine*

On March 2, the following combination of the substitutes for this reservation, offered by Senators Hitchcock and Pittman on November 15¹⁸ was offered and again rejected by a vote of 34 yeas to 43 nays:

That the national policy of the United States known as the Monroe Doctrine, as announced and interpreted by the United States, is not in any way impaired or affected by the Covenant of the League of Nations, and no question which in the judgment of the United States depends upon or relates to such doctrine shall be subject to any inquiry, report, or decision by the Council or Assembly.

Whereupon the reservation was readopted in its original form by a vote of 58 to 22.

RESERVATION No. 6.—*Shantung*

On March 3, Senator Lodge moved to strike from the original reservation the words "between the Republic of China and the Empire of Japan." The motion was agreed to on March 4, 69 yeas to 2 nays. Senator Hitchcock then offered the following substitute for the reservation, which was rejected by a vote of 27 yeas to 41 nays:

That in advising and consenting to the ratification of said treaty, the United States does so with the understanding that the sovereign rights and interests renounced by Germany in favor of Japan under the provisions of Articles 156, 157 and 158 of said treaty, or now exercised by Japan, are to be returned by Japan to China at the termination of the present war by the ratification of this treaty.

¹⁸ See p. 31, *supra*.

The original reservation, as amended by Senator Lodge, was thereupon readopted by a vote of 48 to 21.

RESERVATION NO. 7.—*Appointment of American representatives in the League*

Senator Lodge on March 4 offered the following substitute for the original reservation:

No person is or shall be authorized to represent the United States, nor shall any citizen of the United States be eligible, as a member of any body or agency established or authorized by said Treaty of Peace with Germany, except pursuant to an act of the Congress of the United States providing for his appointment and defining his powers and duties.

This was one of the compromises which Senator Lodge said had been tentatively agreed upon by the bipartisan conference, and when Senator Hitchcock criticized it Senator Lodge withdrew it. It was immediately reoffered by Senator Walsh of Montana and agreed upon by a vote of 37 to 32. The reservation as thus amended was thereupon readopted by a vote of 55 yeas to 14 nays.

RESERVATION NO. 8.—*Reparation Commission*

This reservation was readopted in its original form on March 5 by a vote of 41 to 22, after the following substitute offered by Senator Hitchcock had been rejected by a vote of 23 yeas and 37 nays: "The United States understands that the Reparation Commission will in its control over German economic resources in no respect so exert its powers as to discriminate against the commerce of the United States with Germany."

RESERVATION NO. 9.—*Expenses of the League*

This reservation was called up on March 5. On March 6 the following proviso was added, upon motion of Senator Kellogg, by a vote of 55 yeas to 2 nays:

[48]

Provided, that the foregoing limitation shall not apply to the United States' proportionate share of the expenses of the office force and salary of the secretary-general.

The Senate rejected without a roll call a substitute offered by Senator King reading: "The United States shall not be obligated to contribute to the expenses of the League of Nations or of any official thereof or of any organization or commission thereunder unless and until Congress shall have by appropriate legislation provided therefor."

Reservation No. 9 as amended was thereupon readopted by a vote of 46 to 25.

RESERVATION NO. 10.—*Armaments*

On March 6, Senator New offered the following substitute:

No plan for the limitation of armaments proposed by the Council of the League of Nations under provisions of Article 8 shall be held as binding the United States until the same shall have been accepted by Congress.

Senator McCormick on March 8 proposed the following addition to Senator New's substitute, which he accepted:

And the United States reserves the right to increase its armament without the consent of the Council whenever the United States is threatened with invasion or engaged in war.

On that day the substitute and addition were agreed to by a vote of 49 to 27, and Reservation No. 10, as thus amended, was thereupon readopted by a vote of 49 to 26.

RESERVATION NO. 11.—*Relations with nationals of covenant-breaking State*

This reservation was readopted on March 8 by a vote of 44 to 28, after its phraseology had been improved without a roll call by inserting in line four the words "such covenant-breaking state" in lieu of the words "that violating said Article 16."

**RESERVATION NO. 12.—*Illegal acts in contravention of
American rights***

**RESERVATION NO. 13.—*International Labor
Organization***

These reservations were readopted in their original form on March 8, by votes of 45 to 27, and 44 to 27, respectively.

**RESERVATION NO. 14.—*Voting power of self-governing
dominions***

The following substitute for the original reservation was offered by Senator Lodge on March 8:

Until Part 1, being the Covenant of the League of Nations, shall be so amended as to provide that the United States shall be entitled to cast a number of votes equal to that which any member of the League and its self-governing dominions, colonies, or parts of empire, in the aggregate shall be entitled to cast, the United States assumes no obligation to be bound, except in cases where Congress has previously given its consent, by any election, decision, report, or finding of the Council or Assembly in which any member of the League and its self-governing dominions, colonies, or parts of empire, in the aggregate have cast more than one vote.

The United States assumes no obligation to be bound by any decision, report, or finding of the Council or Assembly arising out of any dispute between the United States and any member of the League if such member, or any self-governing dominion, colony, empire, or part of empire united with it politically has voted.

It was voted upon in two parts on March 9, the first part (the first five lines down to and including the word "cast") being accepted by a vote of 49 to 28, and the remainder by 55 to 22, after an amendment by Senator Walsh of Montana to change the clause "except in cases where Congress has previously given its consent" to read "except in cases in which its consent has previously been given" had been lost 33 yeas to 45 nays.

Senator McCormick offered an amendment providing that unless within a year after ratification the Covenant shall be so amended as to give the United States an equal number of votes to that of any member of the League and its self-governing dominions and colonies, the United States shall cease to be a member of the League, which was rejected by a vote of 19 yeas to 57 nays. Senator Phelan then proposed a substitute identical with those offered by Senator Johnson on October 29 and November 18.¹⁹ The substitute was again rejected, this time by a vote of 4 yeas to 73 nays. A substitute for this reservation, offered by Senator Hitchcock and identical with the fifth reservation offered by him to the treaty in the Senate on November 18, was also rejected by a vote of 34 yeas to 41 nays; and Reservation No. 14, as amended upon motion of Senator Lodge, was then agreed to (March 9) by a vote of 57 to 20.

RESERVATION NO. 15.—*Sympathy for Ireland*

In consenting to the ratification of the Treaty with Germany the United States adheres to the principle of self-determination and to the resolution of sympathy with the aspirations of the Irish people for a government of their own choice adopted by the Senate June 6, 1919, and declares that when such government is attained by Ireland, a consummation it is hoped is at hand, it should promptly be admitted as a member of the League of Nations.

The above resolution was offered by Senator Gerry, on March 18, and adopted by a vote of 38 yeas to 36 nays, and it became Reservation No. 15 to the treaty. An attempt by Senator Thomas to add to the reservation a declaration of sympathy with Korea was rejected by a vote of 34 yeas to 36 nays. A motion by Senator Lodge to amend it by omitting the clause declaring the adherence of the United States to the principle of self-determination was rejected by a vote of 37 yeas to 42 nays, and upon being later moved in the Senate by

¹⁹ See pp. 24, 35, *supra*.

Mr. Calder the same motion was laid on the table by a vote of 51 to 30. Senator Sterling attempted in the Senate to strike from the reservation the words "a consummation it is hoped is at hand" but the attempt failed by a vote of 70 to 11.

REJECTED RESERVATIONS

After the reservations of the Foreign Relations Committee were completed on March 15, 1920, additional reservations were proposed by individual Senators.

Senator Owen again endeavored to secure the adoption of a reservation regarding Egypt, the reservation this time interpreting Great Britain's protectorate "to have been merely a war measure to preserve the integrity and independence of Egypt during the war." Debate upon the proposed reservation continued until March 17, when it was laid on the table by a vote of 54 to 21.

Senator Norris then proposed a reservation withholding the assent of the United States to Article 147 of the treaty in so far as the recognition of the British protectorate over Egypt is extended beyond the going into force of the peace treaty, which was rejected by a vote of 15 yeas to 51 nays.

A reservation was proposed by Senator Reed on March 17, as follows, the language of which he stated was taken from Article 3 of President Wilson's original plan for the Covenant:²⁰

²⁰ The plan referred to was presented to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on September 12, 1919, by Mr. William C. Bullitt, who stated that "it is the President's original proposal, written on his own typewriter, I believe, which was presented to me on January 10 by Colonel House." Article 3 of the plan is as follows:

"The contracting powers unite in guaranteeing to each other political independence and territorial integrity; but it is understood between them that such territorial readjustments, if any, as may in the future become necessary by reason of changes in present racial conditions and aspirations or present social and political relationships, pursuant to the principle of self-determination, and also such territorial readjustments as may in the judgment of three-fourths of the delegates be demanded by the welfare and manifest interest of the peoples concerned, may be effected if agreeable to those peoples; and that territorial changes may in equity involve material compensation. The contracting powers accept without reservation the principle that the peace of the world is superior in importance to every question of political jurisdiction or boundary." (Sen. Doc. 106, 66 Cong., 1st sess., p. 1166.)

The United States construes Part I of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, known as the Covenant of the League of Nations, to the effect that such territorial readjustments, if any, as may in the future become necessary by reason of changes in present racial conditions and aspirations, or present social and political relationship, pursuant to the principle of self-determination, and also such territorial readjustments as may, in the judgment of three-fourths of the Council or Assembly, be demanded by the welfare and manifest interest of the people concerned may be effected if agreeable to those peoples. The high contracting powers accept without reservation the principle that the peace of the world is superior in importance to every question of political jurisdiction or boundary.

After debate, the proposed reservation was laid on the table by a vote of 46 to 21.

Another reservation of Senator Owen was then renewed, stating that in ratifying the Covenant it is not intended to modify "the obligations entered into by the United States and the Entente Allies under the agreement of November 5, 1918; upon which as a basis the German Empire laid down its arms." It was again rejected by a vote of 12 yeas to 55 nays.

Senator Lenroot proposed a declaration of policy by the Government of the United States "that the freedom and peace of Europe being again threatened by any power or combination of powers, the United States will regard such a situation with grave concern and will consider what, if any, action it will take in the premises." The declaration was rejected by a vote of 25 yeas to 39 nays.

On March 18, Senator Reed again sought to add the reservation regarding honor and vital interests which was rejected on November 17.²¹ It was again rejected by a vote of 27 yeas to 48 nays. Another reservation offered by Senator Reed declaring that "the United States assumes no obligation to employ its military or naval forces or resources or any form of economic discrimination under any article of the treaty" was also rejected, the vote being 17 yeas to 52 nays. Senator Reed then proposed to modify the reservation as follows:

²¹ *Supra*, p. 35.

"The United States assumes no obligation to employ its military or naval forces or resources under any article of the treaty," which was likewise rejected by a vote of 16 yeas to 57 nays.

A reservation offered by Senator Gore to prevent any mandatory from monopolizing or enjoying any preference, without the consent of the Council, in respect of the natural resources of territory placed under its control, was rejected without a roll call.

SECOND REJECTION OF THE TREATY

There being no further amendments or reservations to consider, the treaty was immediately, on March 18, reported to the Senate, and the reservations agreed to as in Committee of the Whole were concurred in *en bloc* without a roll call, except Nos. 2, 4, and 15, which, after the attempts to amend them had again failed, as hereinbefore explained,²² were concurred in by the following votes: No. 2, 54 yeas to 26 nays; No. 4, *viva voce*; No. 15, 45 yeas to 38 nays.

On the following day, March 19, the resolving clause was, upon motion of Senator Lodge, without a roll call, amended by omitting the clause requiring the acceptance of the reservations by an exchange of notes by three of the Allied and Associated Powers and providing in lieu thereof that the reservations be accepted

as a part and condition of this resolution of ratification by the Allied and Associated Powers, and the failure on the part of the Allied and Associated Powers to make objection to said reservations and understandings prior to the deposit of ratification by the United States of such reservations and understandings by said powers.

An amendment to this clause, moved by Senator Brandegee, requiring the instrument of ratification to be deposited within 60 days of ratification by the Senate in order to bind the United States, was rejected by a vote of 41 yeas to 42 nays.

²² See pp. 43-45, 46, 51, *supra*.

The vote was then taken on the resolution of ratification, including the fifteen reservations as a part and condition thereof, which in final form read as follows:

RESOLUTION OF RATIFICATION

Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein), That the Senate advise and consent to the ratification of the Treaty of Peace with Germany concluded at Versailles on the 28th day of June, 1919, subject to the following reservations and understandings, which are hereby made a part and condition of this resolution of ratification, which ratification is not to take effect or bind the United States until the said reservations and understandings adopted by the Senate have been accepted as a part and a condition of this resolution of ratification by the Allied and Associated Powers and a failure on the part of the Allied and Associated Powers to make objection to said reservations and understandings prior to the deposit of ratification by the United States shall be taken as a full and final acceptance of such reservations and understandings by said powers:

1. The United States so understands and construes Article I that in case of notice of withdrawal from the League of Nations, as provided in said article, the United States shall be the sole judge as to whether all its international obligations and all its obligations under the said Covenant have been fulfilled, and notice of withdrawal by the United States may be given by a concurrent resolution of the Congress of the United States.

2. The United States assumes no obligation to preserve the territorial integrity or political independence of any other country by the employment of its military or naval forces, its resources, or any form of economic discrimination, or to interfere in any way in controversies between nations, including all controversies relating to territorial integrity or political independence, whether members of the League or not, under the provisions of

Article 10, or to employ the military or naval forces of the United States, under any article of the treaty for any purpose, unless in any particular case the Congress, which, under the Constitution, has the sole power to declare war or authorize the employment of the military or naval forces of the United States, shall, in the exercise of full liberty of action, by act or joint resolution so provide.

3. No mandate shall be accepted by the United States under Article 22, Part 1, or any other provision of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, except by action of the Congress of the United States.

4. The United States reserves to itself exclusively the right to decide what questions are within its domestic jurisdiction and declares that all domestic and political questions relating wholly or in part to its internal affairs, including immigration, labor, coastwise traffic, the tariff, commerce, the suppression of traffic in women and children and in opium and other dangerous drugs, and all other domestic questions, are solely within the jurisdiction of the United States and are not under this treaty to be submitted in any way either to arbitration or to the consideration of the Council or of the Assembly of the League of Nations, or any agency thereof, or to the decision or recommendation of any other power.

5. The United States will not submit to arbitration or to inquiry by the Assembly or by the Council of the League of Nations, provided for in said treaty of peace, any questions which in the judgment of the United States depend upon or relate to its long-established policy, commonly known as the Monroe Doctrine; said doctrine is to be interpreted by the United States alone and is hereby declared to be wholly outside the jurisdiction of said League of Nations and entirely unaffected by any provision contained in the said Treaty of Peace with Germany.

6. The United States withholds its assent to Articles 156, 157, and 158, and reserves full liberty of action with respect to any controversy which may arise under said articles.

7. No person is or shall be authorized to represent the United States, nor shall any citizen of the United States be eligible, as a member of any body or agency established or authorized by said Treaty of Peace with Germany, except pursuant to an act of the Congress of the United States providing for his appointment and defining his powers and duties.

8. The United States understands that the reparation commission will regulate or interfere with exports from the United States to Germany, or from Germany to the United States, only when the United States by act or joint resolution of Congress approves such regulation or interference.

9. The United States shall not be obligated to contribute to any expenses of the League of Nations, or of the secretariat, or of any commission, or committee, or conference, or other agency, organized under the League of Nations or under the treaty or for the purpose of carrying out the treaty provisions, unless and until an appropriation of funds available for such expenses shall have been made by the Congress of the United States: *Provided*, That the foregoing limitation shall not apply to the United States' proportionate share of the expense of the office force and salary of the secretary-general.

10. No plan for the limitation of armaments proposed by the Council of the League of Nations under the provisions of Article 8 shall be held as binding the United States until the same shall have been accepted by Congress, and the United States reserves the right to increase its armament without the consent of the Council whenever the United States is threatened with invasion or engaged in war.

11. The United States reserves the right to permit, in its discretion, the nationals of a covenant-breaking State, as defined in Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, residing within the United States or in countries other than such covenant-breaking State, to continue their commercial, financial, and personal relations with the nationals of the United States.

12. Nothing in Articles 296, 297, or in any of the annexes thereto or in any other article, section, or annex of the Treaty of Peace with Germany shall, as against citizens of the United States, be taken to mean any confirmation, ratification or approval of any act otherwise illegal or in contravention of the rights or citizens of the United States.

13. The United States withholds its assent to Part XIII (Articles 387 to 427, inclusive) unless Congress by act or joint resolution shall hereafter make provision for representation in the organization established by said Part XIII, and in such event the participation of the United States will be governed and conditioned by the provisions of such act or joint resolution.

14. Until Part I, being the Covenant of the League of Nations, shall be so amended as to provide that the United States shall be entitled to cast a number of votes equal to that which any member of the League and its self-governing dominions, colonies, or parts of empire, in the aggregate shall be entitled to cast, the United States assumes no obligation to be bound except in cases where Congress has previously given its consent, by any election, decision, report, or finding of the Council or Assembly in which any member of the League and its self-governing dominions, colonies, or parts of empire, in the aggregate have cast more than one vote.

The United States assumes no obligation to be bound by any decision, report, or finding of the Council or Assembly arising out of any dispute between the United States and any member of the League if such member, or

any self-governing dominion, colony, empire, or part of empire united with it politically has voted.

15. In consenting to the ratification of the Treaty with Germany the United States adheres to the principle of self-determination and to the resolution of sympathy with the aspirations of the Irish people for a government of their own choice adopted by the Senate June 6, 1919, and declares that when such government is attained by Ireland, a consummation it is hoped is at hand, it should promptly be admitted as a member of the League of Nations.

Upon roll call there were 49 yeas and 35 nays, and the resolution, not having received the affirmative votes of two-thirds of the Senators present, was not agreed to and the Senate did not advise and consent to the ratification of the Treaty of Peace with Germany.

As stated above, the Senators were divided generally into three groups, namely, those who opposed the ratification of the treaty, those who advocated the ratification of the treaty either unqualifiedly or with "interpretative reservations," and those who favored substantial reservations. In voting upon the reservations adopted, the treaty opponents invariably voted for the reservations and then voted against the ratification of the treaty. On the other hand, the treaty advocates generally voted against the reservations and after they had been adopted, voted against the resolutions of ratification of which the reservations formed a part. The third group, namely, the reservationists, with one or two exceptions, voted throughout in favor of the reservations adopted and also in favor of the resolutions of ratification.

ANALYSIS OF VOTES ON RESERVATIONS AND RATIFICATIONS

The following table shows how the vote varied on the reservations adopted and on the resolutions of final ratification. The Senators opposed to the ratification of the treaty have been denominated "opponents"; those in favor of unqualified ratification or ratification with interpretative

reservations are included under "advocates"; while those in favor of substantial reservations have been called "reservationists":

	November, 1919		March, 1920	
	Years	Nays	Years	Nays
Preamble:				
Opponents	15	..		
Advocates	38	<i>Viva voce</i>	
Reservationists	33	2		
	—	—	—	—
	48	40		
Reservation No. 1:				
Opponents	15	..	10	..
Advocates	1	35	6	20
Reservationists	34	..	29	..
	—	—	—	—
	50	35	45	20
Reservation No. 2:				
Opponents	13	..	12	..
Advocates	33	9	26
Reservationists	33	..	35	..
	—	—	—	—
	46	33	56	26
Reservation No. 3:				
Opponents	14	..	9	..
Advocates	4	31	26	4
Reservationists	34	..	33	..
	—	—	—	—
	52	31	68	4
Reservation No. 4:				
Opponents	15	..	12	..
Advocates	5	36	10	25
Reservationists	39	..	34	..
	—	—	—	—
	59	36	56	25
Reservation No. 5:				
Opponents	12	..	11	..
Advocates	5	34	13	22
Reservationists	38	..	34	..
	—	—	—	—
	55	34	58	22
	[60]			

	November, 1919		March, 1920	
	Years	Days	Years	Days
Reservation No. 6:				
Opponents	14	..	11	..
Advocates	1	39	6	21
Reservationists	38	2	31	..
	—	—	—	—
	53	41	48	21
Reservation No. 7:				
Opponents	14	..	11	..
Advocates	40	13	14
Reservationists	39	..	31	..
	—	—	—	—
	53	40	55	14
Reservation No. 8:				
Opponents	14	..	9	..
Advocates	40	2	22
Reservationists	40	..	30	..
	—	—	—	—
	54	40	41	22
Reservation No. 9:				
Opponents	14	..	12	..
Advocates	1	39	4	25
Reservationists	41	..	30	..
	—	—	—	—
	56	39	46	25
Reservation No. 10:				
Opponents	15	..	12	..
Advocates	2	39	5	26
Reservationists	39	..	32	..
	—	—	—	—
	56	39	49	26
Reservation No. 11:				
Opponents	15	..	11	..
Advocates	41	2	28
Reservationists	38	..	31	..
	—	—	—	—
	53	41	44	28
	[61]			

	November, 1919		March, 1920	
	Years	Nays	Years	Nays
Reservation No. 12:				
Opponents	15	..	10	..
Advocates	40	5	27
Reservationists	37	1	30	..
	—	—	—	—
	52	41	45	27
Reservation No. 13:				
Opponents	14	..	11	..
Advocates	3	35	3	27
Reservationists	37	..	30	..
	—	—	—	—
	54	35	44	27
Reservation No. 14:				
Opponents	14	..	12	..
Advocates	3	37	12	20
Reservationists	38	1	33	..
	—	—	—	—
	55	38	57	20
Reservation No. 15:				
Opponents	9	..
Advocates	17	15
Reservationists	12	21
	—	—	—	—
	38	36
Ratification with reservations:				
Opponents	14	..	13
Advocates	41	17	22
Reservationists	39	..	32	..
	—	—	—	—
	39	55	49	35
Unqualified Ratification:				
Opponents	14
Advocates	37	2
Reservationists	1	37
	—	—	—	—
	38	53
	[62]			

The reasons of the treaty opponents in voting for the reservations and then against the ratification of the treaty were typically stated by Senators Knox and Brandegee before the vote on November 19. Mr. Knox said:

I voted for the reservations because I wanted to make the treaty as little harmful and as little obnoxious to our Constitution and the spirit and institutions of my country as it was possible, keeping in view the temper of the committee and the temper of the Senate. But, Mr. President, while these reservations have been helpful in that direction, in my deliberate judgment, formed after the most careful and painstaking study of this instrument, a study undertaken with no original attitude of unfriendliness toward it, as it stands with these reservations it is my judgment that it imposes obligations upon the United States which under our Constitution cannot be imposed by the treaty-making power. It delegates powers and functions to an extraneous body of such a nature that only the people of the United States by an amendment to the Constitution could confer.²²

Senator Brandegee then explained his vote as follows:

I have voted for these reservations because if by any chance the United States should have to join this League, I wanted the United States of America to be protected as well as it could be under the circumstances. But I would not vote for a League of Nations based upon the principle that this League is based upon, with all the reservations that the wit of man could devise, because it would not be safe for my country.

Mr. President, I would cheerfully and happily vote for any association of nations designed to promote the development of international law, to agree upon an international code to govern the relations of nations with each other, and for a great international court composed of men of recognized learning in international law, competent, educated, experienced, the elect of the nations, and for that great international court to promulgate its judgment according to a code agreed upon and acknowledged. I think nations could safely submit their cases to such an elevated tribunal.²³

²² Congressional Record, November 19, 1919, p. 8768.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 8775.

The reasons of the advocates of the treaty in voting against the resolutions of ratification may probably best be taken from a letter written by President Wilson to Senator Hitchcock on November 18, in which he said that, in his opinion, the resolution containing the reservations adopted by the Senate "does not provide for ratification but, rather, for the nullification of the treaty." He added: "I sincerely hope that the friends and supporters of the treaty will vote against the Lodge resolution of ratification. I understand that the door will probably then be open for a genuine resolution of ratification."²⁵

RETURN OF THE TREATY TO THE PRESIDENT

After finally voting upon the treaty on March 19, 1920, the Senate adopted a resolution by a vote of 47 yeas to 37 nays, instructing the secretary of the Senate to return the treaty to the President and inform him that the Senate has failed to ratify it, being unable to obtain the constitutional majority therefor.

²⁵ Congressional Record, November 19, 1919, p. 8768.

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I

THE NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL

By VERNON KELLOGG

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The National Research Council is a cooperative organization of the scientific men of America. Its members include, however, not only scientific and technical men but also business men interested in engineering and industry. It is established under the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences and enjoys the cooperation of most of the major scientific and technical societies of the country, its membership being largely composed of appointed representatives of forty or more of these societies. The Council was organized in 1916 to coordinate the research facilities of the country for work on war problems, and in 1918, by executive order of the President of the United States, it was reorganized as a permanent body. Its essential purpose is the promotion of scientific research and of the application and dissemination of scientific knowledge for the benefit of the national strength and well-being.

In the character of its organization and support it differs materially from other similarly-named organizations which have been established in recent years in several other countries, notably England, Canada, Australia, Japan, and Italy. These organizations are

all government-supported and to some extent government-controlled. The American National Research Council, although partly supported during the war period by the government and primarily devoted at that time to activities of direct assistance to the government, is now entirely supported from other than governmental sources, and is entirely controlled by its own representatively selected membership and democratically chosen officers. The Council expects to maintain a close cooperation with government scientific bureaus and their activities but it is in no sense itself a government bureau.

It is composed of a series of major divisions arranged in two groups. One group comprises seven divisions of science and technology representing, respectively, physics, mathematics, and astronomy; chemistry and chemical technology; biology and agriculture; the medical sciences; psychology and anthropology; geology and geography; and engineering. The other group comprises six divisions of general relations, representing foreign relations, government relations, states relations, educational relations, research extension, and research information. As subordinate or affiliated lesser groups each of these divisions comprises a larger or smaller series of committees, each with its special field or subject of attention. There are certain other committees, administrative and technical, which affiliate directly with the executive board of the Council.

The Council maintains two series of publications, one called *Bulletins*, the other, *Reprints and Circulars*. Its official organ for the publication of the minutes of the meetings of its executive board and interim committee (acting as an executive committee between meetings of the board) and for the publication of

certain papers is the *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*. Its administrative officers are a chairman, three vice-chairmen, a permanent secretary, treasurer, and the chairmen of its various divisions. All of these are elected annually by the executive board except in the cases of the permanent secretary and the treasurer, and of the chairmen of the divisions of science and technology who are elected by the members of these divisions.

The financial support of the administrative work of the Council is assured by a gift of five million dollars recently made by the Carnegie Corporation. Part of this gift is to be devoted to the erection of a suitable building in Washington for the joint use of the Council and the National Academy of Sciences, and the rest is to serve as an endowment for the Council. For the support of the special scientific projects set on foot or fostered by the Council it relies on special gifts obtained from time to time from various sources. The most notable of these gifts so far made has been one of five hundred thousand dollars for the support, during five years, of a group of National Research Fellowships in Physics and Chemistry, administered by a Research Fellowships Board affiliated with the Council. Other considerable gifts for specific purposes have been made by the General Education Board, the Commonwealth Fund, the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, the Southern Pine Association, etc. The funds for the purchase of the land in Washington on which the headquarters building is to be erected were obtained from more than a score of generous private individuals.

So much for the general relations of the Council to the scientific men and societies of the country and for

the skeleton of its organization and its financial support. It will be seen by this outline that the Council is organized to be the direct instrument, democratically controlled, of the scientific men of the country. And it distinctly considers itself as such. Any thought of an attempted domination of research activities in America is utterly foreign to its thought. It looks upon itself as a means of encouraging and further developing American scientific endeavor, and of *liaison* between this endeavor and that of other countries.

As for the general policies of the Council and the methods by which it hopes, in following these policies, to accomplish results of service to science and to the national well-being, limitations of space will prevent any but the briefest attempt at exposition and discussion. These policies are suggested in some degree by the character of the Council's organization: this character of organization, indeed, has been determined primarily by the beliefs of the Council's membership concerning policies and mode of work.

The Council is neither a large operating scientific laboratory, nor a repository of large funds to be given away to scattered scientific workers or institutions. It is rather an organization which, while clearly recognizing the unique value of individual work, hopes especially to help bring together scattered work and workers, and to assist in coordinating, in some measure, scientific attack in America on large problems in any and all lines of scientific activity, especially, perhaps, on those problems which depend for successful solution on the cooperation of several or many workers and laboratories either within the realms of a

single science or representing different realms in which various parts of a single problem may lie. It is particularly intended not to duplicate or in the slightest degree to interfere with worthy work already under way; to such work it only hopes to offer encouragement and support where needed and possible to be given. It hopes to bring to bear on scientific problems the wisdom of numbers where such wisdom is not made unnecessary by the competence of genius. It hopes to help maintain the *morale* of devoted isolated investigators, to stimulate renewed effort among groups willing but halted by obstacles, to educate the managers of great industries, which depend on the applications of science for their success, to a fuller appreciation of the necessity of support by them of fundamental science, and to encourage the interest of universities and colleges in research work and workers so that the inspiration and training of American youth for scientific work may never fall so low as to threaten to interrupt the constantly needed output of well trained and devoted scientific talent in the land.

With any serious interruption in the output of American science and scientific workers the strength of the nation will be immediately threatened. The industries are today seriously draining the universities and the technical bureaus of the government in their eager search for scientific men. This may mean an immediate advantage to the industries, but it means also an immediate injury to the indispensable scientific work of the government and a grave menace to the future of all science in the country, including, necessarily, that required by the industries themselves. It is the obtaining of a supply of scientific men to satisfy

the needs of the industries at the present at the expense of the provision for the future.

The various methods of contributing practical assistance to American science in harmony with the general point of view outlined above, which the Council has so far adopted, include the establishment of special committees of carefully chosen experts for specific scientific subjects or problems urgently needing consideration, who shall plan modes of attack and undertake to find men and means (with the assistance of the general administrative offices of the Council) for carrying out the plan; the bringing together of industrial concerns interested in the development of the scientific basis of their processes and inducing them to support the establishment of special laboratories or institutes devoted to this development under the advice of experts representing the Council; the stimulation of larger industrial organizations, which may be in a situation to maintain their own independent laboratories, to see the advantage of contributing to the support of pure science in the universities and research institutes for the sake of increasing scientific knowledge and scientific personnel on which future progress in applied science absolutely depends; the direct maintenance of university research fellowships; the publication of valuable scientific papers for which there is at present no other suitable prompt means of issuance; the preparation of bibliographies and abstracts of current scientific literature; the setting up of well-considered mechanisms for the collection and distribution of information on current research, university and industrial research laboratories and facilities, research personnel, etc.; and the dissemination through the press and magazines

of popular but authentic scientific news and information for the sake of increasing the public interest in and support of productive scientific work. Still other forms of activities might be listed, but those given adequately illustrate the Council's methods.

It will be seen from this brief account of the character of the organization and activities of the National Research Council that it occupies a position quite different from that of any other national scientific organization in America, or in the world, for that matter, or any governmental scientific bureau. In a democracy like America's there are enjoyed the unquestioned advantages which spring from wide opportunity and the high premium put on individual initiative. In all undertakings in which these two circumstances are crucial we outstrip all competition. But our success in this respect is purchased at a price, a price that we were likely to have paid very highly for in the World War; just as England and France did pay so long as Germany held the advantage of alone having foreseen and prepared for other possible circumstances. Germany had seen the advantage of organized and coordinated scientific work and until the Allies and ourselves had taken a leaf from Germany's book and had, with a haste made desperate by necessity, similarly organized concerted scientific endeavor, the victories went chiefly to Germany's science-backed armies and submarines.

What America needs is not to give up its individual initiative in science but to add to it means for coordination and organization. We need a wider recognition, an increased social evaluation, of the place of scientific research in our national life, and hence a willingness not only to encourage and support individual scientific

effort but also to insure a greatly augmented productivity of all present research agencies and a much more effective coordination of them both with regard to planning and with regard to executing the broad, inclusive scientific investigations which are required for the solution of the problems concerned with the most effective use of our national resources, with the highest production in our agriculture and industry, and with our national health and well-being. In a word we need more, and better, and better-coordinated science for the preservation and development of our national strength. The National Research Council is an organization that hopes to contribute in some degree, however modest, to the meeting of this need.

II

THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF
SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH

By GEORGE ELLERY HALE

Honorary Chairman of the National Research Council,
Foreign Secretary of the National Academy of
Sciences, and Member of the Executive
Committee of the National
Research Council.

The progress of research, and the rapid advance of knowledge along particular lines, have naturally resulted in the highly specialized organization of science of the present day. Two centuries ago the Royal Society of London and the Paris Academy of Sciences could easily embrace the whole range of science, and include in their membership essentially all of the able investigators of England and France. The establishment of the Linnean Society in 1788 marked the beginning of a dispersive movement that has continued ever since. While the multiplication of societies dealing with narrowly limited fields of science is a sign of progress, the complete separation of investigators who might work in cooperation is certainly not desirable. In fact, the increase of specialization, instead of rendering unnecessary organizations dealing with science as a whole, has served to emphasize their extensive possibilities. It may be doubted whether there was ever a time in the history of science when such bodies could render greater service. The

rise of astrophysics and physical chemistry is evidence enough of the advantage of bridging the gaps between diverging branches, and organizations whose function it is to bring together men working in diverse fields, are naturally qualified to contribute in large measure toward this end.

In Dr. Kellogg's account we may see how these principles have been applied in the United States by the formation of the National Research Council a federation of research agencies established under the Congressional charter of the National Academy of Sciences. The purpose of the present statement is to describe how the International Research Council has undertaken to federate many such national councils and thus to assure wide-spread cooperation in research.

The international scientific organizations that existed before the war were of several distinct types. Some devoted their efforts to the establishment of uniform standards of measure, others organized cooperative researches, while the majority held occasional congresses for the personal interchange of views. Many of these international bodies were formed to meet some special need, and they had become so numerous that men of science interested in the larger aspects and relationships of their personal researches were often unable to attend meetings of importance to them. Thus in astronomy independent bodies dealt with the international chart of the heavens, solar observations, Kapteyn's selected areas, time standards, astronomical ephemerides, distribution of astronomical telegrams, minor planets, and other subjects, and there was no appropriate organization to initiate new projects falling outside of certain limited fields. In chemistry five distinct organizations existed, and yet

there was little international cooperation in research. In geophysics separate bodies were concerned with geodesy, meteorology (almost exclusively from the standpoint of official routine), terrestrial magnetism (without real activity), seismology, and other branches of the subject, and there was no means of securing common consideration of major problems embracing several aspects of this extensive science. The International Association of Academies was not sufficiently representative of the countries it included, was without permanent headquarters or adequate funds, had no contact with the great majority of international scientific organizations, and was almost completely inactive between its triennial meetings.

With such considerations in view, the Royal Society called an Inter-Allied Conference on International Scientific Organizations, which opened in London on October 9, 1918. Belgium, Brazil, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Serbia, and the United States were represented by delegates. The first act of the London Conference was to define the attitude of the bodies represented toward the question of future relations with the men of science of the central powers. The declaration unanimously adopted pointed out that after the opening of hostilities men of science were still able to hope for an immediate resumption of scientific relations between enemy countries on the conclusion of peace, in harmony with previous experience. Unfortunately, however, the atrocities committed by Germany and her allies have created a new situation in the present war. The work of international scientific associations, unlike business dealings or formal diplomatic procedure, results from personal meetings between friends, who must act together in genuine

harmony and sincere personal regard. Such personal relations, especially with the men whose families and acquaintances have suffered shameless brutality in the invaded countries, are manifestly impossible at present and they cannot be resumed until Germany and her allies have renounced their former methods and have been readmitted to the concert of civilized nations.

Under the circumstances, the Conference decided to recommend the withdrawal from former international organizations and the formation of new ones, in which nations that had been neutral in the war would be invited to take part. It was recognized, of course, that some of the old associations would doubtless be recognized and continued, and these need not be duplicated. But in other cases, as the illustrations just cited sufficiently indicate, there were important reasons for complete reorganization, notably in astronomy, geophysics, and chemistry. There was also a strong demand for a body with more general functions to carry out the tasks that the International Association of Academies had failed to perform.

A plan for the establishment of an International Research Council, prepared by the Council of the National Academy of Sciences, was presented to the London Conference by the American delegates. This proposed the organization, by the national academy of each of the countries represented, of a National Research Council, so constituted as to be a federation of research agencies. The details of organization were to be left to each country, but the general principle of uniting research interests in a single representative body was approved. The International Research Council would then consist of a federation of these National Research Councils.

A second Inter-Allied Conference was held in Paris under the auspices of the Paris Academy of Sciences from November 26 to November 29, 1918. Delegates were present from the countries represented in London, and also from Poland, Portugal, and Rumania. The International Research Council, proposed in the resolutions adopted in London, was provisionally constituted of the delegates attending the Paris Conference, with the understanding that the various National Research Councils, as soon as formed, would take their place in the federation. An executive committee of five members, representing France, Great Britain, Belgium, Italy, and the United States, was appointed to study in detail the questions presented to the Conference and to undertake other duties, especially those relating to the formation of new international organizations.

Provisional statutes were adopted for an International Astronomical Union and an International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics. Plans for an International Chemical Union were also presented for subsequent consideration and action.

The International Research Council and its associated bodies, the International Astronomical Union, the International Geodetic and Geophysical Union, and the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry, were formally inaugurated at the Palais des Académies, Brussels, at a meeting held July 18-28, 1919. Tentative statutes were also adopted for the following bodies, which will be organized as soon as circumstances warrant, and with such modifications as careful consideration may render advisable: International Unions of Mathematics (already in process of organization), Physics, Radio-

telegraphy, Geography, Geology, Biology and Medicine, and Bibliography.

The objects of the International Research Council, as defined at the Brussels meeting, are:

1. To coordinate international activities in the various branches of science and its applications.
2. To encourage the formation of international associations or unions needed to advance science.
3. To guide international scientific activities in fields where no adequate organization exists.
4. To establish relations with the governments represented in the union for the purpose of interesting them in scientific projects.

The General Assembly, consisting of the accredited delegates of the various countries represented in the International Research Council, meets triennially at the permanent headquarters in Brussels. Between meetings the work is conducted by an executive committee, now comprising one representative each from France, Great Britain, Italy, Belgium, and the United States, but soon to be enlarged by the addition of other members. In accordance with the plan presented by the National Academy of Sciences to the London Conference, the United States is represented in the International Research Council by its National Research Council.

The International Astronomical Union unites in a single body those who formerly took part in the work of the International Chart of the Heavens, the International Union for Cooperation in Solar Research, the International Union for the Determination of Time and Longitude, International Conferences on Ephemerides, the centralization of astronomical telegrams, and other groups, formally or informally

constituted, that dealt with international cooperation in astronomy and its applications.

The objects of the Union are to facilitate international cooperation in research, and to advance the study of all branches of astronomy. Each country represented in the Union organizes a National Committee, preferably in conjunction with its National Research Council, for the purpose of aiding and coordinating its astronomical activities, with special reference to the requirements of international cooperation in research. These committees also select the delegates to meetings of the International Union.

Thirty-two international committees, comprising in their membership the leading investigators in the countries represented in the Union, have undertaken to arrange for cooperation in all classes of astronomical research. If it were feasible in the available space to outline the work of some of these committees, and to indicate the advantages that must result from a combined attack on astronomical problems, in which the ablest investigators will utilize the instrumental resources of scores of great observatories in accordance with a general plan of operations, the true possibilities of such united effort would become obvious.

The scope of the International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics is no less comprehensive. Its objects are to encourage the study of problems relating to the figure and physics of the earth, to initiate and coordinate investigations requiring the cooperation of several countries, and to facilitate special investigations such as the inter-comparison of instruments. The Union is constituted of six sections, dealing with (1) Geodesy, (2) Seismology, (3) Meteorology, (4) Terrestrial Magnetism and Electricity, (5) Physical

Oceanography, (6) Vulcanology. Each of these sections appoints special international committees, similar to those of the Astronomical Union, to organize cooperative researches in their respective fields. Action has necessarily been delayed in some of the sections, but a preliminary list of projects already initiated by the Section of Terrestrial Magnetism and Electricity will serve to indicate the character of the cooperative work to be undertaken in this branch of the Union. These involve the comparison of the magnetic instruments in use in different countries, the study of atmospheric electricity, investigation of the electric phenomena of the higher atmosphere, the systematic exchange of magnetic curves, and cooperation with the International Astronomical Union in investigating the relationship between solar and terrestrial magnetic and electric phenomena.

The American branch of the International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics was organized by the Division of Physical Sciences of the National Research Council. Out of this has grown the American Geophysical Union, which officially represents the United States in the International Union and retains organic connection with the National Research Council.

The rapid development of chemistry in recent years, and the limitless variety of its applications in the arts, have led to a great advance in the public appreciation of this branch of science. The possibilities of international cooperation in chemical research are at least as great as in astronomy and geophysics, but prior to the war only a beginning had been made in utilizing them. The organization of the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry, in which the

United States is represented by the Division of Chemistry and Chemical Technology of the National Research Council, provides the means of securing the cooperation of chemists engaged both in fundamental investigations and in industrial research.

The objects of this Union are to provide for permanent cooperation between the chemical societies of the nations represented, to coordinate their scientific and technical procedure, and to contribute to the advancement of chemistry in all of its aspects.

The first task to be undertaken by authority of this Union will be the preparation and publication, under American auspices, of a critical compendium of physical and chemical constants, as part of the contribution of the United States toward an international program of documentation which will be developed as rapidly as possible. The National Research Council, with the support of the American Chemical Society and other national societies, has been requested to organize the editorial board and secure funds for this large project, which will naturally involve considerable expense. This board, while charged with complete responsibility, will conduct the work on an international basis, with the aid of assistant editors and collaborators in the principal nations of the International Union. Other large cooperative projects will be taken up later.

The International Research Council provides the long desired means of coordinating the activities of international scientific bodies, which in the past have almost invariably worked independently—a condition no longer possible if real efficiency is to be expected. Similar confusion has prevailed in each of the participating countries, where no agency has existed to bring

together men engaged in different classes of international research. In the United States this difficulty has been overcome by the organization of the Division of Foreign Relations of the National Research Council. This comprises in its membership the President and Foreign Secretary of the National Academy of Sciences, and the President or other representative of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, the American Philosophical Society, and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Other members include an officer of the Department of State, serving as a Vice-Chairman of the Division; the Chairman of the National Research Council and of each of its Divisions, and certain members at large, including Elihu Root and Herbert Hoover. Each important international scientific and technical organization in which the United States takes part is also to be represented in the Division, which acts for the National Research Council in dealings with the International Research Council, promotes cooperation in matters of common interest between the American national committees or other national representatives of international organizations, aids in the initiation of new international unions, keeps the State Department in touch with pending scientific and technical questions in which the Government may be interested, and publishes annual summaries of international activities in science and technology.

If space permitted, it would be interesting to survey the work of other important international organizations, such as the International Electrotechnical Commission, the International Conference on Electrical Units and Standards, and the International Commission of Illumination. This chapter has

necessarily been confined, however, to a sketch of some developments resulting from the war which have led to a new and promising unification of research activities, in harmony with the spirit of the times.

III

THE INTERNATIONAL UNION OF ACADEMIES
AND THE AMERICAN COUNCIL OF
LEARNED SOCIETIES

By WALDO G. LELAND

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I. THE INTERNATIONAL UNION OF ACADEMIES

The stimulus which the war gave to the organization of research in the fields of pure and applied science has been described in the preceding pages. At first thought the humanistic studies (for the purposes of this article definable as philosophy, philology, archaeology, history, economics, and the political and social sciences), might appear to have been outside the influence, except as their progress was retarded, of the world conflict. Such, however, was far from being the case. In each country scholars in the humanities were called upon to shape and temper that form of public sentiment which we learned to call *morale*, to reorganize old agencies of government for the more efficient performance of their functions, and to develop new agencies to meet new demands. Such activities, however, affected particularly the individual scholar trained in the humanities rather than the organization of research in those fields of learning.

There were, it is true, minor organizations for war purposes in the fields of history, economics, and political science but nothing in any way comparable to the National Research Council. When it came, however, to making preparations for the negotiation of peace the relative status of these studies was materially altered. The elaborate organizations, such as the "House Inquiry" in the United States and the Historical Section in the British Foreign Office, which were developed for the purpose of making an intensive study of the various problems that would come for settlement before the Peace Conference, were composed very largely if not exclusively of humanistic scholars. With the assembling in Paris of the various peace delegations there were brought together large groups of these scholars whose presence furnished the opportunity, as the creation in the preceding fall of the International Research Council offered the inspiration, for the organization of an International Union devoted to the humanities.

The initiative in this movement was taken by the French Academy of Inscriptions and Belles Lettres which in March, 1919, issued an invitation to the principal academies and learned societies of the allied countries to send representatives to a conference to be held in Paris during the month of May. The invitation so admirably sets forth the objects of the proposed conference that it is worth while to quote the first few paragraphs:

The Royal Society of London and the Academy of Sciences of Paris, taking into consideration on the one hand the fact that international collaboration is indispensable to the progress of the sciences, and on the other hand the fact that, because of the war, the International Association of Academies which had its seat in 1914 in Berlin has been dissolved and it is not at present

possible to reestablish relations with the scholars of the central powers, have deemed it of importance to proceed without delay to the organization of scientific associations among the learned bodies of the allied and associated states. Thus in two conferences held in London in October and in Paris in November, 1918, at which eleven states were represented, there have been organized several associations in the domain of pure and applied science, grouped around a central research council.

To the Academy of Inscriptions and Belles Lettres it has seemed that the same scientific and moral considerations should inspire it to take a similar initiative in the domain of archaeology, history, and philology.

The object to be sought for appears to be:

(1) To establish, maintain, and strengthen among the scholars of the allied and associated states corporative and individual relations which shall be sustained, cordial, and efficacious, and which shall, by means of regular correspondence and exchange of communications and by the periodical holding of scientific congresses, make for the advancement of knowledge in the various fields of learning.

(2) To inaugurate, encourage, or direct those works of research and publication which shall be deemed most useful to the advancement of science and most to require and deserve collective effort.

It would appear to be a natural and beneficent result of the victory that has been gained by the common effort if the same principle of trustful, friendly, free, and equal collaboration which has united the allied and associated countries in conflict might now serve as the basis of a scientific entente.

The conference, which was held in May pursuant to the invitation thus worded, was attended by delegates from seven countries: the United States, represented by Professor Charles H. Haskins of Harvard and Professor James T. Shotwell of Columbia, France, Belgium, Italy, Rumania, Greece, and Japan. It drew up a definite project for the establishment of an International Union of Academies, which was to be submitted to the learned societies of the allied and

neutral countries, and called a second conference to meet again in Paris in October for the adoption of the project by duly qualified delegates and for the discussion of any other matters that might come before it. At the second conference, held on October 15-18, eleven countries were represented by delegates and three other countries had announced their intention of becoming members of the new Union. Thus the proposed organization had, at the start, the support of fourteen countries, the seven mentioned above as being represented at the first conference and in addition to them, Great Britain, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Russia, and Poland. Action favorable to joining the Union was expected, but had not yet been taken by the academies of Finland, Czechoslovakia, and Portugal, while Switzerland had a representative sitting informally in the conference for the purpose of securing information respecting the Union, which should be laid before the Swiss societies preliminary to such action as these latter might take. Invitations had been addressed to other countries but evidently had not reached the appropriate bodies in time for a response. The only refusal to join in the conference came from the Swedish Academy of Belles Lettres, History, and Archaeology, which, however, announced its willingness to join the Union "when it shall be possible to invite all countries to participate in it," referring thus to the fact that, for the present, the central powers are not included.

The first and principal task of the conference thus assembled was to perfect the plans drawn up at the first conference for creating an international scientific federation, corresponding in the domain of the humanities to the International Research Council in the

domain of pure and applied science. This was accomplished by organizing a federation bearing the name Union Académique Internationale (International Union of Academies), the object of which was declared to be "cooperation in the advancement of studies by means of collective researches and publications in the fields of the philological, archaeological, historical, moral, political, and social sciences." The visible body of this federation is styled the "Committee of the Union" and consists of the assembled delegates of the participating countries. Each country is entitled to two delegates and to two votes; the delegates are chosen in each country by the national academy or other national body authoritatively representing the humanistic studies, or by a group of such academies, learned bodies, or societies, the composition of which is self-determined. New countries, including, of course, the late enemy states, may be admitted to membership in the Union, upon direct application or upon nomination by three member countries, by a secret vote of three-fourths of all the delegates, which may be taken directly or by correspondence. The assembled delegates elect the officers of the Union, and consider and decide all questions of general interest, such as the admission of new members, the amendment of the statutes, the undertaking of projects of collective research or publication, and the administration of finances. The headquarters of the Union, like those of the International Research Council, are established at Brussels, where, in the Palais des Académies, is located the permanent secretariat or clerical force, and where the delegates must assemble at least once a year in ordinary session. The financial support of the Union is derived from

the annual dues of two thousand francs assessed upon each member country; as the sum thus realized is barely sufficient for the modest expenses of administration it is expected that special funds for research and publications will be forthcoming in the form of subsidies, gifts, or legacies. French has been adopted as the official language of the Union for correspondence and administrative documents, but publications of a scientific character may be in any language.

The organization of the International Union is thus seen to be exceedingly simple; its method of operation is hardly less so. The object of the Union is chiefly to organize international cooperation for undertakings in research or publication which require, or at least will benefit from the collaboration of two or more countries. Such undertakings may be proposed by the officers of the Union acting collectively as a *bureau*, by one of the national delegations, or by any of the learned bodies affiliated with the Union. All proposals must clearly define the subject of the undertaking, its purpose and scope, must explain the plan or method in accordance with which it is to be carried on, must contain an estimate of the expense, and must indicate the extent of the collaboration, either financial or scientific, that will be required for its execution. Such proposals are communicated to the learned bodies affiliated with the Union some months in advance of the session at which they are to be considered in order that there may be ample time to instruct delegates respecting them. An enterprise which is approved by the Union may be carried out under the direct supervision of a special committee appointed by the Union, or it may be assigned to one of the affiliated societies,

generally the one which proposed it. In the latter case the society thus charged with an undertaking has full control of it, subject to the approval of the Union, organizes the work, fixes the place or places where it is to be done, and selects the collaborators.

The first meeting of the Union, after its final organization, was held in Brussels in May, 1920, when the following officers were elected: president, Professor Henri Pirenne of the University of Ghent; vice-presidents, Monsieur Théophile Homolle, director of the National Library in Paris, and Sir Frederic Kenyon, president of the British Academy; secretary, Senator Lanciani of the Academy of the Lincei in Rome; assistant-secretaries, Professor Heiberg of the Danish Academy of Sciences, and Dr. Louis H. Gray of the American Embassy in Paris. Two member countries, Portugal and Serbia, were added to those already mentioned, thus bringing to sixteen the total number of countries which now belong to the Union.

2. THE AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LEARNED SOCIETIES

The organization of the International Union of Academies at once brought forward the problem of organizing American scholarship for an effective participation in the activities of the new group. The desirability of such participation was hardly questioned; too many scholars, indeed, an active support of the new movement appeared as a duty imposed by the conditions of the times. The United States had emerged from the war with burdens insignificant as compared with those of its allies and with a vast increase in material wealth. American scholars had no inclination to do less than their full share in the advancement of learning, but there is in the United

States no national academy, like the British Academy, for example, which is authoritatively representative of the humanistic studies and which would consider itself as having a mandate to speak for American scholarship. Instead there are a dozen or more large societies, each of which is devoted to a single field of learning. These semi-popular societies, membership in most of which is open to all, might at first sight appear hardly to deserve the appellation of "learned"; a closer view, however, shows their activities to be scholarly as to purpose and scientific as to method, and to be directed by those of their members who are recognized as the most expert and the best qualified in their respective branches. Open membership does not, therefore, cheapen the societies nor debase their product, but rather enables them to exert a wider educational influence than might be possible if their membership were confined to the professional element.

Unlike the societies devoted to the pure and applied sciences, the humanistic societies have never been united by any bonds closer than those of mutual amity. Certain groups of them, especially those devoted to history, economics, and political science, have frequently held joint meetings, and have sometimes appointed joint committees for certain purposes, but there has never been an attempt to form a union or confederation of any sort. If, therefore, American scholars were to participate as a unit in the new International Union it was necessary to do one of two things: either to create a new body, preferably a national academy which, being composed of scholars of the highest reputation, would be recognized as authoritatively representing humanistic learning, or to organize a federation of the existing societies. For

many reasons the second course seemed wiser and more practicable. The creation of an academy would be attended by many difficulties, not the least of which would be the selection of the charter members. The organization of a federation could easily be accomplished by bringing together in a group, presided over by some sort of a representative body, the dozen or more societies already existing and successfully exploiting their respective fields.

The initiative in effecting such an organization was taken by the two societies which had been represented in the Paris conference in May, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the American Historical Association. The presidents and secretaries of these two bodies issued an invitation to eleven other societies to be represented in a conference to be held in Boston on September 19. When the conference met it was composed of twenty delegates representing the following societies:

- American Philosophical Society
- American Academy of Arts and Sciences
- American Antiquarian Society
- American Oriental Society
- American Philological Association
- Archaeological Institute of America
- Modern Language Association of America
- American Historical Association
- American Economic Association
- American Philosophical Association

Three other societies had been invited to send delegates but the invitations failed to reach them in time for appropriate action: the American Political Science Association, the American Sociological Society, and the American Society of International Law. Of the societies included in the conference the first three,

which are also the oldest, are of a different type from that just described. All three are societies of closed membership and two of them, the Philosophical Society and the Academy, are devoted to science as well as to the humanities. They more nearly resemble the older type of European academy with its different departments or sections; philosophy, philology, and history are the humanistic studies most cultivated by their members. The Antiquarian Society is, as its name implies, mainly interested in American History. The other societies are true to type and their names are descriptive of their respective interests. The Philological Association lays principal emphasis on classical philology, leaving the other divisions of its field to the Oriental Society and the Modern Language Association.

The conference thus constituted voted unanimously that in its opinion American learned societies should participate as a group in the International Union of Academies. In order to constitute such a group the conference recommended the creation of an inter-society body to be known as the "American Council of Learned Societies," and proceeded to draw up a form of agreement establishing such a body, together with a constitution for its government when it should be organized.

This constitution, which has been ratified and is now in force, provides that the Council shall be composed of delegates of "the national learned societies of the United States which are devoted by scientific methods to the advancement of the humanistic studies." Each such society is represented by two delegates chosen for a term of four years and in such a manner as the society may determine. The duties

of the Council are to choose the representatives of the United States in the International Union of Academies, to prepare their instructions, and in general to serve as the principal medium of communication between the Union and the constituent societies. The Council is also authorized to take such measures on its own initiative as "may advance the general interests of the humanistic studies" and is particularly charged with maintaining and strengthening relations among the societies which are represented in it. The Council is required to make an annual report to the constituent societies setting forth in detail all its acts and all receipts and expenditures of money; instructions voted by a majority of the societies are binding upon it and it may be dissolved by vote of two-thirds of the societies. The organization of the Council is simple in the extreme; its officers are a chairman, a vice-chairman, and a secretary-treasurer, no two of whom may be from the same society, and these, with two other delegates, compose the Executive Committee. In order to defray the administrative expenses of the Council each constituent society is assessed an annual contribution of five cents per member, with a minimum contribution of twenty-five dollars for societies of less than five hundred members. The Council is required to meet at least once a year.

Of the thirteen societies named above, which were invited to be represented in the Boston conference, all but two have ratified the agreement and are now constituent members of the Council. Of the two which have not ratified, one, the American Society of International Law, has declined membership, having already many international affiliations, and the other, the American Philosophical Association, has post-

poned action until December, 1920. The Council has, therefore, been organized with eleven constituent societies whose aggregate membership is over thirteen thousand. Additional societies may be admitted to representation in the Council by a vote of three-fourths of all the delegates. The Boston conference in September took the responsibility of appointing American delegates to the October session of the International Union in Paris, and these delegates ratified, subject to confirmation by the Council when it should be formed, the final statutes of the Union. This action was confirmed by the Council when it met in New York in February, 1920, for the purpose of effecting an organization; at the same time delegates were appointed to represent the United States in the first Brussels session of the Union, which was held in May. Thus, through the organization of the Council, the American learned societies are enabled to take part in the deliberations of the International Union; how great a part they will be able to take in its activities must necessarily depend upon the resources which the Council may be able to develop.

3. THE PROGRAMME

What activities will be undertaken by the Union and by the Council? What programme will they set for themselves? It must be expected that, at least for the present, the role of each will be administrative rather than executive, for neither is possessed of the facilities or the revenues necessary to establish itself as a new agency of research. Their task must be rather to coordinate the work of existing agencies and to encourage and organize cooperative undertakings. Already a number of projects have been adopted by

the Union or laid before it and from them we may judge of the sort of enterprise likely to be sanctioned. The Royal Academy of Sciences of Amsterdam has proposed the publication of a complete edition of the letters and writings of Hugo Grotius, the "father of international law"; of particular interest to the United States is another proposal by the same body that there be organized a series of systematic researches and publications in the customary law of the Dutch East Indies, the Philippine Islands, and of those regions generally which go by the name of Indonesia. This plan includes the publication, with French or English translation, of ancient or modern documents, drawn up in any one of the Indonesian languages, which serve to illustrate the development and present state of living, unwritten law in those parts of the world. The results of such research would evidently have an important bearing upon many problems of colonial administration.

The two Italian Academies of the Lincei and of Turin have drafted a plan for continuing, under the direction of an international committee, the collections of Greek and Latin inscriptions which the Prussian Academy has been obliged to abandon, and which are indispensable for the history of the Greek and Roman world. American archaeologists, who have long maintained schools of classical studies in Athens and in Rome, would be in a position to take an active part in any such enterprise. Other proposals are for a catalogue of ancient vases, the paintings on which constitute one of the richest sources of our knowledge of Greek life, customs and beliefs; for an historical dictionary of Arabic, for a lexicon of Greek architectural terms, for a catalogue of manu-

scripts relating to alchemy, for a revision of Du Cange's *Glossarium* of mediaeval Latin, etc. Four of these projects were adopted by the Union at its meeting in Brussels in May: the corpus of ancient vases, the catalogue of manuscripts relating to alchemy, the revision of Du Cange, and the edition of Grotius.

Other proposals likely to be made in the near future, some of which have already been discussed by the American Council, are of more contemporary interest. Such for example are the compilation of a list, drawn up from the archives of the various foreign offices, of all ambassadors or other diplomatic representatives; another undertaking in the field of diplomatic history would be a collection of documents, likewise drawn from foreign office archives, relating to the Congress of Berlin.

A subject of which the Union has already taken cognizance has to do with historical and archaeological researches within the former territories of the Ottoman Empire. The favoritism, not to say corruption, which so often under the old régime marked the granting of permits for excavations was the cause of many misunderstandings between scholars of different countries and often resulted in an improper exploitation of archaeological finds. A special committee of the Peace Congress studied the problem and recommended measures, approved by the Union, for safeguarding the interests of archaeology and history and for according fair and equitable treatment to the scholars of all countries.

An enterprise in which American scholars are deeply interested and which they may before long propose to the Union, is the compilation of a current

bibliography of the humanistic studies. Hardly any project would be more generally useful; the present lack of such a bibliography makes it difficult for the scholar and impossible for the layman to keep informed with respect to the state of learning in the various fields, while to the librarian such an aid would be invaluable.

An especial care of the Union will be to encourage the holding of international congresses. The historical congresses held in Rome in 1903, in Berlin in 1908, and in London in 1913, are illustrations of the utility of such international gatherings; they demonstrate and at the same time go far to assure that solidarity which is one of the boasts of scholarship.

While organizing American participation in such international activities as those just described will be one of the important functions of the Council of Learned Societies, this body will also, it is hoped, be able to develop a domestic policy. Much can be done in the way of strengthening relations between the constituent societies and in fostering the humanistic studies in general. Joint meetings of societies devoted to closely related fields will doubtless be held more frequently than in the past, and it is not unlikely that periodical conferences of the executive officers of the societies belonging to the Council will be held for the discussion of common problems. Several enterprises which might advantageously be organized by the Council have been suggested, such for example as the preparation and editing of that long and much desired work, an encyclopedia of American biography. Another desideratum is a yearbook of learned and scientific societies and already the Council has commenced the publication

of a *Bulletin*, the first number of which appeared in July, 1920.

From these modest beginnings, modest that is from the point of view of execution rather than of design, much good may come. Whether or not any programme as ambitious as that which has been suggested can be entered upon must depend upon the financial support which the Union and the Council are able to command.

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NOTES EXCHANGED ON THE RUSSIAN-POLISH SITUATION BY THE UNITED STATES, FRANCE AND POLAND



OCTOBER, 1920

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I

AMERICAN NOTE ON THE POLISH SITUATION

BEING A FORMAL REPLY FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE
AMBASSADOR OF ITALY IN ANSWER TO THE AMBASSADOR'S
INQUIRY AS TO THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES
REGARDING THE RUSSIAN-POLISH SITUATION

August 10, 1920

His Excellency

Baron Camillo Romano Avezzana,
Ambassador of Italy.

Excellency:

The agreeable intimation, which you have conveyed to the State Department that the Italian Government would welcome a statement of the views of this Government on the situation presented by the Russian advance into Poland, deserves a prompt response, and I will attempt without delay a definition of this Government's position not only as to the situation arising from Russian military pressure upon Poland, but also as to certain cognate and inseparable phases of the Russian question viewed more broadly.

This Government believes in a united, free and autonomous Polish State and the people of the United States are earnestly solicitous for the maintenance of Poland's political independence and territorial integrity. From this attitude we will not depart, and the policy of this Government will be directed to the employment of all available means to render it effectual. The Government therefore takes no exception to the effort apparently being made in some quarters to arrange an armistice between Poland and Russia, but it would not, at least for the present, participate in any plan for the expansion of the armistice negotiations into a general European conference which would in all probability involve two results,

from both of which this country strongly recoils, *viz*: the recognition of the Bolshevist régime and a settlement of Russian problems almost inevitably upon the basis of a dismemberment of Russia.

From the beginning of the Russian Revolution, in March, 1917, to the present moment, the Government and the people of the United States have followed its development with friendly solicitude and with profound sympathy for the efforts of the Russian people to reconstruct their national life upon the broad basis of popular self-government. The Government of the United States, reflecting the spirit of its people, has at all times desired to help the Russian people. In that spirit all its relations with Russia, and with other nations in matters affecting the latter's interests, have been conceived and governed.

The Government of the United States was the first government to acknowledge the validity of the Revolution and to give recognition to the Provisional Government of Russia. Almost immediately thereafter it became necessary for the United States to enter the war against Germany and in that undertaking to become closely associated with the Allied nations, including, of course, Russia. The war-weariness of the masses of the Russian people was fully known to this government and sympathetically comprehended. Prudence, self-interest and loyalty to our associates made it desirable that we should give moral and material support to the Provisional Government, which was struggling to accomplish a two-fold task, to carry on the war with vigor and, at the same time, to reorganize the life of the nation and establish a stable government based on popular sovereignty.

Quite independent of these motives, however, was the sincere friendship of the Government and the people of the United States for the great Russian nation. The friendship manifested by Russia toward this nation in a time of trial and distress has left with us an imperishable sense of gratitude. It was as a grateful friend that we sent to Russia an expert commission to aid in bringing about such a reorganization

of the railroad transportation system of the country as would reinvigorate the whole of its economic life and so add to the well-being of the Russian people.

While deeply regretting the withdrawal of Russia from the war at a critical time, and the disastrous surrender at Brest-Litovsk, the United States has fully understood that the people of Russia were in no wise responsible.

The United States maintains unimpaired its faith in the Russian people, in their high character and their future. That they will overcome the existing anarchy, suffering and destitution we do not entertain the slightest doubt. The distressing character of Russia's transition has many historical parallels, and the United States is confident that restored, free and united Russia will again take a leading place in the world, joining with the other free nations in upholding peace and orderly justice.

Until that time shall arrive the United States feels that friendship and honor require that Russia's interests must be generously protected, and that, as far as possible, all decisions of vital importance to it, and especially those concerning its sovereignty over the territory of the former Russian Empire, be held in abeyance. By this feeling of friendship and honorable obligation to the great nation whose brave and heroic self-sacrifice contributed so much to the successful termination of the war, the Government of the United States was guided in its reply to the Lithuanian National Council, on October 15, 1919, and in its persistent refusal to recognize the Baltic States as separate nations independent of Russia. The same spirit was manifested in the note of this Government, of March 24, 1920, in which it was stated, with reference to certain proposed settlements in the Near East, that "no final decision should or can be made without the consent of Russia."

In line with these important declarations of policy, the United States withheld its approval from the decision of the Supreme Council at Paris recognizing the independence of the so-called republics of Georgia and Azerbaijan, and so instructed its representative in Southern Russia, Rear-

Admiral Newton A. McCully. Finally, while gladly giving recognition to the independence of Armenia, the Government of the United States has taken the position that the final determination of its boundaries must not be made without Russia's cooperation and agreement. Not only is Russia concerned because a considerable part of the territory of the new State of Armenia, when it shall be defined, formerly belonged to the Russian Empire; equally important is the fact that Armenia must have the good will and the protective friendship of Russia if it is to remain independent and free.

These illustrations show with what consistency the Government of the United States has been guided in its foreign policy by a loyal friendship for Russia. We are unwilling that while it is helpless in the grip of a non-representative government, whose only sanction is brutal force, Russia shall be weakened still further by a policy of dismemberment, conceived in other than Russian interests.

With the desire of the Allied Powers to bring about a peaceful solution of the existing difficulties in Europe, this Government is of course in hearty accord, and will support any justifiable steps to that end. It is unable to perceive, however, that a recognition of the Soviet régime would promote, much less accomplish this object, and it is therefore averse to any dealings with the Soviet régime beyond the most narrow boundaries to which a discussion of an armistice can be confined.

That the present rulers of Russia do not rule by the will or the consent of any considerable proportion of the Russian people is an incontestable fact. Although nearly two and a half years have passed since they seized the machinery of government, promising to protect the Constituent Assembly against alleged conspiracies against it, they have not yet permitted anything in the nature of a popular election. At the moment when the work of creating a popular representative government based upon universal suffrage was nearing completion the Bolsheviki, although, in number, an inconsiderable minority of the people, by force and cunning seized the

powers and machinery of government and have continued to use them with savage oppression to maintain themselves in power.

Without any desire to interfere in the internal affairs of the Russian people, or to suggest what kind of government they should have, the Government of the United States does express the hope that they will soon find a way to set up a government representing their free will and purpose. When that time comes, the United States will consider the measures of practical assistance which can be taken to promote the restoration of Russia, provided Russia has not taken itself wholly out of the pale of the friendly interest of other nations, by the pillage and oppression of the Poles.

It is not possible for the Government of the United States to recognize the present rulers of Russia as a government with which the relations common to friendly governments can be maintained. This conviction has nothing to do with any particular political or social structure which the Russian people themselves may see fit to embrace. It rests upon a wholly different set of facts. These facts, which none dispute, have convinced the Government of the United States, against its will, that the existing régime in Russia is based upon the negation of every principle of honor and good faith, and every usage and convention, underlying the whole structure of international law; the negation, in short, of every principle upon which it is possible to base harmonious and trustful relations, whether of nations or of individuals. The responsible leaders of the régime have frequently and openly boasted that they are willing to sign agreements and undertakings with foreign Powers while not having the slightest intention of observing such undertakings or carrying out such agreements. This attitude of disregard of obligations voluntarily entered into, they base upon the theory that no compact or agreement made with a non-Bolshevist government can have any moral force for them. They have not only avowed this as a doctrine, but have exemplified it in practice. Indeed, upon numerous occasions the responsible spokesmen of this Power, and its official agencies, have de-

clared that it is their understanding that the very existence of Bolshevism in Russia, the maintenance of their own rule, depends, and must continue to depend, upon the occurrence of revolutions in all other great civilized nations, including the United States, which will overthrow and destroy their governments and set up Bolshevik rule in their stead. They have made it quite plain that they intend to use every means, including, of course, diplomatic agencies, to promote such revolutionary movements in other countries.

It is true that they have in various ways expressed their willingness to give "assurances" and "guarantees" that they will not abuse the privileges and immunities of diplomatic agencies by using them for this purpose. In view of their own declarations, already referred to, such assurances and guarantees cannot be very seriously regarded. Moreover, it is within the knowledge of the Government of the United States that the Bolshevik Government is itself subject to the control of a political faction, with extensive international ramifications through the Third Internationale, and that this body, which is heavily subsidized by the Bolshevik Government from the public revenues of Russia, has for its openly avowed aim the promotion of Bolshevik revolutions throughout the world. The leaders of the Bolsheviks have boasted that their promises of non-interference with other nations would in no wise bind the agents of this body. There is no room for reasonable doubt that such agents would receive the support and protection of any diplomatic agencies the Bolsheviks might have in other countries. Inevitably, therefore, the diplomatic service of the Bolshevik Government would become a channel for intrigues and the propaganda of revolt against the institutions and laws of countries, with which it was at peace, which would be an abuse of friendship to which enlightened governments cannot subject themselves.

In the view of this Government, there cannot be any common ground upon which it can stand with a Power whose conceptions of international relations are so entirely alien to its own, so utterly repugnant to its moral sense. There

can be no mutual confidence or trust, no respect even, if pledges are to be given and agreements made with a cynical repudiation of their obligations already in the mind of one of the parties. We cannot recognize, hold official relations with, or give friendly reception to the agents of a government which is determined and bound to conspire against our institutions; whose diplomats will be the agitators of dangerous revolt; whose spokesmen say that they sign agreements with no intention of keeping them.

To summarize the position of this Government, I would say, therefore, in response to your Excellency's inquiry, that it would regard with satisfaction a declaration by the Allied and Associated Powers, that the territorial integrity and true boundaries of Russia shall be respected. These boundaries should properly include the whole of the former Russian Empire, with the exception of Finland proper, ethnic Poland, and such territory as may by agreement form a part of the Armenian State. The aspirations of these nations for independence are legitimate. Each was forcibly annexed and their liberation from oppressive alien rule involves no aggressions against Russia's territorial rights, and has received the sanction of the public opinion of all free peoples. Such a declaration presupposes the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territory embraced by these boundaries, and in the opinion of this Government should be accompanied by the announcement that no transgression by Poland, Finland or any other Power, of the line so drawn and proclaimed will be permitted.

Thus only can the Bolshevik régime be deprived of its false, but effective, appeal to Russian nationalism and compelled to meet the inevitable challenge of reason and self-respect which the Russian people, secure from invasion and territorial violation, are sure to address to a social philosophy that degrades them and a tyranny that oppresses them.

The policy herein outlined will command the support of this Government.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

BAINBRIDGE COLBY

[11]

II

FRENCH REPLY TO THE NOTE OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE RUSSIAN-POLISH SITUATION

The following is an English translation of the text of the note of the French Government to the Government of the United States concerning the Russian-Polish situation:

Washington, August 14, 1920

Mr. Secretary of State:

The President of the Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs, having taken cognizance of the note relative to Russia addressed by His Excellency the Secretary of State to His Excellency the Ambassador of Italy, has charged me to inform Your Excellency that he has learned with satisfaction that the Government of the Republic is in entire agreement with the Federal Government as regards the principles formulated in this document. The Government of the Republic is of the same opinion as the Federal Government concerning the present rulers of Russia. As Your Excellency himself expressed it, they are not in power by the will or the consent of a considerable portion of the Russian people but represent a small minority of the nation. They have seized power by force and by trickery; during the two and a half years that they have retained power, meanwhile subjecting the country to savage oppression, they have not yet authorized popular elections. On the contrary, they have put obstacles in the way of the creation of a popular representative government based on universal suffrage. Events have proved that the present system of government in Russia is founded on the denial of every principle of honor and good faith, and of all the usages and conventions which are the basis of relations between nations and individuals. The responsible heads of this régime have frequently and openly boasted of being

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ready to sign agreements and contracts with foreign powers without having the least intention of observing them. They claim that no contract or agreement concluded with non-Bolshevist governments can bind them morally. After having proclaimed this doctrine they have applied it. They have declared they would foment revolutionary movements in other countries by all possible means, in order there to establish a Bolshevist régime. Furthermore, they recognize that they are themselves subject to the control of a political faction having international ramifications, and they have boasted that their promises of non-intervention in other countries would in no case be binding on the agents of this organization.

All these judgments of the American Government are absolutely true. In consequence, the Federal Government considers it impossible to recognize the present masters of Russia as a government with which the relations common to friendly governments can be maintained.

The Government of the Republic has reached the same conclusion. It cannot have official relations with a government which is resolved to conspire against its institutions; whose diplomats would be instigators of revolt; and whose spokesmen proclaim that they will sign contracts with the intention not to observe them.

In complete accord with the Federal Government, the French Government believes in the necessity for an independent Polish State, and the French people, like the American people, ardently desires the maintenance of the political independence and the territorial integrity of Poland.

This is why there is agreement between the French Government and the American Government to encourage all efforts made with a view to bringing about an armistice between Poland and Russia, while avoiding giving to the negotiations a character which might result in the recognition of the Bolshevist régime and in the dismemberment of Russia.

The Federal Government, as the interpreter of the feelings of the American people, desires to help the Russian people in

whose future the United States retains an unshaken faith. The Government of the Republic associates itself unreservedly with this declaration. The French Government has never altered in its determination to uphold the principles so clearly formulated by the United States. It is in this spirit that it has decided not to approve the armistice conditions offered to Poland unless they are in conformity with these principles.

It is in this spirit also that, after mature examination, it has in fact recognized a Russian Government which declares that it accepts the same principles.

In informing Your Excellency of the reception given to the declarations of the American Government by the French Government, I am instructed by M. Millerand to notify you that the French Government is happy to have this one further assurance of the close harmony of feeling which animates the French and American peoples when the future of civilization is at stake.

Accept, Mr. Secretary of State, the assurances of my high consideration.

(Signed) BEARN

III

POLISH REPLY TO THE NOTE OF THE UNITED
STATES ON THE RUSSIAN-POLISH
SITUATION

The Polish Minister at Washington, Prince Lubomirski, on August 31 transmitted to the Department of State the text of a note, dated August 28, from the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prince Sapieha, in reply to the American note of August 10 to the Italian Ambassador.

Legation of Poland
Washington, August 28, 1920

Sir:

I have been requested by the Government of the Republic of Poland to convey to you, Mr. Secretary, its thanks for the essential principles on the Polish situation expressed in your note of August 10 to the Italian Ambassador.

The declaration that the United States Government and the American nation are, by way of the employment of all available means, solicitous for the maintenance of political independence and territorial integrity of a united, free and autonomous Polish State, is very gratifying to the Polish Nation and has been highly appreciated by the Polish Government as a guarantee that the rights of the Polish nation shall never be curtailed. Poland sees in it the manifestation of the deep sympathy which unites both nations, and which has so many times been demonstrated in their historical development.

I am authorized to express to the United States Government deep gratitude for its open condemnation of the political system and methods of the Bolshevik Government.

The note of August 10 reached Warsaw at a time when Poland was flooded by overwhelming Bolshevik forces, and

when, owing to the lack of material means, only a great moral strength could win the battle of Warsaw. At this decisive moment the weighty words expressed in the note proved a valuable moral support.

By the supreme effort of our national army, not only was Warsaw saved; this victory will, with the help of Providence, contribute in a considerable degree to the weakening of the Bolshevik power, which, having brutally seized the government machinery of Russia, is straining its efforts to force upon the world its oligarchic principles, which are contrary to the general conception of justice and democracy.

I have great pleasure in assuring you, in the name of the Polish Government, that we share the feelings of sympathy for the Russian people as manifested by the American Government.

This war, which was forced upon us by the attack made on Polish cities, is a defensive war and is waged against Bolshevism and not against the Russian people.

The most prominent leaders of the Russian nation, heading the true Russian democratic movement, see in the success of the Polish war-efforts the national Russian interest. They acknowledge them as a very important factor in the emancipation of the Russian nation from Bolshevik oppression, which for two and a half years has been destroying the moral and material strength of Russia.

And, indeed, in this struggle with the Soviet Government, whose armies are still devastating Polish territories, the Polish Government has always been guided only by its duty to defend the independence and territorial integrity of Poland and guard Europe against the Bolshevik wave.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

CASIMIR LUBOMIRSKI

The Honorable
The Secretary of State.

IV

POLISH NOTE TO THE UNITED STATES

On August first the following note was dispatched to President Wilson from the new Premier of Poland, Vincent Witos:

Mr. President:

Having assumed the office of Prime Minister of Poland, at this momentous hour I hasten to renew to your Excellency the expression of the Polish Government's deep and sincere gratitude for America's generous help and continuous sympathy extended to this country.

Poland, for her part, not only has American welfare and American interests strongly at heart, but the entire Polish people consider Polish-American friendship to be one of the greatest assets in the future prosperity of both countries.

Let me add, Mr. President, that you, having been the most staunch promoter and defender of Polish independence, are at this hour of our country's greatest need nearer and dearer than ever to every Polish heart.

WITOS

V

**REPLY OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE POLISH
NOTE OF AUGUST 1, 1920**

Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby on August 21 addressed a note to the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs in reply to the message addressed by Premier Witos, of Poland, to the President of the United States.

Washington, D. C. .

August 21, 1920

The Secretary of State has the honor to acknowledge on behalf of the President of the United States the gratifying message from Premier Witos of August first, expressing the Polish Government's deep and sincere gratitude for America's help and continued sympathy extended to Poland. In a note under date of August tenth, from the Secretary of State to the Italian Ambassador, a copy of which you have no doubt received, the Government of the United States reiterated its friendship for Poland as well as its earnest solicitude for the political and territorial integrity of Poland.

The United States applauds the steadfast gallantry of the Polish Army in its defense of Warsaw and is sympathetic with all necessary measures which Poland may take to preserve its political and territorial integrity. This Government, however, urges that every reasonable effort be made to terminate the present bloodshed. It could not approve the adoption of an offensive war program against Russia by the Polish Government.

The American Government is of the opinion that the Polish advance into Russia tended to create a national sentiment in that country, which ignored the tyranny and oppression from which the people suffer and afforded an undeserved support to the Bolshevik régime, which enabled its leaders to embark upon the invasion of Polish territory.

To prevent a recurrence of the present situation, the United States Government believes that the Polish Government might well take the opportunity afforded by the favorable turn of events to declare its intention to abstain from any aggressions against Russian territorial integrity; to state that its policy is not directed against the restoration of a strong and united Russia, and that pending a direct agreement as to its eastern frontier, Poland will remain within the boundary indicated by the Peace Conference.

This Government fully appreciates the difficulties and dangers which attend dealings with the Bolsheviki, as was emphasized in the note to the Italian Ambassador, but it believes that the most effective method of combating the efforts of their negotiators would be the exhibition of moderation by Poland and the insistence only upon such terms as are essential to the safety, the full sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Polish state.

COLBY

VI

**POLISH REPLY TO THE NOTE OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AUGUST 21, 1920**

In reply, the Polish Minister in Washington transmitted to the Department of State on August 31 the text of a note, dated August 30, from the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, as follows:

Legation of Poland
Washington, August 30, 1920

Sir:

I have the honor to inform you that the Legation has just received the following reply from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, E. Sapieha, to the note of the Department of State dated August 21:

The Polish Government acknowledges receipt of the United States Government note which was handed over to the Polish Government on August 23.

The Polish Government expresses its sincere thanks for the sympathetic attitude of the United States to Poland in this war against the Bolshevik aggressors, and notices the generous efforts of the United States to bring about universal peace. The ideals of justice and freedom which have ruled the attitude of the American nation throughout the war and have directed the steps of the United States Government are undoubtedly responsible for the friendly advice contained in the note of the United States Government to Poland, as well as for the principles laid down in the note of the Secretary of State to the Italian Ambassador dated August 10.

Poland desired a just, lasting and equitable peace, and has not altered her attitude in consequence of her recent victory. Poland has not made war on the Russian nation, and has the most sincere desire to live on peaceful and friendly terms with her eastern neighbors. Peaceful relations between Poland

and Russia will be easily established if the real spirit of justice and sound common sense dictate to both the mutual territorial concessions which, based upon the wish of the local population, the economic necessities and the national rights, will create a state of things that will render impossible a feeling of suffered wrong and future reclamations.

The Polish Government, however, has the honor to draw the attention of the United States Government to the circumstance that the provisional eastern frontier laid down by the Peace Conference has not been respected by the Bolshevik Government. In spite of the diplomatic intervention of our allies, the red army has for a whole month advanced and ravaged territory which is admitted by all as being ethnographically Polish.

Notwithstanding the sympathetic attitude of our allies, the Polish nation had to face the danger alone, and political events proved that it must in the first place rely upon its own military strength. If military operations necessitated the measures to prevent a renewed invasion of Poland, it could hardly be considered fair that artificial boundaries that do not bind our opponent should interfere with the military operations of the other.

However, the Polish Government hopes that a speedy and just peace will put aside any difficulties which might arise in the case of further war. It is very gratifying for the Polish nation to feel that in the efforts to arrive at a just peace it has the support of the United States Government's sympathetic attitude.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

CASIMIR LUBOMIRSKI

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

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PRESENTATION OF THE SAINT-GAUDENS STATUE
OF LINCOLN TO THE BRITISH PEOPLE,
JULY 28, 1920



NOVEMBER, 1920

No. 156

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THE SAINT-GAUDENS STATUE OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN
THE GIFT OF THE AMERICAN TO THE BRITISH PEOPLE
UNVEILED IN THE CANNING ENCLOSURE, WESTMINSTER, JULY 28, 1920

PRESENTATION OF THE SAINT-GAUDENS
STATUE OF LINCOLN TO THE BRITISH
PEOPLE, JULY 28, 1920

I

"HE BELONGS TO THE AGES"

By CASS GILBERT

It was no ordinary occasion that brought together the distinguished company which assembled in Central Hall, London, on July 28, 1920, and proceeded thence to the Canning enclosure.

The time, the place, the circumstances were all so different from what could have been imagined fifty-five years ago that it is safe to say that neither the most far-sighted statesmen nor the most romantic poet of Lincoln's time could have foreseen the conditions under which, if ever, his statue should be erected in England. It would indeed have been a bold prophet who would have foretold that within the lifetime of men then living Lincoln's statue should stand as an expression of amity between the two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race under the very shadow of Westminster. Yet when we examine it in the light of our common heritage, what is more natural and fitting than that this should have come to pass.

Mighty events have shaken the world since Lincoln's time. New conceptions of national life and national interest have caused those nations which inherit a common tradition to draw closer together;

to meet on common ground and to reaffirm, for the strengthening of hearts, those principles upon which their institutions are based, those ideals which form the very essence of their national life. There are certain elemental propositions upon which honest men agree. They are as true today as they were in Lincoln's time, as they always have been and always will be. They are common to the breed.

Love of liberty. Desire for justice. Respect for law. Plain truth and forthright speech which all can understand. Recognition of the rights of others. Compassion for the oppressed. Helpfulness for the needy. Sympathy for the sorrowing, and broad charity for the frailties of men. These virtues, with wisdom to see the right, strength to do it and patience to persevere in it to the end, were characteristic of Lincoln.

Lincoln's career was no matter of chance. His life moved from cause to effect with unswerving logic. There was nothing of the reckless adventurer about him; he was not the shrewd intriguer or the dashing soldier of a more complex or a more romantic age. His course was guided by a compass that did not waver. His policy was the epitome of plain common sense. But with what a vision he saw the truth, with what fervor he followed it. His goal was none less than that essential justice should prevail. That all men of every creed and color should be free. It was in this spirit that he struck the last remaining shackles from the slave and in this spirit would he have bound up the wounds of a war that had devastated his native land for over four long years.

Lincoln came into the world with nothing. Humble indeed was his lot and portion at his birth. But

in his life and death he ennobled humanity by his immortal example from which all may draw new hope and courage. He was of the world's greatest men. Humble birth did not retard his genius, nor high place corrupt his soul. "He was of the immortals."

So it comes about, as men come to know him, that he symbolizes the plain, common sense virtues upon which all can unite. No more fitting subject could have been chosen to represent America in England, no more gratifying response could have been made than that England should place his statue among those of her own greatest men.

It was not surprising then, that the unveiling of this statue should bring together so varied and so great a company. There were assembled there princes and statesmen, prelates and soldiers (veterans of many wars), including the old blue-coated men of the Grand Army of the Republic, and the khaki-clad heroes of the World War, representatives of the native races of Africa, artists and authors, business men and travelers, mechanics and laborers, choir boys from the Abbey and Boy Scouts from various lands, men and women of all stations in life; as representative a group as could have been gathered at any time or place in the world.

Great and humble, rich and poor came together with the common understanding that the simple and impressive ceremonies were not only in honor of Lincoln, but in recognition of the fact that, guided by the virtues which he embodied, peace and amity have existed between the two great branches of the English speaking race for over one hundred years, and with the firm resolve that this peace shall endure.

II

AN APPRECIATION OF AUGUSTUS SAINT-
GAUDENS

By MRS. HERBERT ADAMS

At the age of six months, Augustus Saint-Gaudens, child of a French father and an Irish mother, was brought to the United States where he grew up, an American among Americans. In his early teens we shall find him, a cloud-capped little apprentice, bending over his cameo-cutter's lathe by day and a Cooper Union drawing-board by night; emerging at times from dreams of his own future greatness to touch actual greatness as it passed him in the city streets. He saw one day, "in a procession, the figure of a tall and very dark man, seeming entirely out of proportion in his height with the carriage in which he was driven;" and that image of Lincoln "remained above all in his mind." He saw, too, the dead Lincoln lying in state, the funeral car, the multitude with uncovered heads. The boy's soul was stirred to its depths by our Civil War, its pity, its grandeur; as a matured artist, Saint-Gaudens still felt those vital emotions, and so was able to record our American epic in monuments that are among the world's masterpieces. Thus his Chicago Lincoln, a replica of which has been set in place in London, is not only profoundly national in thought and feeling; like its hero, it "belongs to the ages."

In all his heroic tributes to heroism—the Farragut, the Shaw, the Sherman and others—Saint-Gaudens naturally availed himself of the genius of his friends,

the architects McKim and White, men who like himself had been thoroughly trained both here and abroad. Nowhere is this harmonious collaboration better seen than in the Chicago Lincoln, with its background of foliage, its ample exedra, its noble figure of Lincoln standing in front of the chair of state; a figure in which the commonplaces of modern costume have been met and overcome by the sculptor, intent above all on revealing by his art our great-minded, many-sided statesman. "Strange, is it not," wrote Mr. Lorado Taft, "that this quiet figure which lifts not a hand nor even looks at you, should have within it a power to thrill which is denied the most dramatic works planned expressly for emotional appeal!"

It was natural that Stevenson, in writing to Saint-Gaudens, should address him in the Emersonian way, as "the god-like sculptor." What a wealth of meanings, lofty, lovable or whimsical, that phrase possessed for "the Saint's" companions in art! They knew him as one who sang early and brooded late over his work; an artist joyous in creation, and bold, even over-bold, in self-criticism; a thinker who in rendering his inspiration in sober clay, valued both the counsel of highly trained experts in art and the random impressions of plain people, because he believed that his art, if great, must touch both learned and unlearned. They knew him as a man born with the Mediterranean culture in his veins and the grand style in the hollow of his hand, yet not without the gift of simple Celtic glamour; a man more French than Irish, to be sure, and more American than either, since all that he had from the gods and all that he gained by his studies and by contact with

his fellowmen he dedicated to American sculpture; telling in bronze or stone the story of his own times, creating angel-shapes of strange, new beauty, setting before us in his monuments a standard of art loftier than that which had before satisfied us, and showing us how to redeem our national coinage from the empty ugliness into which it had fallen. A realist, you will say, if you chance to be looking at his statue of Peter Cooper, philanthropist, or his bust of General Sherman, war-horse incarnate in bronze—a romantic, perhaps, if you consider his enchanting bas-relief portraits, or the widely known Amor-Caritas, a high-relief figure perfectly expressing the beauty of holiness. Realist or romanticist, it matters little. Such pigeon-holes are not for the mighty. As Kenyon Cox has well said, "Augustus Saint-Gaudens was not merely the most accomplished artist of America, not merely one of the foremost sculptors of his time . . . He is one of those great creative minds transcending time and place, not of America or of today, but of the world and forever."

III
ADDRESS OF
THE RT. HON. VISCOUNT BRYCE¹

AT THE UNVEILING OF THE SAINT-GAUDENS STATUE OF
LINCOLN, PRESENTED TO THE BRITISH PEOPLE BY THE
PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
WESTMINSTER, JULY 28, 1920

There is no man in America better fitted to address a British audience on an occasion of this kind than Mr. Root. He grew up when the deeds and the character of Lincoln were fresh in the memory of all his countrymen. He has long been in the front rank of American statesmen, and, if I may venture to express what I believe to be the general feeling in America, America looks upon him as the greatest secretary of state it has had since Daniel Webster. It was my good fortune to have to negotiate with him in Washington not a few treaties between our two countries, and I have never known in either hemisphere anyone with a wider range of vision or with a mind more fair and just in handling diplomatic questions. He always showed the sincerest wish for perfect concord and friendly co-operation between our two great countries. With such a man it was a pleasure to negotiate, and to listen to such a man is a privilege. May I now express some of the feelings which led us to-day to erect here, far from his own land, that monument of the great

¹ Reprinted from *The Anglo-American News-Letter and Sulgrave Bulletin*. August, 1920.

president which we owe to American generosity. Three hundred years ago in this coming winter a tiny band of Englishmen settled on the coast of Massachusetts Bay, just as thirteen years before that another band had settled on the coast of Virginia. We are commemorating this year the settlement of that Pilgrim band on Massachusetts Bay. Ever since then the ancient English people has been divided into two branches, but, despite distance and climate and political separation, these two branches have remained one in habits and ideas and beliefs, and the bed-rock of character is still the same in both.

Lincoln's parents were born British subjects, and in 1809, his birth year—the birth year also of Tennyson and Gladstone—the American people were still almost wholly of British race, and Lincoln grew up under the influence of the traditions which the whole race possessed in common. He educated himself on the Bible and Shakespeare. He was one of those who expand and ennoble the old traditions, and hand them on, bright with fresh lustre, to the generations that follow. Thus, thinking of Lincoln as belonging to both branches of the old stock, we wish to commemorate him here among the great ones of Britain. No spot in Britain is so fit. In and around Parliament Square stand the sculptured figures of many of the most illustrious Englishmen—some under the open vault of heaven, some in the venerable Abbey, rich with solemn and pathetic memories, and some in the halls of Parliament itself—illustrious figures from the days of Hampden and Cromwell down to the days of Canning, Peel, Disraeli, and Gladstone. Placing here in such company the statue of Lincoln, we honour him for what he did and for the meaning

which his life has had for our country, for our common English stock, and for the world. He brought his nation through the greatest perils it had ever encountered, and he left behind him a record of patient wisdom and a stainless life. To us he stands as a model of that uprightness and loyalty and truth, that steadfastness and courage which men of British stock have so often displayed in war and in peace.

So we may think of him as being a type of whatever virtues the stock possesses. He is ours almost as much as he is America's and to both nations he is a pledge of brotherhood and friendship. We commemorate him also as a hero who belonged to the whole world, because he showed what fame may be won and what services be rendered by a plain son of the people unaided by any gifts of fortune. His life and his character rise like a beacon light of hope to us all in these dark days of strife and confusion. Here in the midst of our great Englishmen let this great American stand, majestic in his simplicity, a witness to what one indomitable will—bent on high aims, always hopeful because inspired by faith in freedom and in the people whence he sprang—could achieve for all mankind.

IV

ADDRESS OF THE HONORABLE ELIHU ROOT²

AT THE UNVEILING OF THE STATUE OF LINCOLN,
JULY 28, 1920

By authority of His Majesty's Government, a statue of an American has been set up in the Canning enclosure—where, on one side, Westminster Abbey and, on another, the Houses of Parliament look down upon it; where it is surrounded by memorials of British statesmen whose lives are inseparable parts in the history of the Kingdom and of the Empire; and where the living tides of London will ebb and flow about it. The statue is the work of Augustus Saint-Gaudens, son of a French father, native of Ireland, and greatest of American sculptors. The American commemorated is Abraham Lincoln, sixteenth President of the United States. On behalf of the American donors I now formally present the statue to the British people.

Abraham Lincoln was born on the 12th of February, 111 years ago, in a log cabin among the mountains of the state of Kentucky. He came into a frontier life of comparative poverty, labour, hardship and rude adventure. He had little instruction and few books. He had no friends among the great and powerful of his time. An equal among equals in the crude simplicity of scattered communities on the

² Reprinted from *The Anglo-American News-Letter and Sulgrave Bulletin*. August, 1920.

borders of the wilderness, he rose above the common level by force of his own qualities. He was sent by his neighbours to the state legislature, where he learned the rudiments of government. He was sent to the Congress at Washington, where he broadened his conceptions to national scope. He was admitted to the bar and won high place as a successful and distinguished advocate. He became convinced of the wickedness of African slavery, that baleful institution which the defective humanity of our fathers permitted to be established in the American Colonies. He declared his conviction that slavery was eternally wrong with power and insistence that compelled public attention. He gave voice to the awakened conscience of the North. He led in the struggle for freedom against slavery. Upon that issue he was elected President. In that cause, as President, he conducted a great war of four years' duration in which millions of armed men were engaged. When in his wise judgment the time was ripe for it, then upon his own responsibility, in the exercise of his authority as Commander-in-Chief, invoking the support of his country, the considerate judgment of mankind, and the blessing of God upon his act, he set free the 3,000,000 slaves by his official proclamation and dedicated the soil of America for ever as the home of a united liberty-loving commonwealth.

The act was accepted; it was effective; African slavery was ended; the war was won—for union and for freedom; and in the very hour of victory the great emancipator fell at the hand of a crazed fanatic.

It was not chance or favourable circumstance that achieved Lincoln's success. The struggle was long and desperate and often appeared hopeless. He won

through the possession of the noblest qualities of manhood. He was simple, honest, sincere, and unselfish. He had high courage for action and fortitude in adversity. Never for an instant did the thought of personal advantage compete with the interests of the public cause. He never faltered in the positive and unequivocal declaration of the wrong of slavery, but his sympathy with all his fellow-men was so genuine, his knowledge of human nature was so just, that he was able to lead his countrymen without dogmatism or imputation of assumed superiority. He carried the Civil War to its successful conclusion with inflexible determination; but the many evidences of his kindness of heart towards the people of the South and of his compassion for distress and suffering were the despair of many of his subordinates; and the effect of his humanity and considerate spirit upon the conduct of the war became one of the chief reasons why, when the war was over, North and South were able during the same generation to join again in friendship as citizens of a restored Union.

It would be difficult to conceive of a sharper contrast in all the incidental and immaterial things of life than existed between Lincoln and the statesmen whose statues stand in Parliament Square. He never set foot on British soil. His life was lived and his work was wholly done in a far distant land. He differed in manners and in habits of thought and speech. He never seemed to touch the life of Britain.

Yet the contrast but emphasizes the significance of the statue standing where it does.

Put aside superficial differences, accidental and unimportant, and Abraham Lincoln appears in the simple greatness of his life, his character and his

service to mankind, a representative of the deep and underlying qualities of his race—the qualities that great emergencies reveal, unchangingly the same in every continent; the qualities to which Britain owed her life in the terrible years of the last decade; the qualities that have made both Britain and America great.

He was of English blood; and he has brought enduring honour to the name. Every child of English sires should learn the story and think with pride, "Of such stuff as this are we English made."

He was of English speech. The English Bible and English Shakespeare, studied in the intervals of toil and by the flare of the log fire in the frontier cabin, were the bases of his education; and from them he gained, through greatness of heart and fine intelligence, the power of expression to give his Gettysburg address and his Second Inaugural a place among the masterpieces of English prose.

He was imbued with the conceptions of justice and liberty that the people of Britain had been working out in struggle and sacrifice since before Magna Charta—the conceptions for which Chatham and Burke and Franklin and Washington stood together, a century and a half ago, when the battle for British liberty was fought and won for Britain as well as for America on the other side of the Atlantic. These conceptions of justice and liberty have been the formative power that has brought all America, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, to order its life according to the course of the common law, to assert its popular sovereignty through representative government—Britain's great gift to the political science of the world—and to establish the relation of individual citizenship

to the state, on the basis of inalienable rights which governments are established to secure.

It is the identity of these fundamental conceptions in both countries which makes it impossible that in any great world emergency Britain and America can be on opposing sides. These conceptions of justice and liberty are the breath of life for both. While they prevail both nations will endure; if they perish both nations will die. These were Lincoln's inheritance; and when he declared that African slavery was eternally wrong and gave his life to end it, he was responding to impulses born in him from a long line of humble folk, as well in England as in America, who were themselves a product of the age-long struggles for the development of Anglo-Saxon freedom.

The true heart of Britain understood him while he lived. We remember the Lancashire workmen brought into poverty and suffering through lack of cotton. When the Emancipation Proclamation had dispelled all doubt as to the real nature of the struggle in America, 6,000 of them met in a great hall in Manchester and sent to President Lincoln a message of sympathy and support. This was his answer:

Under the circumstances I cannot but regard your decisive utterances upon the question as an instance of sublime Christian heroism, which has not been surpassed in any age or in any country. It is indeed an energetic and re-inspiring assurance of the inherent power of truth, and the ultimate and universal triumph of justice, humanity, and freedom. I do not doubt that the sentiments you have expressed will be sustained by your great nation, and on the other hand I have no hesitation in assuring you that they will excite admiration, esteem, and the most reciprocal feelings of friendship among the American people. I hail this interchange of sentiment, therefore, as an augury, that, whatever

else may happen, whatever misfortune may befall your country or my own, the peace and friendship which now exist between the two nations will be, as it shall be my desire to make them, perpetual.

We may disregard all the little prejudices and quarrels that result from casual friction and pinpricks and from outside misrepresentations and detraction and rest upon Lincoln's unerring judgment of his countrymen and his race. We may be assured from him that whenever trials come, whenever there is need for assurance of the inherent power of truth and the triumph of justice, humanity and freedom, then peace and friendship between Britain and America will prove to be, as Lincoln desired to make them, perpetual.

This man, full of sorrow, spoke not merely for the occasions and incidents of his own day. He expressed the deepest and holiest feelings of his race for all time. Listen to the words of his Second Inaugural:

Fondly do we hope, fervently do we pray, that this mighty scourge of war may soon pass away.

Yet, if God wills that it continue until all the wealth piled by the bondsman's two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until every drop of blood drawn by the lash shall be paid by another drawn with the sword, as was said three thousand years ago so still it must be said, "The judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether."

With malice toward none, with charity for all, with a firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in; to bind up the nation's wounds; to care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow and for his orphan; to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace among ourselves, and with all nations.

Consider this letter which he wrote to Mrs. Bixby of Boston:

I have been shown on the file of the War Department a statement of the Adjutant General of Massachusetts that you are the mother of five sons who have died gloriously on the field of battle. I feel how weak and fruitless must be any word of mine which should attempt to beguile you from the grief of a loss so overwhelming; but I cannot refrain from tendering to you the consolation that may be found in the thanks of the Republic they died to save.

I pray that our Heavenly Father may assuage the anguish of your bereavement, and leave only the cherished memory of the loved and lost, and the solemn pride that must be yours to have laid so costly a sacrifice upon the altar of freedom.

More than half a century has passed, but is this the voice of a stranger to the men and women of Britain in these later years?

Because under the direst tests of national character, in the stress of supreme effort and sacrifice, in the Valley of the Shadow of Death, the souls of both Britain and America prove themselves of kin to the soul of Abraham Lincoln, friendship between us is safe; and the statue of Lincoln the American stands as of right before the old Abbey where sleep the great of Britain's history.

V

ADDRESS OF
THE RT. HON. DAVID LLOYD GEORGE³

AT THE UNVEILING OF THE STATUE
OF LINCOLN, JULY 28, 1920

I have only a very few words to add to the extremely fine and eloquent address with which our distinguished visitor has fascinated and thrilled us. In a few moments we shall see unveiled before our eyes a presentment in bronze of the best-known historical face in the Anglo-Saxon world—in fact, one of the few best-known faces in the whole world. On behalf of the people of this country—and I think I may also say on behalf of the people of the British Empire—I accept with gratitude this fine statue, by a brilliant American sculptor, of a great leader of men. I doubt whether any statesman who ever lived sank so deeply into the hearts of the people of many lands as Abraham Lincoln did. I am not sure that you in America realise the extent to which he is also our possession and our pride. He was in many respects the most remarkable man of his day. If you look at his portraits they always give you an indelible impression of his great height. So does his life. Height of purpose, height of ideal, height of character, height of intelligence. Amongst many notable men who filled the stage in that day, he was

³ Reprinted from *The Anglo-American News-Letter and Sulgrave Bulletin*. August, 1920.

the tallest of them all. His figure stands out now, towering above his tallest contemporaries.

In many respects he was taller than even the great events in which he took a directing part. The preservation of the American Union, the emancipation of the slaves, are notable events in the world's history, and any man who took the leading part in those events, as he did, would have won for himself enduring fame; but, reading the story, I feel that the personality of Abraham Lincoln and his statesmanship are in some respects even greater than those colossal events. His courage, his fortitude, his patience, his humanity, his clemency, his trust in the people, his belief in democracy—and, may I add, some of the very phrases in which he gave expression to those attributes—will stand out for ever as beacons to guide troubled nations and their perplexed leaders. Resolute in war, he was moderate in victory. Misrepresented, misunderstood, under-estimated, he was patient to the last. I know why his face appeared to become sadder as the years of the war rolled past. There were those who thought he ought to have shown his abhorrence of war by waging it half-heartedly, and there were those who thought he ought to have displayed his appreciation of victory by using it hard-heartedly. He disdained both those counsels and he was often reviled by both those counsellors. His tenderness was counted as weakness of character, his simplicity as proof of shallowness of mind; but the people believed in him all the time, they believed in him to the end, and they still believe in him now.

In his life he was a great American. He is no longer so. He is one of those giant figures, of whom

there are very few in history, who lose their nationality in death. They are no longer Greek or Hebrew, English or American; they belong to mankind. Those eminent men whose statues are in that square are great Englishmen. I wonder whether I will be forgiven for saying that George Washington was a great American, but Abraham Lincoln belongs to the common people in every land. He is of their race, of their kin, of their blood, of their nation—the race of the common people. That is the nationality of Abraham Lincoln to-day. Everywhere they love that haggard face with the sad but tender eyes gleaming through it. There is a worship in their regard; there is a faith and a hope in that worship. The people—the great people—who could produce men like Lincoln and Lee for their emergencies are sound to the core. The qualities that enabled the American nation to bring forth, to discern, to appreciate, and to follow as leaders such men are needed now more than ever in the settlement of the world. May I respectfully but earnestly say one word from this platform to the great people of America? This torn and bleeding earth is calling to-day for the help of the America of Abraham Lincoln.

VI

"PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP PERPETUAL."⁴

The Saint-Gaudens statue of Abraham Lincoln which was unveiled in the Canning enclosure last week ought to be a rallying-point in the spirit, if not in the body, for all who hold precious a sustained friendship between America and Great Britain. Lincoln, though he never visited England and though, owing to preoccupations at home, he had little time or occasion for studying foreign relationships, held instinctively to the principle that our two countries must always be friends. He knew that there must be passing causes of annoyance which would be felt on both sides—did not the affair of the "Trent" distract him terribly for some weeks while his whole energy was required for the Civil War?—but he argued that temporary differences and pin-pricks should never be allowed to disturb a substantial and fruitful friendship. We have taken the heading for this article from the unforgettable words which Lincoln addressed to those noble Lancashire cotton operatives who let themselves come near to starvation rather than work upon raw material the acceptance of which would have meant the breaking of the Northern blockade against the South. We cannot remember to have seen before we read it in Mr. Root's speech at the unveiling the message which Lincoln sent to the operatives. It is worthy of that wonderful episode. Americans may be as proud of the grace, generosity, and penetration of Lincoln's words as

⁴ Reprinted from the London *Spectator*. August 7, 1920.

British men and women may be proud of the simple self-sacrifice of the Lancashire operatives who with their shrewd sense disentangled the great issue of the American Civil War from all the side issues, glosses and prejudices that perplexed statesmen, and saw that the North stood not only for national unity but for personal freedom.

The choice of the Saint-Gaudens statue instead of Mr. Barnard's statue as a gift from America to London was, we think, on the whole right. Saint-Gaudens was the most famous sculptor America has produced, and his statue of Lincoln is one of his most famous works. If it be complained that he idealized Lincoln, we can say that there is no great harm in that, and that for London it is desirable to have a statue that will enjoy the greatest common measure of admiration and assent. For our part, however, we confess to some hankerings for the more rugged and very powerful work of Mr. Barnard which has gone to Manchester. Mr. Barnard makes Lincoln stand out almost uncouth in figure, aspect, and dress; one sees the rail-splitter in the unaccustomed habit of the statesman; and yet through all the incongruity there shines the power and personality of genius. It may be that some day the Barnard statue will be admired as much as the Saint-Gaudens statue, or even more. What is startling and experimental to-day is often the common form of the morrow. However that may be, it is a real joy to have the Saint-Gaudens statue in London. No one who knows the story of Lincoln and who intends to do the utmost that lies within the capacity of a man to keep America and Great Britain "in peace and friendship perpetual" could look on the statue unmoved.

Lincoln had in the highest degree the qualities which we like to think of as characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon. Inasmuch as he had an almost perfect combination of those qualities, he may indeed be called the ideal Anglo-Saxon. He had shrewd sense, he had right instincts, he had a great gift of judgment, he had reason, he was temperate, he was tender and indulgent, and he clothed, or it might sometimes be said masked, all these things with an unfailing humour. His humour was only a particular expression of his sense of proportion; it was the token of his ability to see round a question and to see the other man's point of view. It kept him sound, it kept him fresh, and it probably saved him from sleepless nights. A few of his contemporaries who did not understand him said that he displayed levity in the face of tragedy. A more untrue criticism it would be impossible to frame. His heart and his brain were utterly foreign to all vindictiveness or personal bitterness. He declared himself hotly and strongly against wrong causes, but never against men. He regarded himself as a responsible agent appointed to right wrongs and to denounce them, but he left the motives of men to the judgment of God. In no single speech and in no single order or dispatch that he ever wrote during the awful struggle between the North and the South did he ever use a word about the Southern leaders which could afterwards have caused him remorse or them resentment. Some of his misjudging contemporaries even thought that now and again he seemed to favour the South. If the great struggle were to be repeated in our own country and in our own time there would no doubt be some fanatical onlookers who would call Lincoln a "pro-South"

man and demand his ignominious removal from office. But look at the results when the American Civil War was over! We know of no more touching episode in the war than the narrative of the meeting of Grant and Lee when Grant received Lee's surrender. In Velazquez's great picture called "The Surrender of Breda" one might think, to look at the two courtly figures in the middle of the piece, that a ruthless war had been fought only in order that two gentlemen of great suavity might be brought together. That was an illusion in the case of the war which inspired Velazquez's picture, but there was no illusion about the fact that the meeting of Grant and Lee, the honorable terms which Grant conceded to Lee, and the rapidity with which the wounds of the war healed, were the result of the spirit that Lincoln had instilled.

There is a great tradition of temperateness towards the beaten which runs through our history. One sees it in Edward III. and the Black Prince, though it goes further back than that, and one sees it just as notably in Nelson, who said that when men became his prisoners he became their protector. All that tradition manifested itself in Lincoln because he was a man of consummate good breeding. If we were asked through what particular channels he had derived his sense of the tradition, we should say through Puritanism and through his study of the Common Law of England. Mr. Root indicated in his speech at the unveiling of the statue that the Common Law and representative government are the joint possession that binds together inseparably the ideals of the two countries. But although Lincoln had in an unparalleled degree this temperateness and the power to appreciate the point of view of the other

side, he had no trace of that kind of intellectual or moral pusillanimity which shrinks from a severe course because it means at the moment fearful hardship and suffering. He could always take the long view and detect the cases in which an easy and apparently indulgent accommodation would lead to greater misery in the long run. Thus he never faltered in his belief that the war must be won outright. He knew that if he yielded to those who deplored the slaughter—though no one could possibly deplore it more than he himself did—and patched up a compromise, he would have sown the seeds of unceasing trouble in the future. In the same way, when he had become convinced that conscription was necessary, he was not for a moment intimidated by the Irish rising. "Apply the Draft," he ordered. And when hundreds of rebellious Irishmen were killed and wounded in the riots, he saw that what had happened could not have been otherwise. In his loyalty to his colleagues and his generals, in his perception of the occasions when it was necessary to be adamant and when it was permissible to yield, in his faculty for comforting while he was compelled to keep in being the forces that daily administered terrible bereavements, Lincoln was a very great gentleman.

In bringing our brief appreciation to an end we must not omit to mention Lincoln's superb gift of language. We have so often and during so many years quoted from Lincoln's letters to his generals, from his memorable Second Inaugural, from his dedicatory speech on the battlefield of Gettysburg, and so on, that we must not return to the subject now except in a very few words. Students of litera-

ture and oratory know that the golden tongue and the inspired pen are not often possessed by the same man. Lincoln could write as well as he could speak. One hardly knows which he did the better. His models were the simplest, most dignified and most austere founts of the English language. He probably read little, but what he did read he read with amazing discrimination, with affectionate regard and with an infallible selective taste. An eminent representative of the American people has been good enough to say that Westminster Abbey, almost under the shadow of which the Lincoln statue stands, belongs not only to this country, but to the great offshoots of this country. It is not only ours but theirs. In giving us the statue of Lincoln—and, what is very much greater than that, the whole example of Lincoln—the Americans have enabled us to say that what is theirs is also ours.

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THE DRAFT SCHEME OF THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE

WITH A REVIEW BY JAMES BROWN SCOTT



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I

MEETING OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF JURISTS¹

AT THE PEACE PALACE, THE HAGUE

The Advisory Committee of Jurists appointed by the Council of the League of Nations at its meeting at London on February 13th, for the purpose of preparing plans for the Permanent Court of International Justice provided for in Article 14 of the Covenant, held its first meeting at the Peace Palace at The Hague, on June 16th.

Addresses were delivered by the Dutch Foreign Minister, M. van Karnebeek, on behalf of the Netherlands, whose invitation to meet at the Peace Palace the Committee had accepted; by M. Léon Bourgeois, on behalf of the Council of the League of Nations, under whose authority the Commission was to sit; and by Baron Descamps, who replied as President of the Committee.

The membership of the Committee, after certain changes in the original list necessitated by the inability of some of those first appointed to serve, was as follows:

M. ADATCI, Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan at Brussels.

M. RAFAEL ALTAMIRA, Senator, Professor of the Faculty of Law of the University of Madrid.

Baron DESCAMPS, Belgian Minister of State.

Dr. HAGERUP, Former Premier of Norway.

M. DE LAPRADELLE, Professor of the Faculty of Law of the University of Paris.

Dr. LODER, Member of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands.

Lord PHILLIMORE, Member of the Privy Council of His Majesty the King of England.

¹ Reprinted from *League of Nations Official Journal*. July-August, 1920.

M. RICCI-BUSATTI, Legal Adviser to the Consulta at Rome.
Mr. ELIHU ROOT, Former Secretary of State of the United States of America.

Mr. CLOVIS BEVILAQUA, Professor of the Faculty of Law of Pernambuco and Legal Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil, was not able to be present. South American jurists were represented by **M. Raoul Fernandez**, Brazilian member of the Reparation Commission.

II

ADDRESS BY BARON DESCAMPS^{*}

PRESIDENT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF JURISTS AT THE
CLOSING SESSION OF THE COMMITTEE, JULY 24, 1920

When the International Committee of Jurists named by the Council of the League of Nations to prepare a plan of organization for a Permanent Court of International Justice met for the first time in public session in this palace, the dominating impression of all the members was that of the formidable responsibility which they had assumed.

Assuredly we had at that time every desire to achieve success, but nevertheless we knew that the best intentions and the most earnest efforts are not always sufficient to bring about the desired results.

We had a very clear view of the end to be sought, but the road which had to be followed to reach it was a long one, and it appeared to us to be sown with so many obstacles that we could only ask ourselves if it would be given to us to surmount them.

The efforts attempted in 1907 by a world assembly of the powers towards the organization of a Permanent Court of Arbitral Justice and in the direction of obligatory arbitration were also present to increase our apprehensions.

Having in mind the grandeur of the task to be accomplished and of the progress which it would involve for the good of all nations, we dedicated ourselves to our work, guarding ourselves from that scepticism which is fashionable among many, but applying to the study of the problems which stood before us that systematic doubt of Descartes which, when well applied, is a powerful instrument of light and the surest guarantee of positive results.

^{*} Reprinted from *League of Nations Official Journal*. July-August, 1920.

We commenced by long exchanges of views and submitted our opinions, which were sometimes divergent, to the most severe examination. In just such an atmosphere of free and living criticism the hopes of a common agreement amongst us were born and brought into full life.

We cannot certainly flatter ourselves upon having created a perfect work. The material before us does not indeed permit of that, and without doubt it is fitting to recall here that descriptive expression of Portalis in the preliminary part of the Civil Code: "It is absurd to abandon one's self to absolute ideas of perfection in matters which are susceptible to only a relative degree of good." But we nevertheless have the consciousness of being able to propose to the nations a general system of international justice whose projection in the future it seems to us should be happy and very fruitful.

In the work of elaboration to which we set ourselves, we decided that we should not lock ourselves up in a secret chamber inaccessible to the ordinary man. We are glad indeed to have kept the general public in touch with our discussions. Now that these discussions are terminated and while reserving, as is necessary, to those from whom authority flows, the text of the 62 Articles forming the project agreed upon by us, we believe we can nevertheless respond to the universal interest by giving in a résumé what the press has already published and in outlining in a general manner the scheme of our labors.

Three great problems have especially called for our consideration.

The first is that of the organization of the Court of International Justice. It appeared to us necessary at the outset to set off sharply the place to be occupied by the new institution amongst the different bodies which together form the ensemble of international jurisdiction. It was a question of creating a Court of Justice truly permanent, directly accessible to the parties and composed of magistrates who should be independent, chosen without regard to their nationality amongst persons held in the highest moral esteem and either fulfilling the conditions required in their respective countries for the

exercise of the highest judicial positions, or being jurists well known for their competence in international law.

It is an existing and proved institution, the present Court of Arbitration of The Hague, which we have taken as the basis of the new organization in the sense that we have deemed it wise to entrust to the members of this Court the task of proceeding by national groups to the nomination of a restricted number of persons capable of fulfilling the functions of members of the Court. And we have asked each national group, in order to secure the best advice in its choice, to consult in the respective countries the highest court of justice, the faculties and schools of law, the national academies, and the national sections of international academies devoted to the study of law.

Two names are to be chosen by each of these national groups without distinction as to nationality.

The final choice, however, is left to the Assembly and the Council of the League of Nations in such manner that the election of the members of the Court can come about only through the joint action of the one with the other.

Moreover we have adopted a series of provisions which on the one hand directs the selections towards giving representation to the great divisions of civilization and to the principal judicial systems of the world in such a way as to give the Court a truly world-wide constitution, and which on the other hand provides suggestions in cases where accord is not established between the Council and the Assembly.

As regards the functioning of the Court, we have provided for the annual formation of a chamber of three judges called to sit in cases of summary procedure when the parties demand it.

The second capital question upon which our attention was naturally centered was the competence of the Court. Our principal effort was directed towards two objectives: First, the realization of a system of obligatory adjudication in differences of a judicial nature and by extension in all other differences so far as they may be covered by either general or

special conventions between the parties. The declarations made and the engagements undertaken by the second Peace Conference in 1907 served as the point of departure in this connection.

Next we attempted to lay down the rules of judicial interpretation which the judges should apply in the examination of cases submitted to them.

The third point was the object of very particular consideration, namely procedure before the Court. We believe that we have satisfactorily solved a rather large number of questions of this sort, notably as to the measures to be taken at the outset of certain cases, as to the intervention of third parties in disputes, and as to the conditions under which judgments may be rendered by default.

If there be added to the provisions contained in the project two recommendations, the first for the methodical continuation of the work undertaken by the first Hague Conferences for the advancement of international law, and second the creation of a High Court of International Justice to judge future crimes against public international order and international law, and finally the recommendation for the early functioning of the academy of international law at The Hague, we shall then have a general view of the field in which our activity has taken place. The reception which has been given us in the capital of the Netherlands by Her Majesty the Queen, the many cordial attentions paid us by the Foreign Minister and the Vice-President of our Committee as well as by so many other persons and institutions whose names spring to my mind at this moment impose upon us the pleasant duty of expressing here our feelings of deep gratitude. We do not doubt that the Council of the League of Nations will join with us in expressing in its turn its gratitude for the reception given its representatives. We express the wish that our stay upon Dutch soil may be fruitful for the well-being of the country which has so well received us, for the rapprochement of peoples towards international justice and for the good of humanity.

III

LETTER FORWARDED BY THE COUNCIL TO THE
MEMBERS OF THE LEAGUE*

The Council of the League of Nations has the honor to communicate to the . . . Government the scheme presented by the International Committee of eminent Jurists who were invited to submit plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice, and who have recently concluded their deliberations at The Hague.

The Council do not propose to express any opinion on the merits of the scheme until they have had a full opportunity of considering it. But they permit themselves to accompany the documents with the following observations:

The scheme has been arrived at after prolonged discussion by a most competent tribunal: its members represented widely different national points of view. They all signed the report. Its fate has therefore been very different from that of the plans for a Court of Arbitral Justice which were discussed without result in 1907. Doubtless the agreement was not arrived at without difficulty. Variety of opinions, even among the most competent experts, is inevitable on a subject so perplexing and complicated. Some mutual concessions are therefore necessary if the failure of thirteen years ago is not to be repeated. The Council would regard an irreconcilable difference of opinion on the merits of the scheme as an international misfortune of the gravest kind. It would mean that the League was publicly compelled to admit its incapacity to carry out one of the most important of the tasks which it was invited to perform. The failure would be great, and probably irreparable; for if agreement proves impossible under circumstances apparently so favorable, it is hard to see how and when the task of securing it will be successfully resumed.

* Reprinted from *League of Nations Official Journal*. Special Supplement No. 2. September, 1920.

It is in the spirit indicated by these observations that the Council on their part propose to examine the project submitted to them by the Committee of Jurists; and they trust that in the same spirit the members of the League will deal with this all-important subject when the Council brings the recommendations before the Assembly.

San Sebastian,

August 5th, 1920.

IV

DRAFT SCHEME ⁴

PRESENTED TO THE COUNCIL OF THE LEAGUE BY THE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE OF JURISTS FOR THE INSTITUTION OF THE
PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE,
MENTIONED IN ARTICLE 14 OF THE COVENANT
OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

ARTICLE 1

A Permanent Court of International Justice, to which parties shall have direct access, is hereby established, in accordance with Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. This Court shall be in addition to the Court of Arbitration organized by the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, and to the special Tribunals of Arbitration to which States are always at liberty to submit their disputes for settlement.

CHAPTER I

ORGANIZATION OF THE COURT

ARTICLE 2

The Permanent Court of International Justice shall be composed of a body of independent judges elected, regardless of their nationality, from amongst persons of high moral character, who possess the qualifications required, in their respective countries, for appointment to the highest judicial offices, or are jurisconsults of recognized competence in international law.

⁴ Reprinted from *League of Nations Official Journal*. Special Supplement No. 2. September, 1920.

ARTICLE 3

The Court shall consist of 15 members: 11 judges and 4 deputy-judges. The number of judges and deputy-judges may be hereafter increased by the Assembly, upon the proposal of the Council of the League of Nations, to a total of 15 judges and 6 deputy-judges.

ARTICLE 4

The members of the Court shall be elected by the Assembly and the Council from a list of persons nominated by the national groups in the Court of Arbitration, in accordance with the following provisions.

ARTICLE 5

At least three months before the date of the election, the Secretary-General of the League of Nations shall address a written request to the members of the Court of Arbitration, belonging to the States mentioned in the Annex to the Covenant or to the States which shall have joined the League subsequently, inviting them to undertake, by national groups, the nomination of persons in a position to accept the duties of a member of the Court.

No group may nominate more than two persons; the nominees may be of any nationality.

ARTICLE 6

Before making these nominations, each national group is hereby recommended to consult its Highest Court of Justice, its Legal Faculties and Schools of Law, and its National Academies and national sections of International Academies devoted to the study of Law.

ARTICLE 7

The Secretary-General of the League of Nations shall prepare a list, in alphabetical order, of all the persons thus nominated. These persons only shall be eligible for appointment, except as provided in Article 12, paragraph 2.

The Secretary-General shall submit this list to the Assembly and to the Council.

ARTICLE 8

The Assembly and the Council shall proceed to elect by independent votings, first the judges and then the deputy-judges.

ARTICLE 9

At every election, the electors shall bear in mind that not only should all the persons appointed as members of the Court possess the qualifications required, but the whole body also should represent the main forms of civilization and the principal legal systems of the world.

ARTICLE 10

Those candidates who obtain an absolute majority of votes in the Assembly and the Council shall be considered as elected.

In the event of more than one candidate of the same nationality being elected by the votes of both the Assembly and the Council, the eldest of these only shall be considered as elected.

ARTICLE 11

If, after the first sitting held for the purpose of the election, one or more seats remain to be filled, a second and, if necessary, a third sitting shall take place.

ARTICLE 12

If after the third sitting one or more seats still remain unfilled, a joint Conference consisting of six members, three appointed by the Assembly and three by the Council, may be formed, at any time, at the request of either the Assembly or the Council, for the purpose of choosing one name for each seat still vacant, to submit to the Assembly and the Council for their respective acceptance.

If the Committee is unanimously agreed upon any person who fulfills the required conditions he may be included in its

list, even though he was not included in the list of nominations made by the Court of Arbitration.

If the Joint Conference is not successful in procuring an election, those members of the Court who have already been appointed shall, within a time limit to be arranged by the Council, proceed to fill the vacant seats by selection from amongst those candidates who have obtained votes either in the Assembly or in the Council.

In the event of an equality of votes amongst the judges, the eldest judge shall have a casting vote.

ARTICLE 13

The members of the Court shall be elected for nine years.

They may be re-elected.

They shall continue to discharge their duties until their places have been filled. Though replaced, they shall complete any cases which they may have begun.

ARTICLE 14

Vacancies which may occur shall be filled by the same method as that laid down for the first election. A member of the Court elected to replace a member, the period of whose appointment has not expired, will hold the appointment for the remainder of his predecessor's term.

ARTICLE 15

Deputy-judges shall be called upon to sit in the order laid down in a list.

This list shall be prepared by the Court, having regard first to the order in time of each election and secondly to age.

ARTICLE 16

The exercise of any function which belongs to the political direction, national or international, of States, by the Members of the Court during their terms of office is declared incompatible with their judicial duties.

Any doubt upon this point is settled by the decision of the Court.

ARTICLE 17

No member of the Court can act as agent, counsel or advocate in any case of an international nature.

No member may participate in the decision of any case in which he has previously taken an active part, as agent, counsel, or advocate for one of the contesting parties, or as a member of a national or international Court, or of a Commission of Inquiry, or in any other capacity.

Any doubt upon this point is settled by the decision of the Court.

ARTICLE 18

A member of the Court cannot be dismissed unless, in the unanimous opinion of the other Members, he has ceased to fulfill the required conditions.

When this happens a formal notification shall be given to the Secretary-General.

This notification makes the place vacant.

ARTICLE 19

The members of the Court, when outside their own country, shall enjoy the privileges and immunities of diplomatic representatives.

ARTICLE 20

Every member of the Court shall, before taking up his duties, make a solemn declaration in open Court that he will exercise his powers impartially and conscientiously.

ARTICLE 21

The Court shall elect its President and Vice-President for three years: they may be re-elected.

It shall appoint its Registrar.

The duties of Registrar of the Court shall not be considered incompatible with those of Secretary-General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration.

ARTICLE 22

The seat of the Court shall be established at The Hague.
The President and Registrar shall reside at the seat of the Court.

ARTICLE 23

A session shall be held every year.

Unless otherwise provided by rules of Court, this session shall begin on June 15th, and shall continue for so long as may be necessary to complete the cases on the list.

The President may summon an extraordinary meeting of the Court whenever necessary.

ARTICLE 24

If, for some special reason, a member of the Court considers that he cannot take part in the decision of a particular case, he shall so inform the President.

If, for some special reason, the President considers that one of the members of the Court should not sit on a particular case, he shall give notice to the member concerned.

In the event of the President and the member not agreeing as to the course to be adopted in any such case, the matter shall be settled by the decision of the Court.

ARTICLE 25

The full Court shall sit except when it is expressly provided otherwise.

If 11 judges cannot be present, deputy-judges shall be called upon to sit in order to make up this number.

If, however, 11 judges are not available, a quorum of 9 judges shall suffice to constitute the Court.

ARTICLE 26

With a view to the speedy despatch of business the Court shall form, annually, a chamber composed of three judges, who, at the request of the contesting parties, may hear and determine cases by summary procedure.

ARTICLE 27

The Court shall frame rules for regulating its procedure. In particular, it shall lay down rules for summary procedure.

ARTICLE 28

Judges of the nationality of each contesting party shall retain their right to sit in the case before the Court.

If the Court includes upon the Bench a judge of the nationality of one of the parties only, the other party may select from among the deputy-judges a judge of its nationality, if there be one. If there should not be one, the party may choose a judge, preferably from among those persons who have been nominated as candidates by a national group of the Court of Arbitration.

If the Court includes upon the Bench no judge of the nationality of the contesting parties, each of these may proceed to select or choose a judge as provided in the preceding paragraph.

Should there be several parties in the same interest, they shall, for the purpose of the preceding provisions, be reckoned as one party only.

Judges selected or chosen as laid down in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article shall fulfil the conditions required by Articles 2, 16, 17, 20, 24 of this Statute. They shall take part in the decision on an equal footing with their colleagues.

ARTICLE 29

The judges shall receive an annual salary to be determined by the Assembly of the League of Nations upon the proposal of the Council. This salary must not be decreased during the period of a judge's appointment.

The President shall receive a special grant for his period of office, to be fixed in the same way.

Deputy-judges shall receive a grant, for the actual performance of their duties, to be fixed in the same way.

Travelling expenses incurred in the performance of their duties shall be refunded to judges and deputy-judges who do not reside at the seat of the Court.

Grants due to judges selected or chosen as provided in Article 28 shall be determined in the same way.

The salary of the Registrar shall be decided by the Council upon the proposal of the Court.

A special regulation shall provide for the pensions to which the judges and Registrar shall be entitled.

ARTICLE 30

The expenses of the Court shall be borne by the League of Nations, in such a manner as shall be decided by the Assembly upon the proposal of the Council.

CHAPTER II

COMPETENCE OF THE COURT

ARTICLE 31

The Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine suits between States.

ARTICLE 32

The Court shall be open of right to the States mentioned in the Annex to the Covenant, and to such others as shall subsequently enter the League of Nations.

Other States may have access to it.

The conditions under which the Court shall be open of right or accessible to States which are not Members of the League of Nations shall be determined by the Council, in accordance with Article 17 of the Covenant.

ARTICLE 33

When a dispute has arisen between States, and it has been found impossible to settle it by diplomatic means, and no agreement has been made to choose another jurisdiction, the party complaining may bring the case before the Court. The

Court shall, first of all, decide whether the preceding conditions have been complied with; if so, it shall hear and determine the dispute according to the terms and within the limits of the next Article.

ARTICLE 34

Between States which are Members of the League of Nations, the Court shall have jurisdiction (and this without any special convention giving it jurisdiction) to hear and determine cases of a legal nature concerning:

- (a) The interpretation of a treaty;
- (b) Any question of international law;
- (c) The existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation;
- (d) The nature or extent of reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation;
- (e) The interpretation of a sentence passed by the Court.

The Court shall also take cognizance of all disputes of any kind which may be submitted to it by a general or particular convention between the parties.

In the event of a dispute as to whether a certain case comes within any of the categories above mentioned, the matter shall be settled by the decision of the Court.

ARTICLE 35

The Court shall, within the limits of its jurisdiction as defined in Article 34, apply in the order following:

- (1) International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting States;
- (2) International custom, as evidence of a general practice, which is accepted as law;
- (3) The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
- (4) Judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.

ARTICLE 36

The Court shall give an advisory opinion upon any question or dispute of an international nature referred to it by the Council or Assembly.

When the Court shall give an opinion on a question of an international nature which does not refer to any dispute that may have arisen, it shall appoint a special Commission of from three to five members.

When it shall give an opinion upon a question which forms the subject of an existing dispute, it shall do so under the same conditions as if the case had been actually submitted to it for decision.

CHAPTER III

PROCEDURE

ARTICLE 37

The official language of the Court shall be French.

The Court may, at the request of the contesting parties, authorize another language to be used before it.

ARTICLE 38

A State desiring to have recourse to the Court shall lodge a written application addressed to the Registrar.

The application shall indicate the subject of the dispute, and name the contesting parties.

The Registrar shall forthwith communicate the application to all concerned.

He shall also notify the Members of the League of Nations through the Secretary-General.

ARTICLE 39

If the dispute arises out of an act which has already taken place or which is imminent, the Court shall have the power to suggest, if it considers that circumstances so require, the

provisional measures that should be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party.

Pending the final decision, notice of the measures suggested shall forthwith be given to the parties and the Council.

ARTICLE 40

The parties shall be represented by agents.

They may have Counsel or Advocates to plead before the Court.

ARTICLE 41

The procedure shall consist of two parts: written and oral.

ARTICLE 42

The written proceedings shall consist of the communication to the judges and to the parties of statements of cases, counter-cases and, if necessary, replies; also all papers and documents in support.

These communications shall be made through the Registrar, in the order and within the time fixed by the Court.

A certified copy of every document produced by one party shall be communicated to the other party.

ARTICLE 43

The oral proceedings shall consist of the hearing by the Court of witnesses, experts, agents, counsel and advocates.

For the service of all notices upon persons other than the agents, counsel and advocates, the Court shall apply direct to the Government of the State upon whose territory the notice has to be served.

The same provision shall apply whenever steps are to be taken to procure evidence on the spot.

ARTICLE 44

The proceedings shall be under the direction of the President, or in his absence, of the Vice-President; if both are absent, the senior judge shall preside.

ARTICLE 45

The hearing in Court shall be public, unless the Court, at the written request of one of the parties, accompanied by a statement of his reasons, shall otherwise decide.

ARTICLE 46

Minutes shall be made at each hearing and signed by the Registrar and the President.

These minutes shall be the only authentic record.

ARTICLE 47

The Court shall make orders for the conduct of the case, shall decide the form and time in which each party must conclude its arguments, and make all arrangements connected with the taking of evidence.

ARTICLE 48

The Court may, even before the hearing begins, call upon the agents to produce any document, or to supply to the Court any explanations. Any refusal shall be recorded.

ARTICLE 49

The Court may, at any time, entrust any individual, bureau, commission or other body that it may select, with the task of carrying out an inquiry or giving an expert opinion.

ARTICLE 50

During the hearing in Court, the judges may put any questions, considered by them to be necessary, to the witnesses, agents, experts, advocates or counsel. The agents, advocates and counsel shall have the right to ask, through the President, any questions that the Court considers useful.

ARTICLE 51

After the Court has received the proofs and evidence within the time specified for the purpose, it may refuse to accept any

further oral or written evidence that one party may desire to present unless the other agrees.

ARTICLE 52

Whenever one of the parties shall not appear before the Court, or shall fail to defend his case, the other party may call upon the Court to decide in favor of his claim.

The Court must, before doing so, satisfy itself, not only that it has jurisdiction in accordance with Articles 33 and 34, but also that the claim is supported by substantial evidence and well founded in fact and law.

ARTICLE 53

When the agents, advocates and counsel, subject to the control of the Court, have presented all the evidence, and taken all other steps that they consider advisable, the President shall declare the case closed.

The Court shall withdraw to consider the judgment.

The deliberations of the Court shall take place in private and remain secret.

ARTICLE 54

All questions shall be decided by a majority of the judges present at the hearing.

In the event of an equality of votes, the President or his deputy shall have a casting vote.

ARTICLE 55

The judgment shall state the reasons on which it is based.

It shall contain the names of the judges who have taken part in the decision.

ARTICLE 56

If the judgment given does not represent, wholly or in part, the unanimous opinion of the judges, the dissenting judges shall be entitled to have the fact of their dissent or reservations mentioned. But the reasons for their dissent or reservations shall not be expressed in the judgment.

ARTICLE 57

The judgment shall be signed by the President and by the Registrar. It shall be read in open Court, due notice having been given to the agents.

ARTICLE 58

The judgment is final and without appeal. In the event of uncertainty as to the meaning or scope of the judgment, the Court shall construe it upon the request of any party.

ARTICLE 59

An application for revision of a judgment can be made only when it is based upon the discovery of some new fact, of such a nature as to be a decisive factor, which fact was, when the judgment was given, unknown to the Court and also to the party claiming revision, always provided that such ignorance was not due to negligence.

The proceedings in revision will be opened by a judgment of the Court expressly recording the existence of the new fact, recognizing that it has such a character as to lay the case open to revision, and declaring the application admissible on this ground.

The Court may require previous compliance with the terms of the judgment before it admits proceedings in revision.

No application for revision may be made after the lapse of five years from the date of the sentence.

ARTICLE 60

Should a State consider that it has an interest of a legal nature which may be affected by the decision in the case, it may submit a request to the Court to be permitted to intervene as a third party.

It will be for the Court to decide upon this request.

ARTICLE 61

Whenever the construction of a convention, in which States other than those concerned in the case are parties, is in

question, the Registrar shall notify all such States forthwith.

Every State so notified has the right to intervene in the proceedings; but if it uses this right, the construction given by the judgment will be as binding upon it as upon the original parties to the dispute.

ARTICLE 62

Unless otherwise decided by the Court, each party shall bear its own costs.

V

A PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE⁵

By JAMES BROWN SCOTT

For years partisans of justice between nations have advocated the establishment of a High Court of the Nations to decide every dispute between States, parties to its creation, according to the rules of law which in the opinion of the judges of such a court apply to the dispute and which has been submitted by one or other state in controversy to the court.

The First Hague Peace Conference of 1899 declared itself in favor of the arbitration of disputes between States as the most equitable way of settling and getting them out of the way. It went further by providing a permanent panel of arbiters from whom a temporary tribunal could be chosen by the States in controversy for the adjustment of the dispute upon the basis of respect for law. The conference did not stop here. It provided a code of arbitral procedure to be used by the parties unless they should care to vary it and adopt a procedure more suitable to the particular case.

This was a great step in advance. It was not a permanent court, but it made it easier to take the next step.

This the Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907 did by adopting a draft Convention for the establishment of a Court of Arbitral Justice. This Convention provided for the organization, jurisdiction and procedure of a permanent court to be located at The Hague, composed of judges to be appointed in advance of cases and to serve for a period of twelve years.

The Conference was, however, unable, owing to the pressure of other business and the limited time at its disposal, to devise a method of selecting the judges generally acceptable to its members.

⁵Reprinted from *The American Journal of International Law*. October, 1920.

The acceptance of the principle of permanence and the adoption of a draft convention for a permanent court of justice as distinct from a temporary court of arbitration made it easier to take the third step.

This an Advisory Committee of Jurists did at The Hague in the months of June and July of the present year by agreeing upon a method of selecting the judges acceptable to the representatives of ten states. This Committee was appointed by the Council of the League of Nations, and was, in the language of the League of Nations Official Journal for June, 1920, "composed of ten members, five of whom are nationals of the five great Powers and five nationals of smaller Powers," as follows: Messrs. Adatci (Japan), Altamira (Spain), Bevilaqua (Brazil), replaced by M. Fernandes, Baron Descamps (Belgium), Hagerup (Norway), de Lapradelle (France), Loder (Netherlands), Lord Phillimore (Great Britain), Messrs. Ricci Busatti (Italy), and Elihu Root (United States).

The members of the Committee were without instructions; they were not, however, free agents. They were appointed by the Council of the League of Nations to advise that body in the performance of its duties under Article 14 of the Covenant:

"The Council shall formulate and submit to the Members of the League for adoption plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice. The Court shall be competent to hear and determine any dispute of an international character which the parties thereto submit to it. The Court may also give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question referred to it by the Council or by the Assembly."

The Committee was therefore to draft a permanent Court of Justice, not of Arbitration, to render judgment between parties and to advise the Council or Assembly in other cases.

To this extent the Committee was to act under instructions. Again Article 13 of the Covenant practically settled the jurisdiction of the Court, providing as it does:

"The Members of the League agree that whenever any dispute shall arise between them which they recognize to be suitable for submission to arbitration and which cannot be

satisfactorily settled by diplomacy, they will submit the whole subject-matter to arbitration.

Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question of international law, as to the existence of any fact which if established would constitute a breach of any international obligation, or as to the extent and nature of the reparation to be made for any such breach, are declared to be among those which are generally suitable for submission to arbitration.

For the consideration of any such dispute the court of arbitration to which the case is referred shall be the court agreed on by the parties to the dispute or stipulated in any convention existing between them."

Then, again, while the court was to be principally the court of the members, it was undoubtedly to be open to non-members upon such terms as the Council, in pursuance of Article 17 of the Covenant, may lay down.

The difficulty confronting the Advisory Committee in 1920 was the difficulty that confronted the Second Hague Conference in 1907, an acceptable method of selecting the judges. The Committee succeeded where the Conference failed. It was able to and actually did take the third step. How and why? Because the Covenant of the League of Nations provided for two organs. In the Council the five great Powers are permanently represented, while all the other members of the League are represented by four elective members. The five, therefore, have a majority of one. In the Assembly each Power has one vote, although it may have as many as three representatives. The smaller Powers are therefore in the majority.

The interests of the great Powers are represented in the Council; the interests of the smaller Powers are represented in the Assembly.

Mr. Root, therefore, proposed that the judges should be selected by the concurrent action of the Council and the Assembly. In this way the interests of the great and the smaller Powers would be safeguarded and each body would

have a veto upon the abuse of authority by the other. A failure to agree is to be met by a conference committee to consist of an equal number of members chosen by the Council and Assembly, as is the practice of the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States. The list of judges is to be selected by the members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, each national group proposing two candidates without regard to nationality. From these persons the Council and Assembly are to elect. The details, the result of much discussion and the contribution of various members, are stated in Articles 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 of the project.

The judges are to be "elected regardless of their nationality," in the sense that no nationality is of right to be represented in the court. They are to be eligible for appointment to the highest judicial posts of their respective countries or are to be international lawyers of repute (Article 2).

The judges are, according to Article 3, of two classes: titular judges (in the French text) or judges (in the English text); and deputy judges to take the place of judges of the court in case of temporary vacancy, or in the case of a permanent one until a new election takes place. At present, there are to be eleven judges and four deputies. The number of judges can, however, be increased to fifteen and the deputies to six. That is to say, the Court is to consist in first instance of eleven judges and four deputies, and may, upon the proposal of the Council of the League of Nations, be raised to twenty-one (fifteen judges and six deputies).

All judges, titular or deputy, are to be elected for a period of nine years and may be reelected; they remain in office until the vacancy has been filled and finish the cases which they have begun (Article 13).

The judges cannot hold positions which it is supposed will interfere with the impartial performance of their judicial duties (Article 16). They cannot take part in cases with which they have been previously connected (Article 17). In case of doubt, the Court itself is to decide. The seat of the Court is at The Hague and the President (elected by his col-

leagues) and the registrar or clerk of the court, to be appointed by the judges, must reside in that city. A regular session of the court is to be held each year, beginning on June 15th, unless otherwise provided for in the Rules of Court (Article 23). It is to sit *in pleno*, but if the eleven members cannot be present, deputy judges are to be called in, and if eleven cannot be had by calling upon deputies, a quorum of nine may transact business. Provision is made for a court of three to be appointed annually, which smaller body is competent to hear and decide "in summary procedure" such cases as the parties litigant may care to submit to this method of decision (Article 26).

Some litigants are likely to have judges of their nationality on the bench in cases where the other party has none. Are they to withdraw or are temporary judges to be appointed by the parties in litigation not so represented? That is to say, are all or none to be represented? After much discussion, the first alternative was adopted by Article 28, which permits but does not require parties litigant to appoint temporary judges. If they do, then the temporary judge must meet in every respect the requirements of titular judges and be treated on a footing of equality with the others.

Judges and court officials are to be paid appropriate salaries to be fixed by the Council and Assembly, and may, at the discretion of these bodies, receive pensions on retirement.

So much for the organization of the court. Next as to its jurisdiction.

In the absence of special treaties or conventions to the contrary, the court only takes cognizance of suits between states (Article 31), although a state may espouse the cause of its national, and while it is open of right only to members of the League or those states mentioned in the Annex to the Covenant of the League, other states may be permitted to use the court by the Council in accordance with the terms of Article 17 of the Covenant (Article 32).

But diplomacy shall have been resorted to and have failed before the court assumes jurisdiction, unless the parties should

by special agreement waive this requirement (Article 33).

Even then not all disputes are to be laid before the court, which is one of limited jurisdiction, unless the parties by special agreement waive the limitations of Article 34. Without such a special agreement, the court can accept and decide only justiciable disputes, provided they fall under the following heads:

- (a) the interpretation of a treaty;
- (b) any point of international law;
- (c) the existence of a fact, which, if established, would constitute the violation of an international agreement;
- (d) the nature or extent of reparation due for the breach of an international engagement;
- (e) the interpretation of a sentence rendered by the court.

The last of these categories is taken from Article 82 of the Pacific Settlement Convention of the Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907. The others are from Article 13 of the Covenant.

The majority of the Advisory Committee was of the opinion that in such disputes no special agreement of the parties, that is to say no *compromis*, was necessary as in arbitration. The Japanese member was of the opinion that such a special agreement was necessary. He therefore accepted the article subject to his interpretation. The Italian member preferred the interpretation of his Japanese colleague, but did not go so far as formally to reject the opinion of the majority.

The Council and the Assembly will necessarily have to decide this question, as it is fundamental and cannot be overlooked. It is the distinction between arbitration and judicial procedure; it is the distinction between a tribunal of arbitration and a court of justice. In arbitration the parties define the question and submit the issue to arbiters of their choice; in judicial settlement, each party states its case to the court, which frames the issue and decides it by judges chosen in advance and without reference to the dispute. In arbitration both parties must appear before the tribunal; in judicial

procedure one party may submit its case, present the facts, argue the law and obtain judgment against the other party duly summoned but not appearing.

How is the law to be found and applied to disputes falling under Article 34? This matter is dealt with in Article 35, the text whereof is as follows:

"The Court shall, within the limits of its jurisdiction as defined in Article 34, apply in the order following:

1. International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
2. International custom, as evidence of a general practice, which is accepted as law;
3. The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.
4. Judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law."

Of necessity, the Japanese member was opposed to this article, as in his opinion the special agreement would contain such details of this kind as the parties agreed to in the *compromis*.

Finally, it is to be said in this connection that when the court is asked its opinion by the Council or Assembly on a hypothetical case, it may act as a committee of three to five members. When, however, an actual case is laid before it, it sits as a court and renders its opinion in the form of a judgment (Article 36).

The third and last section of the project deals with procedure, and there are only a few matters that need to be specially mentioned in a mere comment.

French is the language of the court, unless the parties, with the consent of the court, authorize the use of another language (Article 37).

The case is to be begun by an application of one of the parties to the clerk of the court. The adverse party or parties

and all members of the League are to be notified forthwith. This is necessary for two reasons: the adverse party is not bound to join with the petitioner as in the case of arbitration; and other parties than those mentioned may care to intervene in accordance with Articles 60 and 61.

It may happen that because of actions taken or imminent, the matter in dispute may be prejudiced. Therefore, the project in Article 39, lifted bodily from Article 4 of Secretary Bryan's treaties for the advancement of peace, signed on September 15, 1914, between France and China and the United States, authorizes the court to suggest to the parties such measures as it may deem necessary to be taken pending the trial and disposition of the case. A like disposition is to be found in Article 4 of the treaty with Sweden of October 13, 1914. This provision is no larger than a man's hand, but it may yet loom large upon the international horizon.

Then follows a series of provisions taken from the Pacific Settlement Convention of the First and Second Hague Peace Conferences, the Draft Convention for a Court of Arbitral Justice and the Prize Court Convention of the Second Hague Peace Conference. For example, the parties are to be represented by agents, advocates, or counsel (Article 40); the procedure is written and oral (Article 41), the written procedure consisting of cases, counter-cases and replies and containing certified copies of the documents relied upon (Article 42), the oral procedure consisting in the hearing of witnesses, experts, agents or counsel before the judges after the court has met for the trial of the case (Article 43).

The President, Vice-President or, in their absence, the senior judge, presides (Article 44) and the hearing is to be public unless the court should decide to hear the case behind closed doors upon the reasoned request of one of the parties (Article 45). Official minutes of proceedings signed by the Registrar and President are to be kept (Article 46). The court may make rules from time to time for the conduct of the cases and fix the time within which the parties are to conclude their arguments and make

arrangements for the taking of evidence (Article 47).

It may happen that the parties have not presented all the documents which the court thinks necessary for the proper disposition of the case. The court may therefore ask for their production, and a failure to do so is to be noted (Article 48). The court may have testimony taken or request an expert opinion (Article 49); the judges may put questions to witnesses, experts or representatives of the parties, and the agents and counsel may request the presiding officer to put questions and in case of refusal may appeal to the court from the ruling of the President (Article 50). This provision is very wise, as continental chairmen rule with a high hand and are apparently not in the habit of yielding to counsel. In the further interest of justice, the court may, but is not obliged to, permit the introduction of evidence after the time fixed by the court for its production. Upon the request of both parties the court must admit it (Article 51).

What if one only of the parties appears as a litigant? Can proceedings be had in the absence of the defendant? Yes, says Article 52, in accordance with the procedure devised by and followed in the Supreme Court of the United States. Such cases will be rare, rarer because of the article. But however rare, justice will be done if the court is established and Article 52, which follows, be retained:

"Whenever one of the parties shall not appear before the court, or shall fail to defend his case, the other party may call upon the court to decide in favor of his claim.

The court must, before doing so, satisfy itself, not only that it has jurisdiction in accordance with Articles 33 and 34, but also that the claim is supported by substantial evidence and well founded in fact and law."

When the case is closed, the court withdraws to consider it in chambers and its deliberations are and remain secret (Article 53), except as their results appear in the judgment, which may be reached by a majority, made, if need be, by giving to the President a casting vote (Article 54).

The judgment states its reasons, mentions the names of the

judges taking part in the decision (Article 55), and the dissenting judges have a right to have their dissent or reservations mentioned, but not a statement of their reasons (Article 56). Practice differs in different countries and in different courts. It seemed best to the Committee to require reasons for the judgment but only to permit a statement of dissent; otherwise national judges might be inclined to argue the case of their respective countries in the very judgment of the court to the discredit of judgment and court. Experience will show whether the Committee acted wisely or not.

For purposes of identification the judgment is to be signed by President and registrar (Article 57), and the judgment so rendered and signed is to be final (Article 58); that is to say, final unless a material fact is discovered which, if known before the judgment, was of a kind to have affected the judgment. The fact must have been unknown to the party claiming to have the judgment revised. The court must find that the fact was of this nature and that the ignorance of the party alleging it was not due to negligence. In any event, proceedings in revision cannot be had after the expiration of five years, and the court may require compliance with the judgment as a condition precedent to revision.

These provisions of Article 59 are not new: they were transferred with slight changes in form from Article 55 of the Pacific Settlement Convention of 1899 and Article 83 of the revised Convention of 1907.

The project has heretofore considered the typical case of a single plaintiff and a single defendant. It may be that a third party has a very real interest and of a legal nature in the decision of the case. It may ask to intervene, and the court decides whether it should be permitted to do so (Article 60). But there is a class of cases in which a third state, and indeed many states, are interested and in which the permission of the court should not be necessary. That is the case of a convention to which more than two nations are parties. Each party to the convention is interested in its interpretation and each may of right intervene in the proceedings. They do so at

their peril, as they are bound by the judgment of the court, which could not affect them in point of law, although it would morally, if they did not intervene in the case (Article 61).

Who shall pay the piper? if such a familiar phrase be permitted. The expenses of the court are to be borne by the parties to its creation; the expenses of the parties to the suit are to be borne by the parties in litigation. However, there may be circumstances in which this rule may seem inequitable to the court and the court is authorized to vary it, according to Article 62, the last of the project.

The court is to find facts, ascertain the law and apply its rules to the facts as found or admitted. This is its sole duty. The execution of a judgment is a matter for the executive. The Advisory Committee therefore left it to the League of Nations to take such action as it might deem advisable in the matter of execution.

Such is in brief, indeed, summary form, the project of the Advisory Committee.

It did not, however, stop here. It felt the need of international conferences to frame rules of law for new cases or cases hitherto considered beyond the domain of law. It therefore unanimously recommended the meeting at stated intervals of conferences for the advancement of international law, as successors to the First and Second Hague Peace Conferences.

The Advisory Committee further suggested to the Council and Assembly the question of organizing a High Court of International Justice for the trial and punishment of acts committed in the future which may disturb the public order and constitute breaches of international law. The violation of Belgian neutrality and offenses alleged to have been committed by Germany in the World War are of the kind that would be laid before such a tribunal, which is to consist of one representative of each of the nations.

Finally, the Advisory Committee expressed the hope that the Hague Academy of International Law and Political Sciences, established in 1913, and which was to have opened in the month of August, 1914, may begin its labors in the

Peace Palace at The Hague alongside of the Permanent Court of Arbitration of The Hague, and the Permanent Court of International Justice to be located at The Hague.

The establishment of the court depends upon the concurrent action of the Assembly and the Council of the League of Nations. If the League should not establish it, or if having created it the League should itself go out of existence, will the court fail? Not if the nations wish to preserve it. They need only accept the unanimous recommendation of the Advisory Committee, call a conference for the advancement of international law, invest the diplomatic corps at The Hague with the powers of the Assembly in so far as the court is concerned, invest an executive committee of the diplomatic corps at The Hague with the powers of the Council. It seems therefore safe to prophesy that whether the League succeeds or whether it fails, the Society of Nations will have a Permanent Court of International Justice, "accessible to all and in the midst of the independent Powers," to quote the memorable language of the preamble to the Pacific Settlement Conventions of the First and Second Peace Conferences at The Hague, which will be, it is hoped, but two links in an ever-lengthening chain by which the nations shall be bound together in justice.

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